Ronald Weed

ARISTOTLE ON *STASIS*:

a Moral Psychology of Political Conflict

λογος

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In memory of Lucille C. Cronin (1919-1981)

Contents

Abbreviations of Works Cited

ARISTOTLE	
AP	Athēnaiōn Politeia
An.	De Anima (On the Soul)
An.Post.	Posterior Analytics
An.Pr.	Prior Analytics
EE	Eudemian Ethics
Met.	Metaphysics
MA.	Movement of Animals
EN	Nicomachean Ethics
Phys.	Physics
Poet.	Poetics
Pol.	Politics
Rhet.	Rhetoric
Top.	Topics
VV	On Virtue and Vices
HERODOTUS	
Hdt.	The Histories
HOMER	
Il.	Iliad
Od.	Odyssey
PLATO	
Rep.	Republic
THUCYDIDES	
Thuc.	History of The Peloponnesian War

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INTRODUCTION

Political conflict is a problem that is as common as city life itself. Much of the political conflict that plagues cities arises from factional rivalries that citizens form in response to real and apparent disagreements about the distribution of goods that anyone might want: wealth, honour, property, power, etc. The great poets, statesmen and philosophers of ancient Greece attest to the peril that such conflicts pose for the long term viability and sustenance of a regime. *Stasis* is one prominent term that a number of such authors use to convey the phenomena of political conflict, whether it be the formation of factional associations, the hardening of factional identities, or their mobilization and unleashing in the form of political unrest, disorder, violence, and outright revolution. There is a long tradition of reflection on the problem of *stasis* from which Aristotle draws and expands upon in his practical thought. Aristotle gives special attention to this problem in his *Politics*, though he keeps *stasis* in view in several other treatises that figure heavily in his practical thought, such as *Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, Rhetoric, Poetics,* and *The Athenian Constitution.*

This tradition of reflection on *stasis* is quite rich, both in its insight into the particularities of ancient Greek civilization and into universal human concerns. This tradition is quite penetrating in its reflection on the social and political contours of classical Greek life, its political ethos, civic imagination, and thought. Moreover, this tradition is illuminating in its grasp of universal human concerns, especially the considerable human potential for excellence, alongside its constant vulnerability to pathology and destruction. For example, Herodotus employs the metaphor of the polis as a living organism that, like any living organism, may be prone to malady, internal conflict and death.[1] He makes numerous references to such political diseases as they are

[1] Herodotus 5.28.13-18. Herodotus discusses one of the most extreme cases of *stasis* – Miletos in the sixth century. At the height of the conflict between its richest citizens and most outraged laborers, the former abandoned the city and their families, only to spark a final crackdown that resulted in the vicious slaughter of their families and the seizure of their property. Eventually, when the wealthy retook the city, they unleashed a storm of retributive violence against the people and their families - burning them to death publically. See V. Gorman, *Miletos, the Ornament of Ionia: A History of the City to 400 BCE* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 129-163. This is the kind of turbulence and destruction that Herodotus characterized as the outgrowth of a prolonged disease of the city.

manifested in the form of factional conditions and conflicts.[2] Homer, early on in the *Iliad*, has the greatest of the Greek warriors – Achilles – fomenting conflict with Agamemnon over his due share of honour.[3] Their internal conflict ominously risks inflaming internal conflict within the Achaean forces. This theme of faction is dramatically depicted also in the works of Aeschylus. Consider the end of *Eumenides*, when Orestes has let loose furious storms of conflict by killing Clytemnestra, in order to avenge her murder of his father. After he is barely vindicated, his antagonists, nevertheless, promise to wreak havoc on the city that has perpetuated this wrong. But Athena allays their wrath with pledges of enduring honour and thereby neutralizes the specter of unrest. The chorus sings,

> May faction insatiate of ill, ne'er raise her loud voice within the city - this I pray; and may the dust not drink the black blood of its people and through passion work ruinous slaughtering for vengeance to the destruction of the State. Rather, may they return joy for joy in the spirit of common love, and may they hate with one accord; for therein lieth the cure of many an evil in the world.[4]

While this conflict has the unmistakable dimensions of a household conflict, it is a rivalry that extends well beyond the household and is symptomatic of a wider condition that infects the city.

This tradition also depicts the clouding of the beliefs and judgments of those citizens and cities subject to *stasis*. In *Heracles*, Thebes has fallen into a grave state when Heracles has left to perform his labours and his wife Megara and father-in-law - king of Thebes - becomes threatened by the seditious and murderous intentions of Lycus. The chorus describes the clouding pathology that falls upon Thebes, "[Thebes] is not in its right mind, it suffers from civil strife and bad counsel."[5] While Heracles returns to Thebes just in time

[2] See Hdt. 1.59.1-3; 1.60.1-2; 1.150.1; 1.173.2-5; 2.26.1-3; 3.82.2-6; 5.28.3-8; 6.109.1-2; 7.2.1-3; 7.153.3; 9.21.2-4; 9.48.2-3.

[3] "Most glorious son of Atreus, greediest of all men, how will the great-hearted Achaeans give you a prize of honor? I do not know of much common property lying around anywhere...Indeed, you threaten to take away my prize yourself, for which I have worked hard, and the sons of the Acheans gave it to me. My prize never equals yours, whenever the Acheans sack a well-built citadel of the Trojans. But my hands carry on the greater share of furious battle; but whenever the distribution comes, you get a prize that is much greater, while I return to my ships worn out from fighting, with some small but precious thing." *Illiad*. 1.122-4, 161-8. Trans. by R.K.Balot in R.K. Balot, *Greek Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 18.

[4] [τὰν δ' ἄπληστον κακῶν μήποτ' ἐν πόλει στάσιν τᾷδ' ἐπεύχομαι βρέμειν. μηδὲ πιοῦσα κόνις μέλαν αἷμα πολιτᾶν δι' ὀργὰν ποινᾶς ἀντιφόνους ἄτας ἁρπαλίσαι πόλεως. χάρματα δ' ἀντιδιδοῖεν κοινοφιλεῖ διανοίᾳ, καὶ στυγεῖν μιᾷ φρενί: πολλῶν γὰρ τόδ' ἐν βροτοῖς ἄκος.] Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, trans. H.W. Smyth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), 976-87.

[5] [οὐ γὰρ εὖ φρονεῖ πόλις στάσει νοσοῦσα καὶ κακοῖς βουλεύμασιν. οὐ γάρ ποτ' ἂν σὲ δεσπότην ἐκτήσατο.] Euripides, *Heracles*, trans. D. Kovacs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 271.

to neutralize the infectious encroachment of Lycus, he doesn't escape the madness of Lysa. She infects him with violent fits of insanity that drive him to kill the family he has just saved. In the end, Heracles becomes subject to madness, despite his valiant attempts to expel the source of the city's madness, as it suffers in the feverish throes of *stasis*.[6] The condition that this tradition describes is not one that an anonymous individual could neatly extricate himself from, nor one that he could ever make himself immune to. Rather, it is represented as a mysterious contagion that may infect the body politic and its citizenry.[7]

In Thucydides' *Histories*, he brings attention to the problem that grasps both the complex political realities of the Peloponnesian Wars and the range of human qualities that inform those realities. Thucydides is especially interested in the violent struggles that erupted across Hellas during the Peloponnesian Wars. He considers *stasis* to be the problem that underlies these conflicts and so he investigates the sources of *stasis* in various cases. In one of his most vivid depictions of *stasis*, Thucydides conveys the scale of enmity and destruction possible in its late stages. In this struggle between the Democrats and Oligarchs during the Peloponnesian Wars, the power returns to a democratic majority that cruelly slaughters the fleeing Oligarchs:

> And during the seven days that Eurydemon, after his arrival, stayed there with his sixty ships the Corcyraeans continued slaughtering such of their fellow citizens as they considered to be their personal enemies. The charge they brought was of conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but some were in fact put to death merely to satisfy private enmity, and others, because money was owing to them, were slain by those who had borrowed it. Death in every form ensued, and whatever horrors are want to be perpetrated at such times, all happened then - aye, and even worse. For father slew son, men were dragged from the temples and slain near them, and some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysios and perished there. To such excesses of savagery did the revolution go; and it seemed the more savage because it was among the first that occurred; for afterwards practically the whole Hellenic world was convulsed, since in each state the leaders of the democratic factions

[6] See *Heracles* 29-31, 543. On the political significance of such imagery in this tradition, see R. Brock, "The Body as a Political Organism in Greek thought," in *Penser et représenter le corps dans l'Antiquité*, eds. F. Proust & J. Wilgaux (Rennes, 2006), 351-9.

[7] On the epidemic quality of *stasis*, consider Loraux's apt comments: "In the first case, this division, *stasis*, is a scourge that by definition arrives from the outside, falling on the city and striking every citizen as though it were a meteorological disaster or an epidemic, advancing with the devastating irresistibility of an invading army." N. Loraux, "Reflections of the Greek City on Unity and Division," in *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*, eds. Julia Emlen, Anthony Molho and Kurt Raaflaub (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), 48.

> were at variance with the Oligarchs, the former seeking to bring in the Athenians, the latter the Lacedaemonians.[8]

While Thucydides aptly analyzes the political fabric of this and subsequent *stasis*, he is also ever observant of the human qualities that are at work in them. Thucydides is part of a long tradition in the history of political thought that understands the city to be not just its laws and institutions, but also the character of its citizens. And so the character of its citizens is always at work when cities decline. Thucydides highlights this important aspect of *stasis* as follows:

> And so there fell upon the cities an account of revolutions many grievous calamities such as happen and will always happen while human nature is the same, but which are severer or milder and different in their manifestations according as the variations and circumstances prevent themselves in each case.[9]

Thucydides recognizes that the human qualities of those engaged in *stasis* are indispensable for understanding it. The degeneration of political community that Thucydides treats as so endemic to *stasis* is also a microcosm of the human deficiencies and breakdowns that are more easily recognized under the strain of *stasis*. This tradition of Greek reflection on *stasis* which spans these (and other) figures recognizes the problem of stasis as something like a disease (*nosos*) that infects the body politic, but has its root in the character deficiencies of its citizenry.[10]

Aristotle's treatment of *stasis* begins as a problem of degeneration that afflicts most regimes. And while this is an ongoing political problem in those regimes, it is one that extends beyond the scope of what many later inter-

[8] [ἡμέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ παρέμεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν, ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἕνεκα, καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων: πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖςἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον. οὕτως ὠμὴ ἡ στάσις προυχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους] (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. C.F. Smith) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920), 3.81-3.82.2.

[9] [καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται.] (Thucydides, trans. C.F. Smith), 3.82.2-4. Consider also the exhortation of Nicias to his troops, captured in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*: "A city is its men, not its walls or empty ships" (Thuc. 7.77).

[10] See H.J. Gehrke, *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen griechiescher Staaten des 5 und 4 Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (München: Beck, 1985); K. Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease: An Inquiry into Stasis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 5; Manolopoulos, Πόλις φλεγμαίνουσα και Πόλις Υγιής (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1995), 61-63.

preters would consider a political problem. Thucydides treats *stasis* as an intractable problem of the city and the soul. In keeping with this approach, Aristotle provides in-depth diagnoses of problems specific to cities of various kinds, without obscuring the light that a study of the soul must shed on the flourishing and pathology of cities While Aristotle investigates commonly acknowledged political problems related to *stasis*, such as those regime-related defects that make factional conflicts more likely (e.g. bad laws, judicial missteps, unchecked graft, etc.), the beliefs and desires of the citizens loom large in his analysis. These beliefs and desires are shaped by their character which Aristotle studies in *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*. Their beliefs are also transmitted through the poetic traditions that inform the educational ethos of the regime. Such beliefs also influence the range and content of emotions that affect its citizens. This is a highly important dimension of political life for Aristotle and is reflected as such in his treatment of *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. The pathos of a regime provides an important backdrop against which the political conflicts of its citizens will be manifested. Ultimately, the character of a regime's citizens will determine their actual beliefs and desires and the emotions that they exhibit. But the conflicts associated with *stasis* are primarily driven by the character flaws of the parties that are drawn to engage in these conflicts, even when they have some legitimate bases for the claims they pursue. This central character dimension of *stasis* marks a critical intersection of three aspects of Aristotle's practical thought that inform one another and have too often been treated in isolation: his political thought (*Pol., AP*), his ethical thought (*EN, EE*) and his thought on emotion and rhetoric (*Rh., Poet.*).

In Book 5 of his *Politics*, Aristotle considers the nature and causes of *stasis*. *Stasis* is a pathological condition of the political community that disposes its citizens to form factional associations that lead to disorder, conflict and violence. Aristotle claims that conflicting views of justice drive oligarchic and democratic factions into conflict over the distribution of wealth and honor. Upon closer consideration, the conflicting views of justice that are the alleged cause of faction are divided into three proximate causes that arise from the beliefs and desires of the agents engaged in factional conflict.

(1) What might be considered the formal cause is the state of mind of a set of citizens whereby they believe, based on their own view of justice, that they have too little in the way of material gain (κέρδος) or honor (τίμη) compared with another set of citizens. (2) The final cause is the material gain or honor that is sought through a change of constitution or the replacement of leadership. (3) The immediate efficient causes[11] of the factional strife are events such as acts of contempt (καταφρόνησις), arrogance (ὕβρις) and election intrigues.

[11] It will also be seen later that the desires that drive factional conflict are classified as efficient causes, though their corresponding beliefs about injustice are formal causes.

In this book I argue that the ultimate cause of these beliefs and desires is the character deficiencies of the agents possessing them, especially the vices of envy (φθόνος) and vanity (καυνότης). These more basic moral causes are bad character (ἦθος) and the custom or habit (ἔθος) that shape it. Specifically, the cause of the beliefs and desires that constitute the condition of *stasis* is deficient character in the citizenry, which for Aristotle is the expected condition in most cities. Put another way, beneath the factional *pathos* is a deficient *ēthos* or character (ἦθος), the inevitable consequence of misguided *ethos*, that is habit or custom (ἔθος). For the habit shapes character; character, in turn, shapes both the beliefs and the desires of the factionalist, thereby, causing factional strife in propitious circumstances. With this understanding of the proximate and ultimate causes of *stasis*, we are in a position to appreciate Aristotle's skepticism about remedying it in most cities. They face a vicious circle where *stasis* prevention is impossible. For, a city that prevents *stasis* by the reduction, if not the elimination, of its causes presupposes right character which is only possible through education in the best of cities. So, a city can only achieve the conditions of *stasis* prevention if it is already structured to honor excellence more than wealth, property, status and power. The most that Aristotle may and does hope for is the stabilization, not the correction, of regimes infected with *stasis*.

But the fact that *stasis* is as inevitable as the bad character that causes it does not entail a thoroughgoing skepticism. Rather, Aristotle offers a more moderate and satisfactory form of skepticism that offers plausible grounds for limiting *stasis* without eliminating its causes. Even though institutional remedies such as the selective redistribution of honor and material goods cannot eliminate the character sources of factional conflict, they can limit the circumstances in which *stasis* occurs. But they can do so only if they take into account *what* character causes are triggered under specific circumstances. An analysis of these remedies reveals an implicit ranking of the vices that cause faction more and less. The final chapter elaborates upon this ranking of vices by explaining how the vices of envy (φθόνος) vanity (καυνότης) ambition (φιλοτίμια), flattery (κόλαξ), recklessness (θράσος), intemperance (ἀσοφρόσυνη) and stinginess (ἀνελευθερία) function in three democratic and oligarchic *stasis* scenarios. It then turns to a discussion of how each of these vices either hastens, curbs, or is indifferent to the *stasis* process. This ranking of vices provides a character-oriented basis for limiting the most *stasis* causing vices. The argument of this book, then, connects the fundamental claims of Aristotle's ethics of character formation and rational choice with his politics of realism and theory of factional strife.

An underlying aim of this study is to expound this argument while avoiding the trifurcation of Aristotle's political, ethical, and rhetorical thought. This requires a treatment of (largely) the *Politics, Nicomachean Ethics*, and *Rhetoric* as interconnected parts of his comprehensive practical philosophy. There is a vast body of scholarship - even recent scholarship – relevant to

the argument of this book. Much of this scholarship is substantial and offers insight and guidance on a number of points taken up in this book. But there has been much less work done that aims to treat Aristotle's practical thought as a whole, and very little of that work pursues the moral psychology of *stasis* in this way. While commentators such as A. Rorty, Sherman, and Cooper emphasize the centrality of the role that character plays in human flourishing, they don't highlight as explicitly the role that the political community plays in that flourishing.[12] Commentators such as Ober, Gehrke, Lintott, Figueira and Fuks offer social-political analyses of *stasis* that are wide ranging and historically masterful.[13] Other commentators such as F. Miller, Mulgan and Keyt contribute detailed and intelligent insights concerning Aristotle's political theory more broadly speaking,[14] but are less attentive to the role that character plays in the problems and successes of political life.[15] While

[12] A. Rorty, ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980); N. Sherman, *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); N. Sherman, "Character Development and Aristotelian Virtue," in *Virtue Theory and Moral Education*, eds. D. Carr and J. Steutel (New York: Routledge, 1999), 35-48; N. Sherman, "Character, Planning and Choice in Aristotle," *Review of Metaphysics* 39, no. 1 (1985): 83-106; J. Cooper, *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); J. Cooper, "Reason, Moral Virtue and Moral Value," in *Rationality in Greek Thought*, essays in honor of Günther Patzig, eds. M. Frede and G. Striker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 81-114; J. Cooper, "Friendship and the Good in Aristotle", *Philosophical Review* 86 (1977): 290-315; J. Cooper, *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[13] J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); J. Ober, 'Aristotle's Political Sociology: Class, Status and Order in the Politics,' in *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science*, eds. Carnes Lord and David K. O'Connor (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991); Hans-Joachim Gehrke, *Stasis: Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (München: Beck, 1985); A. Fuks, The Ancestral Constitution (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1953); Andrew Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City*: 750-330 BC. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); T. Figueira, "A Typology of Social Conflict in Greek Poleis," in *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*, eds. Julia Emlen, Anthony Molho and Kurt Raaflaub (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), 289-307.

[14] F. Miller, *Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); D. Keyt, and F. Miller, eds., *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Keyt, "Aristotle's Theory of Distributive Justice," in eds. Keyt and Miller, 1991; Keyt, *Aristotle's Politics Books V and VI* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999); R. Mulgan 'Liberty in Ancient Greece' in *Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy*, eds. Z. Pelczynski and J Gray (London, 1984); R. Mulgan, "Aristotle's Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy," in Keyt and Miller, 1991; R. Mulgan, *Aristotle's Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

[15] While the isolation of Aristotle's ethical thought from his political thought is still common, it is not as pronounced as it once was. One representative and influential example of this isolation is the work of Werner Jaeger, who argues that Aristotle's conception of the best life and the empirical focus of his reflection on actual life represent inconsistent elements in his political philosophy. See, W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934). On some discussion of this trend and challenges to it, see J.P. Dolezal, *Aristoteles und Die Demokratie*

the works of Kraut, Bodéüs, Nussbaum, and MacIntyre offer very formidable treatments of the role that human flourishing must play in the best of regimes, they give less attention given to how character defects misshape and further undermine non-ideal regimes.[16] The works of Balot, Kalimtzis, Louraux, and Yack do keep in view some character dimensions of political conflict, while offering valuable and wide ranging insights concerning the latter.[17] While these works are always attentive to the role that human viciousness can and does play in political conflict, they don't elaborate upon the moral psychology of vice nor detail the range of vices that might contribute to those conflicts.[18] Of course, the latter concerns may be consistent with their projects, but are not (and need not be) developed in their work, insofar as their central focus is not the character dimension of political conflict in non-ideal regimes. This book builds upon the concerns and insights of these latter authors, while also engaging a wider range of outstanding scholarship that falls more and less into the conventional demarcations of his political, ethical and rhetorical thought. In short, this book advances the argument outlined above while drawing from some of the vast and substantive scholarship on Aristotle, his problem of *stasis* and its character dimensions in order to move closer towards a recovery of a unified approach to Aristotle's practical thought.

(Frankfurt: 1974); R. Bodéüs, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); P. Vander Verdt, "The Political Intension of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," *Ancient Philosophy* 5 (1985): 77-89; B. Yack, *The Problems of a Political Animal* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 18; A. Kemp, *Die Politische Philosophie des Aristoteles und Ihre Metaphysichen grundlagen* (München: Alber, 1985), 124.

[16] M. Nussbaum and A. Sen (Eds.), *The Quality of Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); M. Nussbaum, "Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Distribution," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary Volume I* (1988): 145-154; M. Nussbaum "Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism," *Political Theory* 20 (1992): 202-246; Martha C. Nussbaum, "Non-relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 13 (1988): 32-53; R. Kraut and S. Skultety, eds. *Aristotle's Politics: Critical Essays* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); R. Kraut, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Kraut, *Aristotle on the Human Good* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); R. Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); R. Bodéüs, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

[17] R. Balot, *Greek Political Thought* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); R. Balot, *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); B. Yack, *The Problems of A Political Animal* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); K. Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000); N. Loraux, *La Cité Divisée: L'oubli dans la mémoire d'Athènes* (Paris: Payot, 1997).

[18] One notable exception can be seen in the work of Judith Shklar who offers extensive and penetrating treatments of the role of vice in understanding the dilemmas and conflicts in non-ideal political settings. See J. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) and *Faces of Injustice* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

1. THE FEATURES, REGIME CONTEXTS AND CAUSES OF STASIS

This chapter discusses the major features of Aristotle's understanding of *stasis* in his *Politics*. This discussion includes the nature of *stasis*, its *politeia* contexts and proximate causes. These proximate causes can only be explained by appealing to their character dimensions. Aristotle provides a framework for understanding the latter from his *Rhetoric, Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*.[1] Initially, it is necessary to offer an operational definition of *stasis*.

I. The Nature of Stasis

Aristotle uses the term *stasis* and its cognates (στασιώτικα, στασιάζειν, and στασιώσαται), to signify the structure, condition, or consequences of factional association. Taken together, the term *stasis* is (1) a *condition* of a polis that promotes (2) the formation of factional associations that lead to (3) *pathological consequences*: conflict, violence and revolution.

Firstly, according to Aristotle, *stasis* is a condition of the *polis* because most cities have a tendency to form factional associations.[2] This tendency is the product of a complex process that arrests the political, legal, and institutional development of the city.[3] Secondly, *stasis* is an association of individuals that form on the basis of political and economic interests[4] that are in conflict with

[1] 5.1.1301^{b}26-27. All passages from Aristotle's *Politics* will be drawn from W.D. Ross *Aristotelis Politica*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957). All passages from *Nicomachean Ethics* will be drawn from Burnet, ed., *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1894). All translations from these editions, unless otherwise indicated, will be my own.

[2] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21; 5.5 1305^{a} 27; 5.5 1304^{b}34-35; 5.7 1306^{b}17-21. See also, *Thuc.* 1.2.1, 1.12.1, 2.65.12, 3.82.1, 4.61.1.

[3] *Pol* 5.3 1303^{b}23-26; 5.1 1301^{a}22; 5.3 1303^{b}31. See also, *Thuc.* 3.83.1.

[4] *Pol* 5.3 1302^{b}25; 1302^{b}26-28; 1303^{a} 37;1302^{a}13; See also, *Thuc.* 3.34.2, 3.82.5, 3.83.1, 4.48.5, 4.61.1, 4.71.1. On the centrally political dimension of *stasis*, see T. J. Figueira, "A Typology of Social Conflict in Greek Poleis," 292; Loraux, "Reflections of the Greek City on Unity and Division," in eds. Emlen, Molho and Raaflaub, 1991, 39; M. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 105-106; B. Yack, *The Problems of a Political Animal* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 216.

the goals of the regime[5] or their rivals.[6] This association is typically a class or social group,[7] such as notables (οἱ γνόριμοι) or people (δήμος). In oligarchy the notables are subject to rivalries both among themselves and with the people;[8] whereas, in democracy, the notables are only subject to a starker rivalry between themselves and the people.[9] The course of these rivalries[10] depends on the following factors: the coherence of their association,[11] the state of affairs which they perceive,[12] their relative power in the regime,[13] the extent to which their aims conflict with those of their adversaries[14] and with the regime itself.[15] Thirdly, as the consequence of factional association, *stasis* is always a pathological condition that is corrosive to the regime.[16] Since different regimes are characterized by different governing structures, the ways in which they degenerate vary. But endemic to them all is a tendency to disorder,[17] violence[18] and, eventually,[19] revolution.[20]

[5] *Pol* 5.1 1301^{b}7-10; 1301^{b}10-13; 1301^{b}17-25. See *Thuc.* 3.62.5, 4.74.1, 5.33.1, 6.5.1.

[6] *Pol* 5.1 1302^{a}7: 5.2 1302^{b}22; 1302^{b}39; 1302^{b}25; 1302^{b}2-6; see *Thuc.* 2.20.1, 2.22.1, 3.82.1, 3.82.5.

[7] *Pol* 5.3 1302^{b}25; 1302^{b}26-28.

[8] *Pol* 5.1 1302^{a}9-10.

[9] *Pol* 5.1 1302^{a}11-12.

[10] On the frequency, intensity and rate at which *staseis* may arise and be sustained see Hans-Joachim Gehrke, *Stasis*: *Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrunderts v. Chr.* (München: Beck, 1985), 205, 268, 283; S. Berger, *Revolution and Society in Greek Sicily and Southernb Italy* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992), 99; Loraux, 1991, 38; Finley, 1993, 106.

[11] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}25-30. See *Thuc.* 4.61.7.

[12] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}1; 1302^{b}13; 1302^{b}27.

[13] *Pol* 5.1 1301^{b}10-13.

[14] *Pol* 5.3 1303^{b}23-26; See *Thuc.* 3.82.1. See also, Loraux, "Thucydide et la Sedition dans les Mots," in *Quaderni di Storia*, 23 (1987) 23, 95-134.

[15] *Pol* 5.1 1301^{b}7-10. On the importance of the economic dimensions of factional disparities, see A. Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City*: 750-330 BC (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 248. On the limitations of the economic and class analysis of *stasis*, see Yack, 209; J. Ober, "Aristotle's Political Sociology: Class, Status and Order in the Politics" in *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science*, eds. Carnes Lord and David K. O'Connor (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 123; Lord, "Aristotle's Anthropology," in eds. Lord and O'Connor, 1991, 70, and Figuera, 1991, 290-1.

[16] *Pol* 5.7 1307^{b}26-28; 5.3 1303^{b}23-28. See *Thuc.* 3.82.1, 5.33.1.

[17] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}22. See *Thuc.* 6.5.1.

[18] *Pol* 5.3 1303^{b}22. See *Thuc.* 3.82.4.

[19] On the less dramatic features of revolution, see G.D. Contogiorgis, "Justice as the General Cause of Constitutional Transformation," in *Aristoteles. Papers Presented in Honor of John P. Anton*, ed. D.Z. Andriopoulos (Athens: Ionia Publications, 1996), 106-28; R. Polansky, "Aristotle on Political Change," in *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics*, eds. Keyt and Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 323-345.

[20] *Pol* 5.3 1302^{a}16; 1302^{b}34; 5.4 1304^{b}6-17; See also, *Thuc.* 3.80.1, 3.82.3, 4.46.1, 4.74.1, 6.5.1. There is a wide range of translations for the verb that this phrase refers to. The range of these translations is marked by one extreme where the translator exclusively emphasizes the impacts of factional formation, whereas the other extreme emphasizes the earlier process of factional formation. Jowett represents the former extreme: Aristotle, *Politica*, trans. B. Jowett, in ed. R. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New

This book treats the second feature of *stasis* as the one central to Aristotle's diagnosis of political breakdown and his remedies for it. So, *stasis* will refer to the tendency of individuals to form factional associations. Of course, the other features of *stasis* inform our understanding of factional formation since they describe both its antecedent conditions and subsequent impacts. But there is good reason to think that Aristotle considered factional formation to be the crucial sense of *stasis* for the middle books, as is seen in the subsequent chapters. But the best case for highlighting the sense of *stasis* as factional formation becomes evident in the final chapter, where its centrality in the *stasis* process is most fully established.

Factions are associations of individuals[21] organized around an apparently shared goal[22] that often leads its members into conflict with the regime,[23] as they try to manipulate the regime for their own ends,[24] including its institutions and leadership.[25] Members of a faction allow the goals they seem to share as factionaries to override any goals they may share with other citizens as citizens.[26] But in order to understand the sense in which factional asso-

York: Random House, 1941). Jowett consistently highlights the actions of rebellion and revolution: "the spring and fount of revolution" ($1301^{b}6$), "stir up revolution" ($1301^{a}39$), "to rebel" ($1301^{a}40$), "rise in revolution" ($1301^{b}29$), "[cause] political disturbance and quarrels [to arise]" ($1302^{a}21$), "create revolution" ($1302^{a}33$), "cause revolution" ($1302^{b}8$), "cause of revolution" ($1302^{b}21$), "[cause of] insurrection and revolution" ($1301^{b}25$). Rackham is not as extreme as Jowett, as he is not so prone to highlight the impact of revolution, though he consistently focuses on the later stage impacts such as party strife, class war, and sometimes revolution: Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). Rackham translates the same occurrences as follows: "give rise to party strife" ($1301^{b}6$), "class war ensues" ($1301^{a}39$), "stir up faction" ($1301^{a}40$), "[cause] factious strife" ($1301^{b}29$), "give rise to factious strife" ($1302^{a}21$), "enter into party strife" ($1302^{a}26$), "carry on party strife" ($1302^{a}33$), "rise in revolt" ($1302^{b}8$), "is the motive of faction" ($1302^{b}21$) revolution. In other words, to form factions is to form those associations that lead to conflict, violence, etc. This qualification captures much of the meaning that is more explicit in the other translations. And this translation so qualified has the uncommon advantage of isolating the phase of the *stasis* process when its trajectory and severity is still somewhat ambiguous.

[21] Some of the distinctions used to define factional associations occur in Aristotle's treatment of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, others occur in the *Politics*. Aristotle argues that many of the features of friendship are important for understanding civic associations of all kinds (*EN* $8.11.1160^{a}15$-20). On the use of association influenced by modern social theorists such as Durkheim and Weber assume a greater dichotomy between individual and society than is representative of Aristotle, see B.Yack, *The Problems of a Political Animal* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 44.

[22] *Pol* $5.3.1302^{a}22$-30; *EN* $8.16.1163^{b}1$-5; *EN* $8.4.1156^{b}20$-22.

[23] *Pol* $5.1.1301^{b}8$-12. On the mistake of always diagnosing *stasis* as an explicit and dramatic crisis, rather than an underlying condition, see Figuera, 1991, 291-293 and Finley, 1993.

[24] *Pol* $5.1.1301^{b}7$.

[25] *Pol* $5.1.1301^{b}11$-12; $5.1.1301^{b}17$. See, Linott, 1982, 34, on the civic divisions that *stasis* drives. On the topic of property confiscation as an effect of *stasis*, see Berger, 1992, 88. On its corrosive effect on judicial integrity, see Loraux, 1991, 41.

[26] *EN* $8.11.1160^{a}15$-25; *Pol* $5.3.1304^{b}8$-17; *Pol* $5.3.1303^{b}32$-37. On factional associations

ciations have a distorting effect on a regime, it is important to differentiate factional associations from other associations, as well as the regime itself.[27]

A regime is like no other association insofar as its members are organized around a unique end.[28] The *polis* aims ideally at a moral nobility and justice[29] that is the common good for the regime and its citizens.[30] This is the most fundamental association of the political community and so has its basis in a justice that benefits each and every member of the regime.[31] Whereas, other non-factional associations within the regime, such as families, friendships, clans, etc., may share some good for which its members aim, it need not be incompatible with the good of the regime as such.[32] Yet, these are more limited goods than the good of the regime which has its basis in justice and nobility.[33]

A regime and non-factional associations within it are similar in the sense that they all share a goal that is common and specific to its respective members. For example, a family is organized around a good that is common to each of its members as family members. This good is also specific to each of its members in the sense that the good for the family as a whole is also good for each family member.[34] While this non-factional association does not aim for a good that is as embracing or comprehensive as the good of the regime,

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and their detracting from the common good, see R. Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 221; R. Bodéüs, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 43; K. Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 20-28; R. Mulgan, *Aristotle's Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 117-123.

[27] On the associational nature of the polis and its supporting institutions, see R. Balot, *Greek Political Thought* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2006), 23; Kraut, 2002, 240-253;Yack, 1993, 40-48; O. Höffe, *Aristoteles* (München: Beck, 1996), 238-243; R. Bodéüs, 1993, 47-65; J. Cooper, "Political Animals and Civic Friendship," in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (Eds.), *Aristotle's Politics: Critical Essays.* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 65-75. On the importance of associational sphere and its relative neglect in modern thought, Lord, 1991, 69.

[28] *Pol* 1.1.1252^{a}1-5.

[29] *EN* 1.2 1094^{b}15-20. Aristotle refers to the "fine and just things" (τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια) that he previously qualified to be the end that is the higher and more complete good for the city (*EN* 1.2 1094^{b}7). He also qualifies this good as *the* (human) good (τάνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν) for which activity in the city is organized (*EN* 1.2 1094^{b}14-15).

[30] *EN* 1.2 1094^{b}6-11.

[31] But this does not imply an equal benefit without qualification for each citizen. See Kraut, 2002, 390 and D. Keyt, "Aristotle's Theory of Distributive Justice," in *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics*, eds. Keyt and Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[32] On the benefits of civic friendships, see Kraut, 2002, 456; Cooper, 2005; Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 147-169; Kalimtzis, 2000, 73-74; Yack, 1993, 110-118. On the question of the role of select social grouping in factional formation, see W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 25-87; A. Lintott, 1982, 91-92; Yack, 1993, 225; Kalimtzis, 2000, 75.

[33] *Pol* 1.1.1253^{a}19-28; *EN* 8.11.1160^{a}15-25; *EN* 8.11.1160^{a}28-30.

[34] *Pol* 1.3.1253^{a}1-13; *Pol* 1.1.1252^{a}10-27; *Pol* 1.3.1260^{a}1017.

it shares the structural features of a non-factional association: a goal that is good and which is both common and specific to its members.[35] But the good shared by a family or some other non-factional association is not as ultimate a good as the association of the regime itself, as the latter is organized for the nobler life and justice.[36]

Of course, the crucial comparison for understanding the distorting effect of factional associations is the comparison between factional associations and non-factional associations within the regime. While non-factional associations are fundamentally different from factional associations, factional associations do resemble the former in several respects. Factional associations resemble non-factional associations within the regime in that they do not take *the* good of the regime as their reference point in organizing their association. And while factional and non-factional associations alike share a goal that seems good to their members,[37] the goals of non-factional associations are, in fact, good for them, and so, ones in which they can legitimately share. Whereas, the goals that seem good to factional associations are not even good for them; and so they share very little with the noble and salutary end of the regime, which is justice.

But the most important difference between factional and non-factional associations within a regime is this. While the latter are organized around an apparent good that is, in fact, a good albeit a good that is more limited than the good of the city, it, still, does not appear to its members as such.[38] Whereas, factional associations are organized around an apparent good that is not a good for it or its members. And the most destructive feature of the factional association is that, what is actually not good for its factionaries, appears to them as the just and good end for the city. So, factional associations, like non-factional associations, pursue a good that is limited in nature. But unlike non-factional associations, factional associations pursue a merely apparent good – not even a limited good – as if it were pursuing the just and good end of the regime as such.[39]

This discussion of factional formation highlights those features of a factional bond from its inception to the point at which it becomes an effective agent of conflict, violence and revolution.[40] But, while this phase of the *stasis*

[35] On the difference between a factional association and an alliance, see Balot, 2006, 237.

[36] *Pol* 3.9.1280^{a}33-34; *Pol* 7.1.1323^{b}41; *Pol* 7.1.1325^{b}32. See also *EN* 1.2 1094^{b}5-12, 15-20.

[37] *EN* 8.16.1163^{b}1-5; *EN* 8.1.1155^{b}17-27. On factional association as a distortion of friendship, see Yack, 1993, 118.

[38] *Pol* 5.4.1304^{b}24-27; *EN* 8.16.1163^{b}1-5; *EN* 8.4.1156^{b}20-22.

[39] *EN* 8.1.1155^{b}17-27; *Pol* 3.1.1280^{b}7-17. On how the virtuous person sees the good as good, see R. Kraut, *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 60-61; R. Kraut, *Aristotle on the Human Good* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 396; C. D. C. Reeve, *Practices of Reason: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1992), 89.

[40] On the pathological status of the condition of *stasis* itself, see Loraux. On this point, she appears to Solon: " 'Public evil enters every house, and the gates of the courtyard no

process can lead to conflict, violence and revolution, or some portion of these impacts, it need not escalate into a state of open conflict. The open-endedness of the final impacts that might result from this later phase is what makes Aristotle's remedies for *stasis* plausible. The points from which factional formation and factional conflict begin are the defining phases of the *stasis* process; they decisively determine how capable, equipped and motivated the factional association is for an escalating conflict.

II. The Regime Context of Stasis

The pattern that *stasis* manifests varies among regimes in the way that the manifestations of a disease varies among different animal species. Consider a comparison between two animals of similar complexity, such as a horse and a dog. Even if the same virus vigorously attacks their nervous systems, the differences in the operation of their immune system or the size and location of their nerve endings might explain why one is more resistant than the other is.[41]

So also, different regime types possess different vulnerabilities to the *stasis* process.[42] *Stasis* undermines oligarchic regimes according to a different pattern than it does for democratic ones. The regime types that are most vulnerable to *stasis* are oligarchy (ἡ ὀλιγαρχία) and democracy (ἡ δεμοκρατία). The regime that is least vulnerable to it is aristocracy. In order to understand why this is so it is important to consider two facts: (1) The members of factions strive for either or both of two goods (a) material gain (κέρδος) or (b) honor (τίμη).[43] (2) There are three standards according to which gain and honor are distributed in regimes: the standard of freedom (ἐλεύθερος),

longer contain it. Already has it leapt over the high fence and it seeks you out, though you flee and hide in the depths of your chamber.' " Solon 4 West ('Eunomia') 27-30, Loraux, 1991, 38. See also, Moshe Berent, "*Stasis*, or the Greek Invention of Politics," *History of Political Thought* 19, no. 3 (1988): 331-362.

[41] Of course, Aristotle treats the structural differences between regime types as in kind differences. So, whether the biological differences from the above analogy amount to in kind differences or not, there is enough of a difference in their responses to the virus to illustrate how a moral-political pathology could cause patterns of degeneration that admit of some variation.

[42] On the medical analogies between *stasis* as a disease of the body politic and the body, see L. Manolopoulos, Πόλις φλεγμαίνουσα και Πόλις Υγιής [The Feverish Polis and the Healthy Polis] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1995); G.E.R. Lloyd, "The Role of Medical and Biological Analogies in Aristotle's Ethics," Phronesis 6 (1968): 74-82; J. Anton, "Philosophy, Medicine, and Political Pathology," in *Philosophy and Medicine, Vol. 1*, ed. K. Boudouris (Athens: Ionia Publications, 1998). On more general discussions of Greek conceptions of disease, see M.D. Grmek, *Diseases in the Ancient World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

[43] See, R. Gauthier and J. Jolif (Eds.), *L'Ethique Nicomaque* (Louvaine: Publications Universitaires, 1970), 139; Loraux, 1991, 40; D. O'Connor, 1991, 176; Kalimtzis, 2000, 124-128.

of wealth (πλούσιος) and of moral virtue (ἤθικη ἄρετη).[44] Oligarchies value wealth more highly than freedom or moral virtue. Democracies value freedom over and above wealth and moral virtue. And aristocracies overwhelmingly value moral virtue above both wealth and freedom.

A key indicator of which standard is operative in a regime is the criterion for citizenship. Citizenship is defined as the prerogative to share in the offices of the regime.[45] The level of access that one has to offices greatly influences the amount of one's share in the distribution of material gain and honor.[46] By their emphasis on wealth or honor, rather than virtue, democratic and oligarchic regimes misshape the desires of its citizenry. In this way they prepare the ground for faction, insofar as the chief object for which factions are formed is material gain or honor. To see this, let us begin with a consideration of the structure of offices and magistracies in oligarchies and democracies, for it is through these that citizens gain access to wealth and honor.

The Scope of Offices

This subsection discusses a number of offices of varying importance in the democracy of fifth century Athens.[47] The goal in drawing from this context is not to provide an exhaustive inventory of Athenian offices, nor to provide descriptions of offices that would be present in other democratic regimes, let alone oligarchic regimes at that time.[48] But this discussion introduces enough

[44] On conflicting standards of justice and their reflection of divergent valuing of ends, see S. Salkever, *Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 75; Kraut, 2002, 368, 392. See also Höffe, 2003, 180-183; Yack, 1993, 165-170; Mulgan, 1977, 69-78.

[45] According to Aristotle a citizen shares in the governance of the regime, which includes the defining offices of the regime. The following passages are representative of this view: "For a regime is the arrangement of state offices concerning the manner of their distribution and to the question what is the authority in the state and what is the end of each community" (πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν:) *Pol* 4.1 1289^{a}15-17."And a citizen, generally, is one who shares in ruling and being ruled, although it is different according to each kind of regime" (πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαί ἐστι, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος) *Pol* 3.7 1283^{b}44-1284^{a}1. When these passages are considered together, it can be seen that a crucial feature of citizenship is sharing in the ruling offices.

[46] A citizen's membership in an office brings him gain insofar as he can influence taxing, finance, the flow of business and, generally with people that have monetary clout. In some cases the offices themselves could be directly or indirectly lucrative.

[47] Athenian democracy existed and developed, at least, from 508 B.C. to 322 B.C. with two key periods of oligarchy in 411 and 404 B.C.

[48] The council of elders (γερούσια) advised the two kings from the houses of the Ἀγιαδαι and Εὐρυπόντιδαι. This council was roughly parallel to the role placed by the Athenian council (βούλη). A further council of five annually elected officials emerged as the Ἔφοροι. Their role was also similar to the Athenian council, although there would also be parallels with the executive committee and Areopagus. The Spartan's also

detail about the kind of offices at issue in the distribution of gain and honor in fifth century Athens to provide a model for understanding the context of *stasis* in the other democratic and oligarchic settings that Aristotle has in mind.[49]

When Aristotle refers to offices he usually intends the legislative powers traditionally available[50] through the assembly (ἐκκλήσια) and council (βουλή). The qualifications for participation in the assembly were minimal (mere citizenship),[51] and the council more demanding.[52] Even these differences put the assembly in a position to be closer and more responsive to the people. Whereas, the membership of the council was designed to be a more reflective body, guiding the form and topics of deliberation in the assembly. So, the selection of members for the council was designed, not so much to represent

had an assembly that was filled only be Spartan citizens (σπαρτίται). So they were more highly qualified than their Athenian counterparts. Besides having the standard property qualifications, they required a state education (ἀγώγη) and election in a dining club (συσσίτια).

[49] Many of the features of these offices will be drawn from the *Athenian Constitution* which provides a framework for what Aristotle would have known about various Athenian offices and their functions: Kenyon, ed., *Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920).

[50] The offices (αἱ ἀρχαι) that are most at issue for distributive justice are the legislative offices, though the administrative and executive offices are still important. I place more emphasis on the legislative offices for this reason and because Aristotle also places more emphasis on them in the section of *Athenaion Politeia* that was his most current discussion (42-62).

[51] Membership in the assembly was minimal in the sense that it required not much more than citizenship. But holding citizenship was not attained without some difficulty. It required the full citizen to be a man whose parents were both citizens, registered at the appropriate subdistrict (δήμη)when he is of age (18). One would have to be trained for, and in the process of completing, a two-year period of military service. Aristotle discusses it as follows: "Full citizenship belongs to men the parents of whom are both citizens"(μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν) (*AP* 42.1); "...and when they have been registered, the deme members vote (by oath) concerning whether they appear to have reached the legal age...." (ὅταν δ᾽ ἐγγράφωνται, διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν ὀμόσαντες οἱ δημόται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου)(*AP* 42.1);"...and after visiting the sacred temples they go to the Periaeus and guard..." (πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον, εἶτ᾽ εἰς Πειραιέα πορεύονται, καὶ φρουροῦσιν)(*AP* 42.3); "and at the beginning of the second, at an assembly meeting in the theater, they show the people their war skill, and receive a shield and spear from the city. For the year after they would monitor the countryside and guard the posts. For their two years serving they have a coat...." (καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτως διάγουσι: τὸν δ᾽ ὕστερον ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη χλαμύδας ἔχοντες, καὶ ἀτελεῖς εἰσι πάντων)(*AP* 42.4-5).

[52] Aristotle's discussion of these requirements is noticeably absent from his consideration of the council in *Athenaion Politiea*. But the requirements can still be pieced together from other passages where he discusses it and from other sources. The qualifications for the council were adjustable, but included at least citizenship, assessment in one of the higher property classifications (*AP* 7.3-8.1), being older than thirty (*AP* 30.2), and possibly other requirements.

directly the wishes of the people, but rather to foster deliberations that would best serve the city.

The functions of the assembly were somewhat distinct from the council. When the assembly was called to meet, its members gathered in the agora, the civic center of Athens. All citizens of a certain age,[53] who were established in their respective districts (φύλαι) could participate in the assembly. The assembly generally possessed powers of lawmaking and policy decisions (ψηφίσματα).[54] But in practice, these powers did not rest exclusively with the assembly, as the council had to approve what topics would be discussed and voted on.[55] And other executive offices[56] could influence when the assembly met, the mechanics of its deliberations and the implementation of its decisions. These offices and officials could, in practice, present considerable veto powers over and against the assembly.[57]

The assembly met regularly and according to an established protocol, but was subject to some variation based on the influence of its executive committee (πρυτάνεις). The assembly convened a fixed number of times per year,[58] but

[53] Participation in the assembly would have to follow the young citizens military service (*AP* 43.5), though assembly participation was not required. "After this two years they joined the citizen body"(διεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν.) (*AP* 42.5).

[54] The assembly possessed both powers, although after 403B.C. some lawmaking powers were transferred to a smaller body (νομοθέται).

[55] "They publish the agenda and placed for each meeting of the council, and also draw up the agenda for the assembly" (καὶ ὅσα δεῖ χρηματίζειν τὴν βουλήν, καὶ ὅ τι ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ὅπου καθίζειν, οὗτοι προγράφουσι.) (AT 43.3). "In these things, then the council does not have the final decision, but it holds a prelimary deliberation on anything that is to come before the people, nor can the people vote on anything that has not been discussed by them previously and put on the agent by the executive committee. Anyone who violates this may be prosecuted for an illegal proposal" (τούτων μὲν οὖν ἄκυρός ἐστιν ἡ βουλή: προβουλεύει δ᾽ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, καὶ οὐκ ἔξεστιν οὐδὲν ἀπροβούλευτον οὐδ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν μὴ προγράψωσιν οἱ πρυτάνεις ψηφίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ. κατ᾽ αὐτὰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἔνοχός ἐστιν ὁ νικήσας γραφῇ παρανόμων.)(AT 45.4).

[56] The main office of interest here is the executive committee (πρυτάνεις) While it could be considered executive it had influence over the procedures for legislative and other decisionmaking activity. Other non-legislative offices had similar influence, but not to the same extent.

[57] The executive committee was an executive office consisting of fifty individuals (*AP* 43.2) from each district (φύλαι) holding power for only a period of one month, until all the districts had performed. They were on call at all times in the Tholus at the expense of the city (*AP* 43.3), prepared to call a meeting of either or both bodies if necessary. While they didn't determine what was dealt with in assembly meetings they did present the agenda to the assembly when it had been determined by the council (*AP* 43.3-4).

[58] The assembly would meet at least four times a year for a plenary session that would vote on whether all of its members ruled well (εἰ δοκοῦσι καλῶς ἄρχειν)(*AP* 43.4), and included discussions concerning food supply (περὶ σίτου)(*AP* 43.4), the safety of Attica (περι φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας χρηματίζειν) (*AP* 43.4), and allow impeachments to be presented (τὰς εἰσαννελίας ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοὺς βουλομένους ποιεῖσθαι) (*AP* 43.4). The second meeting would allow petitioners and other appropriate points of presentation (*AP* 43.5) The other two meetings would cover topics concerning heralds, embassies, sacred matters, as well as other topics (*AP* 43.5-6).

could meet more frequently if necessary. The regular meetings of the assembly considered topics such as defense, food supply, budget, and the selection of officials. But different meetings were usually dedicated to different topics. The executive committee could always summon emergency meetings since it was on call at all times. And, the members of this committee rotated on a monthly basis; and its chairman (ἐπιστάτης), everyday within that month.[59] So, the executive committee had considerable discretion in summoning the assembly. When the assembly met, the chairman of the committee would oversee the deliberations of the assembly, coordinating the order of speakers, and administering the voting process. Meetings could last up to an entire day, and be attended by more than six thousand citizens.[60] The numbers in attendance were often influenced by the degree of leisure and financial independence possessed by its citizens, although other kinds of responsibilities and commitments could constrain attendance as well.

The council consisted of five hundred members drawn from a more qualified base of citizens who served for a term of one year, and never more than two terms.[61] Fifty council members were drawn from each of the ten districts across Attica,[62] so that its candidates were not only qualified, but attached to each of the districts that the council served. Each subdistrict (δήμη) would contribute a number of councilors proportionate to its population. These councilors were selected by lot from the base of qualified citizens in each subdistrict. So, the contributions of each subdistrict would constitute the fifty councilors for the district at large and, in conjunction with all the other districts, the five hundred councilors would constitute the whole council.[63] The central function of the council was not to make decisions about policies, as such, or even to craft laws. Rather, its function was to determine what topics would be discussed and voted on in the assembly. Furthermore, its function was to refine these topics of discussion into a manageable form, so that, the assembly could discuss them and vote on them more efficiently. There were a number of other subcommittees that provided administrative support in the implementation of assembly decisions. A crucial function of

[59] The members of the executive committee on duty ("in prutany") were selected by lot each month from a different district, until all the districts served. And the group of fifty would be appointed only for a one-month period. One of the fifty would preside over the forty-nine other members for a day until most of the fifty had presided. So, in the course of a month the greater portion of the executive committee would have presided for a day (*AP* 43.1-3)

[60] The numbers could vary. But some of the factors that could influence the numbers on any one day were the availability of the members, given their other commitments and their financial independence. Sometimes fees were offered for participation in civic obligations: a drachma for an assembly meeting, nine obols for the plenary session, six obols for being on call for the executive committee (*AP* 62.2)

[61] The five hundred members were selected by lot from each district (*AP* 43.2)

[62] The ten districts were constructed to promote better representation of the people. Innovated by Kleisthenes, it replaced the more tribal organization of representation (*AP* 20.1-6)

[63] *AP* 42.1-3)

the council was to oversee the work of these subcommittees and monitor their integrity.

The scope of offices in this discussion extends beyond legislative powers to executive, administrative, and judicial powers.[64] There were a number of officials who provided executive, and administrative support for the state. While the legislative powers provided the most standard access to influence the distribution gain and honor, these other offices also provided influence[65] relevant to securing gain and honor, if not actually providing gain and honor directly.

The officials (ἀρχαί) served as highly powerful executive officers in the sixth century, but, increasingly took on a more subdued role as judicial officials and religious advisors by the end of the fifth century. Initially, these officers (ἄρχοντες) – nine in all were – elected from various classes with greater and lesser property qualifications.[66] So, in the sixth century, these nine officers played a role that synthesized the functions that the council later played in the fifth century, together with military and (some) judicial functions. By the fifth century these nine officials were selected by lot and served a role as religious advisors to the council and supervised judicial functions concerning impiety, homicide, and property disputes among citizens. After a term of service, they were eligible to join the Council of the Areopagus permanently. There, they carried on many of the same functions, but especially their religious functions.[67] But, most importantly, the military function that

[64] These powers should not be construed in the same way that the modern American political system is understood to have divisions of powers that are clearly demarcated through the constitution. There were official and unofficial divisions of power. But they did not necessarily fall into the same functions and associations that we are more familiar with.

[65] One aspect of their influence was their ability to impact how, when and what legislative activity occurred. The chairman of the executive committee (πρύτανεις), while only holding office for one day and night, (δ᾽ἐπισταneῖ νύκ τα, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε πλείω χρόνον)(*AP* 44.1) could dramatically influence whether or not a special meeting of the council or assembly would be called. He would hold the keys to the sanctuary where the treasure and public records are kept (κλεὶς τὰς τῶν ἱερῶν, ἐν οἷς τὰ χρήματ᾽ ἐστὶν καὶ ᾽τὰ᾽ γράμματατῇ πόλει)(*AP* 44.1). He would also hold the city seal (τὴν δημοσίαν σφραγῖδα)(*AP* 44.1). He casts lots to select which of the nine chairman from each district would be when an assembly meeting is convened (καὶ ἐπειδὰν συναγάγωσιν οἱ πρυτάνεις τὴν βουλὴν ἥ τὸν δῆμον, οὗτος κληποῖ προέδρους ἐννέα, ἕνα ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ἑκάστης πλὴν τῆς πρυτανευούσης (*AP* 44.2). While he presided over the meeting, the executive committee monitored the procedure and good order of the meeting (οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες τῆς τ᾽ εὐκοσμίας ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν δεῖ χρηματίζειν προτιθέασιν, καὶ τὰς χειροτονίας κρίνουσιν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διοικοῦσιν, *AP* 44.2-3). Also, the executive committee officially selected the generals (στράτεγοι), though it was practically based on the considerations of the people (καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τῷ δήμῳ δοκῇ) (*AP* 44.4). Lastly, they actually presented the agenda for any meeting of the council or assembly (*AP* 43.3). If they did their job well they would never influence the legislative process. But if they wanted to influence the process they had remarkable powers to do so; albeit, during a very short and unpredictable window of opportunity.

[66] *AP* 50.1-2.

[67] The main ἀρκών presided over the Areopagus and supervised homicide and impiety cases;

the sixth century officials played was carried on in the fifth century through an office that was exclusively military in nature – the office of the generals (στράτεγοι).[68] The only official function of these ten generals, who were (by that point) elected by the assembly, was to lead the military forces. But they did have some unofficial role shaping policy in the assembly, as they could be highly respected there; and so, presented authoritative voices, especially concerning military decisions.

A number of other clusters of officials provided direct administrative support for the council. These officials divided into several functions. The function of auditor was divided into a board of accountants (λόγισται), and ten auditors (εὔθυνοι).[69] There were also a number of managers that included town managers (ἀστύνυμοι), market managers (ἀγοράνομοι), and court managers (ἱερομνήμονες).[70] Of course the city needed a group of revenue officers that included receivers (ἀπόδεκται), and treasurers (τάμιαι).[71] While these offices were generally entered through election, candidates were constrained not only by the kinds of qualifications relevant to legislative offices, but also other qualifications. The further qualifications were tailored to the position based on the required backgrounds and abilities for performing the offices.[72]

Distributive Justice as Proportionate Equality and the Regime Standards for the Distribution of Offices

Before considering how these offices may distribute honor and gain in a regime, let us consider how different standards of worth among regimes influences the distribution of offices. The various standards of worth in a regime – namely, freedom, virtue and wealth – provide the basis for understanding how offices are distributed. Aristotle's theory of distributive justice (διαναμητικός) is implied in several key sections of the *Politics*,[73] but it is discussed most explicitly and completely in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Let us situate distributive justice within Aristotle's larger discussion of justice.[74]

whereas the πολέμαρκῶν served this function resident aliens. The remaining ones, the θεσμοθέται administered other courts (*AP* 50.3-4; *AP* 51.1-2; *AP* 45.2; *AP* 52.1-5).

[68] *AP* 61.1; *AP* 62.3.

[69] *AP* 48.1-4. The council had crucial influence over the supervision, and in some cases the appointment of these and other offices.

[70] *AP* 51.1; *AP* 48.5; *AP* 47.1-2.

[71] *AP* 52.2; *AP* 45.2.

[72] While some of these positions were selected by lot, there were still merit prerequisites and special requirements for more technical offices (*AP* 51-3). See also *Pol* 3.7 1283^{a}.

[73] *Pol* 3.9 1280^{a}7-25; 3.12 1282^{a}14-22.

[74] The following section draws in part from R. Weed, "Aristotle on Justice: Character, Action and Some Pauline Counterparts," *Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism* 3 (2006).

The Division of Justice

1. *General Justice* (justice as lawfulness) EN 5.1
    a) *re* laws establishing a duty to perform (obligation): e.g. duty to fight in wars for polis, to contribute to public expenditures, etc.
    b) *re* laws establishing a duty not to do (prohibition): e.g. duty not to commit assault, not to slander, etc.
2. *Particular Justice* (justice as fairness) EN 5.2
    a) *Distributive Justice* (of legislators; of partners in a joint venture) EN 5.3
    b) *Rectificatory or Corrective Justice* (of judges) EN 5.4
        i. *re* injury in voluntary transactions: sale, marriage, leasing, loans, etc.
        ii. *re* injury in involuntary transactions: assault, murder, theft, fraud
    c) *Exchange or Reciprocal Justice* (of traders) EN 5.5
3. *Equity* (justice as equity) EN 5.9
    a) *re* adjustments when strict application of law would result in injustice, given the circumstances of the case.

Figure 1: The Division of Justice

Justice can be attributed to persons, laws and systems of adjudication. A person is just (δικαισύνη) due to his or her disposition to act justly. "[B]y justice [we mean] that kind of state of character (ἕχις) which makes people disposed to do what is just and...to wish for what is just."[75] In contrast, a law or system of adjudication is considered 'just' (δικίαια) if it tends to promote or preserve the happiness of its citizenry. "Laws (νόμοι) in their enactments...aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those enactments just that tend to produce or preserve happiness and its components for a political society."[76]

[75] *EN* 5.1 1129^{a}6-7.

[76] *EN* 5.1 1129^{a}15-20. See C. M. Young, "Aristotle's Justice," in *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. R. Kraut (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 183.

Different regimes are informed by different conceptions of justice.[77] In an Aristocratic regime, laws are considered just insofar as they foster the true happiness or excellence of the citizenry of that regime. But, in a deviant regime such as oligarchy or democracy, laws are said to be just when they promote the apparent happiness of some portion of the citizenry. For example, an oligarchy is organized according to oligarchic principles and ruled by an oligarchic section that puts down laws conducive to their apparent happiness.

General Justice (Justice as Lawfulness)

Concerning general justice or justice as lawfulness (τὸ δίκαιον τὸ νόμιμον),[78] the law promotes actions that are in keeping with the behavioral requirements of the moral virtues, while punishing those actions that depart from them, especially courage, temperance and good temper.[79] Along these lines, the law demands that citizens fight to protect their city, never abandoning their fellow soldiers, especially under the gravest conditions.[80] Moreover, it restricts acts of adultery and molestation, as well as punishing acts of insult and slander.

> [T]he law bids us do the acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to commit adultery, nor to gratify one's lust, and those of a good-tempered man (e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil), and similarly with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well.[81]

Justice in this general sense is the whole of justice.[82] The moral virtue of the morally virtuous person enables actions that constitute his happiness, just as he does what is useful or beneficial for others and the polis as a whole by those

[77] On the political context for Aristotle's treatment of justice, see T. Lockwood, "Ethical Justice and Political Justice," *Phronesis*, 51, no. 1 (2006): 29-48; F. Rosen, "The Political Context of Aristotle's Categories of Justice," *Phronesis* 20, no. 3 (1975): 228-240.

[78] On justice as lawfulness and the neglect of the general sense of justice, see T. Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 424-425; E. Voegelin, *Anamnesis* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1990), 39-40; Yack, 1993, 158-159.

[79] On the virtue undergirding law abidingness, see Balot, 2006, 255; Yack, 1993, 166.

[80] On the general overlap of objects that justice concerns and objects that the virtues concern, see Young, 2006, 183.

[81] *EN* 5.1 1129^{a}15-24.

[82] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Christopher Rowe, with commentary by Sarah Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 35; J.O. Urmson, *Aristotle's Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1988), 72; W.V.Leyden, *Aristotle on Equality and Justice*: His Political Argument (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); F. Rosen, "The Political Context of Aristotle's Categories of Justice," *Phronesis* 20, no.3 (1975): 228-240. Thornton C. Lockwood, Jr., "Ethical Justice and Political Justice," in *Phronesis* 51, no.1 (2006): 29-48; Kraut, 2002, 111-112, 118-124; Balot, 2006, 255.

same actions. Along these lines, the moral individual and just individual are the same person. Justice is not simply one moral virtue among the others that support the happy life. Rather, justice is the whole of moral virtue and so, in this sense, is the counterpart of the moral virtue.[83]

Distributive Justice

Particular justice[84] concerns (a) the preservation of fairness in reference to the distribution of benefits and burdens (distributive justice, διαναμητικός), (b) the correction of injustices (corrective justice, διορθωτικόν) and (c) commercial exchanges (reciprocal justice, ἀντιπεπόνθος). This section will highlight distributive justice because this is the sphere where the claims of factionaries concerning justice are most in dispute and most relevant to the problem of *stasis*.[85]

Distributive justice is chiefly the virtue of legislators and, to a lesser extent, associates in commercial projects for profit. Legislators must craft laws that

[83] *EN* 5.1 1130^{a}10-13. Similarly, particular justice also avoids the particular injustices that Aristotle describes as follows: "So, it is evident that, besides injustice as a whole, there is another kind of injustice which is specific and has the same name for its definition belongs to the same genus; for both have the force of being defined in relation to some other person, but the narrow one concerns the honor or property or security or something which includes all these and has as its aim the pleasure which comes from gain, while the other is concerned with all the things with which a virtuous man is concerned" (ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει: ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἡ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος., *EN* 5.11130^{a} 7-10). While a full statement and explanation of moral virtue and vice won't be treated until next chapter, their significance (both in reference to them as dispositions and to their motivational dimension) is already implicit in this discussion. This project does not consider whether the dispositions that drive *stasis* are the ones that drive (or are constitutive of) particular injustice. But it is clear that they must overlap considerably. So, while Aristotle doesn't explicitly develop the motivational dimension of particular injustice in these sections, his treatments of virtue and vice may well do that.

[84] *EN* 5.1 1130^{a}14, 5.2 1130^{b}30. Broadie, 2002, 36; Urmson, 1988, 72; W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 187; H. Joachim (Ed.), *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), 131. On the difference between general and particular justice as the difference between virtue as a whole and a particular virtue, see D. O' Connor, 1991, 137. On the priority of particular justice in justice as a whole see J. Cohen, *If you're an Egalitarian, How come you're so rich?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 6.

[85] On the topic of justice as a virtue or settled disposition that enables appropriate desires, and actions concerning proportionately equal distribution and other spheres of justice, see B. Williams, "Justice as a Virtue," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 189-99; O'Connor, 1991, 138; Yack , 1993, 160; David Sherman, "Aristotle and the Problem of Particular Justice," *Philosophical Forum* 30, no. 4 (1999): 235-247; Balot, *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 23-34; Balot, 2006, 255. On the neglect of such a notion in modern philosophical thought and its misunderstanding of Aristotle on this point, see Yack, 1993, 150.

distribute appropriately the levels of decisionmaking (and eligibility) for public office, privileges of leadership in the armed forces, prerogatives of private property ownership, as well as tax burdens.[86] Associates in commercial enterprises must distribute appropriately the shares of ownership and profits (or losses) among themselves.

There is a widespread agreement that distributive justice requires a distribution of benefits and burdens that correctly meets the claims of merit and equality. Both claims are respected best in Aristotle's understanding of proportionate equality (τὸ ἰσόν).[87] This expression refers to an equality of merits and shares of benefits that have the general form:

Distributive Justice

$$\frac{\text{Merit of person X}}{\text{Merit of person Y}} = \frac{\text{Share of Benefits (powers) to person X}}{\text{Share of Benefits (powers) to person X}}$$

Figure 2: Distributive Justice

The proportionately equal distribution is the equality of ratios of the worth (ἀχία)[88] of persons and the goods they possess. The equality of ratios involves

[86] This is not to say that other forms of justice are not concerned with these goods. But Aristotle introduces distributive justice first and emphasizes its role in the struggle for the goods (τῆς δὲ κατὰμέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέροὐ)(*EN* 5.5 1113[b]30-34). On the question of the question of identifying the motivational sphere of injustice, see J. Shklar, *Faces of Injustice* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Balot, 2001, 27-33; Yack, 1993, 160; Kraut, 2002, 136-141.

[87] "...Now proportionate equality depends on at least two things. It is necessary now that, the just be both a mean and proportionately equal, and in relation to something, and for certain persons. As a mean, it lies between certain things (and these are the greater and the less); as proportionately equal, it is in respect of two things; and as just it is in relation to certain persons. The just then must depend on at least four things; for the persons to which it happens to be just are two, and the things are distribute into two parts"(ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ᾗ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν'ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον', ᾗ δ' ἴσον, δυοῖν, ᾗ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν: οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο) (*EN* 5.6 1131[a]15-20). See Joachim, 1951, 136, 139; Hardie,1968, 188; Urmson, 1988, 72, 75; W.V.Leyden, 1985, 16-21; Broadie, 2002, 36; Keyt, 1991, 56-62.

[88] This term is the most explicit reference to the worth of an office. This sense of worth conveys both the principle according to which an office is distributed (*Pol* 4.6 1294[a]10-15; *Pol* 4.7 1294[a]12) and, implicitly, the extent of decision making power available through it (*Pol* 4.12 1299[b]39; *Pol* 4.5 1292[b]29-30).

four terms. Thus, the ratio of the worth of person A[89] to the goods possessed by A must be equal to the ratio of the worth of person B to the goods possessed by B.[90] Distributive justice differs from the other forms of particular justice in that it considers the relevant worth of the person as indispensable for determining whether it is just for that person to hold an office. The other forms of particular justice only consider the value of some good, among other goods, exchanged in a transaction without reference to the relevant worth of the persons involved.[91] But in the case of distributive justice there is a geometric proportion (ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν)[92] set between two persons and two goods.[93]

Aristotle's account of distributive justice provides a useful framework for understanding how different regimes distribute offices on the basis of their regime priorities. And these different standards inform what counts as the proper proportion in distributive justice. So, although there is agreement that justice requires a distribution respecting equality and merit – a proportionate equality – there is no agreement about the standard for merit. "[Although] men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, they do not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with status as free men [hence, all free men have equal merit]; supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence."[94] So, because each of these regime types disagree about what merit is in the distribution of benefits and burdens, they thereby disagree about what the fair distribution is.[95]

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[89] The worth relevant for assessing the distributively just share might not be the whole worth of the persons at issue. And typically, the relevant worth is one factor such as wealth or military valor that the regime highlights as the overriding standard of worth for the regime. So, such a formulation would not indicate a comprehensive assessment of a citizen's worth, even in principle.

[90] See D. Keyt, "Aristotle's Theory of Distributive Justice" in *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics*, eds. Keyt and Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and F. Miller, *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

[91] Unlike distributive justice, corrective and exchange justice (*Pol* 5.5 1131^{a}1-10) is not based on the relevant worth of the persons involved. So, there is no geometric proportion that fixes the ratios between the persons and the objects at issue. Instead there is an arithmetic relation that preserves equality among the terms in the way that the following two operations are equal to one another: 4 - 2 = 7 - 5 (*Pol* 5.7 1131^{b}33-1132^{a}7). The differences between the latter forms of justice and between distributive justice will be treated more directly near the end of this section.

[92] "Mathematicians call such a proportion geometrical; for in a geometrical proportion it also follows that the whole is to the whole as each term is to the corresponding term"(καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί: ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον) (*EN* 5.7 1131b12-15).

[93] *EN* 5.6 1131^{a}15-20.

[94] *EN* 5.6 1131^{a}25-29.

[95] Oligarchs and democrats make mistakes about what merit is because they hope to privilege themselves in their judgment of it and they are bad judges where they themselves are concerned. See *Pol* 3.5 1280^{a}19-23, 13-16.

Aristocrats consider merit to be a function of a citizen's moral and intellectual virtue. This is the basis for the aristocratic principle: To each according to one's moral and intellectual virtue or excellence.

$$\text{Aristocratic Merit} = \mathbf{f}\ (\text{virtue})$$

Accordingly, the distribution of benefits and burdens in an aristocratic regime will be based on this understanding of merit. For example, in an aristocratic regime the most important public offices should be filled by the most excellent of its citizens. Even those public offices with more limited decisionmaking powers should be filled by excellent citizens. So, in this case, the demands of merit and equality are both respected, insofar as the more excellent citizens are more greatly honored for their greater excellence by holding offices with greater decisionmaking powers. Those citizens who are still excellent, though less excellent, are also honored for their lesser excellence through more modest offices. Aristotle's aristocrats treat equals as equals and unequals as unequals. So, offering a greater honor to the most excellent citizen and a lesser honor to the merely excellent is a case of an "equal" distribution, though these honors are neither the same nor of an equal status.[96]

> The unjust is the unequal, and the just is the *equal*, as all men suppose it to be, even apart from argument...[Now] the just involves at least four terms; for the person for whom it is in fact just are two, and the things in which it is manifested, the objects distributed, are two...Further,...awards [of benefits] should be according to *merit*: for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit.[97]

Oligarchs consider merit to be a function of a citizen's wealth, family lineage or social status.[98] Aristotle's oligarch might think that those who contribute more to the regime whether financially (or by genealogy) are due more.

$$\text{Oligarchic Merit} = \mathbf{f}\ (\text{financial or genealogical contribution})$$

Oligarchs, like democrats and aristocrats, agree that distributive justice respects both merit and equality according to a standard of proportionate equality. So, it is just for those of the highest wealth to hold the most important offices, whereas those of lesser wealth (or genealogical contribution) should

[96] But there is another sense of equality preserved among those at the same level of merit. A citizen of the highest excellence is honored at a level that is equal to the honor of those who have the same caliber of excellence. Similarly, the less distinguished citizen who accordingly receives a lower level of honor is equal to those other less distinguished citizens with the same merit (*EN* 5.6 $1131^{a}30$-b16).

[97] *EN* 5.6 $1131^{a}11$-29.

[98] *Pol* 3.5 $1279^{a}16$-19; 3.5 $1279^{b}39$-$1280^{a}6$; 4.3 $1290^{a}17$-20; $1290^{a}39$-$1290^{b}3$; 4.6 $1294^{a}10$-12. According to this understanding even a citizen of high birth who is not wealthy may qualify for office or other benefits and burdens in an oligarchy.

hold an appropriately less significant office. Moreover, it is quite unfair for those who are unequal in wealth or social status to receive offices of equal importance.[99] But the oligarchic standard of wealth[100] is also different from the aristocratic standard in the sense that an oligarch's wealth or status might not have much to do with his character or talent, although he might have trouble holding onto it without excellence in some sphere. So, the oligarchic standard of worth is like the aristocratic one in the way in which merit is respected: the offices, honors and powers given to those with great wealth and status is proportionate to the greatness of their wealth and status. But, the oligarchic standard diverges from the aristocratic one, insofar as what counts as merit is considerably different. What they both agree about is that few citizens have equal merit, and accordingly, that it is unfair to offer equal rewards for unequal merit.

Democrats consider the merit of a citizen to be simply a function of being a citizen. So, the democratic principle of justice treats the merit of each citizen as equal regardless of wealth, genealogy, or excellence.[101]

$$\text{Merit} = \mathbf{f}\,(\text{citizenship})$$

Even in democracy, distributive justice must respect both merit and equality according to a standard of proportionate equality. Those with greater merit should be honored by greater offices and powers, whereas those with less merit should only be more modestly honored in terms of office and power. But democracy is quite unlike oligarchy and aristocracy in its assignment of merit. The factors that might distinguish citizens from one another, above and beyond their citizenship status, are irrelevant to the democratic standard of merit that informs distributive justice. While oligarchs and aristocrats might dispute one another's claims to merit, they both insist that it requires something beyond their status as citizens. But the democrat would disagree

[99] *Pol* 3.5 $1280^{a}25$-32.

[100] Aristotle does not suggest that every office should be filled by a person whose relevant worth is determined by the overriding regime standard. Certainly, the office holders for some administrative or executive offices might be based on some other standard such as talent, skill (see *Pol* 3.7 1283^{a}) or even a combination of regime standards that are weighed differently for a particular position.

[101] *Pol* 4.4 $1291^{b}31$-38; 4.6 $1294^{a}10$-12; 3.5 $1279^{a}16$-19; 4.3 $1290^{a}17$-20; $1290^{a}39$-$1290^{b}3$; 3.5 $1279^{b}39$-$1280^{a}6$. The democratic view of merit should be understood in reference to the goods that distributive justice concerns (*Pol* 3.6 $1282^{b}23$-29). There are other spheres of justice where factors such as talent, background or fit may inform a judgment of democratic merit. For example, even in democracy skill or talent must clearly be a factor (*Pol* 3.7 $1282^{b}31$-35) in the appointment to an office such as city treasurer. The fact that talent is relevant to such an office in democracy is quite compatible with democracy for Aristotle because the office is specialized (*Pol* 2.8 $1278^{b}13$-15) and not a body with broad legislative powers such as the assembly or council. Distributive justice is especially concerned with the latter type of offices, rather than more specialized administrative and executive offices (*Pol* 3.7 $1283^{a}3$-1; 3.6 $1282^{a}34$-42). Also, the quality of the agent's goods or actions rather than his mere citizenship status is central in the other forms of justice, especially in democracy. This is discussed in later portions of this section.

with both. Their status as citizens is the only basis for merit in reference to the goods of distributive justice. So, the democrat agrees with the oligarch that the aristocratic claim to merit is an irrelevant factor for distributive justice. The democrat also agrees with the aristocrat that the oligarchic claim to merit is unwarranted,[102] though not for the same reasons as the aristocrat. Both aristocratic and oligarchic claims to merit are superfluous. For their claims to merit must be captured already under the rubric of their merit as mere citizens,[103] and so, are superfluous to distributive justice.

The democrats agree with oligarchs and aristocrats in their acceptance of distributive justice as proportionate equality, but disagree with their respective assessments of merit.[104] In democracy, all citizens deserve the same level of honor because they are equal in merit.

Rectificatory or Corrective Justice

Corrective justice concerns the correction or rectification of losses that result from the violation of voluntary agreements or from tortfeasance.[105] Justice, in this sense, concerns the actions of a judge. Injury or harm may occur in transactions that the relevant agents enter into voluntarily. Similarly, an injury or harm may occur in a situation that one does not enter into voluntarily, such as in the case of theft. The injured party has apparently suffered a loss, whereas the one who caused the injury is treated as having gained something at the expense of the injured party. Along these lines, justice demands that the judge impose a judgment that best restores to the injured party what was lost. Typically, the injuring or otherwise responsible party must make some form of restitution to the injured party that is equivalent to the harm or injury caused.

> It makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man who has committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal...[T]his kind of injury being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it...by taking away from the gain of the assailant [or wrongdoer]. For the term 'gain' is applied generally to such cases, even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g. to a person who inflicts a wound – and 'loss' to the sufferer;

[102] *Pol* 3.5 1280^{a}23-24.
[103] *Pol* 3.5 1280^{a}25-26.
[104] Moreover, since all citizens in democracy are equal in merit, the numerically equal distribution of shares among them *is* the proportionately equal distribution. So, citizens who are wealthy or excellent might deserve a proportionately greater honor if their wealth or excellence actually counted as merit. But this is not the case in democracy, at least in reference to the goods that distributive justice concerns.
[105] Joachim, 1951, 136; Broadie, 2002, 36; Urmson, 1988, 75-76; W.V. Leyden, 1985, 28-29, 43; Kraut, 2002, 148-150.

Rectificatory Justice

	Before Injury	*After Injury*	*After Correction*
Person X:	has goods A	has goods A - I	has goods A - I + D = A
Person Y:	has goods B	has goods B + I	has goods B + I - D = B

I= value of injury; D = value of damage award

Figure 3: Rectificatory Justice

> at all events when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and the other gain.[106]

So, the goal of rectificatory justice is not to assign "punitive" damage above and beyond the actual damages. Rather, it aims to provide a judgment that restores both wrongdoer and the wronged person to their original conditions.

Exchange or Reciprocal Justice

This form of justice concerns the fair exchange of goods between buyers and sellers.[107] Aristotle considers a fair exchange as one where the value of the goods being exchanged are equal.

> Now proportionate return [in a trade] is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C house, D a shoe. The builder, then must get from the shoemaker the latter's work, and must himself give in return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mentioned will be effected [i.e. justice in exchange is achieved]....But if [this is] not [effected] then the bargain is not equal, and does not hold [as just]....They [exchanged goods]must be equated.[108]

Like rectificatory justice, the worth of the agent involved in the transaction plays no role in determining the fairness of the exchange.[109] The fair exchange respects the value of each of the goods being exchanged and so preserves the equivalence between their values in the exchange.

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[106] *EN* 5.4 1132^{a}4-14.

[107] Hardie, 1968, 196; Broadie, 2002, 37; Joachim, 1951, 145; W.V. Leyden, 47, 1985; Kraut, 2002, 151-155; Urmson, 1988, 76-77.

[108] *EN* 5.5 1133^{a}5-15

[109] See also, *Pol* 5.6 1132^{b}22-1133^{b}28.

Exchange or Reciprocal Justice

	Seller Gain	Buyer Loss
Unfair Price	1	-1
Just Price	0	0

Figure 4: Exchange or Reciprocal Justice

Aristotle seems to think that an exchange is fair if and only if the value of the goods being exchanged is equal. In such a case there is no gain or loss of value by either party. Thus, trading appears to be a zero-sum game: a gain for one party is a loss for the other.

The Equitable (ἐπιεκείας)

A city that manifests a "rule of law" rather than (merely) a "rule of men" tends to be more stable and impartial. In contrast, a city that embodies a "rule of men" – whether through the decisionmaking of one man, or several, or the majority – is quite variable and subject to the partiality of such people. Most cities are especially susceptible to the latter given the baseness of most men.[110] Yet, laws tend to be necessarily general rules. The most that a legislator can do in the crafting of a law is to consider the largest number of cases that might be subject to it. But it is possible that a formulaic application of the law to a particular situation may result in an injustice. For example, citizen A may borrow a weapon from citizen B when citizen A is in his right mind. But citizen A may later become ill and prove unable to exercise good judgment. Suppose he becomes embroiled in a conflict and irrationally seeks to harm a third party. At that moment, citizen A may demand his weapon back from citizen B and have every legal expectation that it be returned. But should citizen B deny him the weapon, even though citizen A is its rightful owner, it may be the most just response in the circumstance. In contrast, should citizen B return the weapon, he may be complicit in some harm and thereby unjust, even though he seems legally required to return it. Equity concerns these kinds of cases, where injustice results from the strict application of the law. Equity, then, is the rectification of a law when it is defective due to its generality.[111]

> This is the nature of the equitable, a correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the reason why all

[110] *EN* 5.6 1134^{b}1-5; *Pol* 3.16 1287^{a}20-89^{b}6; *EN* 5.5 1113^{b}30-34.
[111] Hardie, 1968, 209; Joachim, 1951, 162; W.V. Leyden, 1985, 40-49.

> things are not determined by law,...so a *decree* is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts.[112]

It is clear that the appeal of oligarchic and democratic regimes to their respective standards of freedom and wealth leads them to different conclusions about what the proportionately equal distribution of offices. In order to understand how these standards promote distributions of gain and honor through these offices, it is still necessary to see how the offices already outlined are distributed according to these standards. But, one cannot chart the distribution of offices the way one might track the distribution of chips in a casino. In a casino one may count the kind and number of chip that each person holds in order to tabulate the overall value that each holds. With this information, one can also track the total value of credit being distributed in the casino. But when one considers how shares[113] of greater and lesser worth are distributed in a regime according to the standard of the regime the determination is more difficult. The shares of a regime are distributed through offices that are never purely democratic or oligarchic in structure. There are always regime norms by which assembly or council offices in either democracy or oligarchy are selected, maintained and the decisionmaking powers separated. These norms oftentimes constrain the achievement of a distribution of gain and honor according to regime standards.Certain features of the office such as the council's prerogative in shaping assembly deliberations in a democracy reduces the level of honor for assembly members that a democratic standard of distribution calls for. Similarly, the broader access to offices that the assembly enables citizens in an oligarchy undermines the oligarchic distribution of honor. Some of these features include: (1) the qualifications for holding and office for voting for an office, (2) the total number of individuals that hold an office[114] (for purposes of this discussion, *office numbers*),[115] (3) the extent to which an office holder

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[112] *EN* 5.10 1137^{b}25-32.

[113] The "share" of a citizen in the regime shall refer to the portion of the that citizen's contribution to the governance of the regime. The word is associated with the common expression used throughout the politics of a citizen's prerogative "to share in the regime"(μετεχεῖν τῆς πολιτείας) *Pol* 4.13 1301^{a}38). See also *Pol* 2.8 1268^{a}27-28; 2.10 1272^{a}15; 3.2 1275^{b}31; 4.5 1292^{a}41; 4.6 1292^{b}39; 4.6 1293^{a}3-4; 3.8 1294^{a}18; 4.13 1297^{b}5-6; 4.13 1297^{b}23-24; 5.3 1302^{b}26-27;6.6 1320^{b}26; 7.10 1329^{b}37;7.13 1332^{a}33-35.

[114] The number of members in the assembly depends on the numbers of citizens. But the more citizens there are in the regime, the greater the number of assembly members there are. So, a greater number of assembly members decreases the share of each member in their assembly powers (*Pol* 4.7 1300^{a}1-2). And, while the vote each member contributes is still numerically equal in worth, it is less decisive of a vote in assembly decisions. Also, each person, then, has less of an opportunity to participate in assembly deliberations as there are more individuals deliberating.

[115] Subsequent factors will also be italicized to indicate how they will abbreviated for use in the section.

can determine what issue is discussed[116] (*issue determination*), (4) the weight of the office holder's vote (*weight of vote*),[117] and (5) the process by which the office holder is selected (*selection process*). These five factors may influence the value of the offices being distributed differently in democratic versus oligarchic regimes. While space doesn't permit each of these factors to be fully developed, the subsequent section will refer to them when relevant.

The Worth of Offices and the Distribution of Gain and Honor

Let us now consider how oligarchic and democratic regimes[118] distribute gain (κέρδος) and honor (τίμη) through the distribution of offices.[119]

It is important to note that "gain" refers to any sum of money or item measurable by money that a person filling an office may receive through that office directly or indirectly. And for the purpose of this section, "honor" refers to

[116] The assembly members share in decision making is also diminished by the extent to which they can determine the issue for deliberation. While this is no mitigating factor when the council chooses to introduce topics for deliberation that each assembly member desires to deliberate upon anyhow. But having a share in decision-making implies that one has some investment in a decision being made if democratic citizens can only make decisions about the issues that are unimportant to them, their decision-making powers are limited. And not being able to deliberate and make decisions about how to achieve desirable ends is a considerable loss of decision-making power, even if that power remains in other spheres. So, the share of each assembly member in the decision making of the regime is further limited by the powers of the council, since it determines the matters treated in the assembly by the powers of the council, since it determines the matters treated in the assembly: the form according to which they conduct deliberations and voting (*Pol* 4.5 $1292^{b}27$; *Pol* 4.5 $1299^{b}30$-31).

[117] The issue of their declining share is somewhat distinct from the issue of the weight of their vote vis-à-vis other offices, such as the council, the executive committee, the officials, and other administrative offices. The weight of the assembly's vote should be assessed, first, in comparison to other legislative bodies that hold some decision making power through the vote. This weight can also be assessed in comparison with executive and administrative offices that possess some veto powers over assembly decisions or can in some other way constrain the implementation of assembly decisions. The decline in an assembly member's share in decision-making power in the regime as a whole is actually greater or less, based on the weight of the assemblies vote vis-à-vis other bodies in the government. The weight of the assembly member's vote, in this sense, is not diminished more than it would be if there were two separate bodies of the assembly. But still, the weight of the assembly's vote is mitigated by the implicit decision-making powers of the non-legislative offices (*Pol* 4.7 1300^{a}1-2; *Pol* 4.12 $1299^{b}39$; *AP* 43 3-4).

[118] The notion of assessing how well a regime preserves its own standard of worth in the distribution of offices is consistently mentioned in the *Politics* and certainly with respect to an overall assessment of how much democratic or oligarchic worth the regime preserves (*Pol* 4.7 1294^{a}36-37; 4.6 1294^{a}20; 4.6 1294^{a}15-17; 4.6 1293^{b}36; 4.5 1293^{b}7-8; 4.5 1293^{b}15-17; 4.7 1294^{b}19-40).

[119] While some offices enable their holders to secure gain and honor, there are some offices that are themselves honorable. In this discussion the honor that is available through these offices includes the honor of simply holding the office.

the recognition of worth that is either officially granted or widely acknowledged. The scope of honor considered here includes the honor of holding the office and other honors that are more easily available to office holders such as opportunities for risks, initiatives, and sacrifices that bring honor.

Assembly Offices in Democracies and Oligarchies

In the democratic regime the standard of freedom leads to a distribution of assembly offices that influence the level of gain and honor possessed by members of the regime. The assembly in democratic regimes tends to distribute less gain than its democratic standards demand of it due to its size and limitations in decisionmaking. Whereas, the distribution of honor in the assembly more closely matches its democratic standards.

The level of gain distributed through assembly offices in democratic regimes is undercut by the declining share of decisionmaking power available for individual members. First, the more democratic a regime is the broader its qualification for assembly. Therefore, each member has a smaller percentage of the decisionmaking power in the assembly. This limits the scale of gain that each member can obtain through the power of the assembly. Second, this limitation is reinforced by the subordination of assembly voting to the determinations of the council – a more oligarchic group. Moreover, the more oligarchic the composition of the council the more likely its members are to hinder assembly aspirations for wealth. But, while this condition prevents assembly members from expanding their money and property, it does allow them to check the loss of the same goods.[120] For even an oligarchically dominated council cannot force the majority of the assembly to pass laws or to choose actions that run counter to their advantage. So, the decline of the democratic value of the assembly in a democratic regime is enough that its members cannot advantage themselves with respect to gain, but not so much that the council can disadvantage them with respect to gain.

In contrast, the distribution of honor in a democratic assembly is not much diminished by the size of the assembly, nor its subordination to the council. The level of honor that each assembly member enjoys simply by being a member is not lessened because there are a greater or lesser number of members.[121] The honor accorded to council members is greater and marked

[120] Douglas M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 155-172; Robert Develin, *Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1-22; A.W.H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), 112-119.

[121] Even the decline in assembly share due to rising membership does not diminish the honor of holding the office. For, within the assembly, the honor of the office does not become less as the share decreases. The greater influence of individual members and even of the assembly as a whole creates opportunities to garner higher honors through risk, initiative, and greater influence. But, at worst, the limitations of the assembly may only prevent its members from missing an opportunity for greater honor, not downgrade the honor of its membership.

by their greater decisionmaking power. They are able to determine what subjects can be deliberated upon in the assembly and thereby what matters can be voted on.[122] In this case, the democratic distribution of honor is not proportionately equal since both assembly and council members possess the same honor as citizens,[123] yet possess unequal honor in their legislative offices. But even in this case, the greater honor accorded to the council members does not diminish the level of honor the assembly member possesses. So, even though the democratic distribution of honor in the assembly is somewhat undermined by its subordination to the council, its democratic distribution is largely preserved.[124]

The assembly office in oligarchies performs more a democratic than oligarchic function. The distribution of gain through an oligarchic assembly is nearly as limited as in a democratic assembly, though for different reasons. These kinds of features in the oligarchic assembly frustrate the achievement of a distribution of gain that matches oligarchic standards. Similarly, the structure of an assembly – even an oligarchic one – generates a distribution of honor that meets democratic standards more than oligarchic ones.

Within the assembly, the oligarchically qualified members function like a democracy. The members are entitled to vote and participate in deliberation. In principle, the wealthier assembly members don't receive a weightier vote or more extensive opportunities for deliberation. Any limitation on the equal weight of these votes is based on external constraints such as the influence of the council, executive committee, or administrative offices. So, the oligarchic distribution of assembly offices is greatly skewed. But, the assembly maintains considerable oligarchic value when the assembly is considered as part of a larger whole; that is, the governing body at large. But there are some factors in an oligarchy that enable it to preserve some oligarchic features even in its assembly. In this case, the subordination of the assembly to the council makes the assembly conclusions more oligarchic-friendly. Also the qualifications of assembly membership in an oligarchy will be more restrictive, making it more oligarchic in nature. Even larger assemblies can have the effect of reducing the decision-making power of each assembly member. This enhances the relative decision-making power of each council member since they shape the agenda of the assembly. Despite these oligarchic compensations, the assembly in an oligarchic regime is a largely democratic body.

In an oligarchy, the level of gain and honor distributed through assembly offices that retain most of their oligarchic worth is similar to its democratic

[122] One might think that this latter distinction suggests the superiority of the assembly in decisionmaking powers and so a higher honor in office. The assembly votes on decision-making, not the council. But every council member is also an assembly member. So the prestige of the council member is their ability to determine issues and then to deliberate and vote on it.

[123] It is questionable that Aristotle's notion of honor is such that it can be distributed according to a standard of numerical equality.

[124] *Pol* 4.6 1294[a]10-15.

counterpart. The level of gain possible is somewhat limited due to the constraints placed on the office. As a larger body, its individual members have less individual influence over their pursuit of gain. Also, the larger base of citizens with means in the assembly complicate efforts that are based in collective self-interest. This legislative body is occupied by a larger number of wealthy and more rivalrous members than in a democratic assembly. The prospect for using their individual share in decision-making to vote for laws and choose actions that enhance their collective gain are limited by the power of the council.[125] For, an even wealthier and perhaps more rivalrous body controls what the assembly addresses.[126] Unless there is a law or decision that would unequivocally improve everyone's gain, it is unlikely that such efforts would succeed. And even if there were such a measure, it is unlikely that the level of gain per person would be very considerable. So, the distribution of assembly offices in an oligarchic regime does not translate into high levels of gain. However, like a democratic assembly, it may limit measures that would lead to a great loss of wealth and property.

The extent to which honor is distributed under such a condition is quite similar to its distribution in the democratic setting. The higher qualifications for the assembly office in an oligarchy don't make the office more or less valuable there. The honor of being in an assembly is proportionately equal between its members. Whatever threshold of wealth and property qualifications has been met or exceeded by its members makes them members without qualification. The office doesn't officially allow for a more specific differentiation of status within the assembly. So, the office conveys equal honor among its members.[127] And the honor, when compared with the more oligarchic office of council, is not diminished by the comparison. This level of honor distribution is consistent and considerable.

Council Offices in Democracies and Oligarchies

The distribution of gain and honor through the distribution of council offices offers a thorough contrast to that of assembly offices. In democratic regimes the standard of freedom leads to a distribution of council offices that fails to capture democratic standards. Whereas in the oligarchic regimes, the standard of wealth promotes a distribution of council offices that substantially achieves oligarchic standards.

[125] *AP* 44-49; P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 49-82; Douglas M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 24-40.

[126] A.W.H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), 139-140; Barry S. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 55-58; P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 148-9; Douglas M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 27.

[127] *Politics* 4.7 1299^{b}36-38; 4.6 1294^{a}10-15.

The level of gain available through the distribution of council offices in oligarchies is greater than any other legislative office, whether in oligarchies or democracies. But the level of gain available is still not very high. The oligarchic council wields the greatest influence over what matters are discussed and voted on in assembly, including finance and budgetary issues. So the oligarchic council is the office of all the regimes that is best positioned to gain from its influence. While this is not a direct form of gain, they can still privilege their interests and help those who help them by means of their council powers. Furthermore, they wield further powers to nominate qualified individuals to administrative offices. Many of these offices are quite lucrative. The offices of revenue officers such as the receivers (ἀποδεκται) and treasurers (τάμιαι), as well as the board of accountants (λόγισται) and ten auditors (εὔθυνοι) all deal with considerable sums.[128] Other administrative offices such as town managers (ἀστύνυμοι), market managers (ἀγοράνομοι), court managers (ἱερομνήμονες) still have great discretion over decisions that indirectly impact the flow of money.[129] The council's power of nomination is balanced by the approval and veto powers of other offices. But it still has the somewhat unchecked power to supervise the dealings of officials in these offices.[130] So, their determinations can maintain, hinder, or eliminate the dealings of lucrative offices.

The largely undiminished worth of council offices in an oligarchy enables relatively small numbers of office holders strong influence over the distribution of gain. The council in democracies also have a noticeable access to the distribution of gain, but less than in oligarchies and more than in the assemblies of either regime type. The distribution of gain through the council office in a democracy is reduced by its oligarchic features such as its ability to determine issues, its less representative selection process, and its higher property qualifications. So, the distribution of wealth generated by council influence results in a more oligarchic pattern than a democratic one. As a whole, the council's influence over gain distribution is indirect, and the individual democratic citizens influence on the council even less direct. So, whatever levels of gain are potentially available through the council office becomes more modest on average for each democratic citizen due to the oligarchic distortions of the office.

The level of honor available through the council office is the highest honor of the offices treated in this project. The greater decision-making influence wielded by council members in either regime is itself the greater honor. The council's greater decision-making influence enables the achievement of even

[128] *AP* 49; P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian* Athenaion Politeia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 565-575. Robert Develin, *Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1-22.

[129] Robert Develin, *Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1-22.

[130] P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 56-72.

greater honors. The more democratic office of assembly confers a relatively equal honor on its holders – all qualified citizens – whether in a democratic or oligarchic regime. But the later is not the case for the council. The council, being a more oligarchic office, confers higher honor on its holders, the more exclusive its membership is. So, a very oligarchic oligarchy has extremely high wealth qualifications for holding a council office. This higher standard increases the prestige of its members. Whereas, the honor of the assembly is not increased by making it more exclusive. The assembly is an office for the people, even in an oligarchy. So, even a more highly qualified assembly in an oligarchy will generate somewhat smaller numbers. But the role of the assembly, whether in an oligarchy or democracy, is to serve the citizens at large. A somewhat more exclusive membership doesn't increase the prestige of its members. It only prevents the conferring of honors on citizens lacking sufficient investment in the regime. So, the honor of the oligarchic council is the highest honor of all the offices treated in this section.

The honor of the democratic council is diminished by the oligarchic nature of the council. The high democratic honor of serving people better is possible through the council. But, despite the declining democratic value of the council, it still conveys higher honors than the assembly does; but not as high of an honor as it would were it less oligarchic in structure. So, the council in both democracies and oligarchies is more highly honored than any other office in their respective regimes.

The regimes most vulnerable to *stasis* – oligarchies and democracies – distribute gain and honor indirectly based on the standards of worth for the regime that determine how the full scope of offices will themselves be distributed.[131] While these regime standards are strong indicators of how the objects of gain and honor will thereby be appreciated among the citizenry, a number of other factors skew this framework. So, the manner in which democratic or oligarchic regimes promote the ends of gain and honor is a product of the regime standard and other factors having to do with the specifics of the office, its function, and its relation to other offices in everyday decision making. While the latter factors can blur somewhat the understanding of how each regime standard translates into a regime ethos, it doesn't change the overall pattern for the ethos of oligarchic and democratic regimes that Aristotle describes. But it is still crucial to Aristotle's view of the polis to recognize that the stated (or even established) regime standards alone do not exclusively shape how gain and honor are distributed in the regime, let alone how citizens will come to be disposed to gain and honor.

[131] This is not to say that the gain and honor distributed through offices exhaust what gain and honor is available in regime, or serve as a unique indicator for how citizens might become formed with respect to these aims. But this sphere is still a substantial indicator of how such regime contexts form citizens with respect to the *stasis* process.

So, both the regime aims and contexts in oligarchies and democracies powerfully shape the stance of citizens to gain and honor. For every citizen shares in the decision making of the regime, more and less, and learns how to approach the ends of gain and honor in this process. However encompassing this formation may be, the recurring features of these regimes provide a crucial backdrop for understanding the pattern of *stasis* that they typically generate.

III. The Proximate Causes of Stasis

The previous discussion (Ch. 1, sec. I) of the senses of the term *stasis* puts us in a position to discuss the causes of *stasis* considered in Politics 5.[132] Aristotle identifies three types of causes[133] of *stasis*: the formal, final, and efficient causes.[134]

Overview of the Causes

Aristotle maintains that the knowledge of something requires a knowledge of its causes (αἰτίαι). Moreover, he understands a cause as that which provides an adequate answer to the question "why?" He tends to answer such questions in reference to four explanatory factors: the matter or the material cause, the form or the formal cause, the mover or the efficient cause and the final cause or 'that for the sake of which' a change occurs.[135]

The material cause is the underlying material or matter (ὕλη) from which a thing arises or comes into being. For instance, the wood from which a carpen-

[132] Aristotle first characterizes the investigation appropriate for understanding the causes of *stasis* as one that is rough or in outline form. "Since we are investigating the things from which both factions and revolutions concerning the regime arise, one must first consider their starting points and causes in a general way. These are, roughly speaking, three in number, and should themselves be treated first in outline form."(ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τίνων αἵ τε στάσεις γίνονται καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, ληπτέον καθόλου πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. εἰσὶ δὴ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τρεῖς τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἃς διοριστέον καθ' αὑτὰς τύπῳ πρῶτον) (*Pol* 5.1 1302^{a}16-19).

[133] The goal of this section in using the four causes to understand *stasis* is not to show that they exhaust the complexities of *stasis*, but just that they explain some of those complexities. The use of the four causes can become most problematic when analyzing group behavior *qua* group. That is not to say that an explanation of group action is unintelligible through the use of the four causes. But rather, Aristotle's approach to causality is not at the height of its explanatory powers when reflecting on group behavior. Additionally, this project considers Aristotle's use of the four causes with respect to *stasis* because it assumes that investigating *stasis* in the manner and spirit that Aristotle did, will best illuminate the character dimensions of *stasis* and his moral-political theory as a whole.

[134] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}19-22.

[135] *Phys* 2.3 194^{b}16-195^{a}4; *Meta* 5.2 1013^{a}24-1014^{a}26.

ter crafts a table is the material cause of the finished table.[136] The unformed matter is somewhat indeterminate since it can be shaped in many ways. But the fact it can be so shaped indicates that the matter is also determinable. Aristotle treats matter as indeterminate, insofar as it is incomplete in itself, though the matter is receptive to form.[137]

The formal cause is the pattern (παραδείγμα) or form of that thing which is caused.[138] The formal cause of the table is the model or blueprint according to which the carpenter fashions the wood into a perfect table. The wood is able to receive a new determination or form that the carpenter gives to it, specifically as the form of the table. The wood receives the form of the table and is in fact changed. But the table is a configuration of wood rather than of marble or some other material. So, this change is merely accidental since the substance is still wood, though the shape or configuration of the wood is different.[139]

The efficient cause is the source of change (ἄρχη τῆς μεταβολῆς). Changes have causes and effects. Some effects are things that are made (ποιήμα) or produced as is the case with works such as sculpture, buildings, poetry and even the education of citizens. In such cases, the source of change is the one who makes (ποιήτης) or produces the work. For example, in the case of the table, the carpenter is its maker. Aristotle also treats the carpenter's art (τέχνη) – his rational capacity to make (ἕχις ποιήτικη) – as a source of change.[140] When art or production is understood as a source of change, it is an intellectual virtue that enables one to make something external to oneself.[141] In contrast, there are also changes where the efficient cause is internal to the thing undergoing change. For Aristotle this is the case with the growth and maturation of an

[136] For other examples along these lines, see *Met* 4.2 1013^{a}25-28; *Met* 12.7 1032^{b}13-14; *Met* 12.9 1034^{b}24.

[137] *Phys* 1.9 192^{a}16-24.

[138] This kind of cause answers to the "what is it" (τὶ ἐστί;) question. So, the answer to this question states the essence (genus, plus specific difference) of the thing in question. The following standard passage emphasizes this: "It is clear that we must obtain knowledge of the primary causes, because it is when we think that we understand its primary cause that we claim to know each particular thing. Now there are four recognized kinds of cause. Of these we hold that one is the essence or essential nature of the thing (since the 'reason why' of a thing is ultimately reducible to its formula, and the ultimate 'reason why' is a cause and principle...)"(ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτίων δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην 'τότε γὰρ εἰδέναι φαμὲν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γνωρίζειν', τὰ δ' αἴτια λέγεται τετραχῶς, ὧν μίαν μὲν αἰτίαν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι 'ἀνάγεται γὰρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ἔσχατον, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸ διὰ τί πρῶτον' ...)(*Met* 1.3 983^{a}24-33). See also, *Physics* 2.7 198^{a}14-21.

[139] In other cases of change the thing undergoing change receives a new substantial form. For example, coal may be changed into a diamond if there is sufficient time, pressure, etc. The coal takes on a new substantial form under such conditions, rather than just being configured differently, as in the above example.

[140] Aristotle discusses efficient causality in a very similar case as follows: "both the art of sculpture and the bronze are the causes of the statue,...not however in the same way, but the one as the matter and the other as the source of movement" (*Met* 5.2 1013^{b}6-9).

[141] *EN* 6.4 1140^{a}1-15.

organism or in the case of other natural bodies that move in accordance with their natural motion, unless otherwise hindered.[142]

The final cause (οὐ ἕνεκα) is that end (τέλος) for the sake of which a (moving) cause moves or acts.[143] In the practical sphere, the end may be a cause in the sense of being the object of desire (ὀρέχις) of one who makes (πιοήτης) or acts (πράκτηρ). In the case of the carpenter, there is some end for the sake of which he fashions the wood into a table. So, this end is the final cause of the carpenter's production of the table.

In short, the four causes provide an explanatory framework for understanding 'why' some change has occurred: the carpenter's fashioning of raw wood into a table. Its material cause is the wood from which it's produced. The efficient cause is the art by which he produces it. The formal cause is the blueprint or model for the table being made. The final cause is the end that the desk serves.

Aristotle on the Causes of Stasis

In Aristotle's most paradigmatic treatment of *stasis* he identifies three kinds of immediate causes: (1) the state of mind (πῶς ἐχόντες) of the factionaries, that is their beliefs about the world and their context in it; (2) the aim or goal (τινῶν ἕνεκεν) of the factionaries; and (3) the occasioning causes (ἄρχαι) that provoke or trigger the desires, emotions and actions of the factionaries.[144]

These immediate causes of *stasis* are elaborate as follows:

[142] *De Caelo* 311[a]1-6.

[143] "The fourth is the cause which is opposite to this, namely the purpose or 'good'; for this is the end of every generative or motive process. We have investigated these sufficiently in the Physics"(τετάρτην δὲ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν ταύτῃ, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τἀγαθόν 'τέλος γὰρ γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάσης τοῦτ' ἐστίν', τεθεώρηται μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως) (*Met* 1.3 983[a]30-33). "Cause means...(d) the same as 'end'; i.e. the final cause; e.g., as the 'end' of walking is health. For why does a man walk? 'To be healthy,' we say, and by saying this we consider that we have supplied the cause. (e) All those means towards the end which arise at the instigation of something else, as, e.g. fat-reducing, purging, drugs and instruments are causes of health..." (αἴτιον λέγεται...ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος: τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια. διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ· φαμέν. ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ. καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. καὶ ὅσα δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίγνεται τοῦ τέλους) (*Meta* 4.2 1013[a]25-36).

[144] Aristotle's introduction to the causes of *stasis* in *Pol* 5.1-2 employs terminology that can only suggest his use of the traditional four causes in his discussion. "One should grasp what condition men are in when they form factions; for the sake of what they do so; and thirdly, what the starting points are for civic turbulence and factional tensions among one another" (πρῶτον. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν πῶς τε ἔχοντες στασιάζουσι καὶ τίνων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τρίτον τίνες ἀρχαὶ γίνονται τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων) (*Pol* 5.2 1302[a]19-22).

(1) The relevant state of mind of the factionary is his view of justice and his belief that others have more wealth and honor than they should.[145] The democrat believes that all citizens, as such, are equal without qualification. Justice requires that equals receive what is equal. As a consequence, the proportionately equal distribution of wealth and honor is a numerically equal distribution. The oligarch thinks that the wealthy, including himself, are superior and should receive an unequal distribution of wealth, honor, power, etc.[146] The proportionately equal distribution is one where oligarchs receive far more than the people.

> Now the principal cause, speaking generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed to revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that desire equality form factions if they think that they have too little although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, and they may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people form factions in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men engage in factious struggle.[147]

Aristotle primarily emphasizes the cause of faction as the disposition or condition (πῶς ἔχοντες) of those individuals that form them. Those individuals are in a condition[148] such that their views or beliefs[149] about justice are the

[145] On the distortions of oligarchic and democratic beliefs about justice, see Loraux, 1991, 40; Kraut, 2002, 435; Linott, 1982, 248.

[146] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}2-32.

[147] [ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τίνων αἵ τε στάσεις γίνονται καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, ληπτέον καθόλου πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. εἰσὶ δὴ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τρεῖς τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἃς διοριστέον καθ' αὑτὰς τύπῳ πρῶτον. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν πῶς τε ἔχοντες στασιάζουσι καὶ τίνων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τρίτον τίνες ἀρχαὶ γίνονται τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων. τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν αἰτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα θετέον περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφιέμενοι στασιάζουσιν ἂν νομίζωσιν ἔλαττον ἔχειν ὄντες ἴσοι τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀλλ' ἴσον ἢ ἔλαττον 'τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι δικαίως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως': ἐλάττους τε γὰρ ὄντες ὅπως ἴσοι ὦσι στασιάζουσι, καὶ ἴσοι ὄντες ὅπως μείζους. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες στασιάζουσιν, εἴρηται] (*Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}19-30).

[148] This sense of condition is different from its sense as a condition of the regime. This use simply refers to a state or disposition of the individuals who are faction candidates or are already engaged in one. So, in this section disposition and condition may be used interchangeably. This is consistent with the use of disposition that will be elaborated in subsequent chapters. But the term will take on a more specific use in those later chapters.

[149] It is appropriate to refer to the "views" or "beliefs" of the individuals described in the earlier passages. Aristotle uses verbs such as νομίζειν and ὑπολαμβάνειν to convey their state of mind. These verbs have meanings such as: to think, consider, regard, take (i.e., "I take it that..."). So, it is common for this kind of verb to emphasize the subject's own impressions or views.

basis for the factions they form. While there may be numerous organizing grounds for faction, the one's that Aristotle emphasizes are democratic and oligarchic in nature. Those who form democratic or oligarchic-based factions operate from a view of "justice."[150]

The beliefs of those who form factions function as the formal cause of those factions.[151] They have beliefs about justice that become the organizing principles of these factional associations. This is similar to the model or blueprint that the carpenter has in mind for the production of a table.[152] So also, the

[150] Democrats and oligarchs, alike, think that equals should receive what is equal and unequals should receive what is unequal. But they differ about two kinds of particulars concerning the circumstances of justice. Firstly, they disagree about what the correct standard of worth is for the distribution of related goods. Democrats think that all citizens are equal without qualification because each and every citizen is free, whereas, oligarchs think that those who possess more wealth or status are greater in worth than those with less of these same goods. Secondly, oligarchs and democrats disagree about what the just distribution of goods is in a particular circumstance. Consider a case where the city is in a condition of grave scarcity. Under such circumstances, oligarchs and democrats disagree about which persons should hold which offices. For example, democrats might think that a person with modest property qualifications should be able to hold prestigious and lucrative administrative offices, in the above circumstances; whereas, oligarchs insist that a more propertied person hold the office on the grounds that those who are unequal-wealthier citizens – deserve unequal things – the better office.

[151] This is not the standard way of using formal causality because factional formation is not the standard kind of change that formal causality tries to explain. It is more typical for it to explain changes of substances. But once Aristotle's causes are used to explain faction, the role of the factionaries views or beliefs about justice are not out of place; but rather, are an intelligible approach for the subject matter. This view is especially consistent with Aristotle's understanding of production (τέχνη), which includes the making of citizens. While statesmen try to make good citizens under the conditions of the best political communities, factionaries try to promote their claims of justice, vindicating the injustices they (or their friends) suffer, by making factions. So, this use of formal causality is very appropriate given Aristotle's other philosophical and political commitments. Jowett considers the disposition or condition of the men forming factions as the material cause rather than a formal cause (and an efficient cause) Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958). But this view seems problematic given the fact that the factionaries are not merely subject to certain changes, but have dispositions for factional formation. Keyt puts forward a superior view that this condition or disposition of the factionaries includes both formal and (as we shall discuss later) efficient causes: Keyt, Aristotle's *Politics Books V and VI* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 77. Furthermore, the more that the character of the factionaries is understood as the cause beneath both the beliefs and desires of the factionaries, the more we should understand these conditions or dispositions as both formal and efficient causes of faction.

[152] The beliefs or view of justice held by individuals forming factions is analogous to the artist's conception of a work he produces. This is a formal cause because the work gets its form from the artist's conception of the form. This is a consistent view in Aristotle's thought: "Now the healthy subject is produced as the result of this reason: since health is so-and-so, if the subject is to be healthy, it must have such-and-such a quality, e.g. homogeneity; and if so, it must have heat. And the doctor continues reasoning until he arrives at what he himself finally can do; then the process from this point forward, i.e. the process towards health, is called 'production'. Thus, health comes from health and the house from a house; that which has matter from that which has not (for the

view of justice shared by the individual factionaries is the model for their factional association and ultimately for the regime that they hope to put in place. Their shared view of justice is the bond of their association and the organizing structure for their opposition to the regime or its leadership.[153]

But the disposition of the factionaries that shapes their beliefs about justice also shapes their desires. These desires are an efficient cause of factional formation and will be discussed below. But, it is important to indicate at this point that such desires drive the production of factions from their status as merely misguided beliefs about justice into actual factional associations.[154] Moreover, the misguided beliefs of these proto-factionaries about justice are not causally efficacious in their manufacture of factional associations. But rather, that their beliefs about justice become the models for a production of faction that they are already determined to make.[155]

(2) The aim or goal (τινῶν ἕνεκεν)of the factionary is to secure for himself or his friends a greater portion of wealth and honor relative to others, or the avoidance of loss or dishonor, relative to others.[156] The means to this end is to

art of medicine or of building is the form of health or the house). By substance without matter I mean the essence" (ἡ δὲ ὑγίεια ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. γίγνεται δὲ τὸ ὑγιὲς νοήσαντος οὕτως: ἐπειδὴ τοδὶ ὑγίεια, ἀνάγκη εἰ ὑγιὲς ἔσται τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, οἷον ὁμαλότητα, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, θερμότητα: καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ νοεῖ, ἕως ἂν ἀγάγῃ εἰς τοῦτο ὃ αὐτὸς δύναται ἔσχατον ποιεῖν. εἶτα ἤδη ἡ ἀπὸ τούτου κίνησις ποίησις καλεῖται, ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. ὥστε συμβαίνει τρόπον τινὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἐξ ὑγιείας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐξ οἰκίας, τῆς ἄνευ ὕλης τὴν ἔχουσαν ὕλην: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ ἐστι καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς οἰκίας, λέγω δὲ οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) (*Met.* 7.7.1032^{b}5-14). Aristotle makes a similar point: "It is clear also from what we have said that in all artificial things are generated either from something of [the same] name (just as with natural objects) or from a part of something of [the same] name as themselves (e.g. a house from a house, inasmuch as it is generated by mind; for the art is the form)..."(δῆλον δ΄ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ πάντα γίγνεται ἐξ ὁμωνύμου, ὥσπερ τὰ φύσει, ἢ ἐκ μέρους ὁμωνύμου 'οἷον ἡ οἰκία ἐξ οἰκίας, ἧ ὑπὸ νοῦ: ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος') (*Met* 7.9.1034^{a}24). See also, *Phys.* 2.2.194^{a}21-7 and *Met.*12.7.1032^{a}32^{b}14.

[153] *Pol* 5.1 1301^{b}5-25.

[154] See Yack, 1993, 221.

[155] The disposition of the individuals forming factions is a formal cause of factions insofar as it shapes their beliefs, but the desiderative component of the disposition is the efficient cause of factions in this later sense. Keyt also argues that the disposition of those who form factions is both a formal and efficient cause of factional association in Keyt (1999), 77. See also Salkever, 1990, 66 who also emphasizes the desires of factionaries as the efficient cause of the *stasis*. This latter use of efficient causality is also manifest in illustrations Aristotle uses. Consider the following samples: "It is clear then, that there are such things as causes, and that they can be classified under the four points that have been detailed. For these are the four ways of understanding the 'how and why' of things: we may refer it...to that which first initiated the movement) as in : 'Why did they go to war? Because the others had raided them" (*Phys.*, 2.7 198^{a}14-20). Consider also: "Why did the Persian expedition come against Athens? Or in other words, what was the cause of her fighting in the war ? what was the cause of her fighting in the war? Because Athens had, in company with Eretria, attacked Sardis"(ἆ τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις· τίς αἰτία τοῦ πολεμεῖσθαι Ἀθηναίους· ὅτι εἰς Σάρδεις μετ᾽ Ἐρετρειέων ἐνέβαλον. Τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκίνησε πρῶτον) (An. *Post.* 2.2.94^{a}36-94^{b}8).

[156] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}32-35. Gauthier and Jolif, 1970, 139; Loraux, 1991, 40; D. O'Connor, 1991,

organize into factional associations and then to alter or replace the regime[157] through the use of force (βία)or fraud (ἀπάτε):

> What the condition is when they engage in factional conflict, then, has been spoken of. As for the things for which they engage in faction conflict, these are gain and honor and their opposites (for they may engage in factional conflict in cities in order to avoid dishonor or punishment either for themselves or for their friends).[158]

(3) The occasioning causes (ἄρχαι) which trigger factional conflict are many and varied; any of a number of events can spark convulsive action. Aristotle lists eleven occasioning causes. The first seven of them are provocations, whereas the last four are simply circumstances that increase the likelihood of *stasis*: (i) the perception of grossly unfair or illicit gains, (ii) the perception of honor gained by a rival individual or group, (iii) the fear of a retaliation or exploitation that seems imminent and which triggers preemptive action, (iv) the perception of oneself as a victim of insolence (ὕβρις) due to more powerful rivals who hope to demonstrate their superiority, (v) the perception of excessive dominance (ὑπερόχη) of others, (vi) contempt (καταφρονήσις) for those perceived to be weak, (vii) disproportionate growth of power in some other part of the polis; and also (viii-xii) election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, and racial dissimilarity.[159]

> And the causes and starting points of the changes by which men are affected in the manner already discussed and concerning the objects [discussed] are by one account seven in number, but according to another [account] more. Two of them are the same as those discussed previously, although not operating in the same way. For it is because of gain and honor that men are incited against one another, not (as we said before) in order that they may aggrandize themselves, but because they see others (some justly, others unjustly) getting more. Again, it is because of insolence, fear, superiority, contempt, and disproportionate growth. And, still in another way, it is because of electioneering, belittlement, smallness, or dissimilarity.[160]

176; Kalimtzis, 2000, 123-127; Mulgan, 1978, 121-124.

[157] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}32-^{a}5.

[158] *EN* 1302^{a}31-33.

[159] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}32-35.

[160] [αἱ δ᾽ αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων, ὅθεν αὐτοί τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἑπτὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς πλείους. ὧν δύο μέν ἐστι ταὐτὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡσαύτως: διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν καὶ παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα κτήσωνται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρους ὁρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δ᾽ ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων: ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχήν, διὰ καταφρόνησιν, διὰ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον: ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον δι᾽ ἐριθείαν, δι᾽ ὀλιγωρίαν, διὰ μικρότητα, διὰ ἀνομοιότητα. Τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν: ὑβριζόντων τε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ πλεονεκτούντων στασιάζουσι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς διδούσας τὴν ἐξουσίαν] (*Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}35-1302^{b}8).

The first two occasioning causes can be understood through formal, final and efficient causality. The final cause of *stasis* is the end of gain and honor for which the factionaries organize.[161] But an agent's stance towards this end must involve his desires and beliefs. The agent desires greater wealth or honor, or avoiding the loss of it. The desire that drives the movement of the factionaries is the efficient cause of *stasis*.[162] Their desire for greater gain and honor fuels their movement, association and conflict for those objects. The agent also believes he has received too small a portion of it.[163] This belief is the formal cause of faction, as it is the belief that they have received less than what seems like the proportionately equal distribution. Of course, this belief is based on their view of justice that informs their respective judgments about how little they have received.[164] What is the disposition that best accounts for these desires and beliefs?[165] Aristotle offers a further sketch of this through the remaining listing of perceptions (iii)-(vi) that provoke agents with this disposition to engage in *stasis*. The best way to understand the causes of *stasis* is to explain the disposition that shapes the beliefs and desires of those engaged in *stasis*.[166] This will be discussed in chapters two and three of this

[161] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}32-35.

[162] These desires (and the dispositions that ground them) serve as efficient causes in the way that the craftsman's (τέχνη) causes him to produce the table. It is by virtue of his productive ability that he builds the table. Of course, the dispositions of those factionaries are not productive abilities but rather moral dispositions. Along these lines, the ability of the runner to perform well in a race is an efficient cause that is closer to a moral disposition. But a team of excellent runners who use their running ability in a military operation are producing a military victory. So, however dissimilar moral dispositions are from productive abilities, they still have the effect of producing factional associations in cities. So, in reference to the individuals that factionaries deal with in their daily lives, their dispositions are character states that enable practical action (πράχις) whether good or bad. But their dispositions operate according to a productive function when they are in larger political settings where they have the opportunity and impetus to form factions.

[163] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}26-28.

[164] See note 148.

[165] There are a number of character states that account for a person's stance to the objects of honor and gain. The ones more directly concerned with them in the case of honor are good temper (ὀργίλος), irascibility (ὀργιλότης) and inirascibility (ἀοργησία), shamefulness (αιδήμων), greatness of soul (μεγαλοψυχία), vanity (καυνότης), small mindedness (μικροψυχία), righteous indignation (νέμεσις), from the first table of virtues and vices *EN* 2.3 1104^{b}2- 2.7 1108^{b}16). The states more concerned with gain are stinginess (ἀνελευθερία), wastefulness (ἀσωτια) and, indirectly, intemperance (ἀσοφρόσυνη). Whereas states concerned with both gain and honor are enviousness (φθόνος), ambitiousness (φιλοτιμία),and the unnamed vices it is between), spitefulness (ἐπιχαιρεκακία), generosity (ἐλευθεριότης), munificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια), friendliness (φιλία), flattery (κόλαξ), and quarrelsomeness (δύσερίς). In the case of the emotion of fear, the states of cowardice (δειλία), courage (ἀνδρεία) and rashness (θράσος) are all possible dispositions that determine one's susceptibilities to it. There is a wide range of states that control one's stance to these objects. The topic of what states or dispositions account for the motivations and drives of factionaries at various stages in the *stasis* process is further incorporated into the discussion in subsequent chapters.

[166] On the significance of viciousness for injustice and *stasis*, see Kraut, 2002, 435; Yack, 1993, 156.

project. But the other portion of these occasioning causes (vii)-(xi) do not provoke such dispositions, but rather, increase the likelihood of *stasis*. These are circumstances such as a growing gap between rich and poor that simply serve as a catalyst for whatever dispositional causes are already in place.[167]

IV. Conclusion

Stasis is a condition of the polis that promotes factional associations that lead to conflict, violence and revolution. But the features of *stasis* are best understood in their regime contexts. These are the contexts from which and through which the struggle for gain and honor occur. The disputes between oligarchs and democrats that ostensibly concern the just distribution of these goods can only be adequately explained by appealing to their character dimension. A treatment of the proximate causes of *stasis* illuminates the beliefs and desires of the agents engaged in it. Let us first turn to Aristotle's moral psychology, highlighting especially the function of character in the formation of beliefs and desires from which agents act. Then we shall return to an account of bad character and, especially the vices of envy and vanity, as the ultimate cause of *stasis*.

[167] The later chapters will also show that some of the above circumstances must seem uniquely provocative to the envious and vain.

2. ARISTOTLE'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

A central claim of this book is that the ultimate cause of stasis in Aristotle is the bad character of those who inhabit these cities. This chapter discusses the distinctions needed to understand Aristotle's theory of character (ἦθος) and of virtue and vice. The first section elaborates the distinction of the faculties of the human soul. With this distinction, it is possible to understand action as the consequence of choice, choice as the consequence of the union of desire and belief, and desire and belief as the consequence of character. The second section considers the role of moral education in the formation of character, which in turn shapes desire and belief and, in turn, choice and action. The third section considers the defining features of good and bad moral character, namely, virtue and vice.

I. The Faculties of the Soul

Aristotle divides the faculties of the soul into cognitive and non-cognitive faculties.[1] A non-cognitive faculty (δύναμις) is an ability or power that is either receptive to reason or not. The faculties that are not receptive to reason are vegetative (τὸ φύτικον) faculties such as those that provide the nutritional, maturational and reproductive undergirding for the activities of mere life.[2] The nutritional faculty is the ability to process biologically the materials necessary for nutrition. The maturational faculty is the ability for growth and decay. The reproductive faculty is the ability to contribute to the conception, formation, and the birth of a human life.[3] The bulk of these faculties are the material base for life that a person can choose to employ well or badly.

[1] Aristotle sometimes refers to this division as the rational (τὸ λόγον) part of the soul and the non-rational (τὸ ἄλογον) part of the soul (*EN* 1.13 1102^{a}28). The non-rational part is divided into a part that is receptive to reason and a part that is not. So the designation of the "non-rational" part of the soul can be misleading since part of it is capable of being guided by reason. Broadie, *Ethics With Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 61.

[2] *EN* 1.13 1102^{b}1. Aristotle refers to these nutritive and maturational parts, respectively, as the cause of nutrition (τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι) and the cause of growth (τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὔξεσθαι). See also, Stewart, 1892, 165; Broadie, 1991, 62; Hardie, 1968, 74; Joachim, 1951, 62

[3] *EN* 1.13 1102^{b}1-2. Broadie, 1991, 62; Kraut, 1989, 67.

The higher faculties enable a person, who already draws from the resources of mere life to live well.[4]

The faculties that are potentially receptive to reason[5] are the desiderative faculties (δύναμις ὀρέκτικου).[6] Once they are educated and perfected, they become moral virtues. The raw ability of the desiderative faculty is to be moved by emotion and desire.[7] So, when this faculty is perfected it enables its possessor to be moved well by emotion and desire.[8] Aristotle sometimes refers to the upper limits of this faculty as the ability to wish (ἐυθελεῖν) well. The ability to wish well or to have a rational desire (βουλήσις) is a structuring of one's capacity for appetitive desire (ἐπιθύμια), emotion (πάθος) and non-appetitive desire (ὀρέξις) such that one is receptive to the guidance of practical wisdom (φρόνησις).[9] An unperfected ability for desire and emotion leaves a person controlled by appetitive impulses and extreme emotional reactions. The force and urgency of the person's unperfected desires and emotions causes them to ignore the counsel of practical thought. Consequently, the function of practical wisdom is reduced to the calculation of the most effective means for achieving whatever end is already in one's desiderative purview. In contrast, when the faculty is properly structured, the person is receptive to practical wisdom because the end he desires is amenable to the best guidance of practical wisdom. So if the end informing the deliberations of practical wisdom is a good end (and not merely an apparently good end), then practical wisdom can guide the person who is wishing for good ends to the most appropriate choice of action.

The cognitive faculties divide into two: the sensory faculties and intellectual.[10] The sensory faculties include perceptual and imaginative faculties, whereas the intellectual faculties are divided into three: the theoretical, productive and deliberative faculties.[11]

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[4] Hardie, 1968, 74.

[5] *EN* 1.13 $1102^{b}13$; $1102^{b}26$. Aristotle refers to this part of the non-rational part as sharing or participating in reason (μετέχειν λόγου)Broadie, 1991, 62; Joachim, 1951, 61.

[6] *EN* 1.13 $1102^{b}31$. This faculty can also be referred to with the word associated with appetitive desire (ἐπιθύμια) in the form (δύναμις ἐπιθυμήτικου), rather than the word that is associated with the broader sense of desire (ὀρέξις) A use of the expression that emphasizes the broader sense of desire is the better use for our purposes, since it also embraces the capacity for appetitive desire. Aristotle also refers to a faculty of emotion (δύναμις πάθου) under the designation of desiderative faculty. So, in this chapter, the use of "desiderative faculty" will embrace both faculties.

[7] See, Hardie, 1968, 75; Joachim, 1951, 62, 66.

[8] See, Hardie, 1968, 100; Kraut, 1989, 70; Broadie, 1991, 74.

[9] *EN* 1.13 $1102^{b}32$.

[10] *EN* 1.13 $1103^{a}6$; 6.1 $1139^{a}13$; $1139^{a}19$. Aristotle sometimes refers to the intellectual faculties as δύναμις διανοντικῆς or δύναμις ἐπιστημάτικου even though the latter usually refers to science – one of the five intellectual virtues – rather than the intellectual faculty itself. I will use the former expression to avoid the latter conflation. Aristotle more consistently refers to the sensory faculty as δύναμις αἰσθησέως

[11] *EN* 6.1 1139^{a}; 6.3 $1139^{b}18$-6. 6 $1141^{b}24$. Aristotle usually treats the deliberative faculty (δύναμις λογίστικου) as the faculty that the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom

The sensory faculties enable the person to receive sense data about the world; that is, the persons, places and things that constitute it and one's place in it.[12] This data is perceived through the five senses and developed into images (αἱ φαντάσιαι) through the faculty of imagination.[13] The faculty of imagination draws from current and past sense data to form mental images of persons, places, things and their attendant circumstances, whether real or unreal.[14] These images may be formed in response to a changing circumstance or in order to focus one's attention on an ongoing circumstance. So also, the same images may become dreams or simply become stored as memories for that person to access in the future.

The sensory faculties do not function in isolation from the non-cognitive part. The complex motivations associated with emotion and desire are triggered in response to perceived circumstances that the sensory faculties convey. Moreover, each intellectual faculty relies upon the input of the sensory faculties more or less, depending on the nature of its intellectual function, so that it can perform its function well.

These intellectual faculties (deliberative, productive and theoretical) are briefly outlined as follows. The productive faculty is what enables the person to craft works of all kinds: useful products (e.g. buildings, shoes), artistic productions (e.g. paintings, sculpture, novels, poems, music) and products of human organization (e.g. military campaigns, stable household economies, a well educated citizenry).[15] This faculty allows its possessor to grasp the form or organizing principle for a work he intends to produce and then to generate that work from its raw unformed state into a perfected work. The faculty of production, unlike that of deliberation, achieves an end that is distinct from the act that produces it. So, the faculty of production always functions according to a model of change that is based on a purely means-ends pattern.[16]

In contrast, the faculty of deliberation or practical wisdom enables its possessor to achieve an end that is an action that completes the person desiring it.[17] Choice of action then is not just a means to an end. The faculty of deliberation

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perfects. The faculty of production (δύναμις ποιησέως) is perfected by the intellectual virtue of art (τέχνη)

[12] See, Hardie, 1968, 75; Joachim, 1951, 67; Kraut, 1989, 68.

[13] *De Anima* 3.3 428a1-428^{b}10. See also, Kraut, 1989, 68; V. Caston, "Why Aristotle Needs Imagination," *Phronesis* 41, no. 1 (1996): 30-35; Everson, *Aristotle on Perception* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 139-149.

[14] Hardie, 1968, 75; Joachim, 1951, 67.

[15] *EN* 6.4 1140^{a}. On the difference between productive and practical goods, see Joachim, 1951, 205; G. Lawrence, "How to Justify Ethical Propositions: Aristotle's Method," in *Blackwell Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. R. Kraut (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2006), 39.

[16] *EN* 6.2.1139^{a}36-1139^{b}6.

[17] C. Bobonich, "Aristotle's Ethical Theories," in ed. R. Kraut, 2006, 21; Broadie, 1991, 49; Reeve, 1992, 67.



Figure 5: The Faculties of the Soul

has been introduced already and will be discussed in more detail later. But for the purposes of this section, the faculty of deliberation is an ability to obtain correct deliberations concerning the achievement of good ends under changing circumstances. This faculty is the central cognitive faculty relevant to the exercising of moral virtue and, consequently, the selection of the best action to achieve the end of nobility in action.

The perfection of the theoretical faculties include science (ἐπιστήμη), intelligence (νοῦς), and wisdom (σοφία). Intelligence and science play a complementary role in scientific explanation. One important function of science is to know that a claim is so and to know this through a demonstration that establishes, not only *that* P is so, but also *why* P is so.[18] Such a demonstration must explain the fact expressed by the conclusion by virtue of its premises containing a proper middle term – a term that explains the cause of the fact

[18] *EN* 6.3 1139^{b}28-30. Science enables reasoning by deduction (τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν) from universals (καθολῶν) to a conclusion by necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης). See also, *An Post* 1.71^{b}9. Reeve, 1992, 59; Irwin, 1988, 91-93.

expressed in the conclusion.[19] So, a crucial function of science is the ability to achieve explanatorily-rich demonstrations.

But the ability to grasp the proper premises is an important function of intelligence.[20] It is easier to understand this function by understanding the role it plays in science. The demonstrations of science require premises that are proper.[21] But not all premises can themselves be objects of scientific knowledge through demonstration, otherwise an infinite regress looms. Thus, some premises must be first premises (ἄρχης). Grasp of such first principles of science is intelligence.[22] In short, the knowledge that science enables one to gain through demonstration requires premises that the faculty of intelligence enables one to grasp as first principles. In *Post An* II.19 Aristotle explains intelligence and the grasp of first principles as the outcome of intuition from observation of what is essential to particular cases.

Wisdom is an ability to know the most "exalted objects" by the proper exercise of both intelligence and science.[23] So, the wise man knows that his first principles are true and that his conclusions follows from these principles.[24] Wisdom is not simply the coincidence of excellent scientific reasoning and intuition of first principles. The person who has wisdom has a separate intellectual virtue than intelligence and science which enables them to function properly when exercised together.[25]

II. The Education of Desire and of Knowledge

The faculties that are central to Aristotle's theory of character are the desiderative and deliberative faculties. There are two sets of distinctions Aristotle uses to explain the education of these faculties. A power (δύ-

[19] *An Post* 2.10.

[20] *EN* 6.6 1141^{a}. Joachim, 1951, 197; Irwin, 1988, 179-88; J. Barnes, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," in *Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 1: Science*, eds. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, M. and R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1975), 65-87; T. Engberg-Pedersen "Converging Aristotelian Faculties: A Note on Eth. Nic. VI xi 2-3 1143a25-35," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 99 (1979): 158-160; C.D.C. Reeve, 1992, 56.

[21] *EN* 6.3 1139^{b}33-36; 6.6 1141^{a}2-3.

[22] Ibid., 6.6 1140^{b}33-1141^{a}2; 1141^{a}7-8.

[23] These most exalted or honorable objects (τῶν τιμιωτάτων, *NE* 6.7 1141^{a}20) are those unchanging objects that Aristotle contrasts with the variable objects that deliberative reason concerns. The unchanging objects that wisdom concerns are the most important and foundational of the unchanging objects. Aristotle refers to wisdom then as the most perfect (ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη) of the modes of knowledge. Joachim, 1951, 189; Kraut, 2002, 77; Reeve, 1992, 95; Kraut, 1989, 241-244; Broadie, 1991, 52.

[24] *NE* 6.7 1141^{a}18-19.

[25] Aristotle's statement ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη emphasizes that wisdom "must be" a "combination" of both science and intuition. Aristotle isn't referring to the occasionally excellent function of each, but the consistently perfect use of each. And since wisdom must still be distinct from intuition and science, it must be that wisdom supports or guides the "combination" of both or the excellent function of both.

ναμις)[26] is either passive or active; and a power is either an underdeveloped first grade power or a developed power.[27] The first distinction recognizes that there are in humans both (i) capacities to be affected by something else and even by oneself *qua* other[28] and (ii) capacities to produce[29] or do

[26] Aristotle discusses the distinction of 'power' or 'potency' as follows. " 'Potency' means: the source of motion or change that is something (other than the thing changed), or in itself *qua* other. For example, the art of building is a potency that is not present in the thing build; but the medical art, being a potency, maybe present in the patient, but not *qua* patient. And so in general 'potency' is said to be the source of change or motion in something (other than the thing changed) *qua* other; or the source of something being moved or changed or by (moving or changing) itself *qua* other. (For that according to which the affected thing is affected...)"(δύναμις λέγεται ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς ἡ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὖσα ὑπάρχοι ἂν ἐν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρευόμενος. ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἢ κινήσεως λέγεται δύναμις ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, ἡ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον 'καθ᾽ ἣν γὰρ τὸ πάσχον πάσχει τι, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐὰν ὁτιοῦν, δυνατὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι παθεῖν)(*Met* 5.12.1019[a]15-23).The first statement introduces what Aristotle seems to consider the active potency, followed by examples of active potencies. The sentence following the examples is a restatement of what an active potency is followed by a short description of what a passive potency is. This breakdown of the former passage is a working assumption through the remaining chapter.

[27] Aristotle first presents his statement of passive potency as follows: "the source of something being moved or changed or by (moving or changing) itself *qua* other (for that according to which the affected thing is affected)..."(ἡ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον 'καθ᾽ ἣν γὰρ τὸ πάσχον πάσχει τι, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐὰν ὁτιοῦν, δυνατὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι παθεῖν, ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ πᾶν πάθος ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον') (*Met* 5.12.1019[a]19-22). He later reinforces this distinction in subsequent passages: "[Potency also means]...that over which something may have a potency of this kind " (ἕνα δ᾽ἐὰν ἔχῃ τι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο δύναμιν τοιαύτην) (*Met* 5.12.1019[b]1). " Other things are said to be potent because something else has such a potency over them; others because it does not possess it; others because it possesses it in a particular way" (τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα λέγεται δυνατὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔχειν αὐτῶν ἄλλο τι τοιαύτην δύναμιν τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν τὰ δὲ ὡδὶ ἔχειν) (*Met* 5.12.1020[a]1-3).

[28] The passive potency can be divided into three distinctive features. First, it is an ability that enables one to be affected by a motion or change. Second, in some cases, the passive potency enables its possessor to be affected by a change or source of motion that is not present in it. The example that Aristotle uses for this point is perhaps the most extreme example he could use. He introduces the case of a builder who constructs a building (*Met* 5.12 1019[a]16). The building in its roughest phase of production, has a potential to be perfected that only the builder can perfect. So, the barely formed building has a potential to be changed into a perfected building. But the source of that change – the builder – is not present in the thing undergoing change – the building. In other cases, the passive potency enables its possessor to be affected by a change that is only present in it *qua* other. For example, a patient with a broken leg possesses the raw capacity to be healed by a doctor, as he sets the broken leg and carefully guides the regrowth of the bone. Thus, when the patient is changed from having an injured leg to having a healthy leg, the source of the change is present in the patient, but only *qua* other i.e., *qua* doctor. Third, the passive potency enables its possessor to be directed towards some end or goal. The patient's ability to be healed by the doctor leaves the patient in a better position to achieve the end of being physically healthy.

[29] The active potency also has two features worth elaborating. First, an active potency is an ability that enables a change to occur that is external to the person possessing the ability. For example, a builder is able to construct well formed buildings from the raw materials that he is given. His active potency is what enables him to make this change. Moreover, the change is external to him, as the building he constructs is an artifact

something.[30] The second distinction recognizes that a power or capacity can be either (i) a raw, natural, first grade capacity or (ii) a developed, second grade capacity, perfected by appropriate training and education. Accordingly, a fourfold division of powers emerges in Aristotle's psychology.[31]

1. The undeveloped passive power is a raw capacity (first grade) or power one is born with, but which is normally capable of being disciplined and developed.[32] For instance, a child has such a capacity in having the potentiality of being affected by the emotion of anger, well before it develops any refinement or modulation in its emotional response.

2. The developed passive power is a perfected ability, whereby one is disposed to be appropriately affected by an emotion.[33] When the child has been educated morally, his first grade passive capacity is refined into a second grade passive capacity. He is then capable of feeling the emotion of anger at the right time, in the right way, with the right intensity, for the right duration, and at the right objects.

3. The undeveloped active power is the capacity to do or to make something.[34] The child capable of molding clay or wielding a paintbrush has an active, but unperfected power.

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that is entirely separate from him. Second, the change that the active potency enables is achieved for the sake of some further goal or end. In the building example, the art of building enables the builder to complete the building project and thereby achieve some goal, such as that of housing families.

[30] *Met* 5.11 1019[a]15-33.

[31] Hardie, 1968, 95, 97; Kraut, 2002, 67; Salkever, 1990, 79; Broadie, 1991, 74.

[32] *De An* 2.5 417[b]10-18.

[33] A person's ability to be moved by right emotion is the paradigmatic case of a passive potency and shares important similarities with the previous examples. Aristotle uses the building example in reference to both active and passive potencies. In reference to the passive potency he suggests that the barely formed building under construction is able to be affected by something not at all present in it. Whereas in the medical example the patient's ability to heal himself is an ability to heal himself *qua* doctor. That is, the patient's ability to recover from a broken a leg relies on his own ability to regrow bone. (The possibility of the building art of the doctor being in the patient is hinted at by the word for patient in the dative singular: ἰατρευομένῳ. This suggests that something of the healing is in the one healed). But his ability to recover is only effective so long as the doctor guides the regrowth of the bone at various steps along the way. The ability to be moved by an emotion is similar to the medical example in the sense that the affected person possesses something, even prior to being affected, that enables him to be affected. Along these lines he is affected due to something present in him. This ability is similar to the construction example, insofar as what triggers the change is completely external to affected person. So, just as the work of the builder is separate from the building being constructed, so also is the source of a person's anger a trigger for the affect that is external to him.

[34] Aristotle refers to action, in this sense, as πράχις and production as ποιήσις. The latter requires an active potency for making. The art of building (ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμις) and the medical art (ἡ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις) are consistent examples of this in Aristotle (δύναμις λέγεται ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς ἡ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὖσα ὑπάρχοι ἂν ἐν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ) (Met 5.12.1019[a]15-20).

4. The developed active power is the capacity to do[35] or make[36] something well. Doing or making anything well involves the acquisition of a perfection or art, whereby one knows how to act or what to do.

Each of these powers should be distinguished from the activity or production that they enable.[37] It is the exercise of undeveloped capacities, whether active or passive, that leads to actions or productions. Moreover, the practice of such actions or productions can shape these capacities into perfected capacities; that is, ones that may be exercised well when the situation calls for their use. Consider a variation on the previous example that Aristotle uses regularly:

[35] There are, of course, fundamental differences between making and doing in Aristotle's thought. In a case of production, such as with the building example, the art of building enables the builder to complete the building project and thereby achieve some use for which it was built. In the case of action a person may be able to take a walk. This action brings the person to some end (τὸ τέλον) such as being healthier or more fit. But unlike the building example, the action of walking is not merely a means to an end. It is an action that captures the nobility of the end in the action itself. Just as the person with courage is able to be appropriately affected by fear and confidence under dangerous situations such that he acts courageously. The nobility of his end – being honorable – is captured in the act and isn't merely the beneficial use of a morally neutral action. The motion from which the act results is an internally informing principle of action, rather than a motion that causes change in something else. So, it is understandable how the quality of one's action can be shaped by the end for which one acts when the motion initiating the act is an internal principle of change. For, by choosing an action one further changes oneself in accordance with the nobility of the end one desires.

[36] The formulation for being the source of motion or change in something *other* than the thing changed is (ἡ ἐν ἑτέρῳ) and occurs frequently in this cluster of passages. Besides *Met* 5.12.1019^{a}16, see also 1019^{a}20; 1019^{b}1; 1020^{a}2; 1020^{a}6. This is the most common way that Aristotle refers to active potencies.

[37] The above examples and explanations make it clear that an active potency can be productive. But the sense in which an active potency can be a capacity for action is discussed less directly in this series of passages. Consider the following text: "Thus, 'Potency' is said to be...the ability to complete this action well or in accordance with choice; sometimes we say that those who can only walk or speak, without doing it as well as they choose to cannot walk or speak" (ἡ μέν οὖν...λέγεται δύναμις...ἔτι ἡ τοῦ καλῶς τοῦτ' ἐπιτελεῖν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν: ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς μόνον ἂν πορευθέντας ἢ εἰπόντας, μὴ καλῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ ὡς προείλοντο, οὔ φαμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ βαδίζειν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν) (*Met* 5.12.1019^{a}23-27). This passage introduces a distinction not yet elaborated – the ability to act well in contrast with the ability to just act. But it still introduces the ability to act, since one cannot act well if one cannot act. Also, it uses the language of choice (προαίρεσις) which is always associated with action (πράχις) more than production (ποιήσις). See also similar terms and formulations in neighboring passages: ἔτι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἢ τῷ μόνον ἂν συμβῆναι γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῷ καλῶς. (*Met* 5.12.1019^{b}13) and ἔτι δὲ καθ' ἑκατέραν δύναμιν ἔστιν ἀδυναμία ἀντικειμένη, τῇ τε μόνον κινητικῇ καὶ τῇ καλῶς κινητικῇ (*Met* 5.12.1019^{b}20-21). Aristotle also uses these distinctions to think about the soul and its relation to the body. "The soul is the first actuality of a natural body that is potentially alive" (*De An* 2.1 412^{a}27). He refers to the soul in its unperfected sense as a first grade actuality, whereas in its second grade actuality it is perfected, fully actualized of its potential, and in activity. See also, Salkever, 1990, 65; Kraut, 2002, 67-68; Hardie, 1968, 76; Joachim, 1951, 65; Irwin, 1988, 152.

an ability to use grammar.[38] A toddler already possesses an undeveloped capacity to use grammar well before he uses it. When he begins to practice grammar, he may only form a complete sentence a small percent of the time. But regular practice of grammar can lead to the perfection of this ability. At that point, the person is able to use grammar well in situations that call for it. So, we must distinguish between the actual use of grammar from its status as an unperfected capacity and its status as a perfected capacity. The right use of grammar shapes the unperfected capacity into a perfected state.

III. Moral and Intellectual Virtue

The desiderative and intellectual faculties are perfectible; virtue is their perfection. Aristotle details twelve moral virtues or good character states that perfect the desiderative faculty. Similarly, he discusses how practical wisdom perfects the faculty of deliberation. Let us consider the major features of both kinds of virtue and how they enable right choices.

Aristotle's understanding of moral virtue (ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ) captures the complex relationship between a person's state of character, desires and emotions. Aristotle's central statement on moral virtue introduces its essential features.[39]

> Virtue then is [i] a settled disposition of character[40] concerning choice lying in the mean relative to the person, [ii] the mean being determined in accordance with right reason as [iii] the practically wise man would determine it.
> [Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν]

The first portion of the statement concerns moral virtue and its relation to desire (ὄρεχις) and emotion (πάθος). The second and third portions concern the role of practical wisdom (φρόνησις) in conjunction with moral virtue in

[38] See *De An* 2.5 $417^{b}1$; *Met* 5.12 $1019^{a}24$.

[39] For discussions of this passage and the major features of moral virtue see, Salkever, 1990, 79-80; R. Hursthouse, "The Central Doctrine of the Mean," in ed. R. Kraut, 2006, 109; Broadie, 1991, 23, 61, 75, 80; Hardie, 1968, 95; Urmson, 1988, 28; Reeve, 1992, 167.

[40] There may be several words or expressions that acceptably translate the Greek word ἕξις, besides "settled disposition," such as "disposition," "habit," "state," "stable state," "tendency," "inclination," and "state of character." The most direct rendering of the word is as "disposition," just as "state" is the most bald translation of ἦθος. But, since the state being referred to in *EN* is almost always a state of character, this is an appropriate translation. Similarly, a ἕξις almost always refers to a settled disposition of character. So, the above translation captures the best aspects of both words. Moreover, for the purposes of this project the words "disposition," "state of character," "character," "character state," "state" and "settled disposition" will all be used interchangeably. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Definitions of *psuchê*," in *Articles on Aristotle: Psychology and Aesthetics*, eds. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth , 1979), 65-75; Hardie, 1968, 103; Joachim, 1951, 82; Reeve, 1992, 167. Broadie, 1991, 75; Salkever, 1990, 80.

yielding a choice of action. Let us begin with the first portion of the statement: the relation of moral virtue and emotion.[41]

Moral Virtue as the Perfection of Emotion

In his most complete discussion of emotion, he lists them as follows: "By the emotions, I mean desire,[42] anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those which are accompanied by pleasure or pain."[43] All these emotions share the following three features that Aristotle discusses most explicitly in *Rhetoric* 2. An emotion (πάθος)[44] is (1) a sudden feeling of pleasure or pain[45] prompted by (2) an image of something that is real or only imagined that the affected person considers good or bad.[46] As a result, (3) the affected person desires to do something that will end or prolong that initial feeling.[47] Let us consider how these features of emotion

[41] For other discussions of this section, its related passages and its general ethical context, see Reeve, 1992, 166-170; Kraut, 1989, 441-448; Bostock, *Aristotle's Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 33-50; Sparshot, *Taking Life Seriously: A Study of the Argument of the Nicomachean Ethics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 94-103; Irwin, 1988, 373-5, 439-48; Stewart, 1892; Pakaluk, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 105-117; Höffe, 1996, 222-26; Achtenberg, *Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 110-122.

[42] While Aristotle classifies (appetitive) desire as an emotion in this list, it is clear that he usually distinguishes it from emotion. The differences between appetitive desire (ἐπιθύμια), non-appetitive desire (ὄρεχις) and emotion (πάθος) will be taken up in more detail later.

[43] [λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη] (*EN* 2.4 1105^{b}20-23). Hardie, 1968, 95; M. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 78-101; S. Leighton,"Aristotle and the Emotions," *Phronesis* 27 (1982): 144-174; W. Fortenbaugh, "*Aristotle's Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv Für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970): 40-70.

[44] John Cooper emphasizes the three features of emotion that this chapter highlights in "Rhetoric, Dialectic and the Passions," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 11 (1993): 175-178. These features are manifest in Aristotle's discussion of specific emotions in *Rh*, *EN*, *Pol* and *EE*. See also Hardie, 1968, 95-96; Urmson, 1988, 39. E. Garver, *Aristotle's Rhetoric and the Art of Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 115-121; M. Stocker, *Valuing Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 182; Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics and Ethics* (London: Duckworth, 1975), 70-75.

[45] See also, Urmson 1988, 39-40; Broadie, 2002, 220; Garver, 1995, 122-127; M. Stocker, 1996, 182-185; Fortenbaugh, 1975, 103-113.

[46] Garver, 1995, 118-120; M. Stocker, 1996, 286-290; Nussbaum, 1994, 80-85; Leighton, 1982, 160-164; Fortenbaugh, 1975, 94-102.

[47] Aristotle refers to each of these features of emotion in his discussion of the following particular emotions: anger (ἡ ὄργη, *Rh* 2.2 1378^{a}36-1380^{a}5), mildness (ἡ πραΰνσις *Rh* 2.3 1380^{a}6-1380^{b}24), love (ἡ φιλία *Rh* 2.4 1380^{b}43-1382^{a}1), enmity and hate (ἔχθρας, μίσειν, *Rh* 2.4 1382^{a}1-1382^{a}24), fear (ὁ φόβος, *Rh* 2.5 1382^{a}25-1383^{a}15), confidence [θαρραλέα, θαρρεῖν, *Rh* 2.5 1383^{a}16-1383^{a}12), shame (ἡ αἰσχύνη, *Rh* 2.6 1383^{a}13-1385^{a}18), shamelessness (ἡ ἀναισχύνη, *Rh* 2.6 1383^{a}13-1385^{a}18), benevolence (ἡ χάρις, *Rh* 2.7 1385^{a}19-

are discussed by Aristotle in the case of a basic emotion such as anger.[48] The emotion of anger and its contrary[49] (mildness) manifest each of the above features in corresponding circumstances. Aristotle describes anger as follows:

1385^{b}10), pity (ἡ ἐλέος, *Rh* 2.7 1385^{b}11-1386^{b}9), envy (ὁ φθόνος, *Rh* 2.7 1386^{b}18-1387^{a}6; 2.8 1387^{b}26-1388^{a}36), righteous indignation (ἡ νέμεσις, *Rh* 2.7 1386^{b}10-1386^{b}17; 1387^{a}7-1387^{b}25), emulation (ὁ ζῆλος, *Rh* 2.8 1388^{a}37-1388^{b}25) and contempt (ἡ καταφρονήσις, *Rh* 2.8 1388^{a}25-34). On the distinctiveness of emotion-induced desires, see Cooper, 1993, 180-182; M. Stocker, 1996, 28-37; Nussbaum, 1994, 80-85; Leighton, 1982, 160-164; Fortenbaugh, 1975, 83-87; Reeve, 1992, 71; Joachim, 1951, 66.

[48] Leighton, 1982, 160-164 and "Aristotle's Account of Anger: Narcissism and Illusions of Self-Sufficiency," *Ratio* 15, no. 1 (2002): 23-45; M. Stocker, 1996, 246-249, 265-280; Nussbaum, 1994, 80-85; Fortenbaugh, 1975, 83-87; Garver, 1995, 112-115.

[49] Aristotle uses the distinction of "contrary" (ἐναντία) throughout his corpus, but especially in his theoretical works. Before explaining his use of contraries with reference to emotions it is worth elaborating his broader use of the term. He outlines its use as follows: "The term 'contrary' is applied (1) to those attributes differing in genus which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject, (2) to the most different of the things in the same genus, (3) to the most different of the attributes in the same recipient subject, (4) to the most different of the things that fall under the same faculty, (5) to the things whose difference is greatest, either absolutely or in genus or in species. The other things that are called contrary are so called, some because they possess contraries of the above kind, some because they are receptive of such, some because they are productive of or susceptible to such, or a producing or suffering them, or are losses or acquisitions, or possessions or privations, of such" (*Met* 5.10 1018^{a}24-35). While Aristotle doesn't provide a formal discussion of the contraries that are emotions, the above quotation is helpful in establishing that contrary emotions oppose one another, whether they differ only in species or whether they are not even classified under the same genus. Moreover, the above quotation refers to emotion most directly when he discusses "the others things that are called contrary...because they are...producing or suffering them..." Nearly every emotion treated by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* II is paired with a contrary emotion. Each contrary emotion opposes one another in such a way that the occurrence of one emotion at one time impairs the occurrence of its contrary emotion at the same time. So, the occurrence of anger opposes mildness such that the incidence of anger prevents mildness from occurring, though it will almost always be succeeded by mildness (*Rh* 2.3 1380^{a}6-1380b24). Aristotle contrasts a person's development or perfection (ἐπίδοσις) of a character state, for instance, with a condition where an immature person suffers the alternation of contrary emotions on a frequent basis. (This replacement of one contrary with another is referred to as a change, μεταβόλη). That person might exchange one emotion for its contrary under some stressful condition, slipping from anger to mildness and back to anger or repeatedly shifting from extreme fearfulness to fearlessness and back to extreme fearfulness again. So, a development of a character state presents a contrast to the former condition insofar as it allows the person to suffer those same emotions, but at the right time, towards the right person, in the right manner and for the right duration and intensity. (This development or perfection, ἐπίδοσις) can also be contrasted with an alternation, ἀλλοΐωσις, which is a more generic modification of a quality. It is usually not a reference to a substantial or formative step in one's character development. It might even refer to a decline or degeneration of some quality). So, even a person with fully developed character states – a morally virtuous person – is still moved by emotions that have contraries. But Aristotle's reference to emotions that are *contraries* to one another can be most easily recognized in the condition of a person whose relevant character state is extremely undeveloped thereby causing him to more acutely suffer the most opposed or contrary of extremes available for a pair of contrary emotions.

> Let anger be a desire, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved. If this is anger then it is necessary that the angry man must always be angry with a particular individual (for instance, with Cleon but not with men generally), and lastly, anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come. It is pleasing to think that one will obtain what one aims at; now, no one aims at what is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and the angry man aims at what is possible for himself.
>
> [ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας [φαινομένης] διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος εἰ δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν τινι, οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τί πεποίηκεν ἢ ἤμελλεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονήν, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι: ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὐτῷ.][50]

A person is provoked to anger upon perceiving or imagining that he is slighted by another.[51] The object of this pain is the one whose action, speech, attitude or gesture slights or injures him. His assessment of how much he has been slighted influences how strongly he is pained. Lastly, the angered person desires revenge and is pleased by the thought of the other's suffering. So, the angry person desires to restore some honor that has been lost.

For example, compare the slights that Odysseus receives when he returns to his home from the Trojan War.[52] Transformed by Athena into an old beggar he is able to assess safely the magnitude of the danger he faces in reclaiming his home from the suitors. During this time he comes into contact

[50] *Rh* 2.2 $1378^{a}30$-$1378^{b}4$.

[51] When Aristotle refers to a slight (ὀλιγωρία), he has a specific occurrence in mind. For Aristotle a slight occurs when one (the slighter) conveys through speech, attitude, gesture or deed to another person (the slighted) that something which is valued by the slighted person values is actually unimportant or less important (*Rh* 2.2 $1378^{b}6$-7). There are three kinds of slights each varying in gravity: contempt (καταφρόνησις), spite (ἐπηρεασμὸς) and the insult (ὕβρις) *Rh* 2.2 $1378^{b}14$). The person who disdains another, downgrades something that is important to the person who is the object of the disdain or that person himself (*Rh* 2.2 $1378^{b}15$). The person who slights another through spite tries to prevent the person who is the object of spite from achieving what he wishes for, not for the sake of gaining some advantage, but just for the sake of undermining the spited person (*Rh* 2.2 $1378^{b}16$-17). The person who insults another attempts to cause injury or disturbance to the insulted person in order to bring shame or disgrace upon that person. The insult is not a form of punishment or retaliation. Instead the person who insults does it for the pleasure of publicly downgrading the insulted party and thereby demonstrating his own superiority (*Rh* 2.2 $1378^{b}22$-23).

[52] Selections from Homer's *Odyssey* will be taken from *Odyssey*, trans. S. Lombardo (Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis and Cambridge, 2000).

with several individuals from his past to whom he either reveals or conceals his true identity. Not long before the finale when he and Telemachus execute their revenge on the suitors, Odysseus is subject to persistent insults, condescension and jeering on the part of the suitors, their own servants, and even some collaborating servants from Odysseus' household. One such person was Melantho. Though Penelope had raised her as her own, Melantho repaid her kindness with callous disrespect, joining the suitors' cause and taking up with one of their more vicious leaders – Eurymachus. One can compare the impact of her slights towards Odysseus with those of Eurymachus towards Odysseus. While they both slight Odysseus, Eurymachus's slight is one that prompts a more painful anger than did Melantho because the slight occurs in a context that is more disrespectful. He had grasped what was most dear to Odysseus: his wife and son, his home, not to mention his household authority. Moreover, besides grasping after Odysseus's place in his family and household in a vicious manner and taking pleasure in it, he treats Odysseus as if he were beneath this place in his family, even undeserving of the company of the suitors:

> Eurymachus said:
> 'I wonder if you would like to be a hired hand,
> Stranger. Should I hire you to work
> On one of my outlying farms gathering fieldstones
> And planting tall trees? Oh, I'll pay you.
> I'll keep you fed the year round out there,
> Give you some clothes and sandals to wear.
> But you've never done a hard day's work
> In your life, preferring to beg your way through town
> For food to stuff in your bottomless belly.'[53]

In this context, the slight of Eurymachus is worse than than the slight of Melanthus who jeers at him about "being out of his mind;" so "blathering" as to seem drunk, and out of place around "these" real men.[54] This slight prompts the pain of anger and leads him to growl some threats that scatter her band with panic. On Aristotle's view of emotion, Odysseus should be more pained by the anger of Eurymachus's slight. The image he perceives is such that the overall seriousness of the slight under such conditions is more anger causing and, therefore, more pain causing than that he perceives in Melanthos' slight. Athena allows him to be subject to the greater pain of being slighted by Eurydice and others: "Now Athena was not about to let the suitors abstain from insults. She wanted pain to sink deeper into Odysseus' bones. And so Eurymachus began to jeer at him for his friends' entertainment...."[55]

Lastly, this scenario illustrates the third feature of emotion for Aristotle: the resulting desire for revenge. So, Odysseus increasingly desires to vindicate

[53] *Od.* 18.389-398.
[54] *Od.* 18.258-268.
[55] *Od.* 18.377-382.

himself and his family from the dishonor consistently inflicted by the suitors. The slight just described simply continues to solidify that desire. Odysseus's reaction to Eurymachus reveals that desire, and not surprisingly foreshadows the end of the story:

> And Odysseus, his mind teeming
> '...And it would be even better
> If Zeus brought war upon us from somewhere,
> Today, right now, and I had a shield, two spears,
> And a bronze helmet that fit close to my temples
> Then you would see me out in the front ranks,
> And you wouldn't stand here jeering at me
> Because of my belly. But you are insufferable,
> And you have a hard heart. No doubt you think
> You are some great man, a tough guy,
> Because you hang out with puny weaklings
> If Odysseus came back home, these doors,
> Wide as they are, would be far too narrow
> For you to squeeze through as you made for daylight.'[56]

The emotion of mildness is the contrary of anger. Mildness is an emotion with features that are parallel to anger, though the conditions and objects prompting it are quite different. The emotion of mildness occurs when the pleasure of relieved pain[57] affect a person who had been agitated and angry. The pleasures of mildness may be sudden and intrusive, as with the pain of anger. Mildness is prompted by an image of some object that might have triggered anger, but has been modified in such a way that it doesn't cause anger or significantly mitigates it. Aristotle maintains that one is mild when one refrains from insult or slights or in some way humbles oneself in the presence of the affected person. So, when the image that an angry person perceives of a person who slights him is replaced by an image of the same person, regretful and humble towards him, then he is moved by the emotion of mildness. What was an image of something that seemed bad to the affected person becomes an image of something that seems good, thereby shifting his reaction. The person moved by mildness will also desire to do something to maintain the good condition he is in.[58] So, these are the three features of emotion that Aristotle treats as a given in his theory of character.

A good character state is not an emotion or a mere ability to feel emotion. A good or bad character state is something for which its possessor can be praised

[56] *Od.* 18.399-423.

[57] The pleasure might even exceed the mere relief of pain, while the emotion of mildness is more than simply the sudden absence of anger. It is an emotion with a field of motivation distinct from subsiding anger. But Aristotle is somewhat ambiguous about the extent to which the pleasure of mildness – one component of the emotion – is enjoyed above and beyond the relief of pain and anger.

[58] *Rh* 2.3 $1380^{a}6$-$1380^{b}24$.

or blamed, respectively. But, simply feeling an emotion, whether anger or fear is not something for which one is praised or blamed. Similarly, being able to be moved by an emotion is not itself praiseworthy or blameworthy,[59] whereas a perfected ability to be moved appropriately by right emotion under circumstances that call for that emotion is praiseworthy.[60]

Along these lines, a good character state, such as good temper, enables its possessor to be moved by right emotions with the three features mentioned.[61] As in the case of the perfected passive power, the state makes the agent ready to react well whenever a situation provoking an emotion arises. Aristotle further qualifies the excellence of this disposition as follows:

> Now we praise a man who feels anger on the right grounds and against the right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time.
> [ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται][62]

[59] See *EN* 2.1.1105^{b}29- 1106^{a}6. Aristotle makes case that a moral virtue or good character state is not an emotion nor a mere ability to be moved by emotion. He especially emphasizes that a good character state cannot be a raw ability to be moved by an emotion because the raw ability does not yet involve choice. Humans possess these raw capacities by nature. But one is never good or bad simply by nature. In contrast, a disposition or state of character is related to one's choice of actions, and so, can be praised or blamed. See *EN* 2.5 1106^{a}6-11.

[60] What it means to be moved well by an emotion is filled out further both when he provides a fuller account of a moral virtue and how practical wisdom supports this. Before those discussions occur, he refers to not being excessively or deficiently angry (*EN* 2.4 1105^{b}27-28) as well not being angered inappropriately (*EN* 2.4 1105^{b}32-33).

[61] On the disposition to be appropriately affected by emotion, see Kosman, "Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics," in ed. A. Rorty, 1981; N. Sherman, "The Role of Emotions in Aristotelian Virtue," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 9 (1994): 23-29; M. Stocker, 1996, 152-60; Fortenbaugh, 1975, 70-79; R. Hursthouse, "The Central Doctrine of the Mean," in ed. Kraut, 2006, 109; Broadie, 1991, 75.

[62] *EN* 4.5 1125^{b}31-33. This text on the virtue of good temper (πραότης) raises a question about what counts as the exercise of practical wisdom and what counts as simply the exercise of the moral virtue. Typically, it is practical wisdom that guides the person's exercise of their moral virtue so that he acts at the right time, towards the right person, in the right manner, and for the right duration because he desires to do just that. In the case of this virtue – a virtue that is somewhat more emotion-laden than some other virtues (e.g., generosity) – it is hard to distinguish the exercise of the virtue from the practical wisdom guiding the choice of actions that should result from the virtue. Consider this difference in the case of courage. The person who possesses the moral virtue of courage is disposed correctly to the emotions of confidence and fear such that he desires to be honorable under conditions of mortal danger. But what is the best way to achieve the end of being honorable on the battlefield? What are the brave actions that he should perform on the battlefield that will strategically advance his honorable cause? Practical wisdom guides his deliberations about this. So, in this case practical wisdom and the moral virtue can be distinguished from one another, even though the exercise of both are fully at work in his choice of action. But the former distinction is much harder to recognize in the case of good temper.

The moral virtue of good temper (πραότης), for example, is what enables the person to feel right emotion.

Right emotion makes the end right, and deliberation determines the means or what pertains to that end in the order of actions.

Moral Virtue as the Perfection of Desire

A second feature of a character state is that it enables one to be moved by the right desires. A good character state causes the person to be moved by emotions that are structured in the way discussed above, thereby resulting in the activation of right desire. The emotion of anger is a feeling of pain prompted by an image of someone who slights the affected person, thereby inducing a desire to vindicate oneself.[63] So, what enables the person to be moved by anger is also what enables him to be appropriately driven by the desire that results from the onset of anger.

Before discussing what makes such desires *right desires*, it is necessary to outline the variety of desires that Aristotle distinguishes. Sometimes what is translated as broadly as desire (ὄρεχις) can refer to appetitive desire (ἐπιθύμια),[64] non-appetitive desire (ὄρεχις) and emotion (πάθος).[65] The appetitive desire (ἐπιθύμια)[66] is a longing or a want for some end that is achieved through activity associated with food, sex and drink. This longing is not

[63] *Rh* 2.2 1378^{a}36-1380^{a}5.

[64] Initially, Aristotle includes appetitive desire (ἐπιθύμια) as one of many emotions. This is so in his initial description of emotion in *EN* 2: "By the emotions, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those which are accompanied by pleasure or pain" (λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη) (*EN* 2.4 1105^{b}20-23). At this point, non-appetitive desires are not treated as emotions. And eventually in *EN*, Aristotle more sharply distinguishes appetitive desire from emotion, even though they still share some of its features. So, for the purposes of this chapter, appetitive and non-appetitive desires alike shall be considered two species of desire and not a function of desire, even though the activation of most desires are preceded by the onset of an emotion or emotion-like response.

[65] In Aristotle's practical thought he may refer to desire in a more general or more specific manner. For example he may refer to it, more generally, as a category in his moral psychology as he does when he characterizes choice as the union of desire and deliberation. Other times he is referring to a more specific kind of desire; a non-appetitive desire, such as the desire to vindicate oneself when one is slighted. Aristotle uses the term ὄρεχιςto refer to both kinds of desire. See also, Urmson, 1988, 39; Hardie, 1968, 219; Lear, 2006, 122; Pakaluk, 2005, 130; Irwin, 1988, 139; Bostock, 2000, 33-34,47, 79, 81, 115; Sparshott, 1994, 121-122.

[66] The use of ἐπιθύμια as a desire associated with food, sex and drink is frequent in *EN* and to a lesser extent in *Pol* and *Rh*. See *EN* 1103^{b}15,1105^{b}20, 1111^{a}20, 1111^{a}25, 1111^{b}10,1111^{b}15, 1117^{a}1, 1118^{b}5,1118^{b}15, 1119^{b}1, 1119^{b}5, 11130^{a}20, 1145^{b}35, 1146^{a}10, 1147^{a}30, 1147^{b}1, 1148^{a}20, 1149^{a}20, 1149^{a}30, 1149^{b}1, 1149^{b}5, 1149^{b}15, 1149^{b}20, 1150^{a}15, 1150^{b}25, 1151^{b}5, 1151^{b}10, 1151^{b}30, 1152^{b}35, 1153^{a}25, 1168^{b}15, 1175^{b}25, 1178^{b}15; *Pol* 1258^{a}35, 1266^{b},1267^{a} ; *Rh* 1264^{b}, 1269^{a},1364^{b},1369^{a}, 1369^{b}, 1370^{a}, 1370^{b}, 1374^{b},1385^{a}, 1269^{a},1388^{b}, 1389^{b} , 1390^{a},1392^{a}, 1393^{a}, 1406^{a} . This word is never used in reference to non-appetitive desires, though it can refer more loosely to bodily pleasures and impulses.

prompted chiefly by a perception of the world. Rather, it is more the result of internal physical conditions, such as the absence of nourishment or hydration.

In contrast, the non-appetitive desire is a longing for an end such as being honorable in battle. Non-appetitive desire is one that is typically manifested in emotion. So, the desire that is presented[67] as the third feature of emotion is usually a non-appetitive desire.[68] When a person's character state of courage enables him to be moved appropriately by the emotions of fear and confidence under conditions of war, then he desires to be honorable in combat. The feelings of pain and pleasure associated with fear and confidence are prompted by an image of a mortal threat and plausible target. This condition is then succeeded by a non-appetitive desire to be honorable in combat. So, it is the image of someone or something that the affected person takes to be good or bad that activates the desire, rather than an internal physical condition, as with appetitive desire. Aristotle's agent doesn't crave ends associated with anger or confidence. Instead, his established non-appetitive desires for these ends are activated when the emotion is triggered by an external source.

There are three other features of desire, both appetitive and non-appetitive. Some of these features have been implicated in the foregoing discussion. Desire for Aristotle is a want or longing for an end that appears to its possessor as a good.

First, a desire is a longing or want.[69] The agent lacks something that he considers good.[70] A particular longing may be an occurrent one and thereby move the agent towards the end of his desire. Similarly, the agent may tend to have an occurrent longing which becomes activated under appropriate conditions. For example, when Odysseus returns to Ithaca, his good temper disposes him to desire the vindication of his family's honor in the face of the suitors' impudence, when the occasion is right.

Second, a desire is for an end.[71] Aristotle defines desire in reference to the end state towards which its possessor is moved. So, different desires have different end states corresponding to them.[72] The courage of Odysseus disposes him

[67] Again, while the definition of emotion presented here includes desire, both appetitive and non-appetitive, as its third feature, it is not simply a function of emotion. Rather, it marks the activation of desire.

[68] Aristotle uses the term ὄρεχις throughout his practical thought, especially in *EN*, but also in *Pol* and *Rh*. See *EN* $1094^{a}15$, $1095^{a}10$, $1107^{b}25$, $1113^{a}5$, $1116^{a}25$, $1119^{b}5$, $1125^{a}5$, $1138^{b}5$, $1139^{a}15$, $1139^{a}25$, $1139^{a}30$, $1139^{b}1$, $1149^{b}1$, $1054^{b}10$, $1159^{b}15$, $1166^{a}30$, $1175^{b}30$; *Pol* 1254^{b}, 1277^{a}, 1287^{a}; *Rh* 1364^{b}, 1368^{b}, 1369^{a}.

[69] *EN* 1.1 $1094^{a}17$-20; 1.1 $1094^{a}2$-3; 3.3 $1112^{b}31$; 6.2 $1139^{a}21$-23.

[70] *EN* 3.4 $1113^{a}16$-23;$1113^{a}25$-29.

[71] *EN* 1.1 $1094^{a}18$; 3.2 $1111^{a}27$-31; 3.4 $1113^{a}15$-16; 6.2 $1139^{a}36$-$1139^{b}6$. See, Nicholas P. White, "Good as Goal," in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27, Supp. (1988): 169-193; Joachim, 1951, 101; Urmson, 1988, 40; Hardie, 1968, 252, Irwin, 1988, 176; Pakaluk, 2005, 140-144.

[72] For example, consider a person who possesses several virtues (e.g. temperance, generosity, etc). This person has good desires associated with these virtues though they would not

to desire the end of acting honorably with respect to the honor of his family. Similarly, the virtue of temperance (σωφροσύνη) disposes one to desire the end state of being physically healthy. Any one person may be prone to numerous desires with any number of corresponding end states. But the end state one desires is always specific to that person. For example, what it would be for Odysseus to be physically healthy may be different than it would be for Milo the wrestler.[73] Consider Milo and Odysseus in the best physical shape that they could possibly be. Of course, their size, strength and constitution will be different and demand different levels of nourishment and sustenance. The features of physical health are the same for them both, but they are exemplified differently, given their above differences.[74]

Third, the end of a desire is something that appears good to its possessor.[75] The state appears good to an agent because of the character of the agent. But there may be a variety of reasons for having it, just as friendships are of three sorts: of use, of pleasure, and of the good. So also, desires are of three things: of the pleasant (τὸ ἥδος), the useful (τὸ συμφέρον) and the noble (τὸν κάλον).[76] The noble or the beautiful (τὸν κάλον) is a motive for virtuous action that Aristotle emphasizes in a number of places. Consider the following notable example: "Now the brave man is as dauntless as man may be. While he will fear even the things that are not beyond human strength, he will face them as he ought and as the reason directs, for the sake of doing what is noble or beautiful, for this is the end of virtue."[77] The goal of nobility is deeply engrained in Aristotle's ethical thought and marks the standard against which the best and worst in human character is judged.[78] The best men are motivated by the best goods; the most noble and beautiful of goods. Aristotle refers to such men as good-and-noble men (κάλοι κάγαθοι) and maintains that they choose noble things for their own sake.[79] Similarly, he presents the worst of men in terms of the scale of their ignobility and ugliness. He uses terms that capture the unattractiveness of such a state: vicious, bestial, etc.[80]

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be active at the same time. So, under conditions of hunger, he actively desires the end state of satisfaction; but in a way that promotes health. At that time he may not actively desire the end of being generous to others, even though he would actively desire to be so under the appropriate conditions.

[73] *EN* 2.6 1106^{b}4-7.

[74] This point does not suggest that there is an altogether different standard of physical health for each person. A physically healthy person has certain attributes that are the same for all other physically healthy persons. But there may be some appropriate variation in what they eat, drink, as well as in their physical regiment.

[75] *EN* 3.4 1113^{a}23-29; 8.6 1157^{b}27; 8.7 1166^{a}4; 1.4 1095^{a}18. Reeve, 1992, 89; Kraut, 2002, 60-61; Urmson, 1988, 57; Pakaluk, 2005, 49-50.

[76] *EN* 2.3 1104^{b}29-34; *EE* 8.15 1248^{b}9-1249^{a}16.

[77] *EN* 3.7 1115^{b}10-15.

[78] *EN* 2.1 1104^{b}27-1105^{a}1.

[79] *EE* 13.8 1248^{a}3-7, 10-15. See also, Lear, 2006,122; Pakaluk, 2005, 153-158; Sparshott, 1994, 188.

[80] *EN* 7.51143^{b}15-1149^{a}24.

While any of the above standards may inform the agent's recognition of the goodness of his end, the person with a right desire, desires ends that are noble.[81] Similarly some have unperfected desires that attract them to ends are not noble. In either case the end state appears good to its possessor. So, the vicious person desires ends that are bad and ugly; yet they appear good and to him. In contrast, the virtuous person desires noble ends. He desires ends that are good and beautiful and so is able to see them as good and beautiful. For example a person who desires to hear good music doesn't wonder whether a masterpiece he hears is very good or not. The fact that he desires the best of music helps him to perceive it so easily as beautiful. This ability to perceive things as they are is an important feature of the virtuous person and an intractable problem for the vicious.

Four, the desire possessed by the agent may be more or less unified.[82] A desire is unified if the choice it motivates cannot be overridden by an inappropriate desire for pleasure. In contrast, a desire is not unified if that conflicting desire for pleasure could move an agent to act contrary to his choice. Compare more and less unified desires with respect to temperance. The person with the virtue of temperance has the right desires in this sphere and so fully desires health. This dominant desire grounds his correct deliberations about what choice of action would most appropriately achieve that end. Consequently, he makes the right choice of action. The incontinent person has mixed desires. So, under adverse conditions, his weaker but better desire for physical health is overridden by his stronger but worse desire. Not only does he fail to deliberate upon his better desire, he does not deliberate at all.[83] He then acts upon the bad desire, thereby performing a bad action. The continent person also has mixed desires. But, in contrast with the incontinent, he may[84] in fact deliberate upon the good desire, even though he is conflicted by a less good desire. In some rare cases, he may fail to deliberate, yet still perform the good action. Consider the case of the person who both wants to raid the cookie jar and to avoid the cookie jar. One who lacks temperance but is continent resists his bad desire, embraces his good desire to eat appropriately

[81] See also, Kraut, 2002, 22; Hardie, 1968, 252; Joachim, 1951, 68; Irwin, 1988, 159; Urmson, 1988, 52.

[82] *EN* 7.4 1148^{a}18-20; 1147^{a}25-^{b}19; 1148^{a}5-12.

[83] Of course, the vicious person does deliberate upon his dominant and bad desire (and so no longer has a weak but good desire about which to be conflicted). He habitually chooses the bad action and so is as consistent in his badness as the virtuous person is in his goodness.

[84] In rare cases, one with mixed desires may be considered continent when he performs a good action without the benefit of deliberate desire. Consider a person at a party who is conflicted because he desires to drink more than he should and just what he should. As it turns out, he drinks only what he should because he needs a ride home. So, in order to catch the ride he must leave before he can drink more than he should. His action is good in the sense that he drinks the right amount; though it is certainly neither a virtuous action nor one grounded in deliberate desire. He must stop drinking as quickly as he starts drinking. It is largely the intervening circumstance that allows him to not act badly.

and deliberates upon how and when to do so. Of course, he doesn't have temperance because his good desire for health is not dominant, as he also desires to raid the cookie jar. Under different conditions he may very well have acted upon his bad desire. The incontinent person is conflicted by his desire for health and his desire to raid the cookie jar. He neither deliberates upon his desire for health nor his desire to raid the cookie jar (as the vicious would do). He simply acts impulsively.[85]

Now that Aristotle's view of desire has been discussed we can better appreciate what he means by an agent with a good character state having a right desire. A right desire is a dominant desire for an end state that is good in itself and appears as such to the agent. It is a good character state that enables a person to be moved by that particular right desire and appropriately moved by the associated emotion. For example, the good temper of Odysseus both enables him to be moved well by anger and driven by the right desire to preserve the honor of his family. His right desire in directs him towards an end that seems good to him and, in fact, is good.

Lastly, A good state of character (ἦθος), or disposition (ἕχις or διαθήσις) is a mean of states (μέσον) and it determines an agent to the choice of an action that is a mean relation to an agent as that would be judged by a prudent man (φρόνιμος). A distinction then is to be made between (a) the dispositional mean (b) the mean with respect to the choice of action.[86] Take them in turn.

(a) Moral virtue is a dispositional mean in the acquired capacity to be affected by emotions and desires that are right (ὄρθη).[87] Rightness of emotion (and the desires they incorporate) is rightness of time, occasion, object, purpose, manner, and amount or intensity.[88] This disposition to right emotion is between the extreme states: the state of being disposed to excess emotion and deficiencies of emotion.[89] Accordingly, one can be disposed to feel fear or confidence, pity or anger, or any other emotions either too much or too little and in both cases wrongly[90]: that is, at the wrong time or the wrong occasion, toward the wrong object, for the wrong purpose, in the wrong manner, or with the wrong intensity.[91] Both the disposition to excess and to defect is vice.

[85] For more on Aristotle's understanding of continent vs. incontinent conditions, see Kraut, 2002, 76; Reeve, 1992, 93; Joachim, 1951, 232; Irwin, 1988, 330-332; Pakaluk, 2005, 233-56.

[86] *EN* 2.1 1106^{a}27-32; *EN* 2.1 1106^{b}16-24.

[87] Ackrill, 1979, 65-75; Hardie, 1968, 95, 103; Joachim, 1951, 82; Reeve, 1992, 167; Broadie, 1991, 75; Salkever, 1990, 80; Urmson, 1988, 28.

[88] *EN* 2.7 1106^{b}22-25.

[89] *EN* 2.7 1109^{a}20-24. See Hursthouse, 2006, 109; Broadie, 1991, 75; Reeve, 1992, 167; Sherman, 1994, 24-24; Kosman, 1981; Stocker, 1996, 152-6.

[90] *EN* 2.1 1106^{b}24-27; 1104^{a}12-17.

[91] On some plausible ways of construing the dispositional mean and its motivational range, see Hardie, 1968, 132; Joachim, 1951, 86; Kraut, 1989, 328, 331; Broadie, 2002, 20; Urmson, 1988, 83-85. On objections to a standard Aristotelian presentation of the mean and some substantive responses, see Hursthouse, 2006, 108-111; Joachim, 1951,

Virtue is a disposition to the mean.

(b) Consider now the mean with respect to the choice of an action.[92] A virtuous agent is disposed to right emotion and desire and the agent is ready to listen to the directions of reason (λόγος) – the reason of the prudent man, which may be the outcome of his own deliberation – his choice of an action that will best satisfy his desire. Even prior to an actual choice of action one with a virtuous character state is inclined towards the choice of action that is a mean between the extreme actions possible in the situation.[93] But, a determination of the mean action is the function of practical deliberation which relates to the context of choice and to the status of the agent.[94] Thus, determination of the mean of action to be chosen is not a question of application of rules to cases, but of the perception of particulars to the situation.[95] In the matter of the choice of right action "The unproven assertions and opinions of experience and elderly persons, are as much deserving of attention...for experience has given them an eye for things, and so they see correctly."[96]

Practical Wisdom as the Perfection of Deliberative Thought

Practical wisdom is an intellectual virtue in the deliberative sphere. It enables the morally virtuous person to deliberate rightly and thereby determine the appropriate choice of action in order to satisfy the aims of right desire. Aristotle introduces his understanding of practical wisdom in his central statement on moral virtue. Let us reconsider parts two and three of the statement:

> Virtue then is [i] a settled disposition of character concerning choice lying in the mean relative to the person, [ii] the mean being determined in accordance with right reason as [iii] the practically wise man would determine it.

90; Broadie, 2002, 21; Kraut, 1989, 436. This issue is also considered in the context of more specific virtues and vices in chapters three and five.

[92] *EN* 2.6 $1106^{a}22$-23. On the distinction between the dispositional and action mean, see Gauthier and Jolif, 1970, 141-142; Young, 2006, 184; Kraut, 1989, 328; Hardie, 1968, 131.

[93] See Broadie, 2002, 42; Reeve, 1992, 80; Urmson, 1988, 55; Joachim, 1951, 102; Hardie, 1968, 165; Cooper, 75, 6.

[94] See, Salkever, 1990, 65; Broadie, 1991, 80; Hardie, 1968, 158; Joachim, 1951, 100; Urmson, 1988, 49; Irwin, 1988, 181, 183; Pakaluk, 2005, 136.

[95] See Reeve, 1992, 168; Kraut, 1989, 339; Hardie, 1968, 134-135; Pakaluk, 2005, 215, 226; Sparshott, 210-16; Bostock, 2000, 83-87.

[96] *EN* 6.11 $1143^{b}16$-20; See also *EN* 6.8 $1142^{a}24$-28. A moral virtue is formed by habituation, though it concerns one's disposition to be affected by emotion and desire, as well as one's inclination to act. In this sense, it is not a cognitive virtue, though it needs the guidance of cognitive virtue. See Broadie, 1991, 23. For a more cognitive account of moral virtue, see Kraut, 1989, 441.

> [Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν][97]

These two parts of the statement assert that the practical reason of a practically wise man (φρόνιμος) is the right standard for determining an appropriate choice of action. So, practical wisdom enables the morally virtuous person to achieve the aims of his desire by finding right action, which will be a mean between two extremes relative to him. We can see that the mean in the choice of action is the right choice because it is the product of right desire and belief.

Practical wisdom[98] works in conjunction with particular moral virtues to enable the agent to deliberate rightly about what choice of action falls in the mean between two extreme choices of action and, therefore, serves as the most suitable means to the desired end.[99] Moral virtue determines the ends,[100] whereas practical wisdom determines the means to that end.[101] The end that

[97] *EN* 2.2 $1106^{b}36$-$1107^{a}2$.

[98] One way that Aristotle distinguishes intellectual and practical virtues in this context is that the former concerns truth whereas the latter concerns correctness. He maintains that a good choice requires right desire and true principle. This "pursuit and avoidance" in the desiderative sphere corresponds to "affirmation and denial" in the intellectual sphere. See *EN* $6.2.1139^{a}22$-32.

[99] Aristotle emphasizes that an action is not purely a means to an end, whereas a productive work is merely a means to the end that it serves. In reference to production consider the following text: "Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing with action. This indeed is the moving cause of productive activity also, since he who makes some thing always has some further end in view: the act of making is not an end in itself, it is only a means, and belongs to something else" (διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει: ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς 'ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινόσ' τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν) (*EN* $6.2.1139^{a}36$-$1139^{b}4$). In contrast, consider the following text in reference to action: "If they find that there are several means of achieving it, they proceed to consider which of these will attain it most easily and best. If there is only one means by which it can be accomplished, they ask how it is to be accomplished by that means, and by what means that means can itself be achieved, until they reach the first link in the chain of causes, which is the last in the order of discovery" (ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι: καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν)(*EN* 3.3.1 $112^{b}15$-19).

[100] One's desires or wishes are the starting point for choice. They are always concerned with ends rather than means. "Again, we wish rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end; for example we wish to be healthy, but choose things to make us healthy; we wish to be happy, and that is the word we use in this connection, but it would not be proper to say that we choose to be happy; since, speaking generally, choice seems to be concerned with things within our own control" (ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει: ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι.) (*EN* $3.2.1111^{b}27$-31). See also, *EN* $3.4.1113^{a}15$-16; $3.2.1111^{b}27$-31; $3.4.1113^{a}16$-23; $3.2.1111^{b}14$-18.

[101] On Aristotle's view that practical wisdom does not concern what ends to choose, but rather how to achieve some desired end. Consider the following text: "And we deliberate not about ends, but about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether he is to cure his patient, nor an orator whether he is to convince his audience, nor a statesman

a virtuous person desires is always the noble (τόν κάλον). The courageous agent desires to do whatever is noble in battle; the temperate agent desires to do whatever is noble in satisfaction of the appetite; the just agent desires what is noble in the treatment of others. The noble or the beautiful is a motive for virtuous action as opposed to the lesser goods of the useful and pleasant which are not worthy for their own sake.[102] The best men are motivated by the best and most noble of goods. These good and noble (κάλοι κάγαθοι)men choose what is noble in battle or what is noble in the treatment of others for its own sake.[103] So, the noble is the best motive for virtuous action because it is the most suitable and appropriate guide for a practically wise achievement of the end one desires.[104] That is, if one desires a noble end, its nobility best informs what means are most appropriate for its achievement. Otherwise, the agent can only calculate what means are most effective or useful in the achievement of his desired end. This is why the expression that is usually translated as "means to the end" is appropriate but misleading. The expression πρὸς τὸν τέλον in most contexts should read as what "pertains to the end" and emphasize the quality of being conducive to the end rather than simply being effective.[105]

Aristotle elaborates upon the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom by discussing both the scope of the subjects and the role that it plays in determining choice. According to Aristotle, one never deliberates about things that don't change.[106] The nature of justice and the definition of a circle are eternal

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whether he is to secure good government, nor does anyone else debate about the end of his profession or calling; they take some end for granted, and consider how and by what means it can be achieved"(βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους: ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι)(*EN* 3.3.1112^{b}12-15). *EN* 3.3.1112^{b}15-1; 3.3.1112^{b}31-33; 3.3.1113^{a}1-2. See also Hardie, 1968, 169; Urmson, 1988, 83; Bostock, 2000, 82-87; Pakaluk, 2005, 323-324.

[102] See Lear, 2006, 116; K. Rogers, "Aristotle's Conception of ton kalon," Ancient Philosophy 13 (1993): 355-71; G. Scott, "Purging the Poetics," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 25 (2003); J. Owens, "The *Kalon* in Aristotelian Ethics" in *Studies in Aristotle*, ed. D. Omeara (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 261-277; T. Tuozzo, "Contemplation, the Noble, and the Mean: The Standard of Moral Virtue in Aristotle's Ethics" in *Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean*, ed. R. Bosely (Edmonton: Academic, 1996), 129-154.

[103] *EE* 13.8 1248^{a}3-7, 10-15. See also, *EN* 2.7.1109^{a}24-29.

[104] Joachim, 1951, 102; Cooper, 1975, 22; Pakaluk, 2005, 230-231; Allan , "The Practical Syllogism," *Autour des Aristote* (Louvaine: Publications Universitaires, 1955), 336-337; Hardie, 1968, 215; Sparshott, 1994, 210-212.

[105] *EN* 3.2.1111^{b}27-31; 3.3.1112^{b}15-19. See also, Joachim, 1951, 102,188; Reeve, 2002, 82-88; Cooper, 1975, 19.

[106] Ibid., 3.3.1112^{a}24-30. See also P. Gottlieb, "The Practical Syllogism," in R. Kraut (Ed.), 2006, 219; Reeve, 1992, 80; Urmson, 1988, 53; Joachim, 1951,101; Gauthier and Jolif, 1970, 211-212; A. Abizadeh, "The Passions of the Wise: Phronesis, Rhetoric, and Aristotle's Passionate Practical Deliberation," *Review of Metaphysics* 56, no. 2 (2002): 267-296; P. Clark, "The Action As Conclusion," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 31, no. 4 (2001): 481-506.

and, hence, never change. In contrast, one deliberates about objects that are subject to change. Thus, a soldier desiring to be honorable in battle deliberates about how to behave honorably in this battle.[107]

Second, one deliberates about objects that are not merely variable, but are in one's control.[108] One doesn't deliberate about what the temperature will be tomorrow or about the best form of government for a foreign country. In contrast, a deliberator is concerned with an inquiry about a changing situation that will enable him to determine the best course of action in that situation. Aristotle maintains that one only deliberates about a course of action that is possible for oneself.[109] In a battle scenario, a soldier might deliberate about how he can subdue *that* enemy in *this* situation in the most honorable manner possible. Other objects of inquiry excluded from deliberation concern those actions that are not relevant to the deliberator, though they may be relevant for a separate deliberator. For example, a person who doesn't have the means to fund a trireme doesn't deliberate about how he might fund it. Moreover, one doesn't deliberate about past events or actions impossible to perform, even if they happen to be relevant and necessary to achieving some good outcome. Now, having discussed what falls within the scope of deliberation, we can better understand the role that deliberation plays in the structure of choice.[110]

The practical syllogism provides a formal structure for connecting an individual's desire and deliberation with his action. It consists of a conclusion that is supported by two premises.[111] The major premise formulates the desire of the individual. The minor premise expresses the individual's deliberative reasoning about what must be done to satisfy the desire presented in the desiderative premise.[112] The conclusion states an action that may be performed by an agent. Consider the following syllogism:

1. Agent **A** desires end **E**
2. Agent **A** believes that particular action a causes or constitutes end **E**.
3. Agent **A** chooses action **a**.

[107] *EN* 3.3.1112^{a}22-23.

[108] *EN* 3.3.1112^{a}31-33; 3.2.1111^{b}23-27.

[109] *EN* 3.2.1111^{b}21-23.

[110] For other more general discussions of practical reason and deliberation, see Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue," in ed. A. Rorty, 1980; Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason" in ed. A. Rorty, 1980; J. McDowell, "Virtue and reason," *Monist* 62 (1979): 331-51.

[111] *De Motu* 7.701^{a}10-24.

[112] *EE* 2.11 1227^{b}36.

Both humans and mere animals can perform actions that are the result of the union of deliberation and desire.[113] Such an action is voluntary because it is the consequence of both faculties rather than arbitrary causation.[114] But when the deliberative contribution to the resulting action is rational and the desire receptive to reason about its most appropriate satisfaction then the consequential action is a prohairetic action. So, the prohairetic action is distinguished from mere action[115] by desires that are not just impulsive, but rather can be guided towards the achievement of their end through rational deliberation.

The deliberation that guides the agent's choice is distinguished from the most basic deliberation. It is an ability to reason correctly about what course of action would most appropriately, and in keeping with the nobility of that end, achieve it. The correct deliberation is the exercise of practical wisdom as will be discussed later. But mere deliberation is simply a belief about what action would be merely effective for desire satisfaction rather than a judgment about what is most appropriate in accordance with the nobility of the end. Consider the following formulation[116] of the practical syllogism for a prohairetic action.[117]

1. Agent **A** desires the end of **being honorable in battle**.
2. Agent **A** believes a particular action a causes or constitutes his **being honorable in battle**.
3. Agent **A** chooses **a**.

[113] On the union of desire and deliberation, see also *EN* 6.2.1139^{a}36-1139^{b}6; 6.2.1139^{a}32-35; 6.2.1139^{a}32-35.

[114] On the conditions and constraints upon voluntary action, see Sparshott, 1994, 113-120; Pakaluk, 2005, 121; Hardie, 1968, 152; Urmson, 1988, 42; Irwin, 1988, 181-182; Bostock, 2000, 103-121. On discussion about the scope of animal belief and desire in connection with deliberation, see Salkever, 1990, 65; Urmson, 1988, 49; Irwin, 1988, 179, 181.

[115] *EN* 3.3.1112^{a}13-15.

[116] The predicate term that captures the object of the desire cannot be too general, lest it become too vague to drive choice. It cannot be too specific concerning the end, lest it become undistinguishable from what is being deliberated upon. (e.g., the agent desires to be honorable in *this* battle. And then he deliberates about what is honorable in this battle, rather than wanting to be honorable in battle, simply; and then deliberates about whether this action in this battle is most honorable. On the level of specificity of the end being desired, consider *EN* 3.4.1113^{a}16-23; *EE* 2.1 1227^{b}3; *EN* 2.2 1104^{a}. See also, Hardie, 1968, 229.

[117] Kraut, 1989, 85; Hardie, 1968, 230; L.H.G. Greenwood, *Nicomachean Ethics Book VI* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909); P. Gottlieb, 2006, 224; Urmson, 1988, 94; Cooper, 1975, 23; A. Kenny, "The Practical Syllogism and Incontinence," *Phronesis* 11 (1966): 169-175; Sparshott, 1994, 246-149.

A prohairetic practical syllogism such as the one listed above, presents a conclusion that is necessitated, given the premises.[118] In theoretical reasoning one is compelled to affirm the resulting conclusion, given such premises. So also, the agent is necessitated to act given the premises of the practical syllogism.[119] Choice issues from a determination along the lines of that suggested by the practical syllogism. Desiderative and deliberative reasons cause a choice that is consistent with those reasons.[120] Let us consider each part of the prohairetic practical syllogism in turn.

The major (desiderative) premise. The structure of the syllogism requires only the consistency of the choice of action with the desire of the agent. But a choice of action that is also a correct one (ὄρθη προαίρεσις) has a prerequisite (ὄρθη ὄρεχις). The right desire is a unified, undivided desire for an end that is noble.[121] The agent with the right desire desires that end for its own sake. Consider the desiderative premise from the previous syllogism:

(1) Agent **A** desires the end of **being honorable in battle**

The brave soldier fully desires the nobility of honor in the battlefield without the drag of other conflicting desires within that sphere. So, this right desire determines the agent towards that end.[122] But, actually achieving that end requires a choice that must be wisely deliberated upon if it is to be a right choice.

The minor (deliberative) premise. Agent A believes particular action a cause or constitutes being honorable in battle.[123] An agent with deliberative intelligence reasons well about a course of action that is sufficient or necessary to achieve his desire.[124] The two kinds of deliberative intelligence that are determined in the minor premise are distinguished from one another based on the sort of desire that the deliberation serves. In the case of the virtuous agent, he aims to determine what counts as an honorable action in a specific situation. The required deliberative intelligence is practical wisdom (φρόνησις). In contrast, consider the case where the agent, whether morally virtuous or not, is not considering a choice problem, but rather, a problem of

[118] *EN* 6.12 1144^{a}31-37; 7.3 1147^{a}26-29.
[119] *EN* 7.3 1147^{a}25-29.
[120] *EN* 6.2 1139^{a}21-31.
[121] See Ando, *Aristotle's theory of Practical Cognition* (The Hague, 1958), 287-288; Allan, 1955, 336-337; Joachim, 1951, 210; Hardie, 1968, 229.
[122] *EN* 6.13 1245^{a}4-6.
[123] The deliberative premise first introduces the action that will be chosen. The deliberation brings the desire – the deliberate desire – into great focus, so that the person's desire also drives his choice of action: "As then the object of choice is something within our power which after deliberation we desire, choice will be a deliberate desire of things in our power; for we first deliberate, then select, and finally fix our desire according to the result of our deliberation" (ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν: ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν)(*EN* 3.3.1113^{a}9-13).
[124] See Reeve, 1992, 68; Hardie, 1968, 229.

determining the most efficient way to get from one place to another. Then the required deliberative intelligence is something like cleverness or astuteness (δείνοτης).[125] Moreover, Aristotle doesn't claim that an agent deliberates only when the deliberation concerns what constitutes noble conduct.

Aristotle also maintains that deliberation requires more than the application of rules to cases, but rather, a judgment or discrimination about the particulars[126] of the choice problem; usually without the help of a universal rule that connects actions and the desired end. Let us reconsider premise two:

(2) Agent **A** believes a particular action a causes or constitutes his **being honorable in battle**

The kind of deliberation that is determined in the minor premise is based on the kind of desire that it serves – a right desire. The end of being honorable in battle is a correct desire to have. Moreover, a deliberation about how to achieve one's end may be an effective, but not necessarily a right deliberation. But the agent with practical wisdom is able to determine the course of action that is most in keeping with the nobility and goodness of the correct end he desires. In this case, the agent rightly deliberates upon his right desire.

In contrast, a person without courage may desire the end of mere safety. In a similarly dangerous situation that agent could deliberate about how to most effectively achieve safety. Such a deliberation would never yield a practically wise action since the desire from which it stems is not a correct one. But the latter is a form of deliberative intelligence and can be performed more and less aptly.

The conclusion: Choice. An agent chooses well through the benefit of deliberation which is necessary to determine a choice consistent with his desires, information and context.[127] The agent does not do this if he is impulsive or unable to delay satisfaction. One of the goods of moral virtue is that it is a training of one's emotions and desires such that one does not act on impulse but waits upon the guidance of practical wisdom in order to determine the most appropriate way to satisfy the right desires that one's character enables. Let us reconsider the conclusion:

(3) The agent chooses action **a**.

The above conclusion captures a choice made by an agent that is correct, rational and noble. Presented in its syllogistic form, the choice of action is rational because it is entailed by its desiderative and deliberative premises.[128] It is a right choice of action because it follows from a right desire and right

[125] *EN* 6.12 1144^{a}25-28.
[126] *EN* 2.2 1104^{a}.
[127] See, Hardie, 1968, 230; Joachim, 1951, 102, 188; Broadie, 2002, 44; Urmson, 1988, 48-50; Sparshott, 1994, 371, 378; Irwin, 1988, 179, 220.
[128] *DM* 6 700^{b}17-23; 7 701^{a}10-24.

deliberation. But it is not simply an application of a rule to a situation. Instead, it is an action that follows from the desire for a noble end, guided appropriately by practical wisdom[129] and so nobly meeting the demands of a dangerous situation.

The practical syllogism shows the structure of the right choice of action as a product of right desire and right deliberation. But the mutual dependence of practical wisdom and moral virtue also illuminates an important aspect of the above structure – the connection between right desire and right deliberation.

Moral virtue is necessary for an agent to possess the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.[130]

> Practical wisdom is linked to virtue of character, and this to practical wisdom since the principles of practical wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtue and rightness in morals is in accordance with practical wisdom.[131]

Aristotle insists that an agent cannot rightly deliberate if the end for which he deliberates is a bad one. The agent deliberates upon a plan of action that may achieve the end he desires more or less. But if he desires a bad end then he cannot deliberate rightly. For, the action that his deliberation yields could never count as the appropriate means to the end because there is not a noble end to inform his deliberation about what is the most appropriate means.[132] The moral virtue of the practically wise man has noble ends that inform his deliberation about what choice of action is most in keeping with the nobility of that end.[133] But of course, only a virtuous agent fully desires noble ends. So, moral virtue is necessary for the agent to have practical wisdom.[134]

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[129] Moreover, practical reason doesn't cause the action either, it merely guides it to a choice of action. "Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing with action. This indeed is the moving cause of productive activity also, since he who makes some thing always has some further end in view: the act of making is not an end in itself, it is only a means, and belongs to something else. Whereas a thing done is an end in itself: since doing well (welfare) is the End, and it is at this that desire aims. Hence, Choice may be called either thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect." (διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική: αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει: ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς 'ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινόσ' τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν: ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος)(*EN* 6.2.1139^{a}36-1139^{b}6).

[130] See Reeve, 1992, 72; 70; Leighton, 1982; Urmson, 1988, 81; Fortenbaugh, 1975; Pakaluk, 2005, 231; Bostock, 2000, 78-81.

[131] *EN* 10.8 1178^{a}-1178^{b}8. Of course, Aristotle also acknowledges this in his initial definition of moral virtue where he links the two, *EN* 1106^{b}36-1107^{a}2.

[132] *EN* 3.2 1111^{b}27-31.

[133] *EN* 2.7 1109^{b}24-29.

[134] See also *EN* 6.8 1144^{b}30-32.

Practical wisdom is also necessary for an agent to be morally virtuous.[135] The agent who has a moral virtue desires a good and noble end in that sphere. But unless an agent is also able to choose actions that appropriately achieve his noble end then he would not actually have the moral virtue. "The work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means."[136] For example, an apparently generous man may desire the noble end of being a benevolent donor of wealth and property. But if he is not able to determine the right amounts, the right people and the right times, then does not achieve his end. The actions of the agent substantially affect his character.

> But not only are the virtues both generated and fostered on the one hand, and destroyed on the other, from and by the same actions, but they will also find their full exercise in the same actions. This is clearly the case with the other more visible qualities, such as bodily strength: for strength is produced by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, while also it is the strong man who will be able to eat most food and endure most exertion. II. The same holds good with the virtues. We become temperate by abstaining from pleasures, and at the same time we are best able to abstain from pleasures when we have become temperate.[137]

And having the right desire is not enough to make a right choice of action.[138] Without already having the ability to deliberate rightly about the means to satisfy that desire, one could not make the right choice of action that is necessary for one to have good character and the correct desires that go along with it.[139] So practical wisdom does not cause more moral virtue nor does it cause right choices of action.

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[135] See also *EN* 2.1.1103^{a}33-1104^{b}1; 2.1.1103^{b}31-32; 2.1.1104^{a}18-27; 3.2.1112^{a}1-3.

[136] *EN* 6.12 1144^{a}6-9.

[137] *EN* 2.1.1104^{a}27-35. See also *EN* 2.1 1114^{a}18-27.

[138] *EN* 6.2 1139^{b}32-35.

[139] Of course this is a difficult case to treat because if moral virtue and practical wisdom are required for one another then all examples that provide a contrast of an agent with moral virtue but no practical wisdom (or vice-versa) would be counterfactual. Moreover, since moral virtue and practical wisdom always occur together one must explain why what is already the case, must be the case. For example, discussing why the courageous agent must have practical wisdom involves discussing a courageous agent who must already have practical wisdom. But, of course, it is problematic to show why an agent with courage must also have practical wisdom by using an example of someone who already has courage and practical wisdom, since the supporting example is too much like the claim in question. But, any other example is either counter-factual, unhelpful, un-Aristotelian or trivial. The case of a person who has neither moral virtue nor practical wisdom is not helpful for understanding why the two must go together. A case of one with a moral virtue but without practical wisdom is counterfactual. One other alternative is to discuss cases of agents who are still learning a moral virtue or practical wisdom. But it is more difficult to test the claim that one cannot rightly deliberate without moral virtue if one uses a case of an agent who doesn't yet desire the right end. There is also the un-Aristotelian case of one who might lose some moral

> Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing with action...Hence choice may be called either thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect.[140]

Practical wisdom guides the agent with right desires to the right choice of action, without which he could not be morally virtuous action.[141] So, practical wisdom is necessary for the exercise of moral virtue.

Lastly, let us consider how the choice of the mean that right desire and belief generates is the appropriate choice of action. What counts as the choice of a mean for a person is not determined by any formula, but instead relies on the person's practical wisdom to determine it.[142] Some of the factors that go into a determination of the mean are the following: the resources and abilities of the person making the choice, the circumstances surrounding that person's choice of action, and the person's dispositional background.[143]

Each of these factors is manifested in the practically wise man's judgment about finding the mean. First, the mean is relative to the resources and abilities of a person.[144] Of course, the starting point for a person who already possesses a moral virtue is that his dispositional state already lies between two extremes-the vice of deficiency and the vice of excess.[145] So, the person possessing a moral virtue is able to find and choose the mean in respect of action since the virtue is a dispositional mean that inclines one to choose whatever practical deliberation discovers to be the mean in the order of action. But the moral virtue is a dispositional mean that is manifested somewhat differently in each of its possessors.[146] For example, the courage of Odysseus looks somewhat different than the courage of Achilles, although they both share the major features of courage that Aristotle identifies in *EN*. Achilles has an extraordinary capacity to fight with swiftness, power and agility. So, this makes his courageous actions seem much more daring than the courageous actions of more ordinary soldiers. The average courageous soldier would be

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virtue or practical wisdom, although they had it before. But this introduces other assumptions that undermine his ethical theory. There is also the weaker case of someone who maintains or reinforces their current state of moral virtue and practical wisdom. But this kind of case understates the extent to which moral virtue and practical wisdom require one another. So, these are some reasons why the above example has some limitations in how it can be explained and illustrated. But this does not diminish the validity of the point itself, which is central to Aristotelian ethics.

[140] *EN* 6.2.1139^{a}36-1139^{b}6.

[141] *EN* 2.6 1106^{b}36-1107^{a}2.

[142] Ibid., 3.4.1113^{a}31-33.

[143] See also, Lesley Brown, "What is the 'mean relative to us' in Aristotle's Ethics?" *Phronesis* 42, no. 1 (1997): 77-91; Reeve, 1992, 68, 168; Kraut, 1989, 339; Hardie, 1968, 134-135; Pakaluk, 2005, 215, 226; Sparshott, 210-16; Bostock, 2000, 83-87; Broadie, 2002, 48; Urmson, 1988, 84, 86.

[144] See *EN* 2.1 1106^{a}26-37; 3.4 1120^{b}7-8; 2.7.1109^{b}24-27.

[145] *EN* 2.6 1107^{a}2-8.

[146] Ibid., 2.1 1106^{a}27-32.

rash to engage in the same order of combat as does Achilles. Of course, such a person still risks his life and fights vigorously. So, the courageous action for this average soldier is in accordance with a mean that falls between the extremes specific to him, just as the mean of Achilles is specific to his abilities.[147]

Second, the choice of the mean in action is relative to the circumstance of the person.[148] What counts as a courageous act is always specific to the situation. The choice of one extreme of action in a situation is to act too rashly, whereas acting too mildly or not at all is also an extreme choice of action. But what constitutes these extremes for the person who must act in a battle is altogether dependent on the particulars of the battle. The courageous choice of action, then, falls in the mean between the choices of extremes of action for that circumstance.

Third, the choice of the mean in action for a person must take into account the dispositional background of the person.[149] The choice of the mean in action for a person with an intemperate disposition might have to be adjusted to compensate for this dispositional background. For example, consider the case of a person who has been mildly intemperate for several years with respect to drink. In a situation where this person is thirsty he consistently desires to drink slightly more than he should and take more pleasure than he should. The choice of the mean in action for this person would typically be for him to consume the kind of drink and amount that is most appropriate to his needs, constitution and circumstance. But whatever this mean might be, typically, it should be adjusted according to a proportion that appropriately compensates for his intemperate background. Along these lines, he should consume an amount of a drink that is slightly less than would be, otherwise, appropriate for him to consume. He thereby consumes somewhat less than would be appropriate for him in order to compensate for the months where he had consumed somewhat more than was appropriate for him. Ideally, this level of compensation will adjust his appetitive desire such that he consistently desires the kind and amount of drink that is appropriate to his needs, constitution and circumstance. He will also be appropriately pleased by consuming the appropriate kind and amount. The extent and time that a person should compensate depends on how well engrained his bad disposition is. The role that overcompensation plays in finding the choice of mean in action is the most context and agent specific aspect of practical wisdom.

Practical wisdom is not a rule-based procedure for selecting choice of mean in action. It is an ability to recognize what choice of action is a mean with respect to the person's natural ability, circumstance and dispositional background. And while the choice of the mean in action is specific to the person

[147] Ibid., 2.6 1107^{a}2-8.
[148] Ibid., 2.7.1109^{b}8-23.
[149] Ibid., 2.7.1109^{b}1-7; 1109^{b}24-27.

and his circumstances, there are common features of such a choice of action among all persons choosing it. Some of these features are spelled out in Aristotle's treatment of specific moral virtues. But, the fact that these features are common does not diminish the specificity of practical wisdom to the particulars of the agent and his circumstances.

These are some of the ways that practical wisdom guides the virtuous person from the stability of his dispositional mean to a choice of action that is fitting for such an agent to do in that circumstance. The choice of the mean in action is the appropriate choice because it is a union of his right desires and right deliberation.

Perfecting the Faculties through Education

Moral education is necessary for individuals to develop moral virtues and to gain practical wisdom.[150] The education of moral virtue is the training of a person's capacities for desire and emotion.[151] The most important results of this aspect of moral education is that one's desires are receptive to the guidance of practical reason in the selection of the action for the satisfaction of the desire.[152] The education of one's desires makes them receptive to the guidance of practical wisdom in two ways. First, one's desires are disciplined such that they are less urgent or impulsive. Second, they become increasingly inclined to the direction of practical wisdom as the only guide to the achievement of their ends.[153]

[150] *EN* 10.9 1179^{b}31-1180^{a}24.

[151] See Bodéüs, 1993, 110-119; N. Sherman, *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Moral Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 157-163; R. Curren, *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); J. Swanson, *The Public and the Private in Aristotle's Political Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 147-153; Urmson, 1988, 25.

[152] The priority of educating desire doesn't diminish the role that education of emotion plays in moral education. The education of desire and emotion are closely related. First, how one desires an end and what ends one desires is impacted by one's disposition toward emotion. Take the case of a soldier who has some experience in war, but not in very dangerous scenarios. He may have developed unified desires for the right end – to be honorable in battle. But under the most hostile conditions he may be overly affected by fear, making the desires that are then activated of a mixed quality. (That is, he might not be fully unified in his desire to be honorable in battle. He might have a slight desire for his own safety that is mixed with his more established desire to be honorable in battle, whether it promotes is own safety or not). This kind of case shows how the training of emotion necessarily goes together with the training of desire. Second, the capacities for desire and emotion are intertwined. What leads one to be overaffected by fear in a dangerous situation is what leads one to have mixed or bad desires activated in the subsequent moments. But, what enables one to be affected by fear is not identical with what enables one to desire. Still, one's character state does embrace both capacities. So, the proper or failed training of the relevant capacity for emotion supports or impairs the training of desire.

[153] On the limits of discourse in moral education, see Bodéüs, 1993, 51-54, 100-102. Yack also argues that Aristotle's view on this topic has become widely misconstrued through

The desires of young citizens must be educated such that they are not so urgent or demanding that they blind them to the guidance of practical wisdom.[154] The most pressing dimension of this aspect of moral education is the training of appetitive desires. This is because these are the most impulsive of desires and so the one's that overshadow the guidance of practical wisdom most easily.[155] The desire associated with food, sex and drink can become so demanding that the person may satisfy it in any way and at the earliest moment, without reference to what would most appropriately achieve the end of the desire.[156] So, Aristotle suggests that the appetitive desires are the most impulsive ones and therefore the ones most in need of training.[157] But non-appetitive desire can also be impulsive, and so, it needs to be made more receptive to practical wisdom by, first, by being chastened enough to listen to practical wisdom.[158] Furthermore, a person with well-trained desires learns that practical wisdom best guides them to their ends.

The second aspect of Aristotle's approach to moral education is the training of the faculty of deliberation itself. Practical wisdom, like moral virtue, is learned not inherited.[159] Practical wisdom must be learned from someone who already has it, i.e. the man of practical wisdom (φρόνιμος).[160] Such a person has learned how to deliberate rightly about what the most appropriate choice of action is for achieving an end that is good. The man with practical wisdom guides the young person through various situations that call for the development of the various moral virtues.[161] He teaches the young person how to use his practical wisdom to find the mean of action, by imitating his way of deliberating from situation to situation. Just as a desire must be receptive to practical wisdom, the young person must learn to be receptive to the guidance of the man of practical wisdom. The young person learns how to deliberate in the way that the practically wise man does. He learns from him how to recognize *what* course of action is most in keeping with the nobility

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some modern and contemporary efforts to make his view of responsibility and blame more palatable by attributing a greater level of rational control in character-shaping than Aristotle himself supports (Yack, 1993, 286).

[154] Sometimes Aristotle refers to a well-structured desire that is amenable to the direction of deliberative reason as a wish (in its verbal form, ἐϑελεῖν) or rational desire (βουλήσις).

[155] *EN* 1.13 1102^{b}.

[156] Of course, in reference to temperance it may be the case, oftentimes, that there is no appropriate way to satisfy some appetitive desires. So, for Aristotle, the incidence of an appetitive desire doesn't mean that there is always some course of action that – done in the appropriate time, place and manner – would appropriately satisfy that particular desire.

[157] *EN* 7.1 1145^{b}11-14; 7.7 1150^{b}19-27; 1.13 1102^{b}21.

[158] The desires associated with anger are a very good example of the kind of non-appetitive desire that can be as impulsive as appetitive desires.

[159] *EN* 1.5 1095^{b}; *Pol* 7.17 1337^{a}2-3; *EN* 2.1 1103^{b}1-5, ^{b}13-15, ^{b}21-26; *Pol* 8.3 1388^{a}.

[160] *EN* 3.4 1113^{a}29-31; *Pol* 7.13 1332^{a}-23-24; *EN* 2.2 1106^{b}36-1107^{b} 2.

[161] On the role of the *phronimos* or man with practical wisdom in the cultivation of practical wisdom and moral virtue, see Reeve, 1992, 79; 36-38, 50-53; Sparshott, 1994, 189, 404.

of the end he desire.[162] Eventually, the maturing agent may acquire practical wisdom and moral virtue. A perfected faculty of desire is then guided best by a perfected faculty of deliberation. Moral education enables young citizens to have good desires that are guided by practical wisdom and, thereby, correct choices of action.

Both moral virtue and practical wisdom must be learned. But they can only be learned in a political community from persons that already possess these virtues. But without good moral education neither moral virtue nor practical wisdom can be taught. So, both moral education and the developments of these virtues are mutually dependent. In conclusion, humans have no *a priori* intuitions into right political or moral order; humans have no innate awareness of what is good in itself. Practical wisdom and the appreciation of the true good are functions of right desire; and right desire presupposes right moral discipline and education.[163]

IV. Conclusion

Aristotle's account of the faculties of the soul provides a substantive basis for understanding character and its connection with emotion, desire and action. It is on this basis that Aristotle treats action as the consequence of choice and choice as the consequence of the union of desire and belief. Most importantly, desire and belief are the consequence of character. But the formation of character relies decisively on the quality of the moral education available to those agents. For the character of those formed in this setting shapes their respective desires and beliefs and in, turn their choices and action. But most regimes don't cultivate character very well because they fail to honor virtue as highly as they should and accordingly they honor wealth or freedom more highly than they should. In the next chapter we shall see that that the bad character formed in most regimes is the ultimate cause of their *staseis*.

[162] See also, Hursthouse, 2006, 112; Broadie, 1991, 103-110, Swanson, 1992, 154-160; M. Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good," in ed. A. Rorty 1980, 69-74.

[163] *EN* 1.7 1098^{b}1-4.

3. THE ULTIMATE CAUSES OF STASIS: ETHOS AND ĒTHOS BEHIND FACTIONAL PATHOS

This chapter returns to Aristotle's claim that distorted beliefs about justice are the cause of *stasis*. The goal of this chapter is to make the case that bad character states in general, and the vices of vanity and envy in particular, are the decisive and ultimate cause of *stasis*. Both of these vices contribute to the formation of distorted beliefs about justice. More importantly, they supply the dispositional sources that precisely match Aristotle's profile of the democratic and oligarchic factionaries engaged in *stasis*.

I. The Politeia Context for Distorted Beliefs about Justice

This section expands, explains, and provides a *politeia* context for Aristotle's claim that distorted beliefs about justice is a cause of *stasis*. These beliefs only constitute one side of the causes of *stasis*, as there is a dispositional framework for these beliefs that is not made fully explicit by Aristotle in the *Politics*. It is well to recall the principles of Aristotle's theory of justice and its multiple interpretations by aristocrats, oligarchs and democrats.

But, initially, this section will highlight specifically distributive justice (and its interpretations) because this is the sphere where the claims of factionaries concerning justice are most in dispute and most relevant to the problem of *stasis*.[1] Distributive justice is largely the virtue of legislators. They should frame

[1] Distributive justice is one form of particular justice. Particular justice (*EN* 5.1 $1130^{a}14$, 5.2 $1130^{b}30$) concerns the preservation of fairness in reference to the distribution of benefits and burdens (distributive justice, διαναμητικός), the correction of injustices (corrective justice, διορθωτικόν) and concerning commercial exchanges (reciprocal justice, ἀντιπεπόνθος). See also, J. Frank, "Democracy and Distribution: Aristotle on Just Desert," *Political Theory* 26, no. 6 (1998): 784-802; P. Keyser, "A Proposed Diagram in Aristotle *EN* V3, $1131^{a}24$-b20 for Distributive Justice in Proportion," *Apeiron* 25, no. 2 (1992): 135-144; F. Rosen, "The Political Context of Aristotle's Categories of

laws that distribute correctly the levels of decisionmaking (and eligibility), privileges of leadership in the military service, private property protections and tax burdens.[2] Most people would agree that distributive justice demands distributions of benefits and responsibilities that satisfy the claims of merit and equality. These claims are respected best in Aristotle's understanding of proportionate equality (τὸ ἴσόν).[3] This formulation expresses an equality of merits and shares of benefits that have the form previously discussed in chapter one.

$$\frac{\text{Merit of person X}}{\text{Merit of person Y}} = \frac{\text{Share of Benefits (powers) to person X}}{\text{Share of Benefits (powers) to person X}}$$

There should be an equality of ratios between the worth (ἀχία)[4] of persons and the goods they possess. This is the proportionately equal distributions. So, the ratio of the worth of person A to the benefits possessed by person A must be equal to the ratio of the worth of person B to the benefits possessed by person B.[5]

Aristotle's treatment of distributive justice helps us understand how various regimes distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of what they value most. Additionally, these diverging standards necessarily affect what counts as the correct proportion in distributive justice. There is agreement that justice demands a proportionately equal distribution; that is, one that appropriately respects equality and merit.[6] In short, they disagree about what is a fair distribution because they disagree about the standard of merit.

Aristocrats treat merit as a function of excellence. The Aristocratic principle for distributive justice considers a citizen's moral and intellectual excellence to be the basis for what he deserves.

$$\text{Aristocratic Merit} = \mathbf{f}\ (\text{virtue})$$

Justice," *Phronesis* 20 (1975): 228-40; V. Karasmanis, "The Mathematical Passage in *Nicomachean Ethics* $1131^{b}5$-15," *Ancient Philosophy* 13, no. 2 (1993): 373-378; D. McKerlie, "Aristotle's Theory of Justice," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 39, no. 1 (2001): 119-141; L. Judson, "Aristotle on Fair Exchange," in ed. C.W. Taylor, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997), 147-175.

[2] *EN* 5.5 $1113^{b}30$-34.

[3] *EN* $1131^{a}15$-20.

[4] *Pol* 4.6 $1294^{a}10$-15; 4.7 $1294^{a}12$; 4.12 $1299^{b}39$;4.5 $1292^{b}29$-30.

[5] Distributive justice differs from the other forms of particular justice in that it considers the relevant worth of the person that might hold an office. The other forms of particular justice, corrective and exchange justice (*Pol* 5.5 $1131^{a}1$-10), only consider the value of some good, among other goods, exchanged in a transaction without reference to the relevant worth of the persons involved. See also, Joachim, 1951, 139; Broadie, 2002, 36; Hardie, 1980, 187-188; Urmson 1988, 72-75; W.V. Leyden, 1985; Keyser, 1992, 138-141; Judson, 1997, 153-158.

[6] *EN* 5.3 $1131^{a}25$-29.

Accordingly, in an aristocratic regime, the distribution of benefits and burdens is based on this standard of merit. For instance, in aristocracy the highest offices should be held by its most excellent citizens. The claims of merit and equality are both met, insofar as the most excellent citizens are honored most for their superlative excellence by filling the highest offices. Citizens who have considerable excellence, though not the highest excellence, are honored for their lesser grade of excellence through offices that are proportionately less significant in importance.[7]

Oligarchs treat merit as a function of a citizen's wealth, family lineage or social status.[8] Aristotle's oligarch believes that those who make greater financial (or genealogical) contributions also deserve more.

$$\text{Oligarchic Merit} = \mathbf{f}\,(\text{financial or oligarchic contribution})$$

Oligarchs accept a view of distributive justice that preserves both merit and equality in accordance with a standard of proportionate equality. Justice requires that the wealthiest or most socially distinguished citizens should be able to hold the most important offices, whereas, those of lesser wealth or status should only be able to hold an office that is proportionately less important. So also, it is unfair for citizens who are unequal in wealth or social status to hold equally important offices. The oligarchic standard departs from an aristocratic one, to the extent that their standard of merit differs. But they both agree that few citizens have equal merit, and so, it is unfair to offer equal rewards for unequal merit.[9]

Democrats treat the merit of a citizen as merely a function of being a citizen. So, the democratic principle of justice considers the merit of each and every citizen as equal whatever their level of excellence, social status and wealth may be.[10]

$$\text{Merit} = \mathbf{f}\,(\text{citizenship})$$

Even in democracy, merit and equality is respected according to a standard of proportionate equality. Those with greater merit deserve greater offices, whereas those with less merit deserve appropriately lesser offices. But democracy is unlike either oligarchy and aristocracy in its assignment of merit.

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[7] *EN* 5.3 $1131^{a}11$-29.

[8] *Pol* 3.5 $1279^{a}16$-19; 3.5 $1279^{b}39$-$1280^{a}6$; 4.3 $1290^{a}17$-20; $1290^{a}39$-$1290^{b}3$; 4.6 $1294^{a}10$-12.

[9] On oligarchic views of justice, see K. Raaflaub, "Democracy, Oligarchy, and the Concept of the 'Free Citizen' in Late Fifth-Century Athens," *Political Theory* 11 (1983): 517-524; Yack, 1993, 156; Kraut, 2002, 368; P. Simpson, *A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 363-364; Ober, 1991, 118; J. Sikkenga, "Plato's Examination of the Oligarchic Soul in Book VIII of the *Republic*," *History of Political Thought* 23, no. 3 (2002): 380-385; R. Brock, "Athenian oligarchs: the numbers game" *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 109 (1989): 160-4; D. Keyt (trans. and comm.), *Aristotle: Politics Books V and VI*, trans. and comm. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 59,63,67, 204; Kalimtzis, 2000, 37-30.

[10] *Pol* 4.4 $1291^{b}31$-38; 4.6 $1294^{a}10$-12; 3.5 $1279^{a}16$-19; 4.3 $1290^{a}17$-20; $1290^{a}39$-$1290^{b}3$; 3.5 $1279^{b}39$-$1280^{a}6$.

The ability, achievements, status and wealth that might otherwise distinguish citizens from one another, over and above their citizenship status, are not relevant to a democratic standard of merit.[11]

Thus, democrats accept the view that distributive justice requires a proportionately equal distribution. But they disagree with oligarchic and aristocratic assessments of merit.[12] Equals should be treated as equals and unequals should be treated as unequals.[13] But the numerically equal distribution is the proportionately equal distribution because all citizens are equal in merit. So, wealthy or excellent citizens might deserve greater honor due to their wealth or excellence if their wealth or excellence counted as merit. But all citizens in democracy are owed the same level of honor because they are all equal in merit.

Aristotle summarizes these conflicting views of justice in his account of factional conflict. He initially states the problem as follows:

> Thus democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely (for they suppose that because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely), oligarchy arose from their supposing that if they are unequal as regards some one thing they are unequal wholly (for being unequal in property they assume that they are unequal absolutely); and then the democrats claim, as being equal to participate in all things in equal shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. All these forms of constitution then have some aspect of justice, but from an absolute point of view they are mistaken; and owing to this cause, when each of the two parties has not got the share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that they happen to entertain, factions form.[14]

Aristotle then specifies their conflict of judgments concerning what the proportionately equal distribution is in particular circumstances.

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[11] See also, J. Frank, 1998, 787-790; Kraut, 368, 45-451; R. Mulgan, 'Liberty in Ancient Greece' in *Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy*, eds. Z. Pelczynski and J. Gray (London, 1984); R. Mulgan, "Aristotle's Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy," in eds. Keyt and Miller, 1991, 312; J. Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 318, 356; B. Strauss, "On Aristotle's Critique of Athenian Democracy," in eds. Lord and O'Connor, 1991, 212-220; T. Lindsay, "Liberty, Equality, Power: Aristotle's Critique of the Democratic 'Presupposition,' " *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (1992): 743-761; Keyt, 1999, 59, 62-63; Kalimtzis, 2000, 39-40; Simpson, 1998, 363-365.

[12] *Pol* 3.5 1280^{a}19-23, 13-16.

[13] *Pol* 3.5 1280^{a}11-14.

[14] [δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὁτιοῦν ὄντας οἴεσθαι ἁπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι 'ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἁπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν', ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἔν τι ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν 'κατ' οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες ἁπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι. εἶτα οἱ μὲν ὡς ἴσοι ὄντες πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσι μετέχειν: οἱ δ' ὡς ἄνισοι ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον. ἔχουσι μὲν οὖν τι πᾶσαι δίκαιον, ἡμαρτημέναι δ' ἁπλῶς εἰσιν](*Pol* 5.1 1301^{a}27-35).

> Those that desire equality form factions if they think that they have too little although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, and they may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people form factions in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men engage in factious struggle.[15]

Behind these conflicting views about justice are states of character that shape both one's beliefs and desires.[16] The belief[17] that one always deserves more gain and honor and the corresponding desire for that greater honor and gain is a product of one's state of character.[18] The following section makes the case that bad character contributes to the formation of these mistaken beliefs and, furthermore, produces the desires and emotions motivating the factionaries engaged in *stasis*.

II. Bad Character as the Source of Factional Strife

In Aristotle's criticisms of Plato, he implicitly agrees with Plato's characterization of *stasis* as a problem uniquely caused by bad character.[19] Aristotle then offers decisive criticisms of Plato's solution to that problem.[20] Both points strengthen the contention that Aristotle considers bad character the underlying cause of *stasis*.

Plato and Aristotle share an unexpected point of agreement that faction is a political problem which bad character uniquely generates. This agreement

[15] [μάλιστα θετέον περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφιέμενοι στασιάζουσιν ἂν νομίζωσιν ἔλαττον ἔχειν ὄντες ἴσοι τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀλλ᾽ ἴσον ἢ ἔλαττον ‘τούτων δ᾽ ἔστι μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι δικαίως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως’: ἐλάττους τε γὰρ ὄντες ὅπως ἴσοι ὦσι στασιάζουσι, καὶ ἴσοι ὄντες ὅπως μείζους. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες στασιάζουσιν, εἴρηται: περὶ ὧν δὲ στασιάζουσιν ἐστὶ κέρδος καὶ τιμὴ καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες καὶ ζημίαν, ἢ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἢ τῶν φίλων, στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν] (*Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}22-30).

[16] Aristotle highlights the murkiness of oligarchic and democratic judgments about justice. He thinks that both groups tend to draw inappropriate conclusions about the justice of their respective situations. See, Salkever, 1990, 75; Loraux, 1991, 40; Kraut, 2002, 392, 435; Linott, 1982, 248; Keyt, 1999, 62-63; Kalimtzis, 2000, 39-43; Simpson, 1998, 365-368.

[17] On the role of perceptions and beliefs of agents in group action, see Figuera, 1991, 292; Balot, 2006, 230; Yack, 1993, 219, Kalimtzis, 2000, 112-115; Keyt, 1999, 77-78; Simpson, 1999, 369.

[18] On the range and quality of the ends for which factionaries desires, see O'Connor, 1991, 153; Yack, 1993, 220; Kraut, 2002, 268; Balot, 2006, 232; Keyt, 1999, 77, 79; Simpson, 1998, 370.

[19] *Rep* 5 465^{a}, *Rep* 8 560^{d}, *Rep* 4 444^{b}.

[20] *Pol* 2.1 1260^{a}28-1264^{b}27.

is so surprising due to the extent of their disagreement about the solution to this problem.[21] Plato's alleged solution in the guardian class is to eliminate faction through:

1. a moral education that fosters good character in the guardians, [22] and
2. a political community where all private associations and property are held in common.

But this solution is misleading because it leaves the reader wondering whether there is an additional source of faction – inequalities of property and association – one that a communism of property and association would remove. Along these lines, Plato would be claiming that the two fundamental causes of faction are both bad character and inequality. According to this view, moral education solves the first problem, and communism, the second problem.[23]

[21] Plato, just preceding the alleged solution presented in *Republic* V, presents the scope of disunity in the city and the soul. While there are many aspects to it and more than one representative sample of it consider the following: " ' Mustn't it, in its turn, be a certain faction among those three – a meddling, interference, and rebellion of a part of the soul against the whole? The purpose of the rebellious part is to rule in the soul although this is not proper, since by nature it is fit to be a slave to that which belongs to the ruling class. Something of this sort I suppose we'll say, and that the confusion and wandering of these parts are injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, lack of learning, and in sum, vice entire' "(*Rep* 4 18 444^{a}10-444^{b}7).

[22] While, most of books two and three discuss the virtues and what educational practices would best inculcate them that goal carries on in book five but in the context of training male and (supposedly) female guardians. (See also the latter note on how book five should be understood in relation to the dialogue as a whole). " 'Virtue then, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease, ugliness and weakness.' 'It is so.' 'Then is it not also true that beautiful and honorable pursuits tend to be winning of virtue and the ugly to vice'? 'Of necessity.' 'And now at last, it seems, it remains for us to consider whether it is profitable to do justice and practice honorable pursuits and be just, whether one is known to be such or not, or whether injustice profits, and to be unjust, of only a man escape punishment and is not bettered by chastisement.' 'Nay, Socrates,' he said, 'I think that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdity – if, while life is admittedly intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very nature and constitution of that whereby we live is disordered and corrupted, life is going to be worth living, if a man can only do as he pleases, and pleases to do anything save that which would rid him of evil and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue – now that the two have been shown to be as we described them.' 'Yes it is absurd,' said I; 'but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, we must not grow weary in endeavoring to discover with the utmost possible clearness that these things are so.' " (*Rep* 4 19 444^{e}4-445^{b}7). Then in book five there are a number of activities that had been treated earlier as virtue promoting activities which are reintroduced: " 'And this music and gymnastic applied as we describe will effect.' 'Surely' "(*Rep* 5 6 456^{e}6-447^{a}2).

[23] The kind of passage that Aristotle associates with Plato's proposal that property and families be held in common is as follows: " 'You, then, the lawgiver', I said, 'have picked these men and similarly will select to give over to them women as nearly as possible of the same nature. And they, having houses and meals in common, and no private

The above view cannot be Aristotle's understanding of Plato, despite what some commentators contend.[24] Aristotle takes Plato to be offering two proposals that, together, would solve the single problem of faction by eliminating the bad character that causes it. Aristotle's criticism of Plato does not extend to Plato's characterization of the problem of faction, but rather centers on Plato's solution to it. In fact, much of Aristotle's later discussion in *Politics* 5 is an outline of a solution to just this problem, but one that Aristotle considers a vastly superior alternative to Plato's. In short, it is the magnitude of this disagreement that obscures their fundamental point of agreement that bad character is the central cause of faction.

Aristotle's actual criticisms of Plato's solution reveal the extent to which he considers bad character the source of faction. Aristotle rejects the goal of unity as the organizing principle of political life on the grounds that it is an inappropriate goal for a city. According to Plato the city cannot be a good one unless it is a unified one. But, the complete unity of the city requires unity both within and between each social class. This is a goal that only the eradication of faction could bring about. And, insofar as bad character

possessions of that kind, will dwell together, and being comingled in gymnastics and in all their life and education, will be conducted by innate necessity to sexual union. Is not what I say a necessary consequence'? 'Not by the necessities of geometry', he said, 'but by those of love, which are perhaps keener and more potent than the other to persuade and constrain the multitude (Rep 5 7 458^{c}4-458^{d}8).' " The topic of the communism of women, children and property is suggested throughout *Republic* 5. This chapter has assumed that the measures outlined in book 5 of the *Republic* for holding all things in common is a serious plan of action. But this is only assumed as a serious proposal because Aristotle does. And most of this project turns on what are and are not Aristotle's assumptions. Consider the tone of Aristotle's introduction to his criticisms of *Republic* 5: "For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the *Republic* of Plato. Which is better, our present condition or the proposed new order of society (*Pol* 1.2 1261^{a}4-6)"? In actuality, there are good reasons to think that the proposals of book 5 are not meant to be taken seriously. The radical nature of these measures is in fact comical. If one sees how drastic the consequences of these proposals are it questions whether the proposal is a solution for anything at all. While this is a controversial point of interpretation, it is the best way to read this section. This view seems compatible with the assumption of this project, since much of the latter only turns on Aristotle's interpretation of Plato.

[24] See D. Hall, "The *Republic* and the Limits of Politics," *Political Theory* 5 (1977): 293-313; V. Provencal, "Writing the Large Letter Small: the Analogy of State and Individual at *Republic* V 462c-d," Apeiron 30, no. 2 (1997): 73-88; C. Pierce, "Equality: *Republic* V," *Monist* 57 (1973): 1-11; Kraut, 2002, 169-173, 356-257, 310-313, 444; R. Mayhew, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Republic* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); T. Saunders, *Aristotle: Politics, Books I and II*, trans.and comm. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 106-108. On other intepretations of Republic V and some responses to those interpretations, see A. Bloom, "Response to Hall's 'The *Republic*' and the 'Limits of Politics,' " *Political Theory* 5 (1977): 315-330; S. Benardete, *Socrates' Second Sailing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 109-117; R.F. Stalley, "The Unity of the State: Plato, Aristotle and Proclus," *Polis* 14, no. 1 (1995): 129-149; C. Evangeliou, "Even Friends Cannot Have All Things in Common: Aristotle's Critique of Plato's *Republic*," *Philosophia* 25 (1995): 200-212; R. Heinaman, "Social Justice in Plato's *Republic*," Polis 15, no. 1 (1998): 23-43 Mayhew, 1997; Bodéüs, 1993, 244.

is the fundamental source of faction, bad character is the essential barrier to the goal of political unity. What this reveals, therefore, is that Aristotle recognizes Plato's solution (parts 1 and 2) as such a radical scheme because it must entirely solve the radical problem of bad character. Consider the following two representative statements of Aristotle's criticisms of *Republic* 5:

> Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause – the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much quarreling among those who have all things in common, though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property.[25]

This passage, taken from the portion of his criticism concerning private property,[26] emphasizes the problem that a communism of property would allegedly eradicate – the most basic kinds of factional struggle. So, the achievement of a state where all citizens are friends would eliminate the apparent inequalities of private property. But, bad character is of such a magnitude that these conflicts cannot be eliminated, especially by a communism of property.

The character sources of factional conflict are even more substantially implied in the portion of his criticism concerning the communism of women and children.[27] The factional struggles that are heightened, supposedly, by an attachment to one's own family are better managed when the natural structure of the family is left in tact.

> For there are two things that most cause men to care for and to love each other, the sense of ownership and the sense of preciousness; and neither motive can be present with the citizens of a state so constituted. Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandman or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers

[25] [εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν: ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἔσεσθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων κολακείας: ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοινωνοῦντας πολλῷ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὁρῶμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρὶς τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας: ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνιῶν διαφερομένους, πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτημένους ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις](*Pol* 2.5 1263^{b}15-27)

[26] *Pol* 2.5 1262^{b}36-1263 b27.

[27] *Pol* 2.2 1262^{a}10- 2.4 1262 b35.

> or transferors cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom. And the previously mentioned evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often among those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will not longer call the guardians brothers, and children and fathers, and mothers, and will not therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity.[28]

Aristotle also emphasizes the extent to which the replacement of natural family associations with a more fitting "class" identity exposes, more vividly, the brute viciousness of most humans. Aristotle argues that Plato's solution provides a political environment that actually intensifies just those character problems that cause factions. Again, in this series of criticisms Aristotle doesn't dispute Plato's assumption that bad character is the fundamental source of faction, but instead, vigorously disputes the position that the communism of property and association would diminish the character problems that cause faction. Aristotle emphasizes these criticisms to show, not just that such utopian schemes are doomed to fail, but to show that the problem of bad character and its factional consequences are sure to persist.

Moreover, when one considers the problem of faction according to Aristotle's more natural basis for political organization, then bad character can be more easily seen as the chief cause of factional conflict. Aristotle criticizes the goal of complete political unity as an inappropriate principle of political organization – one that is unnatural, insofar as it treats a city as if it were only a family or clan. Instead, Aristotle borrows from his analysis in *Politics* I (1.1 1252a1-13 1260a24) concerning the parts that naturally constitute a city: families, clans, villages, and collections of villages.[29] While each of these component parts

[28] [δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν: ὧν οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν τίνα ἔσται τρόπον: καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας τίσι τίνας διδόασιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οἷον αἰκίας ἔρωτας φόνους: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύσουσιν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας οἵ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες τοὺς φύλακας καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, ὥστ' εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν](*Pol* 2.5 1262^{b}24-35).

[29] "The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants...but when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled with the same milk....When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of the good life. Hence every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and nature is an end, since that which each thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse, a household. Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its

is developmentally prior to the city, none are capable of being self-sufficient. The city is naturally capable of being self sufficient, but only achieves this goal according to a principle of political organization that appropriately preserves each of these component parts.[30] So, Aristotle argues that the goal of unity is not a goal appropriate for a city, since its achievement would misshape, if not altogether destroy, the constitutive elements of a city.

The latter point is important for understanding Aristotle's position on the character causes of faction because factions should be understood as a political problem endemic to cities as they are naturally structured. Aristotle

chief good and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good. From these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (like the 'clanless, lawless, hearthless' man reviled by Homer for one by nature unsocial is also 'a lover of war') inasmuch as he is solitary, like an isolated piece at draughts. And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech" (ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἰκός ἐστιν, οὓς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρὴς ὁμοκάπους: ἡ δ᾽ ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι, οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ὁμογάλακτας, [παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖδα;]...ἡ δ᾽ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἤδη πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἔστιν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν: οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον: ἡ δ᾽ αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος: ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ᾽ Ὁμήρου: λοιδορηθεὶς ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος:ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ)(*Pol* 1.2 1252^{b}12-19; 1252^{b}27-1253^{a}10).

[30] "Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually. For the whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal sense, like the sense in which one speaks of a hand sculptured in stone as a hand; because a hand in those circumstances will be a hand spoiled, and all things are defined by their function and capacity, so that when they are no longer such as to perform their function they must not be said to be the same things, but to bear their names in an equivocal sense. It is clear therefore that the state is also prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god." (ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους: ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν λιθίνην 'διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ὁμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δῆλον: εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι᾽ αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός)(*Pol* 1.2 1253^{a}20-30).

maintains that natural associations of families, clans, and even friendships should not be understood as factions. Along these lines, the candidate sources of Aristotelian faction should cannot be fairly and accurately tested according to an understanding of faction as those associations hindering the full unity of the "city." The candidate sources of Aristotelian faction should be tested according to a framework that compares naturally structured cities; that is, cities that are constituted by individuals forming families, clans, villages and collections of villages. These individuals may also associate with one another on the basis of interests and goals besides those interests and goals served by these units of the city. The pattern of association in this sphere occurs in a backdrop of a regime that is better (i.e. aristocracy) and, therefore, more conducive to the living of the good life or less good (i.e. democracy, oligarchy), and so, is less conducive to the living of the good life.

When the *Politics* is read as a whole, it is evident that Aristotle's comparison of those naturally structured cities that are the most faction prone and the least faction prone leads him to conclude that character is the central cause of faction.[31] While there are many possible points of comparison, the starkest comparison is among aristocratic regimes and the deviant regimes of oligarchy and democracy. Faction is not a significant problem in aristocracies, whereas, it is a significant problem in the various forms of oligarchies and democracies.[32]

[31] *Pol* 2.6 1266^{a}30-2.7 1267^{b}20; 2.7 1267^{b}21-2.9 1269 b27; 2.9 1269^{b}28-1271 b19; 2.10 1272^{b}24-1273 b26).

[32] Aristotle provides an overview of the disorder endemic in those regimes that fall short of aristocracy: "Though neither the former nor the aristocracies spoken of just now are really deviations, we have classed them thus because in actual truth they have all fallen away from the most correct constitution, and consequently are counted with the deviation-forms, and those are deviations from them, as we said in our remarks at the beginning. Tyranny is reasonably mentioned last because it is the least constitutional of all governments, whereas our investigation is about polity. Having then stated the reason for this mode of classification, we have now to set forth our view about polity. For its meaning is clearer now that the characteristics of oligarchy and democracy have been defined; since polity is, to put it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. But people customarily give the name of polity only to those among such mixed constitutions that incline towards democracy, and entitle those that incline more towards oligarchy aristocracies, because education and good birth go more with the wealthier classes, and also the wealthy are thought to have already the things to get which wrongdoers commit wrong; owing to which people apply the terms 'gentry' and 'notabilities' to the rich. Since therefore aristocracy means the assignment of the highest place to the best of the citizens, oligarchies also are said to be drawn rather from the gentry. And it seems an impossibility for a city governed not by the aristocracy but by the base to have well-ordered government, and similarly also for a city that has not a well-ordered government to be governed aristocratically" (δι᾽ ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τέτακται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, εἴρηται: νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. εἰώθασι δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν ἀποκλινούσας [ὡς] πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις. ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν οἱ εὔποροι ὧν ἕνεκεν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν: ὅθεν καὶ καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις

The most striking difference between the deviant and good regimes is that the latter regimes possess a wider base of citizens that are virtuous than do the former regimes. Furthermore, moral virtue is a state of character that is valued so highly in the aristocratic regimes that it is ruled by the virtuous for the virtuous.[33] While the various deviant regimes disagree about what is the most important basis for rule, they agree that it is not moral virtue. So, if Aristotle's criticisms of Plato offered reasons for his view that bad character is the central cause of faction, then this comparison offers confirmation of this point. While the differences between oligarchic and democratic regimes are considerable, these differences only affect the kinds of circumstances and events that form the backdrop of faction. These differences do not mitigate

τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναί φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον δοκεῖ δ΄ εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην πόλιν ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία τὸ εὖ κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους, μὴ πείθεσθαι δέ) (*Pol* 4.7 1293[b]21-1294[a]3). Moreover, Aristotle locates the difference between the two in the better moral condition of aristocracies. Aristocratic government possesses the most virtuous citizenry: "Now the name of aristocracy is indeed properly given to the constitution that we discussed in our first discourses (for it is right to apply the name 'aristocracy' – 'government of the best' – only to the constitution of which the citizens are best in virtue absolutely, whereas those who are good me in relation to some arbitrary standard, for under it alone the same person is a good man and a good citizen absolutely)..."(ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις 'τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ΄ ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν: ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν)(*Pol* 4.7 1293[b]1-5).

[33] Aristotle discusses how Aristocracy builds into its constitution an honoring of excellence, whereas lesser regimes emphasize it less: "But aristocracy in the fullest sense seems to consist in the distribution of the honors according to virtue; for virtue is the defining factor of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy (while the principle that a decision of the majority is supreme is found in them all: for in both oligarchy and aristocracy and democracies whatever the larger part of those who have a share in the government decides is supreme). In most states then the name of aristocracy is given to that form of constitutional government, for the combination aims only at the well-off and the poor, wealth and freedom (since in almost the largest number of states the rich seem to occupy the place of the gentry); but as there are three things that claim equal participation in the constitution, freedom, wealth and virtue (for the fourth, what is called nobility, accompanies the two latter-nobility means ancient wealth and virtue), it is manifest that the mixture of the two factors, the rich and the poor, ought to be termed constitutional government, while the mixture of the three factors deserves the name of aristocracy most of all the various forms of aristocracy beside the true and best form" (δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς τιμὰς νενεμῆσθαι κατ΄ ἀρετήν 'ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος ἀρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δ΄ ἐλευθερία: τὸ δ΄ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει: καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν δήμοις, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλείονι μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτ΄ ἐστὶ κύριον. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τοῦτο τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται: μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας: 'σχεδὸν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὔποροι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν': ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή 'τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσίν: ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή', φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην)(*Pol* 4.8 1294[a]11-25).

the fundamental character sources of faction that are quite prominent in both regimes. It may be that the difference between democracy and oligarchy can be adjusted to be more or less conducive to the education of virtue; and more or less able to manage the emergence of factions when their character causes are well entrenched in the citizen base. But, still, the difference between the widespread virtue base in the aristocratic regime and the more minimal virtue base in a democracy or oligarchy is the factor that best accounts for the difference between the significant incidence of faction in democracies and oligarchies and the more limited incidence of faction in aristocracies.

Lastly, Aristotle's criticisms of Phaleas of Chalcedon[34] provide a somewhat different support for the view that bad character for Aristotle is the central source of faction.[35] In this discussion Aristotle identifies an established tendency to generate faction in the context of a naturally structured city that possesses many of the features of property communism. This is a helpful example to consider because it tests whether a more egalitarian but non-communistic form of property and wealth distribution would diminish impetus for faction caused by property and wealth inequality. And it tests this possibility in the most plausible way because it considers the allegedly best features of egalitarianism without the disadvantages of the more radical and more clearly destructive forms of property and familial communism. Yet, faction was generated even under such conditions. Aristotle highlights the extent to which the bad desires of the individuals in this community lead to a considerable level of faction.

> This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a state is already established....Moreover, civil troubles arise, not only out of inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honour, though in opposite ways. For the common people quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honor; as the poet says – 'The bad and good alike in honour share.' There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to crime; they also wish to enjoy themselves and to be in a state of desire – they may desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit crimes. Now what is the cure of these disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance; as

[34] *Pol* 2 7 1266[a]31-1267 b7.

[35] See Balot, "Aristotle's Critique of Phales: Justice, Equality, and *Pleyonexia*," *Hermes* 129.1 (2001): 32-44; Balot, 2006, 252; Ober, 1991, 121-122; Saunders, 1995, 135-139; Kalimtzis, 2000, 140-141.

> to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others. The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence great is the honour bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas only avail against petty crimes.[36]

In this selection Aristotle makes explicit the problem that the community of Phaleas hopes to solve, the disunity and conflict between disparate social groups. Those involved in the struggle maintain that it is an unfair distribution of wealth and honor them motivates them and Phaleas agrees. But, this is exactly their point of confusion for Aristotle. It is the magnitude of a citizenry's bad desires that drives factional struggles, especially the most political and violent ones.

The fact that bad character causes factional conflict is crucial for understanding the nature of factional conflict.[37] But bad character is always tied to specific vices or sub-virtuous dispositions. So, an understanding of the kinds of bad character that cause factional conflict is especially important for understanding the nature of factional conflict. Envy and vanity, in particular, are the vices that best fit the dispositional profile for those who engage in factional conflict.

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[36] [Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ᾽ εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος: φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν.τοῦτο δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπὸν ὤετο ποιεῖν, τὰς δ᾽ ἤδη κατοικουμένας ἐργωδέστερον μέν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ᾽ ἂν ὁμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προῖκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μ;... ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοὐναντίον δὲ περὶ ἑκάτερον: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι: ὅθεν καὶ: ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ ἠμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός.οὐ μόνον δ᾽ οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὧν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν ἢ πεινῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν: ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω ἔχωσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν ταύτης ἰατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν: οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν] ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων· τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βραχεῖα καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη: τρίτον δ᾽, εἴ τινες βούλοιντο δι᾽ αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄκος αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται: ἐπεὶ ἀδικουσί γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ‘οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσιν: διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ τύραννον’: ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας] (*Pol* 2.6 1266^{a}40-1266 b3; 2.7 1266 b38-1268^{a}18).

[37] See Balot, 2006, 231; Kraut, 2002, 435; Yack, 1993, 156. For a more explicit discussion of political division as a reflection of psychological divisions, see Loraux 1991, 37; 39. On the objections of Van Effenterre and Loraux's response, see H and M. Van Effenterre, "L'acte de fraternization de Nakone, " *Melanges de l'Ecole francaise de Rome* 100 (1988): 696-698; Loraux, 1991, 47.

Envy

Envy (φθόνος) is a vice of excess associated with the virtue of righteous indignation (νέμεσις). Aristotle doesn't develop his discussion of this moral virtue in his expanded treatment of the virtues in *EN* 1115a7-1138 b11. But his initial discussion still provides a helpful framework for understanding the nature of the vice and its motivational scope. Aristotle presents righteous indignation as a virtue where its possessor is appropriately pained by the good fortune or success of others.[38] That is, when others receive goods that are undeserved the righteously indignant are appropriately pained by that success. This description of righteous indignation doesn't capture all the fields of motivation associated with a virtue (e.g. how it enables one to be affected appropriately by an emotion, above and beyond a painful sensation; how it enables a desire for some good end). But it remains a character state that poses a plausible contrast to the vice of envy.[39]

[38] "Again, Righteous Indignation is a mean between Envy and Malice, and these qualities are concerned with pain and pleasure felt at the fortunes of one's neighbors. The righteously indignant man is pained by undeserved good fortune; the envious man exceeds him and is pained by all the good fortune of others; while the malicious man so far falls short of being pained that he actually feels pleasure" (νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας: ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν) (*EN* 1108^{b}1-3). Aristotle discusses this topic in *Rhetoric* and then compares it with envy and pity: "...indignation is being pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently undeserved..." (...τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπαγεῖν...)(*Rh* 2.9 1387^{a}9). "Now what is called indignation is the antithesis to pity; for the being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character"(ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν: τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενόν) (*Rh* 2.8 1386^{b}9).

[39] The reason why this is phrased as a helpful "contrast" is that there are a few difficulties with simply understanding righteous indignation as a virtuous disposition that is the mean between the extremes of envy and malice. First, there is a glaring incongruity between the extreme dispositions that righteous indignation is between. Most of Aristotle's virtues are between extreme dispositions, where for the purposes of making a coherent description, all other factors are held equal. For example, courage can be understood as a character state that enables one to be moved appropriately by the emotions of fear and confidence and driven well by its related desires under conditions of mortal danger in a noble battle. However, it would be difficult to appreciate how courage is a mean between the dispositions of cowardice and rashness, if the background conditions were shifted. Consider the implications of this example. Courage would be described under conditions of grave danger, yet cowardice would described as a state where one tends to be over affected by fear and under affected by confidence during conditions of peace, where the affected person only perceives a mild possibility of danger. Rashness could also be described under background conditions that are more intense than grave danger; perhaps a condition of impending doom. The virtue of righteous indignation is a mean between extreme dispositions that are described incongruously, along the same lines. Righteous indignation is a tendency to be appropriately displeased by the undeserved success of one's neighbor; whereas envy is a tendency to be excessively pained, not by the undeserved success of one's neighbor, but rather, by a success that may very well

Aristotle treats envy as a vice of excess where its possessor is pained by the good fortune of others, especially when it is not undeserved.[40] Malice

be deserved. Similarly, he presents malice as a tendency to be deficiently pained by the undeserved suffering of one's neighbor, instead of as a dispositional deficiency that is described under the same background condition set in his description of righteous indignation. The condition that triggers the emotion and desire is crucial to an understanding of the disposition. So, it is difficult to compare fully the virtue with its extremes when all three dispositions are not presented with similar prompting conditions. Second, Aristotle doesn't use the full range of motivations that he uses in most virtues and vices. Aristotle usually describes the emotions that the virtue appropriately enables as more than just pleasure and pain, although they always include pleasure or pain. These problems do not make Aristotle's discussions of these dispositions unhelpful. They only pose a challenge to understanding righteous indignation as a virtuous mean. Even if objection one were granted (problem two is only a problem of underdescription), Aristotle's account of envy as a vicious disposition could still be maintained since one might not need to know what disposition would be a corrective of a bad disposition in order to know that such a disposition is bad. Moreover, there are some emotions and desires that are always bad to have. So, the fact that there is no disposition that enables one to be affected appropriately by an inherently pathological emotion doesn't mean that such a tendency cannot be condemned as a bad disposition. On the plausibility of vices that lack clear-cut correctives see R. Hursthouse in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (ed.) A. O. Rorty (California: Calif. University Press, 1980) and *Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[40] Aristotle initially describes envy as follows: "the envious man...is pained by all the good fortune of others..." (ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς...ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται)(*EN* 2.7 1108^{b}1-3). He also presents the envious person initially as one who is only pained by the success of others when it is not undeserved. "...it [envy] is excited not by the prosperity of the undeserving but by that of people who are like us or equal with us" (ἀλλ′ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον)(*Rh* 2.8 1386^{b}19-20). Other passages suggest that one might envy something that is possessed by someone who doesn't deserve it. For example, in some passages Aristotle says that envy is only for that good fortune (whether some honor, opportunity or good) that is obtained by someone else (*EN* 2.7 1108^{b}1-3). But this is ambiguous enough to include good fortune that is undeserved. There are also a few passages where Aristotle's language suggests injustice. "That is, one might envy that which one deserves but doesn't have or that which someone else should not have. We feel envy also if we fall but a little short of having everything; which is why people in high places and prosperity feel it – they think everyone else is taking what belongs to themselves"(*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}27-30). "The goods that excite envy have already been mentioned...and particularly if we desire the thing ourselves, or think we are entitled to it..." (ἐφόῖς δὲ φθονοῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰεῖρμται...καὶ μάλιστα ὧν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὀρέγονται ἢ οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοὺς ἔχειν...)(*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}34-1388^{a}2). "We also envy those who have what we ought to have...."(καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἠκεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς προσῆκεν)(*Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}21). But, we should understand Aristotle to mean that one only envies what is not undeserved. First, on balance the most decisive and critical passages suggest this. His initial comments on his most comprehensive treatment of envy are clear on this point (*Rh* 2.8 1386^{b}19-20). Subsequent passages more forcefully deny that one envies what one deserves or what others don't deserve. "We also envy those whose possession of our success in a thing is a reproach to us: these are our neighbors and equals; for it is clear that it is our own fault we have missed the good thing in question; this annoys us, and excites envy in us" (*Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}17-18). Second, other dispositions besides envy control motivations concerning unjust situations. For example, if one feels pain when a rival (or anyone) obtains something good that is undeserved, one is righteously indignant. And if envy is, in any substantial sense, a vice associated with righteous indignation then to have envy is not to have righteous

(ἐπιχαιρεκακίας)is the vice of deficiency where one is insufficiently pained by the undeserved misfortune of others. The person is so insufficiently pained by the misfortune of others that he takes pleasure in their condition. With this contrast in mind, let us consider a fuller account of the vice of envy in Aristotle.

Envy is a character state where one tends to be overaffected[41] by the emotion of envy[42] and driven by an inappropriate and excessive desire for wealth and honor under conditions where others, especially peers, apparent equals or rivals receive some greater level of wealth or honor.[43] The emotion of

indignation. So, if one is greatly displeased by one who unfairly obtains some good, even if it is a desirable good, then righteous indignation is the relevant disposition at work.

[41] References to excess and deficiency with respect to emotion can be misleading unless significantly qualified. One important aspect of a good or bad character state is how it is affected by emotion. And Aristotle considers all vicious character states to be either deficient or excessive in some important respect. But the viciousness of being wrongly disposed to an emotion does not refer to the quantity or intensity of the emotion, as such. See, J.O. Urmson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean," *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pgs. 160-162). As Urmson clarifies, there are many times when an appropriate reaction involves very little emotion, such as when someone mispronounces one's name as opposed to a very strong reaction if a family member were tortured. So, these are obvious cases where being appropriately affected cannot be a quantitative mean. But it is in some sense accurate to refer to an excessive or deficient reaction. Urmson stresses that what counts as an excessive or deficient reaction must always be understood primarily in reference to the character state. So, the excessive anger of the irascible agent is understood primarily in reference to the excessive or deficient quality of the vicious character state. It is a state that causes him to be overaffected by anger in some way. His state is an excess because it causes him to exceed whatever would be an appropriate expression of anger in some situation. And it would be difficult to deny that the irascible person doesn't exhibit too much anger in some sense. But the excess of the irascible agent's reaction does not imply some precise measurement of that excess. So, it is appropriate to refer to an agent as being overaffected or underaffected by some emotion, so long as the above qualification is maintained.

[42] Aristotle presents envy as a vice of excess (ὑπερβάλλων) where the person is pained by the [not undeserved] good fortune of others (*EN* 2.7 1108^{b}1-3). But, the way that the vice of envy causes one to be overaffected (see previous note on the potential difficulties of such references) by the emotion of envy (designated by the same term in Greek) is unusual for an Aristotelian vice. One cannot be appropriately affected by the emotion of envy; to feel that emotion at all is not right. This seems to defeat the purpose of referring to the vice as a disposition of excess. But, nearly every Aristotelian vice can cause one to be affected by an emotion at the wrong time or in response to the wrong object or in wholly the wrong way. These are ways of being inappropriately affected that are not matters of degree. Moreover, there are emotions, desires and actions that could never have a disposition that would enable them to be realized appropriately and so, could never admit of a mean (e.g. theft, adultery). See also, Crisp, 2005, 161.

[43] Aristotle treats envy as an excessive desire for both goods of wealth and property as well as reputation and honor. In reference to envy as an excessive desire, notes: *Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}23, 27; 2.10 1388^{a}1, 3-4, 14, 21, 23. In reference to its object being property or wealth, see *Rh* 2.9 1387^{a}1; 2.10 1387^{b}27,30; 2.8 1386^{b}13; honor (*Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}1,6; 10) or honor and wealth (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}23; 2.10 1388^{a}17). See also L. Purshouse, "Jealousy in Relation to Envy," *Erkenntnis* 60, no. 2 (2004): 179-2004; A. Ben-Ze'ev, "Envy and

envy[44] shares the features of emotion elaborates earlier: 1) an intrusive feeling of pleasure or pain that is 2) prompted by an image of something that seems good or bad to the affected person such that he 3) desires something that will respectively sustain that pleasure or diminish that pain.[45] The emotion of envy begins with a feeling of pain that is triggered by the affected person's image of the good fortune of others with respect wealth, honor, fame, reputation, and property. The person who is prone to be affected by this emotion already longs for more in the way of wealth and honor whether by having much and wanting what remains in that domain or by having little and simply wanting more.[46] The occurrence of the emotion reinforces this inappropriate and excessive desire.

The objects that trigger the emotion of envy are those individuals who are perceived equals[47] in some sphere,[48] especially those who are rivals in some activity that is important to one.[49] Moreover, when such a person possesses goods such as reputation, honor or fortune,[50] while the affected person thinks

Pity," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (1993): 3-19; G. Taylor, "Envy and Jealousy: Emotions and Vices," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 13 (1988): 233-249; J. Epstein, *Envy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3, 4, 88; Leslie H. Farber, "Faces of Envy," in *The Virtues: Contemporary Essays on Moral Character*, eds. R. Kruschwitz and R. Roberts (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1987), 163-170.

[44] On the distinction between envy as a disposition and emotion, see M. Mills, "Pthonos" and its related "Pathh" in Plato and Aristotle," *Phronesis* 30 (1985): 1-12.

[45] "To take envy next: we can see on what grounds, against what persons and in what frame of mind, we feel envy. Envy is a pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man getting anything, but because of others possessing it. For those men will be envious who have, or seem to have, others equal to them. By 'equals' I mean equals in birth, relation, age, dispositions, reputation, and possessions"(δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινομένῃ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ (δι' ἐκείνους: φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσί τινες ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται: ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ' ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα)(*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}23-26).

[46] The persons Aristotle has in mind may have much in different domains. Some individuals are among the highest of social status, but still grasp after any remaining source of status that would further distinguish them (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}28). Similarly, those who are ambitious (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}31) for a better reputation in some endeavor (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}33) envy that reputation. Even those distinguished for wisdom may envy the reputation of being wise (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}29-32).

[47] Aristotle doesn't rule out the possibility that one might envy someone who isn't a perceived equal. But envy is most common due to comparisons with those who are equals or plausibly equals (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}23-24), whereas, one never envies someone who is overwhelmingly better or worse in some sphere (*Rh* 2.10 1388^{b}11-12).

[48] According to Aristotle we envy those are near us in time, place, age or reputation (*Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}6-7).

[49] Envy is especially common among those who are rivals in some competitive activity such as in sports (*Rh* 2.10 1388^{b}13), vocation (*Rh* 2.10 1388^{b}16), or love (*Rh* 2.10 1388^{b}13). See also, A. Ben-Ze'ev, "Envy and Inequality," *Journal of Philosophy* 89, no. 11 (1992): 551-581; R. Young, "Egalitarianism and Envy," *Philosophical Studies* 52 (1987): 261-276.

[50] Aristotle highlights goods such as wealth (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}27-28), honor and reputation (*Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}6-7), and social distinction (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}26).

that he deserves those same goods,[51] it triggers envy.[52] And envy is most likely to occur when the envied person obtains a good that puts his rival – the envious person – just behind him, especially when his obtaining it would have put him just ahead of his rival.[53]

Vanity

Vanity (καυνότης) is a vice of excess associated with the virtue of greatness of soul (μεγαλοψυχία). The man with the virtue of greatness of soul is one who already possesses the other moral virtues and recognizes that he is one of great worth.[54] This state of character enables him to be appropriately affected by the emotion of pride such that he desires to be honored by others

[51] Aristotle does not think that we envy those who unjustly obtain those things that we should have. Otherwise we would be driven by righteous indignation. (See earlier note). But since Aristotle doesn't use the word should (δεῖ) casually, it must be explained. There may be many reasons that we do not have things that we should have besides that of some injustice being done to us. Some objects and outcomes that we think we should have are not necessarily things that we should have. But Aristotle does maintain that we envy things that we "should" (*Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}26) have, in some weaker sense of the word, such as that which is desirable or good.

[52] "So too we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves: we compete with our rivals in sport or in love, and generally with those who are after the same things; and it is therefore those whom we are bond to envy beyond others. Hence the saying: 'Potter against potter' " (ὡσαύτως καὶ ρὸς τούτους καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφιεμένους φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν, διόπερ εἴρηται καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ)(*Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}11-16).

[53] *Rh* 1388^{a}4.

[54] Aristotle presents the great-souled man as one who accurately assesses his own great worth. "Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much" (δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν)(*EN* 4.3 1123^{a}4). Aristotle continues to explain the scale that his worth must be to be great souled. He must be the best of men: "And inasmuch as the great-souled man deserves most, he must be the best of men; for the better a man is the more he deserves, and he that is best deserves most. Therefore the truly great-souled man must be a good man" (ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη: μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι)(1123^{b}28-30). Moreover, the possession of all of the virtues is necessary for one even to be able to have the highest of the virtues – greatness of soul. "Indeed greatness in each of the virtues would seem to go with greatness of soul. For instance, one cannot imagine the great-souled man running at full speed when retreating in battle, nor acting dishonestly; since what motive for base conduct has a man to whom nothing is great? Considering all the virtues in turn, we shall feel it quite ridiculous to picture the great-souled man as other than a good man. Moreover, if he were bad, he would not be worthy of honor, since honor is the prize of virtue, and the tribute that we pay to the good. Greatness of Soul seems therefore to be as it were a crowning ornament of the virtues: it enhances their greatness, and it cannot exist without them. Hence it is hard to be truly great souled, for greatness of soul is impossible without moral nobility" (μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ δόξειεν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ᾽ ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ᾽ ἀδικεῖν: τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ᾽ οὐδὲν μέγα· καθ᾽ ἕκαστα δ᾽ ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὤν: τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς

appropriately.[55] That is, he doesn't desire to be honored as much as he actually deserves since he doesn't strive for excellence in order to be honored.[56] He doesn't desire that others not honor him at all since he is overwhelmingly honorable and deserves some recognition.[57] So, he desires to be honored appropriately; neither too much, as the vain person does nor too little, as the small-minded person does. Along these lines, he is able to respond to those who honor him wrongly and correctly in a manner that is wholly in keeping with the most noble or beautiful ends. His nobility engenders a gracious self-sufficiency that is not coolly detached, but grounded in a strong and benevolent independence.[58]

He manifests this self-sufficiency in his approach to others through his voice, words, attitude, deeds, and overall bearing.[59] This aspect of the great-souled

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ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν: μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας)(*EN* 4.3 1123^{b}27-1124^{a}3).

[55] Aristotle insists that this virtue is inextricably connected with honor, especially desiring it correctly. "Therefore the great-souled man is he who has the right disposition in relation to honors and disgraces. And even without argument it is evident that honor is the object with which the great-souled are concerned, since it is honor above all else which great men claim and deserve"(περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι: τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δέ)(*EN* 4.3 1123^{b}23-25).

[56] For other discussions of the virtue of greatness of soul, see Crisp, 163, 164, 172; M. Pakaluk, "The Meaning of Aristotelian Magnanimity," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 26 (2004): 241-275; Stewart, 1892, 335-337; Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London: Methuen, 1900), 179.

[57] "Honor and dishonor then are the objects with which the great-souled man is especially concerned. Great honors accorded by persons of worth will afford him pleasure in a moderate degree: he will feel he is receiving only what belongs to him, or even less, for no honor can be adequate to the merits of perfect virtue, yet all the same he will deign to accept their honors, because they have no greater tribute to offer him" (καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων: ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν) (*EN* 4.3 1124^{a}5-11).

[58] These series of points are essential to Aristotle's characterization of the great-souled man. His noble excellence grounds his desire for great honors. " Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest of deeds; and such a thing is honor....The great-souled man is he who has the right disposition in relation to honours and disgraces" (ἡ δ᾽ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά:μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ᾽ ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον: τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ τιμή: μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν: περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ) (*EN* 4.3 1123^{b}17-21). "Hence, it is hard to be truly great-souled, for greatness of soul is impossible without moral nobility" (διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας) (*EN* 4.3 1124^{a}4-5). His resources and abilities give him an independence that is even reflected in his noble pleasures. "He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather than useless things that bring in a return, since the former show his independence more" (καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων: αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον)(*EN* 4.3 1125^{a}11-12).

[59] *EN* 4.3 1125^{a}17-19; 4.3 1124^{b}5-7, 12-13.

man is most striking when he responds to others when he is wrongly honored; whether it is due to being honored too little, being honored in the wrong manner, or even being dishonored altogether. Of course, he doesn't care to be honored as much as he deserves because even such a high honor could never appropriately match the great worthiness of his character. He does not pursue opportunities for small honors, nor accept honors from those who do not recognize or appreciate his worth.[60] Similarly, he does not accept flattery or pandering from anyone. But his position of excellence, nobility and strength enables him to respond to inappropriate honors without lording his superiority over others, nor treating them with insolence (ὕβρις) and contempt (καταφρόνησις) as the vain person does.[61]

And when he is dishonored these same qualities enable him to respond appropriately, acting from a fitting contempt and indignation, in the worst cases, and with suitable indifference in the small cases. For example, he is never embroiled in small or avoidable showdowns concerning reputation, especially with those beneath him. Moreover, he does not trifle with those who inevitably misunderstand him, nor does he hold grudges.[62] And when he is among the people, he is prone to be self-deprecating; unlike vain oligarchs who tend to elevate themselves by diminishing others.[63] Lastly, his self-sufficiency

[60] "It is also characteristic of the great-souled man never to ask help from others, or only with reluctance, but to render aid willingly"(μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως) (*EN* 1124^{b}19-20). Aristotle also indicates the deficient honor that he cares little for such as trivial honors, flattery, compliments and general pandering. "Honour rendered by common people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise, for this is not what he merits...he therefore to whom honor is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well. Hence, great-souled men are thought to be haughty" (*EN* 4.3 1124^{a}11-13; 20-22). "He will be incapable of living at the will of another, unless a friend, since to do so is slavish and hence flatterers are always servile, and humble people flatterers. He is not prone to admiration since nothing is great to him" (*EN* 4.3 1125^{a}5-7).

[61] "It is true that even those who merely possess the goods of fortune may be haughty and insolent; because without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune becomingly, and such men, being unable to carry their prosperity, and thinking themselves superior to the rest of mankind, despise other people, although their own conduct is no better than another's. The fact is that they try to imitate the great-souled man without being really like him, and only copy him in what they can, reproducing his contempt for others but not his virtuous conduct" (ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα: οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲφέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ΄ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται: τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ΄ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων)(*EN* 4.3 1124^{a}31-1124^{b}5). Of course, the great-souled person can also be contemptuous of those who deserve it. But his judgments about worth tend to be more accurate than the vain person, or others for that matter. "For the great-souled man is justified in despising other people – his estimates are correct; but most proud men have no ground for their pride" (καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ 'δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶσ', οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως)(*EN* 4.3 1124^{b}5-7).

[62] *EN* 4.3 1124^{b}13-15, 24-27;1125^{a}4-6.

[63] *EN* 4.3 1124^{b}30-1125 a1.

and excellence lead him to give to others when appropriate, but to rarely accept assistance or gifts from others. This is a crucial feature of the great-souled man as his greatness in virtue enables him to handle his wealth and power in such a way that he can maintain his relative independence, and so, treats those beneath him with respect and benevolence. This is quite different from the vain person whose lack of virtue makes him unable to handle what wealth, power and status he has.[64] He becomes enslaved to the reputation and wealth that he imagines he deserves, but which he doesn't have the mastery to wield effectively.

So, this is a virtue that enables the man with greatness of soul in conjunction with his practical wisdom to have appropriate actions, bearing, and attitude towards others in circumstances where they he is treated either more or less in keeping with his great worth.[65] Aristotle's understanding of greatness of soul helps us understand the vain character so well because the vain person imitates the great-souled man.

The vain person possesses a vice of excess (though not in a standard way),[66] where he tends to be wrongly affected by the emotion of pride, such that he wrongly desires to be honored by others.[67] Like the virtue of greatness of soul, the vice of vanity includes an associated belief where the person either appropriately estimates his worth or not. Unlike the great-souled man, the vain man doesn't possess all the other virtues, but nevertheless, thinks of himself as having great worth. He consistently overestimates his worth.[68] This misunderstanding of himself, an extricable effect of his bad character, inflates his dissatisfaction with those around him. The actions and attitudes of others can be more or less in keeping with the level of worth he recognizes in

[64] *EN* 4. 3 1124[a]31-1124[b]5.

[65] Such an action falls in the mean between the extreme choices of action possible under such conditions.

[66] While greatness of soul is a virtuous disposition that is the mean between the extreme dispositions of small-mindedness and vanity, vanity is not a standard vice of excess. Like the vice of envy, vanity is not a vice that is described according to the same background as its corresponding virtue is. The disposition of the great-souled man is not one that, if excessive would be the disposition of vanity. The vain person is not highly virtuous, whereas the great-souled person is. And the latter character rightly recognizes his worth, whereas the former has an exaggerated view of his worth. So, the ability to be moved appropriately by the emotion of pride and driven by a correct desire for honor as opposed to being over affected by pride and wrongly driven by the desire for honor is not the central point of comparison between the virtue and vice. The incongruous starting point of a virtuous life versus an unvirtuous life is the factor that explains the deviation from the virtue.

[67] See Kraut, 2002, 442; A.T. Nuyen, "Vanity," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 37, no. 4 (1999): 613-627; J. Shklar, *Ordinary Vice*s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Yack, 1993, 230, 237; Crisp, 2005, 160.

[68] "The vain on the other hand are foolish persons, who are deficient in self-knowledge and expose their defect: they undertake honorable responsibilities of which they are not worthy, and then are found out"(οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς: οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται)(*EN* 4. 3 1125[a]29-31).

himself. And he consistently perceives others to honor him too little. Since he always expects more honor than he actually deserves, he will always see himself being deficiently honored (unless he is always surrounded by flatterers). His excessive character state leads him to be wrongly affected by pride such that he wrongly desires to be honored. Unlike the great-souled man, the vain man expects to be honored as much as he thinks his excellence demands because, in fact, he does strive for excellence for the sake of being honored. So, his wrongful desire for an honor that he doesn't deserve, based on a standard for honor that doesn't match what is honorable, leads him to be contemptuous of his perceived inferiors; and to a lesser extent, his perceived peers.[69]

III. Envy, Vanity and Faction

Let us now return to Aristotle's account of the immediate causes of factional conflict, followed by an analysis of the desires and beliefs that drive these causes, and so, their ultimate cause – the character states that shape such desires and beliefs.

The Three Immediate Causes of Stasis

As we have seen in Chapter One, in Aristotle's most representative account of the causes of *stasis*, he discusses three immediate causes.[70] They are as follows:

1. The state of mind (πῶς ἔχοντες) of the factionary is his view of justice and his belief that others have more wealth and honor than they should. Aristotle initially treats this condition or state of mind as the cause of faction association. Those individuals are in a condition such that their views or beliefs concerning justice, especially the justice of their situation, inform their outlook towards their regime and their rivals.[71] Moreover, the belief of such a factionary is the model for the factions he forms with other like-minded individuals and for his enmity to the regime or its leadership. So, their belief about justice is the formal cause of factional association and its consequent conflict and revolution.[72]

[69] On other discussions of contempt, see. M. Mason, "Contempt as a Moral Attitude," *Ethics* 113, no. 2 (2003): 234-272; W. Miller, "Upward Contempt," *Political Theory* 23, no. 3 (1995): 476-499.

[70] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}16-40.

[71] The distorted beliefs about justice are not causally efficacious in their manufacture of factional associations. Instead, their beliefs about justice become the models for a production of faction that they are already determined to make, though not due to their beliefs but rather their character.

[72] *Pol* 5.1 1301^{b}5-25. See, Yack, 1993, 221.

2. The aim or goal (τινῶν ἕνεκεν) of the factionary is to secure for himself or his friends a greater share of honor and wealth relative to others, or the avoidance of dishonor or decline in wealth.[73] They try to achieve this end by means of organizing themselves into factional association and eventually altering and replacing the regime, [74] whether through force (βία) or fraud (ἀπάτε).[75]

3. The occasioning causes (ἄρχαι) trigger or provoke the desires, emotions and actions that bring about factional conflict.[76] There are numerous occasioning causes and number of events can spark tumultuous actions. Aristotle includes eleven occasioning causes.[77] The first seven of these causes are provocations, whereas the last four are merely circumstances that increase the likelihood of *stasis*:

(i)	The perception of grossly unfair or illicit gains.
(ii)	The perception of honor gained by a rival individual or group.
(iii)	The fear of a retaliation or exploitation that seems imminent and which triggers preemptive action.
(iv)	The perception of oneself as a victim of insolence (ὕβρις) due to more powerful rivals who hope to demonstrate their superiority.
(v)	The perception of excessive dominance (ὑπερόχη) of others.
(vi)	Contempt (καταφρονήσις) for those perceived to be weak.
(vii)	Disproportionate growth of power in some other part of the polis.
(viii-xii)	Election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, and racial dissimilarity.

Envy and Occasioning Causes (i) and (ii) in Democratic Faction

The factions that arise under such circumstances are largely oligarchic and democratic ones.[78] In Aristotle's paradigmatic summary of the causes of *stasis*, he maintains that oligarchs and democrats have conflicting beliefs about

[73] *Pol* 5.2 1302[a]32-35.
[74] *Pol* 5.2 1302[a]32-a5.
[75] *Pol* 5.2 1302[a]31-33. See also, O'Connor, 1991, 153; Keyt, 1999, 79; Simpson, 1998, 370.
[76] On desire as an efficient cause, see also Salkever 1990, 66; Keyt, 1999, 76; Kalimtzis, 2000, 104-112.
[77] *Pol* 5.2 1302[a]32-35.
[78] *Pol* 4.9 1296[a]21-22, 24-27.

justice that fuel *stasis*.[79] Since the factions that Aristotle has in mind here are either democratic or oligarchic, it is necessary that gains of wealth or honor seem provocative to agents that form either democratic or oligarchic factions.

In the case of those who form democratic factions, envy uniquely causes them to be provoked by such perceptions. Specifically, envy causes them to be provoked by the perception of their rivals receiving excessive gain and honor (occasioning causes (i) and (ii)).

First, the object of envy for Aristotle is any perceived equal.[80] But, of course, democrats consider themselves all equal in a fundamental respect.[81] They consider themselves to be as deserving of the wealth, honor and power of the regime as any other citizen. So the unequal distribution that the oligarchs have in the latter goods seems particularly enviable to the democrats since they are ordinary people who just happen to have more than others. Moreover, envy is the one disposition that ignores qualitative distinctions that might account for different shares of wealth and honor.[82] Without these distinctions, its possessors don't see the basis for accepting an unequal distribution of goods. This condition makes oligarchs particularly likely targets of envy since they have noticeably more. The oligarchs seem well within the reach of the envious who see no reason that they should be more deserving of such goods, nor any reason why they themselves cannot have it.[83]

Second, the envious are motivated by rivalry for those with the same ends.[84] In the context of factional struggle, one strives for the most basic ends for survival, wealth and honor. These are the ends of all factionaries. And Aristotle treats the desire for those goods as the central pathology of envy.[85] There are other vices besides vanity and envy that cause their possessors to desire gain and honor inappropriately (e.g., overambition, stinginess in the form of taking too much, etc.), but they do not occur as widely as envy does.

Overambition cannot be the central disposition that motivates democratic factions because the average citizen is not overambitious. It is a more common vice among those who already have some higher status and aspire for more. Aristotle indicates that some would-be democratic leaders plague the regime with their overambition,[86] but it is not the kind of vice that drives the rank and file worker to organize.[87]

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[79] *Pol* 5.1 1301^{a}27-35.
[80] *Rh* 2.9 1387^{a}23-26.
[81] *Pol* 5.1 1301^{a}25-31.
[82] *Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}26.
[83] *Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}6-7. This is also quite consistent with Aristotle's claim that those that desire equality form factions if they think that they have too little although "they are the equals of those who have more." *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}22-30.
[84] *Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}11-16.
[85] *Rh* 2.10 1387^{b}23, 27; 2.10 1388^{a}1, 3-4, 12, 21, 23.
[86] *Pol* 5.7 1308^{a}9.
[87] *EN* 4.3 1125^{b}1-12; *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}5-9.

While the disposition to take too much seems like an equal opportunity vice in democracy, it isn't the optimal disposition for *stasis*. There are only so many ways for someone without means to take too much. Such agents may either take too much through illegal means or by (lawfully) acquiring the resources to take more. But, one who takes too much through illegal means has an easier time doing so as a petty thief rather than as a revolutionary. The average impulsive agent, who takes too much in this way, doesn't care to delay gratification subject to the timetable of the revolution. It is much more efficient to take too much individually than to organize into factions, especially for the petty thief. In addition, the person who takes too much through acquisition, must work within the current system to do so. To the extent that he is unsuccessful, he grows into a member of the middle class (or higher), thereby, making him less prone to form democratic factions.[88] In contrast, envy keeps the sights of the people on the oligarchs,[89] as they have more and are equal.[90] This cements the rivalry that is indispensable for *stasis*. Eventually, it culminates in conflict, violence and regime change. Envy is the vice that causes democratic factions because it equalizes all citizens into rivals against whom one competes for just those ends that Aristotle's factionaries desire - wealth and honor.[91]

Vanity, and Occasioning Causes (i) - (vi) in Oligarchic Faction

The other kind of faction that Aristotle has in mind is oligarchic factions. These are factions that oligarchs organize either in response to a democratic ruling class or to counter a more powerful oligarchic ruling class. So, some vice besides envy must motivate the formation of oligarchic factions and cause its possessors to perceive the circumstances listed above as provocations. Vanity is the only vice that drives oligarchs into factions and explains those occasioning causes that are provocations: (i) - (vi). Of course, it is important to see how one vice, vanity, *could* account for these perceptions. The perceptions (i) - (ii) concerning gain and honor are straightforward enough. Oligarchs form factions because they see others aggrandizing themselves with greater wealth and honor, whether they are oligarchs or people, but especially people.[92] The vain are especially concerned with the honor component, but also with the accumulation of wealth since that brings honor, from their perspective. The vain agent desires to be honored more. The more the people gain wealth and honor, the less the oligarchs receive honor because the new honor is being

[88] *Pol* 4.11 1296^{a}8-11.
[89] *Pol* 4.11 1296^{a}28; 4.10 *Pol* 1295^{b}30-33.
[90] *Rh* 2.10 1388^{a}6-7.
[91] *Rh* 2.10 1387^{b}26; *Pol* 5.1 1301^{a}25-31.
[92] *Pol* 5.3 1303^{b}1-3; *Pol* 5. 1 1302^{a}14-17.

showered on rising new people. Additionally, this makes the current honor status of the oligarchs less distinguished.[93] The vain agent always wants to be more highly honored.[94] But, the more that ordinary citizens gain honor and the conditions for honor – wealth – the less honor they receive. Therefore, they must organize themselves more aggressively in order to elevate their honor status and diminish the honor of the people. Vanity is the only vice Aristotle discusses that would cause more established and honored citizens to respond to the gains of the people in this way. Moreover, it is certainly the only vice that fits this profile that Aristotle also identifies with oligarchs.

Vanity is the characteristic vice of oligarchy.[95] Vanity is endemic to oligarchy because oligarchies produce an environment where greater exclusivity in one's social group is always the standard for honor. The regime structure of oligarchy shares the defect of the vain agent. An oligarchy measures the worth of its citizens based chiefly on his wealth and property holdings. But from the standpoint of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, if a wealthy man were to assess his own worth based on the starting point of an oligarchy, then he would already be on his way to vanity. For, he would already incorrectly rate his worth based on his wealth and property.[96] And, just as an oligarchy distributes honor on the basis of this assumption, the good oligarch expects to be honored in keeping with his exaggerated worth.[97] These are the central features of vanity. So, it is not just that oligarchy happens to promote vanity. Oligarchy must produce vanity unless most of its oligarchs happened to be transplanted from another regime. Aristotle links oligarchy, vanity and its associated traits in a number of texts. Most notably, he claims that the one who has wealth but not moral virtue thinks of himself as the great-souled man, as the vain man typically does.[98] The following section considers a number of these texts in more detail. But besides the general link between oligarchy and vanity, the following sections also consider it in the context of oligarchic faction.

Vanity is the only vice that could account for the remaining occasioning causes, especially in an oligarchic faction. Causes (iv) - (vi) are perceptions of rival citizens with greater status and influence, who act with insolence, contempt, and dominance towards those they consider beneath them. These perceptions can provoke democrats and oligarchs alike to engage in factional conflict, whether they are envious or vain. These perceptions do not arise

[93] *EN* 4.3 $1123^{b}17$-19.

[94] *EN* 4.3 $1123^{b}25$-28.

[95] *Pol* 4.11 $1295^{b}30$-33.

[96] Of course, it is possible that a wealthy agent who is also virtuous could consider himself of great worth because he is wealthy. But one who is truly virtuous would also have the self-knowledge that he is of great worth because of his virtue rather than his wealth. So, anyone who would consider himself of great worth because of his wealth already overestimates his worth as the vain man does. For, no one who would assess his worth based on his wealth would be correct about having great worth.

[97] *EN* 4.3 $1125^{a}29$-31.

[98] *EN* 4.3 $1124^{a}31$-$1124^{b}5$. See also *Rh* 2.11 $1388^{b}4$-8; 2.14 $1390^{b}31$-$1391^{a}1$; 2.14 $1390^{b}2$-5.

ex nihilo. They arise in response to circumstances where rival citizens act in ways that *could be* perceived as insolence, contempt and domination towards others. Vanity is the only Aristotelian vice that could cause and does cause all of those actions. Aristotle treats contempt (καταφρονήσις) and insolence (ὕβρις) as attitudes that result from the vice of vanity. The vain person's overestimation of his worth and tendency to desire far more honor than he deserves leads him to be contemptuous of his perceived inferiors.

> ...even those who merely possess the goods of fortune may be haughty (ὑπερόπται) and insolent (ὑβρισταὶ);...without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune becomingly, and such men, being unable to carry their prosperity, and thinking themselves superior to the rest of mankind, despise other people, although their own conduct is no better than another's. The fact is that they try to imitate the great-souled man without being really like him, and only copy him in what they can, reproducing his contempt for others but not his virtuous conduct.[99]

It is appropriate that Aristotle considers the oligarchs, especially young ones, most prone to vanity since their immaturity leads them to confuse their worth with their wealth.

> Wealthy men are insolent and arrogant; their possession of wealth affects their understanding; they feel as if they had every good thing that exists; wealth becomes a sort of standard of value for everything else, and therefore they imagine that there is nothing it cannot buy.[100]

It is common for oligarchs with vanity to consider themselves virtuous because they have wealth or status. So, it is not accidental that oligarchic regimes honor wealth more than virtue since the oligarchs as individuals easily conflate the two. So, the vice of vanity is most dramatically exhibited among the oligarchs and so, their wealth and status give them more pretense for contempt towards their perceived inferiors.

Insolence (ὕβρις) and displays of superiority (ὑπερόχη) are also similar effects of vanity. When Aristotle discusses the sources of anger he lists a number of different slights that appropriately provoke it: contempt, spite and insolence. While the *Rhetoric* considers insolence and superiority from the side of the

[99] *EN* 4.3 1124^{a}31-1124^{b}5. See also *Rh* 2.14 1390^{b}2-5 and *Athenian Constitution* 12 where Aristotle indicates that those with wealth, status and family lineage are easily prone to vanity and *Rh* 2.11 1388^{b}4-8 where Aristotle indicates that citizens have contempt for that which they should not emulate. In this light, the above passage treats vanity as an attempt to emulate greatness of soul without the prerequisites in character and thereby to show the most problematic form of contempt. They display contempt for what should not be emulated – the many (οἱ πόλλοι) – when they are not so different from the latter, save their property, wealth and status.

[100] [ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου (ὥσπερ γάρ ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τἀγαθὰ οὕτω διάκεινται· ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος οἷον τιμή τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων] (*Rh* 2.14 1390^{b}31-1391^{a}1).

injured party, Aristotle's treatment of vanity describes it from the side of the injuring party.

> Similarly, insolence is also a form of slight; for insolence consists in causing injury or annoyance whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act, but for one's own pleasure; for retaliation is not insult, but punishment. The cause of the pleasure felt by those with insolence is the idea that, in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing superiority. That is why the young and the wealthy are given to insults; for they think that, in committing them, they are showing their superiority. Dishonor is characteristic of insolence; and one who dishonors another slights him; for that which is worthless has no value, either as good or evil.[101]

The vain person's tendency to overestimate his worth and to be overaffected by the emotion of pride causes him to have an attitude of insolence.[102] Moreover, as he tries to emulate the nobility of the great souled-man without having that nobility and goodness, he finds ways to assert his superiority over the people. But the excellence of the great-souled man overwhelmingly distinguishes him from others. Moreover, his greatness also manifests itself through a bearing and manner that would never be nor appear to be a grasping assertion of superiority. In contrast, the vain man tends to be petty, condescending, contemptuous as well as slighting in his speech, gesture and overall manner. In short, contempt, insolence and assertions of superiority are all the effects of vanity in Aristotle's view.

Pure acts of contempt, insolence and superiority are not required for *stasis* to be provoked. Rather, actions that merely seem like the former are sufficient to provoke those who are their rivals. Of course, vanity is the only vice that oligarchs are particularly prone to and which yields the combination of effects described above. Vanity leads to the actions and attitudes that appear to the rivals of oligarchs as provocations (iv)-(vi).

Most importantly, the vices of envy and vanity must be the dispositional causes of these beliefs and desires and ultimately the cause of *stasis*. The discussion above has investigated why this must be so, based on a closer look at Aristotle's accounts of envy and vanity and the perceptions that occasion *stasis*. The following recapitulates the structure of character that generates beliefs about justice and desires for ends of a certain kind. Then it reconsid-

[101] [καὶ ὁ ὑβρίζων δὲ ὀλιγωρεῖ: ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ᾽ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γίγνηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἡσθῇ: οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες αὐτοὶ ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον ‘διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὑβρισταί: ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες: ὕβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὁ δ᾽ ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ: τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ] (*Rh* 2.2 1378^{b}23-30).

[102] See also *Pol* 4.9 1295^{b}9-12.

ers the dispositional causes of faction from the standpoint of the beliefs and desires of oligarchic and democratic factionaries.[103] Seen in this light, their beliefs and desires are ones that only envy and vanity could generate.

Beliefs about Justice and the Good as Functions of Character

In the *EN*, Aristotle argues that moral perception and moral beliefs are not a function of pure practical reason, as in Kant. Rather, they follow upon the moral character of the agent.

> [T]he good man judges everything correctly; what things truly are, they seem to him to be, in every department – for special things are noble and pleasant corresponding to each type of character, and perhaps what chiefly distinguishes the good man is that he sees the truth in each kind, being himself as it were the standard and measure of the noble and the pleasant. It appears to be pleasure that misleads the mass of mankind; for it seems to them to be good, though it is not, so they choose what is pleasant as good and shun pain as evil.[104]

So, the beliefs that inform an agent's judgment about what course of action best fits with the end he desires, is itself shaped by the quality of his character.

> The eye of the soul...cannot acquire the quality of prudence without possessing [moral] virtue. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct always have a major premise of the form 'since the end or good is so and so' (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for the sake of argument); but the supreme good only appears good to the good man; vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles of conduct.[105]

So, just as the good character of a good man enables him to have correct moral perceptions, the bad character distorts moral perception and moral belief.

> The first principles of action are the end to which our actions are means; but to the man corrupted by love or pleasure or pain, the [truly good] end does not seem to be a first principle at all; and [he] cannot see that he ought to choose and do everything as a means to this end, and for its sake; for vice tends to destroy the sense of principle.[106]

[103] See Kraut, 2002, 442; Yack, 1993, 238, 442.
[104] *EN* 3.4 $1113^{a}30$-$1113^{b}3$; See also 10.5 $11176^{a}16$-20.
[105] *EN* 6.7 $1144^{a}30$-36.
[106] *EN* 6.5 $1140^{a}15$-20. See also Lawrence, 2006, 47.

Such distortions are no less present among those who drive factional conflict. Aristotle blames democratic and oligarchic factionaries for having incorrect beliefs and distorted perceptions about the distribution of gain and honor.

It has already been established that the most common kinds of *stasis* – the ones that Aristotle is most concerned with in *Politics* 5 – are either oligarchic or democratic.[107] It has also been established that envy is the only vice that could account for the stated causes of *stasis* that are not due to vanity and occur in a democratic context. But when one considers the beliefs of those engaged in factional conflict it is also clear that they must be envy and vanity.

The democratic agent engages in *stasis* because he believes that he has received too little gain and honor.[108] It is the contention of this chapter that he sees it this way because he is disposed to see it this way under such circumstances. Envy disposes democratic agents in this way because, unlike other vices, it causes them to see themselves as equal to others, especially in reference to the goods they desire.[109] But the source of rivalry in democratic factions is only oligarchs, unlike oligarchic factions, where it is both oligarchs and democrats.[110] So the consistent comparison that drives democratic factions is the greater portion of gain and honor that oligarchs consistently have. The only vice that causes agents to want the goods that others have is envy. And so, in the case of democratic factions, they are not likely to envy what they and their fellow democrats have; but rather what the oligarchs have.[111] If democrats saw the oligarchs as their superiors, then they wouldn't envy them. But envy is the only vice that allows them to see those with such status and desirable goods as equals and therefore, as rivals. But, they have far less than these privileged equals. Such agents notice that they have too little, most when they have less than their peers and equals, rather than less than those who are acknowledged and accepted superiors. Envy makes this belief in democratic factions uniquely possible.

It has already been established that vanity is the only vice that could account for the stated causes of *stasis* that are not due to envy and that occur in an oligarchic context. But when one considers the beliefs of factional agents that bad character causes, it is clear that only vanity could give rise to them. The vain person believes that he has too little[112] because the people receive too much.[113] There are all kinds of circumstances where oligarchs are privy to the distribution received by others and themselves. In such circumstances, the vain oligarch perceives some distribution of his rival and compares it

[107] *Pol* 5.1 1301^{a}26- 5.2 1301^{b}4. See also 4.11 1296^{a}21-23.
[108] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}26; 5.2 1302^{b}14-15.
[109] *Rh* 2.10 1387^{b}26.
[110] *Pol* 5.1 1302^{a}14-18; 4.11 1295^{b}9-12, 30-33.
[111] *Pol* 4.11 1295^{b}10-15.
[112] *Pol* 5.1 1302^{a}14-15; 5.2 1302^{a}28.
[113] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}40- 5.2 1302^{b}2, 11; *EN* 4.2 1123^{b}17-19.

with his own. He believes that his own share is too little.[114] For, he is disposed to overestimate how much honor he should receive because he has an inflated view of his own worth. Moreover, he underestimates the worth of others, especially when it must be assessed in reference to his own.[115] So, he takes his assignment of too small a portion to be a symptom of a regime in which people honor him too little, even though his belief is a symptom of his character defect.[116]

The Ends of Action as Functions of Moral Character

The ultimate end that anyone pursues is a function of one's character, for character determines what things will appear as goods worthy of pursuit. A good character – one defined by the possession of moral virtue – makes right the end one pursues; and in turn, prudence determines one to choose the most appropriate means to that end. "Moral virtue makes then ends right, prudence makes us adopt the right means to the end."[117]

A person of good character will see that the truly good and happy life is the life of moral nobility (καλοκάγαθον). The person who lacks moral virtue will neither understand this nor aim for it in his actions. The majority of men identify the good life with the life of license, the life of free enjoyment of pleasure, honor or money.

> The generality and the most vulgar identify the Good with pleasure, and accordingly are content with the life of enjoyment....Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that the Good is honor – for this may be said to be the end of the Life of Politics.[118]

Furthermore a person of good character will be disposed towards the goods that justice concerns – wealth and honor – correctly. His virtue makes him want the appropriate amount of wealth and honor for himself and others. In contrast, the vicious are so badly disposed to these same ends that they always want more than they deserve and less for others.

It has been established that those engaged in *stasis* have such desires and that such desires must be the product of bad character. It has also been seen that the envy and vanity cause the distorted beliefs that Aristotle associates with *stasis*. But what other reasons are there to think that envy and vanity account for the desires that drive *stasis*?

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[114] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}27-28.
[115] *Pol* 4.2 1123^{b}17-19.
[116] Salkever, 1990, 75; Yack, 1993, 220.
[117] *EN* 6.8 1145^{a}10-12.
[118] *EN* 1.4 1095^{b}16-20. See also *EE* 1.5 1216^{a}23-28.

The vain person desires the ends of greater honor. His inordinate desire for the end of honor seems good to the vain person even though it is quite destructive. He also sees the desire of the people for greater gain and honor as bad, even though it could be bad or good depending upon the justice of their claim. But he uniformly rejects their claims and views their assertion of it as always bad. Moreover, their resistance to offering him greater honor, which may very well be justified, always seems bad to him. The vain agent sees his desire for the end of gain, and especially honor, as quite good. It would even seem as good to him, as the good desires of the great-souled man seem to great-souled man. But, the vain man has inordinate desires for this end; partly because he is wrongly disposed to it and consequently cannot satisfy it. He will always desire more honor because he always exaggerates his worth. Only the worst flatterer would honor him as much as his inflated worth calls for. And few else would ever honor him as much as he wants, leaving him eager for the honor that he wrongly expects. So, what he might consider his honor deficit leaves him desiring greater honor and the perception of greater honor as good, even though it is not. Anyone who hinders that wrong end seems unfair to him, even though it may be laudable to hinder it.

The envious person sees more gain and honor as good even though it is not good. His inordinate desire for what other perceived equals have, leads him to acquire it. But this desire is not satiable because it is incorrect and unsustainable even if inequality could and should be eliminated. And democratic envy does not distinguish between the status levels of any citizen. So democratic envy will always cause its possessors to want the gain and honor of some other citizen because that greater wealth and honor always seems arbitrary.[119] So,

[119] The envious person may initially desire that his rival have less, but then desires that he himself have more. The poor desire that the oligarchs have less of the gains and honors with which the former aggrandize themselves. This more spiteful reading of envy is also consistent with the claim that the poor are motivated by envy towards the notables. But this view of envy requires a different explanation of how the relation of the poor towards the oligarchs fits with Aristotle's texts on envy. Consider the following: "We feel it [envy] towards our equals; not with the idea of getting something for ourselves, but because other people have it" (*Rh* 2.10 1387^{b}23-25). Extending this view to the struggle between the people and the oligarchs (see also *Pol* 5.2 1302^{a}36-1302^{b}2) the poor's desire that the oligarchs have less in the way of gain or honor than the oligarchs currently have is due to the latter's acquisitive behavior. This desire of the poor that oligarchs have less than they already have is closer to envy than it is to malice, though it has qualities of malice. Malice is a state where the person is prone to take pleasure in the misfortune of another. But the person who has envy in the way just described is concerned with images of actual circumstances, not images of potential circumstances. So, according to this latter view of envy, it is a state of character where the poor person desires the oligarch to have less than he currently has, rather than a state of character that would lead the poor person to take pleasure in the oligarch's loss of something that was deserved. And this envious person does not take *pleasure* when the oligarch suffers an unfortunate loss of those same goods. So, this envy is not quite malicious, but is rather envy tinged with spite; a dissatisfaction with the good fortune of others, when those others are equals. This view is compatible with the primary view of envy where it triggers the affected person to want more for himself. For, wanting someone to have

envy causes the democratic agent to see his longing for the wealth and honor of others as good when it is not. Moreover, he considers his consequent desires to acquire those goods – wherever they may lead him – as good, even though they are never good without qualification.

In summary, there are three immediate causes of *stasis*. The final cause of *stasis* is the end of gain and honor for which the factionaries organize.[120] But the agent's tendencies concerning this end are manifest through their desires and beliefs. The agent desires greater wealth or honor, or avoiding the loss of it. The agent desires greater wealth or honor, or avoiding the loss of it. The desire that drives the movement of the factionaries is the efficient cause of *stasis*, though the end for which their desires drive them is the final cause. Their desire for greater gain and honor fuels their movement, association and conflict for those objects. The agent also believes he has received too small a share of it.[121] This belief is the formal cause of faction, as it is the belief that they have received less than what seems to be the proportionately equal distribution. Of course, this belief is based on their view of justice that informs their respective judgments about how little they have received. Most importantly, the vices of envy and vanity must be the dispositional causes of these beliefs and desires and ultimately the cause of *stasis*. The previous section discussed why this must be so, based on a closer look at Aristotle's accounts of envy and vanity and the occasioning causes as the perceptions of oligarchic and democratic agents. Lastly, we have considered dispositional causes of faction from the standpoint of the beliefs and desires of oligarchic and democratic factionaries. Understood in this light, the beliefs and desires that are relevant to faction could only be generated by envy and vanity.

Most importantly, the vices of envy and vanity must be the dispositional causes of these beliefs and desires and ultimately the cause of *stasis*. The previous section discussed why this must be so, based on a closer look at Aristotle's accounts of envy and vanity and the occasioning causes as the perceptions of oligarchic and democratic agents. Lastly, we have considered dispositional causes of faction from the standpoint of the beliefs and desires of oligarchic and democratic factionaries. Understood in this light, the beliefs and desires that are relevant to faction could only be generated by envy and vanity.

From "the absolute point of view" – the point of view of the genuine Aristocrat, the man of good character – democratic and oligarchic conceptions of justice are the offspring of their perverse characters. Behind the outcome of egalitarianism of the democrat is the vice of envy; behind the "elitism" of the oligarch is that of vanity. Aristotle says

less when he acquires something we have, is a good starting point for wanting more for oneself. But the primary desire associated with envy is for more gain and honor for oneself.

[120] *Pol* 5.2 1302[a]32-35.

[121] *Pol* 5.2 1302[a]26-28.

> The one class[the poor and common born, the democrats] is envious; the other [the well born and wealthy, the oligarchs]are contemptuous.[122]
>
> Those who merely possess goods of fortune may be haughty and insolent; because without virtue it is not easy to bear good fortune becomingly, and such men, being unable to carry their prosperity, and thinking themselves superior to the rest of mankind, despise other people although their conduct is no better than others.[123]

IV. Conclusion

After reconsidering the regime context of *stasis* and character dimension of those engaging in it, it becomes clear that their beliefs about justice are not the ultimate cause of their factional conflict. Aristotle's unambiguous commitment to the view that one's beliefs and desires are a function of one's character also commit him to the view that bad character is the source of the beliefs and desires that drive *stasis*. But this latter part is also quite consistent with his treatment of faction throughout the *Politics* (and other texts) such as can be seen in his criticism of Plato's *Republic* and the projects of Phaleas of Chalcedon. Of course, bad character must always be manifest as specific vices. As it turns out, the ends which Aristotle's factionaries desire and the beliefs according to which they understand their circumstances must have as their causes the vices of envy and vanity.

Moreover, the dispositions of envy and vanity are as deeply engrained in the character of some citizens as are the dispositions of factionaries to make distorted judgments about justice. So also, envy and vanity are as likely to influence the actions of citizens in most regimes as democrats and oligarchs themselves are to influence those regimes. So, while identifying the character sources of *stasis* only shows how intractable the problem is, it doesn't mean the regime is less able to manage *stasis*. Rather, an understanding of the magnitude of the problem may avoid "solutions" that complicate a distributional quagmire or, even worse, deepen its character causes. Let us now discuss Aristotle's approach for minimizing the incidence of *stasis*.

[122] *Pol* 4.9 1295^{b}22-25.
[123] *EN* 4.3 1124^{a}30-b4.

4. SKEPTICAL REMEDIES: THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

This chapter discusses Aristotle's major remedies for *stasis*. Bad character is the cause of *stasis* and cannot be eliminated without the education and system that only an Aristocracy can provide. Yet, Aristotle still offers remedies that limit *stasis*. These remedies decrease the incidence of those circumstances that typically provoke factional conflict. These remedies include a well-crafted expansion of the middle class and numerous strategies for the selective distribution of gain and honor in specific regime contexts.

I. Ineliminability of Stasis in Deviant Politeiai

One of the central preoccupations of Aristotle's *Politics* is how to minimize the scope and magnitude of political conflict.[1] These are not pressing problems in cities where all of their citizens are excellent human beings.[2] Most of the political problems that Aristotle treats, especially in the middle books, arise because most citizens are not virtuous. The fact that most citizens of most regimes are not virtuous thoroughly informs his *Politics* and his approach to *stasis*.

First, Aristotle presents this fact as a starting point for his approach to *stasis*. He conveys this through a wide range of passages, especially those that illuminate the following *stasis* contexts: regime types, specific regimes, events and general observations about the former. He presents this point as a general observation of city life in his criticism of Phaleas:

[1] Of course, Aristotle's approach to *stasis* involves more than just minimizing its scope and magnitude. But this is the aspect of his approach that is most relevant to the discussion in this chapter.

[2] Consider Madison's famous line in *Federalist 10* that "If men were angels no government would be necessary." Madison offers this is a starting point for his discussion of the problem of faction in the American context. This is a quite appropriate comparison in one sense, but quite misleading in another sense. The problem that Madison is referring to is the fact that human beings can be quite bad in practice. The scope and magnitude of this problem fuels factional conflict. But this statement is also misleading because it implies that this condition is the ultimate nature of human beings, rather than a failure to achieve the excellence of that nature (second nature in Aristotle).

> ...and also the viciousness of human beings is insatiable and though at first a portion of only two obols is enough, yet when this has become familiar, they always want more, until they get more without limit. For appetitive desire is by its nature without limit and most human beings live for the satisfaction of it.[3]

Later he shifts the reference point to democracy and oligarchy, where he indicates that virtue and goodness is always in short supply: "And two regimes arise most on account of this, democracy and oligarchy for noble birth and virtue are found in few men, but these other qualifications are found in more: nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there are rich men in many places."[4] In other selections he presents the scarcity of moral virtue as a limitation that informs his investigation:

> But what is the best regime and what is the best way of life for most cities and most of mankind, if we do not judge by the standard of a virtue that is the above the level of private citizens or of an education that needs natural gifts and means supplied by fortune, nor by the standard of the best regime, but of a way of life shared by most men and a constitution possible for most states to attain?[5]

So Aristotle presents this point in reference to specific regimes as a general observation.

Second, other positions he takes in reference to nature and scope of *stasis* requires him also to think that most citizens will not be virtuous.[6] Aristotle places much attention on the details of stabilizing oligarchies and democracies because these are the most common regime types.[7] But he also indicates that

[3] [ἔτι δ' ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκανὸν διωβελία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἤδη τοῦτ' ᾖ πάτριον, ἀεὶ δέονται τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς ἄπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἧς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν](*Pol* 2.2 1267^{b}1-5).

[4] [διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία: εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν ὀλίγοις, ταῦτα δ' ἐν πλείοσιν: εὐγενεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἑκατόν, εὔποροι δὲ πολλαχοῦ](*Pol* 5.1 1301^{b}40-1302^{a}1).

[5] [τίς δ' ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἄριστος βίος ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἣ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς, μήτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατ' εὐχὴν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ βίον τε τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατὸν καὶ πολιτείαν ἧς τὰς πλείστας πόλεις ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἃς καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατίας, περὶ ὧν νῦν εἴπομεν, τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρω πίπτουσι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, τὰ δὲ γειτνιῶσι τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ 'διὸ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾶς λεκτέον'] (*Pol* 4.9 1295^{a}25-32). Consider also: "If then the possessors of virtue should be quite few in number, how is the decision to be made? Ought we to consider their fewness in relation to the task and whether they are able to administer the state, or sufficiently numerous to constitute a state?" (εἰ δὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον· ἢ τὸ 'ὀλίγοι' πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν)(*Pol* 3.7 1283^{b}10-12).

[6] On Aristotle's assumption that bad character is inevitable in most regimes, see Kraut, 2002, 369, 398, 447; Nichols, 92, 86-88; J. Swanson, 1994, 224-225; Mulgan, 1977, 57; Newman, 1902, 3.155; Simpson, 1988, 145.

[7] *Pol* 4.9 1296^{b}8-10.

these are the regimes that are most prone to faction.[8] These regimes can generate a species of factional conflict that is among the worst that he classifies. He maintains that bad character is the most decisive cause of factional conflict and is no less a cause in the regimes most afflicted by *stasis*. The incidence of bad character must be as widespread in these regimes as the ever-present specter of *stasis* is. Unless Aristotle revised his other views about *stasis*, he must think that most citizens in most regimes are not virtuous.

Third, although Aristotle doesn't offer a sustained or detailed explanation of why virtue is so scarce in these regimes, he does suggest some problems for the widespread achievement of virtue. Of course, at the beginning of his discussion of *stasis*, Aristotle emphasizes that democracy and oligarchy are flawed regimes because they honor freedom and wealth more than virtue, which encourages license and the pursuit of wealth more than the cultivation of virtue. This is not problematic for those who would be virtuous whether the regime honors it or not. Rather, it is problematic for those who do not strive for virtue and are more vicious than they would have been in a better regime. When considered on a wide scale, a much larger portion of the citizenry lacks virtue in a deviant regime. Aristotle suggests other reasons for the lack of virtue in these regimes. Some parts of the city don't have adequate conditions for the learning and sustaining of virtue. For example, leisure is necessary for the exercise of some of the virtues. Yet, constant activity and occupation can render an individual slavish and unable to practice self-rule[9] and deny them the means for the exercise of certain virtues (e.g., magnanimity, generosity). Moreover, some conditions of life undermine a person's receptivity to practical wisdom:

> Since then it is admitted that what is moderate or in the middle is best, it is manifest that the middle amount of all of the good things of fortune is the best amount to possess. For this degree of wealth is the readiest to obey practical wisdom, whereas for a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite – exceedingly poor, weak, or very mean station, it is difficult to follow the bidding of practical wisdom. For the former turn more to insolence and grand wickedness and the latter overmuch to malice and petty wickedness, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either insolence or malice.[10]

At the very least, Aristotle is saying that some circumstances of life make certain moral virtues difficult to achieve, whereas others are enabling conditions

[8] *Pol* 5.1 1301[a]37-39. On the inevitability of *stasis*, see Yack, 1993, 231; Kraut, 2002, 374, Newman, 1902, 4.277.

[9] *Pol* 3.3 1278[a]22-25.

[10] [ῥᾴστη γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν, ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἢ ὑπερίσχυρον ἢ ὑπερευγενῆ ἢ ὑπερπλούσιον , ἢ τἀναντία τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἢ ὑπερασθενῆ ἢ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖν: γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν, τῶν δ᾽ ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δι᾽ ὕβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν] (*Pol* 4.9 1295[b]6-11). See also *Pol* 3.2 1276[b]38-1277[a]12.

for their achievement.[11] Aristotle suggests that some occupations involve moral danger. Such occupations lend themselves better to the learning of courage and loyalty than others that reward its practitioners for avoiding danger and for undermining colleagues. Other occupations, such as accounting and budget management, are rewarded for restraint and judicious planning. So such occupations allow its practitioners regular opportunity to perfect and test virtues connected with self-restraint and use of money. At the very least, long term success in such occupations is not compatible with vices in these areas.

In any case, Aristotle doesn't present an extended explanation of why virtue is not possible on a large scale in deviant regimes. But he does suggest problems for its achievement. And, more importantly for this chapter, he presents this fact as a starting point for his approach to *stasis*.

II. Stability in the Middle Class.

This section discusses Aristotle's principles for a properly proportioned expansion of the middle class. Aristotle surveys the parts of the city and the political function that those parts serve. By weighing the overall importance of each of these functions, they can be classified into qualitative and quantitative elements. The guideline he suggests is this: the qualitative elements in a *politeia* should exceed the quantitative elements in quality by a measure that is greater than the quantitative elements of the same *politeia* exceed the qualitative elements in number. Accordingly, there is some appropriate proportion among the notables (a qualitative element), the middle class (a combination of qualitative and quantitative elements) and the people (a quantitative element) that provides an optimal level of stability.[12] While the middle class should expand beyond the numbers of notables and people, the extent to which it should be expanded is relative to the *politeia*. A fitting expansion of the middle class doesn't reform the dispositions of vanity and envy. But it does decrease the range of scenarios in which notables and poor clash. This remedy also diminishes the problems of provocative dissimilarity and the disproportionate growth of notables or poor.

Aristotle's discussion of the stabilizing function of the middle class reveals principles for its properly proportioned expansion. But any political stability that might be achieved requires a well-calibrated mixture of various parts of the city, many of which are different in kind and easily discordant.[13] Aristotle

[11] *Pol* 5.71309^{a}33-1309^{b}13.

[12] *Pol.*, 4.12 1296^{b}15-25.

[13] One reason that there are different regimes is that there are different parts of the city. Aristotle emphasizes this three times in *Pol* 4.3-4 before turning to the range of regimes that require stabilization (*Pol* 4.3 1289^{b}27-1290^{a}5, 1290^{b}21-1291^{b}13, 4.4 1291^{b}14-30). Initially, Aristotle claims that "the reason for their being several kinds of regimes is

classifies the parts of the city[14] according to different bases of organization.[15]

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that every city has a considerable number of parts" (*Pol* 4.3.1289^{b}27-28). The in-kind differences between these parts also account for the kinds of regimes possible: "It is clear therefore that there must necessarily be several forms of constitution differing in kind from one another, inasmuch as these parts differ in kind among themselves" (*Pol* 4.3.1290^{a}6-7). Lastly, he considers how different kinds of animal species are composed of different kinds of parts (e.g. sense organs, locomotive organs, etc.) to understand how different kinds of regimes are composed of different kinds of parts (*Pol* 4.3.1290^{b}21-39).

[14] Aristotle classifies the part of the city in three separate lists. The parts of the city listed in the remaining portion of the chapter form a working list interpolated from the three lists included below (*Pol* 1290^{a}1, 1291^{b}29).

List One (1289^{b}27-1290^{a}5)	**List Two** (1290^{b}21-1291^{b}13)	**List Three** (1291^{b}14-30)
Household (ἡ οἰκια)	Agricultural Class (ὁ γεωργίκος)	People (ὁ δήμος)
Agricultural (ὁ γεωργίκος)	Class Artisan Class (ὁ βάναυσος)	Agricultural Class (ὁ γεωργίκος)
Artisan Class (ὁ βάναυσος)	Commercial class (ὁ ἀγοραῖος)	Artisan Class (ὁ βάναυσος)
Commercial Class (ὁ ἀγοραῖος)	Manual Labor (τὸ θητικόν)	Commercial Class (ὁ ἀγοραῖος)
Poor (οἱ ἄποροι)	Poor (οἱ ἄποροι)	Manual Labor (τὸ θητικόν)
Middle Class (ὁ μέσος)	Military class (οἱ προπολεμοῦντες)	Poor (οἱ ἄποροι)
Wealthy (οἱ εὔποροι)	Judicial class (τὸ μετέχον δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς)	Notables (οἱ γνωρίμοι)
Wealth (ὁ πλοῦτος)	Deliberative class (councilors) (τὸ βουλευόμενον)	Wealth (ὁ πλοῦτος)
Birth (ὁ γένος)	Public servants (magistracies) (τὸ δημιουργικὸν)	Education (ἡ παιδεία)
Virtue (ἡ ἀρετή)	Wealthy (οἱ εὔποροι)	Birth (ἡ εὐγένεια)
		Virtue (ἡ ἀρετή)

The first list offers the broadest account of the parts of the city, providing less differentiation of its economic and (more standard) political activity and more emphasis on other functions such as the household, birth, virtue, etc. This list is also significant because it suggests the presence of a section that is neither wealthy nor poor. The second list emphasizes the range of activities in the city, especially those neglected in the first list, such as its military, judicial and deliberative functions. His presentation of these parts also underemphasizes the economic status of each whether as poor, wealthy or in between. The third list is different because it accentuates the division between the two most significant sections of the city: the notables and the people. This is different from the first list where, to adopt the terms of the third list, the differences between notables and people are understood in economic terms – the wealthy and the poor. The third list is also different from the second list in its greater emphasis on the division between two fundamental sections of the city – the notables and people. The second list suggests less division insofar as it includes political, military and judicial functions that don't fall straightforwardly into either the sections of the notables or of the people. The second list does, however, share the third list's de-emphasis of economic status.

[15] The difference between the parts of the city discussed in the first and the second list

Some parts of the city are individual human beings that are organized into a group that contributes to the good of the city. These parts include: the household (ἡ οἰκία),[16] manual labor (τὸ θητικόν),[17] an agricultural class (ὁ γεωργίκος),[18] an artisan class (ὁ βάναυσος),[19] a commercial class (ὁ ἀγοραῖος),[20] middle class (ὁ μέσος),[21] military class (οἱ προπολεμοῦντες),[22] and

parallels the difference between the first and second city in Plato's *Republic* 2 (369^b, 372e). The first city includes four specialized jobs: weaver, farmer, homemaker, and builder. But this city only provides for the needs of the body and doesn't even provide for them very well. The second expands these range of jobs and supporting jobs in order to make the city more self sufficient. This expansion includes a military class, another necessity for securing and maintaining the land needed for self-sufficiency. Also consider Aristotle's comments on this transition (*Pol* 4.3.1291^a12-21).

[16] This part of the city cannot be unimportant for Aristotle since it is the first part of the city that he discusses in the *Politics* and the first part listed on this first of three lists. In *Politics* 1.1 (1252^a24-1252^b27) he treats the household as an essential and non-reducible ingredient in the natural organization of the city, though not a self-sufficient one. It is unclear why it receives less emphasis and less discussion in his subsequent lists and explanations of these parts. This is not to say that Aristotle changed his mind about the household as an essential part of the city. Everything he says about it in his middle books is compatible with its place in the formation of the citizens (and even non-citizens) who make up the other parts of the city. See also P. Coby, "Aristotle's Three Cities and the Problem of Faction," *Journal of Politics* 50 (1988): 869-919.

[17] *Pol* 4.3 1291^a7. While this term is only included on the second list (1290^b21-1291^b13), it may also refer to a portion of the poor from the first list.

[18] *Pol* 1289^b33. Aristotle uses this term in his initial list (1289^b27-1290^a5), but then as οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί (1291^a1) in the second list (1290^b21-1291^b13) and, similarly, as οἱ γεωργοί (1291^b19) in the third list (1291^b14-30). All of the terms suggest a fairly ambiguous group of agricultural workers that may perform a wide range of activities. This designation is also ambiguous enough to refer to occupations that fill other parts of the city.

[19] *Pol* 1289^b34. Aristotle refers to the mechanic or artisan class in all three lists. But the first list (1289^b27-1290^a5) where the above Greek term occurs is more specific than its later occurrences, where Aristotle leaves the expression more general: τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας. This same expression occurs both at 1291^a1 within list two (1290^b21-1291^b13) and at 1291^b19, within list three (1291^b14-30).

[20] *Pol* 1289^b33. Aristotle also uses the same term in the second and third lists. But in both of the later lists he also describes this class as those who are engaged in selling, buying and retail trade (τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρῖβον) (1291^a5-6)(...τὸ αγοραῖον τὸ περὶ ὠμὴν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρῖβον)(1291^b20).

[21] *Pol* 1289^b32. Aristotle refers to this part of the city as the section between the wealthy and the poor (τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δ' ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους)(1289^b31-32). Typically, this is understood as the middle class. While Aristotle doesn't use the same term in the later two lists, it doesn't mean that the distinction isn't still in effect. There are a number of parts of the city listed on both of the later lists where Aristotle's middle class could easily apply (e.g. rising members of the commercial class, very established artisans, government functionaries).

[22] *Pol* 1291^a7. Aristotle refers to this class most explicitly in the second list. See his other references to it on the list at 1291^a20, 1291^a27. He also suggests that this class will have a heavy armor division (ὁπλιτικὸν) 1291^a33. In the first list, this function is absorbed under the rich who have heavy armor (τὸ μὲν ὁπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄνοπλον) 1289^b30 and cavalry (τοὺς πολέμους ἵπποις) 1289^b38 and the poor, who have neither 1289^b31. In his third list, Aristotle makes passing reference to something like a military class, but only

the judicial class (τὸ μετέχον δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς),[23] the deliberative class (τὸ βουλευόμενον),[24] the class of public servants (τὸ δημιουργικὸν),[25] the wealthy (οἱ εὔποροι),[26] and the poor (οἱ ἄποροι).[27] What Aristotle refers to as the other "parts" of the city should be understood as properties since they are not composed of individual human beings, as such, but rather derive from contributions that individuals make to the city. Some of these properties include wealth (ὁ πλοῦτος),[28] birth (ὁ γένος),[29] education (ἡ παιδεία)[30] and virtue (ἡ ἀρετή).[31]

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in connection with naval warfare (1291^{b}21). On questions and problems defining the middling citizen, see Ober, 1991, 119, 123; Yack, 1993, 74.

[23] *Pol* 1291^{a}27. Aristotle refers to this class only in his second list. But he refers to it several times, highlighting different aspects of the class: litigants (1291^{a}40), judges (1291^{b}5, 1291^{a}40), and those who support the administration of judicial justice (1291^{a}28).

[24] *Pol* 1291^{a}28. Aristotle refers to this class as those who engage in deliberation concerning public matters. Representative examples of those in this class include councilmen (as some translators indicate). He considers this ability to be a function of political intelligence (συνέσεως πολιτικῆς, 1291^{a}29). He also distinguishes this group from public servants. The reference to the latter group seems to include any civic office besides those of the assembly and those that specifically involve public deliberation, such as jury members and other non-legislative offices. The term Aristotle uses to describe this group (τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν)(1291^{a}35) suggests that the members of this group hold offices are unpaid and perform, primarily, out of civic responsibility. Of course, Aristotle also maintains throughout the treatise that these offices can become platforms for aggrandizement and ambition, depending on the regime and its context.

[25] *Pol* 1291^{a}35. Some translate this term as magistracies. See previous note.

[26] *Pol* 1289^{b}31. Aristotle refers to the wealthy most extensively in the first two lists. On the first list he emphasizes their property status, and its impact on military strength (1289^{b}35-40). On the second list he emphasizes their property holding function and its beneficial effects on the community (1291^{a}34). On the emphasis of wealth and leisure as defining of Aristotle's rich, Ober, 1991, 118; Findley, *The Ancient Economy* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 40-41; V. Gabrielsen, *Remuneration of State Officials in Fourth-Century B.C. Athens* (Odense, 1981), 119-126.

[27] *Pol* 1289^{b}31. Aristotle refers to the poor in all three sections. He doesn't elaborate on the precise boundaries of this group. In the third list he describes this group as those who lack the means for leisure especially manual laborers (1291^{b}26-27). While he doesn't offer an exhaustive list of which occupations count as the poor, it is plausible that (besides manual labor) it includes the larger portion of the mechanic, agricultural and commercial class. He also suggests in the second list that the poor part of the city must be in opposition to the wealthy and occupied by separate individuals (1291^{b}7-11). See also Yack, 1993, 216.

[28] *Pol* 1289^{b}41, 1291^{b}28. While Aristotle includes both wealth and the wealthy in list one, he lists them separately on lists two and three.

[29] *Pol* 1290^{a}1 Aristotle treats this term as equivalent to εὐγένεια at 1291^{b}28. Aristotle uses this term loosely to convey various forms of social distinction, whether through family lineage (as the English word indicates) or other forms of distinction that arise from such lineage: citizenship status, blood ties to wealth, political power or other kinds of notoriety. ὁ γένος and ἡ εὐγένεια both capture the wider implications of birth better than the English word does. In this sense, Aristotle's use of the word might actually highlight aspects of wealth, power, etc., that his more generic references to wealth and power do not.

[30] *Pol* 1291^{b}29.

[31] *Pol* 1290^{a}1,1291^{b}29^{a}.

Aristotle provides a classification of these properties of the regime to measure the strength of each of its classes.[32] As will be discussed later, a regime will be stable so long as the strongest class (or set of classes) desires the continuation of that regime.[33] The strength of classes is measured as a product of quantity (number of members) and quality (properties such as education, wealth, virtue, etc.).[34] The quality (τὸ ποῖον) and quantity (ὁ ποσος) are variable properties that determine the strength of a class. The strength of a class may be expressed roughly in the following form:

Strength of a Class = Quantity (of that class) X Quality (of that class)[35]

Before considering the implications of this formula for the stabilization of oligarchies and democracies, let us briefly consider the contribution that each of these factors makes to the strength of a class and the regime at large.[36] While Aristotle does not offer an extensive explanation for why one property might contribute more or less to that strength, he does discuss each factor in a number of texts. Specifically, he discusses the function that the former serves for that class or the city, at large.

Aristotle oftentimes refers to the city as an organism.[37] Some parts of the city function like the body, providing for the mere life of the city.[38] Other parts function more like the soul of the city, providing the guidance and organization that is necessary for living well in the city. Along these lines, Aristotle considers the deliberative, judicial, military and ruling functions in the city to be of a qualitative status in the city.[39] He considers other parts of the city such as education and virtue as qualitative in status because they enable the former parts to function well. Aristotle also refers to the wealthy,

[32] On the limitations of class as a category in Aristotle's thought, see Ober, 1991, 123.

[33] *Pol* 4.12 1296^{b}15-17.

[34] "But every state consists of both quality and quantity" (ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ), *Pol* 4.10 1296^{b}17.

[35] See Fred Miller, *Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), 292-293.

[36] *Pol* 4.11 1290 a11-13; 4.4 1291^{a}12-27; 4.10 1296^{b}13-24. While it is clear that Aristotle maintains the goodness and priority of hierarchies in the political community, he also admits that there are some tensions in this view. Earlier in the *Politics* (4.8-9) he wrestles with the implications of his view that each and every citizen deserves to be involved in government in some capacity. But, of course, not every citizen is equally virtuous, nor equally skilled in each function necessary for government (e.g., accounting, speech writing, etc.), nor equally capable of wise leadership. Still, he rejects the Platonic view in *Republic* that those most able to rule should always rule and those less able to rule should be ruled. Each regime, except monarchy and tyranny, finds ways to involve its citizens as widely or narrowly as the principle of the regime demands. He struggles to balance his commitment to the prerogatives of citizenship with his view that citizens are vastly unequal – both in practice and in principle – in the activity of ruling. One interpretation of Aristotle's taxonomy of the parts of the city is that it is a taxonomy of power in the city. See Kraut, 2002, 428.

[37] *Pol* 4.4 1290^{b}20-37. See also 3.4 1277^{a}5-10.

[38] *Pol* 4.4 1291^{a}12-19; 4.4 1291^{b}25-27; 4.11 1296^{b}25-32.

[39] *Pol* 4.4 1291^{a}20-29; 4.11 1296^{b}19-21.

wealth and birth as properties of the city that have a qualitative status. The chief reason that he considers the wealthy part of the city as a qualitative part is because its members hold and manage the bulk of the property of the city.[40] Moreover, in any household the management of property and wealth must be done well for the household to flourish.[41] So also, the proper management of property and wealth across the city[42] plays an important role in the flourishing of the city. Wealth and birth provide some status and means through which the wealthy may exercise their abilities as wealth holders.[43] Of course, education and virtue provide the primary basis for the wealthy to handle their resources well.[44]

Aristotle treats most[45] of the remaining groups as not rising to a qualitative status for the city. The chief contribution of these groups is the production of the goods necessary for mere life.[46] So these groups are concerned with

[40] *Pol* 4.4 1291^{a}33-35.

[41] See Aristotle's discussion of the art of household management, its preconditions and limits, *Pol* 1.2 1253^{b}1-1.3 1287^{b}9. Of course moral virtue, education and leisure are even more important for this flourishing.

[42] Aristotle is chiefly referring to the management of private property. While he does consider the role that the proper management of public wealth and property might play in various constitutions such as with those of Phaleas (*Pol* 2.4 1267^{a}24-32), Hippodamus (*Pol* 2.5 1267^{b}23-37; 4.13 1268^{a}38-1268^{b}2) and Sparta (*Pol* 1.2 1263^{a}35-37), he is critical of them on this score. Moreover, his previous and subsequent treatments of the topic make it clear that the proper management of property and a well established system of private property belong together.

[43] It may seem that wealthy and property have to do more with mere life than the good life. But Aristotle maintains in his section on household management and acquisition that the pursuit of wealth can be done in such a way that it never rises above mere life; though, it can also be done in a way that is not only consistent with the good life, but is a constituent of it.

[44] Many moral virtues are need for living well and even some of them are required for mere life (*Pol* 1.5 1280^{a}34-36). Some virtues, such as generosity, specifically pertain to the handling of wealth with nobility (*Pol* 2.2 1263^{b}11-14). Along these lines, some virtues can be misused in the service of unqualified acquisition, thereby missing the mark of the good life (*Pol* 1.3 1257^{b}42-1258^{a}14). This is a case where a virtue like temperance supports restraint and frugality, though vices connected with greed and injustice lead that person to use those resources in the service of unwise acquisition.

[45] It wouldn't be accurate, at this point, to refer to "all" of the remaining groups since Aristotle suggests the possibility of a middle class. There is also some ambiguity about which of the remaining non-poor groups fit his characterization of the middle class. This will be treated later.

[46] Plato highlights the same function of this group (*Rep* 2 369^{b}-371^{e}), though more pointedly. And while Aristotle disagrees with Plato's classification of the parts of the city he keeps many of the same classifications in tact. This is quite evident in the second list where he discusses what Plato would consider the productive classes (agricultural, artisan, commercial, and manual labor) before turning to his alleged disagreement with Plato – even on his grouping of the productive classes in the first city. But Aristotle doesn't actually dispute that some of the city is dedicated to this kind of productive activity and is largely concerned with the basic necessities of life. He disagrees with Plato in the sense that he adds other groups (e.g., wealthy, middle class, birth) that Plato doesn't thematize in the same way. He also disagrees with Plato about whether one can occupy more than one part of the city at the same time. Plato and Aristotle both agree

the cultivation and distribution of goods directly or indirectly necessary for food, shelter, clothing, and the maintenance thereof. These groups include the poor, generally speaking, as well as agricultural, artisan, and labor classes.[47]

There is also a group[48] that is neither wealthy nor poor, namely the middle class.[49] The development of a middle class helps stabilize both an oligarchy and a democracy. In a democracy the greater quality of a middle class give weight to the poor. In an oligarchy, greater quality of the middle class helps support the rich.[50] Aristotle doesn't treat the middle class as a group that performs a separate and distinct function, such as the mechanic class does in contrast with the judicial class. Instead, in respect of quality, the middle class might include its lower end (e.g., the better of the non-propertied farmers and the men of commerce) and in its higher end (military personnel, bureaucratic functionaries, those of the wealthy with the lowest status and smallest of

that an artisan (or producer, to apply the Platonic term) and military person (Plato's guardian) are separate parts of the city. But Aristotle claims that the same person can occupy both of these functions. (Of course there are some functions that cannot be occupied by the same person, e.g., rich and poor). Plato would certainly disagree that the same person could occupy these roles, especially during the same phase of life. Some guardian (or guardians) may become a ruler (or rulers); but not at the same phase of life or (minimally) at the same time. Another example of a Platonic classification that Aristotle allegedly rejects, but then later adopts in large measure, is the division of the soul. Aristotle claims that the soul only has two parts, contra Plato, who claims that it has three parts. But Aristotle identifies a component of the non-rational part that is receptive to reason. This subpart functions much like Plato's spirited part. Moreover, it performs as central a role in Aristotle's moral psychology as it does in Plato's.

[47] Aristotle usually includes the latter groups within the broader category of the poor.

[48] It is unclear how homogenous Aristotle considers *this* group. In his initial listings of the parts of the city he treats the middle class as something like a placeholder – those who by some measure of wealth and property are neither rich nor poor. The classification of "middle class" is like "rich" and "poor" in the sense that it more like a designation of economic status than a designation of economic activity such as "artisan" or "business man" indicates. But, later, Aristotle better explains the role of the middle class in stabilizing the regime. Then, what had been seen as a vague economic function – whatever the activities of its members might be (e.g., upper end commercial class or lower end political/bureaucratic class) – finds greater coherence as a political function. Along these lines, this is the group that provides the buffer between the sectional extremes of the city.

[49] There is some danger in using the term class. It is a term with associations that Aristotle would most certainly reject. Marx and various strains of neo-Marxist thinkers use the term to convey a much greater degree of economic identity and solidarity than Aristotle would concede to. But there are conditions, especially in the most pathological of cities, when a group or section's economic status becomes a basis for association – factional association. This is not a basis for progress or historical consciousness, but rather breakdown and destruction. See also A. Lintott, 1982, 248; Yack, 1993, 209; J. Ober, 1991, 123; Lord, 1991, 70, P. Springborg, "Aristotle and the Problem of Needs," *History of Political Thought* 5, no. 3 (2004): 393-424; Figuera, 1991, 290-1.

[50] See F. Miller, 288-289. For some reflection on how Aristotle might have understood the exercise of political functions on the part of larger groups see J. Waldron, "The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's *Politics*," *Political Theory* 23, no. 4 (1995): 563-584.

property holdings).[51] What is most important, though, is not where the middle class fits in the spectrum of contribution to the city, but its role as a sizable section that checks the extremes: "It is evident that the middle form is the better form; for it is the only form without faction, since where the middle class is many, factions and sectional strife among the citizens may arise the least."[52]

Aristotle's analysis of the parts of the city is integral to the discussion of the first remedial principle. Let us now examine this principle. Aristotle claims that a regime is less likely to be unstable if the part that wishes the regime to remain is stronger than the part that wishes it not to remain.[53] As he formulates this principle, "it may be that, while on the one hand, the quality of the regime belongs to one among the parts of the regime and its quantity to another part – e.g., those without distinctive lineage may be in larger numbers than those with distinctive lineage or the poor or the wealthy, still the part that is larger in number may not exceed in quantity as much as it lags behind in quality."[54] The middle class is all-important as a demographic block for offsetting the intensity and force of the sections demanding to replace the regime. But the size and achievement level of a middle class, that is able to provide the needed stability, varies among regimes.[55] One of the key variables is both the composition of the oligarchy or democracy that requires greater stabilization and the composition of the expanded middle class. Consider the following formulae for democracy and oligarchy:

1. If [Qn x Ql (wealthy)] < [Qn x Ql (poor)], then the constitution must be democratic to be stable (That is, democracy is natural to such a power arrangement).

[51] These variations become more familiar in later sections where the various grades of democracy and oligarchy are elaborated.

[52] [ὅτι δ' ἡ μέση βελτίστη, φανερόν: μόνη γὰρ ἀστασίαστος: ὅπου γὰρ πολὺ τὸ διὰ μέσου, ἥκιστα στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις γίγνονται τῶν πολιτῶν](*Pol* 4.9 1296^{a}8-10).

[53] "It is necessary that the part of the city that wishes the regime to remain must be stronger than the part that does not wish it to remain" (δεῖ γὰρ κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ βουλόμενον μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν) (*Pol* 4.9 1296^{b}15-16).

[54] [ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν, οἷον πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων τοὺς ἀγεννεῖς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λείπεται τῷ ποιῷ](*Pol* 4.9 1296^{b}19-24). Or the principle could be restated as follows: the parts of the city that are smaller in number may not lag behind (the more numerous part/parts) in quantity as much as they exceed them in quality.

[55] Initially in this section, Aristotle presented the above mentioned formulation as a general principle that applies to each regime "Now we must consider first a general principle to each sort of regime" (ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον περὶ πασῶν καθόλου ταυτόν) (*Pol* 4.9 1296^{b}14). And in the previous section (4.9 1295^{b}12-1296^{b}11), he discussed the importance of the expansion of the middle class as a stabilizing force with respect to faction. But the size and composition of a middle class that provides the best stabilizing conditions varies by regime. Aristotle then returns to the application of the above principle in oligarchies and democracies.

2. If [Qn x Ql (wealthy)] > [Qn x Ql (poor)], then the constitution must be oligarchic to be stable. (That is, oligarchy is natural to such a power arrangement).

(1) In a democratic regime, the numbers of people are great enough to offset the advantages of a qualitative nature that the oligarchs might have.[56] In this democracy the numbers of the poor are overwhelmingly larger than that of the oligarchs. Moreover, this margin is so great that the qualitative advantages of the oligarchs do not translate into a level of superiority. Perhaps larger numbers of a much wealthier class of oligarchs or a larger class of exceptionally distinguished oligarchs would translate into superiority. Of course, in the unlikely condition that the numbers of oligarchs were equal or nearly equal to that of the poor, the oligarchs would dominate the people since their added advantages in quality could not be offset by numbers. An expanded middle class adds stability to the democracy because the greater quantity and quality of the middle class will give greater weight and substance to the poor. But the level of stability that this expanded middle class would contribute is a function of the quality and quantity of its members. A lower quality and smaller middle class adds less stability than a more distinguished and populous middle class does. Of course, the extent to which the middle class needs to be expanded also depends on the composition of the regime that requires greater stability. A democracy of people who have great advantages in numbers and who face undistinguished oligarchs will not require a middle class with much distinction or numbers.

(2) In such an oligarchy, the quality of the oligarchs is great enough to offset the advantages that the people might have in raw numbers.[57] The people might play some role in the decision making of the regime, but the oligarchs play the most significant role in terms of decisions that are the most important and long-lasting. The factors that enable the oligarchs to have more influence are those that Aristotle treats as qualitative factors in the city (e.g. wealth, property, birth, education). Consider an oligarchic regime where the average level of wealth and property assets is quite high. This is one example of what Aristotle might consider an oligarchic regime of high oligarchic quality – a very oligarchic oligarchy.[58] Along these lines, it is plausible to think that the people would want to replace the regime and might have a large majority in numbers. But because the oligarchs have such consistently high levels of

[56] In Aristotle's language, the quantity of the people exceeds the oligarchs in quality more than the people lag behind the oligarchs in quality.

[57] In Aristotle's language the wealthy (and otherwise notable) members exceed the people in quality more than they lag behind them in quantity.

[58] Of course there are variations of oligarchic quality, depending on the grade of oligarchy and what weight each oligarchic factor is given in that grade. For example, some oligarchies might place factors such as birth and education closer to the elevated position of wealth and property, whereas other oligarchies might place more of a decisive gap between them.

wealth and property, their level of influence as members of the ruling class is greater than it would be as less wealthy members of the ruling class. So, they are of a sufficient size and quality that they can successfully offset the regime goals of people who are larger in numbers.[59]

But, at some point, even a ruling class with the greatest of property holdings and other forms of distinction, will not be able to offset a people whose numbers are overwhelmingly greater. This is a case where the expansion of a middle class could deflect an otherwise imminent revolution. It would add stability to the oligarchy because added quality and quantity of the middle class will support the oligarchs. But the level of stability that this expanded middle class would contribute is a function of the quality and quantity of its members. A lower quality and small middle class offers less added stability than would a more distinguished and populous middle class. Moreover, the extent to which the middle class should be expanded also depends on the composition of the regime that requires greater stability. An oligarchy with only moderate distinction and numbers who face an extremely numerous poor will require a middle class with sufficient distinction and numbers to offset the growing strength of the poor.[60]

The expansion of the middle class[61] does not change the dispositions of vanity and envy, but it does decrease the range of scenarios in which notables and poor clash.[62] Without a middle class of this size, the notables and poor are

[59] Aristotle discusses how polarized the political community becomes without a sufficiently large middle class (*Pol* 4.11 $1296^{a}21$-$1296^{b}33$). For more on how the middle class diminishes the polarization of the regime, See Loraux, 1991, 46.

[60] An expanded middle class also gives greater prominence to those who have less affinity with the goals of the people because their interests and aspirations begin to diverge from those of the people. Aristotle expresses not only how the interests differ sufficiently among the middle class and the sectional extremes, but also how that measure of difference can be stabilizing for the regime (*Pol* 4.12 $1296^{b}38$-$1297^{a}14$).

[61] A more complete expansion of the middle class is already manifested in polity. Its stability formula might be understood as follows. If [Qn x Ql (middle class)] > [Qn x Ql (poor and/or wealthy)], then the constitution must be a polity to be stable. (That is, polity is natural to such a power arrangement). In a regime where the product of the quantity and quality of the middle class is greater than that of the poor and/or wealthy sections, the regime must be a polity in order to be stable. While this chapter focuses on stabilization of oligarchy and democracy rather than polity, the polity is the model for stabilizing oligarchy and democracy. An oligarchy that needs greater stabilization may expand its middle class and thereby look more like a polity. Similarly, a democracy that needs greater stabilization will benefit from a larger middle class. These changes make the regime more like a polity, even though it is still a democracy. So, from an economic demographic standpoint, a polity is the rule of the middle class. It is the direction towards which oligarchy and democracy should be altered. However, too large and distinguished of a middle class would turn the democracy or oligarchy into a polity, which might be just as destructive as the alternative. So, an appropriate expansion of the middle class makes the oligarchy or democracy more like a polity without becoming a polity.

[62] While an expanded middle class has the effect of diminishing factional conflict that arises from envy and vanity, it doesn't mean that the middle class is necessary less prone to envy and vanity or other faction-related vices. This interpretation of Aristotle's middle

forced to avoid conflict and revolution by allowing the other a greater role in decision making. Oligarchic regimes still rule oligarchically. But in order to avoid revolution they are forced to offer more decision making to the people than they think the people deserve. Similarly, democratic regimes might do the same to stave off an oligarchic revolt. But, insofar as the middle class grows, it is able to play a greater role in the governance of the regime, whether the regime is an oligarchy or a democracy. This turns out to be a group that is far less prone to inflame either the people or the notables, especially when they deliberate about public matters. Aristotle says:

> It is always necessary for the lawgiver in this regime to draw in the middle class; if he is making the laws of an oligarchical sort he must keep the middle class in mind, and if he is making laws of a democratic sort, he must legislate so as to draw them in...for there is no fear of the rich ever aligning with the poor against this numerous middle class; for neither group shall ever wish to be subject to the other, and if they look for another regime more congenial to both they shall not discover it; they would not endure ruling and being ruled because they don't trust each other: it is everywhere the moderator that is most trusted, and the one in the middle is the moderator. And the better mixed the regime, the more permanent it is.[63]

This remedy also diminishes the problems of provocative dissimilarity, and the disproportionate growth on the part of notables or poor.[64] Aristotle indicates in his analysis of the causes of *stasis* that the sheer dissimilarity of the poor and the notables makes their conflict with one another greater.[65] This is especially the case when the most oligarchic of notables and the most democratic of the poor lead the factional associations at work. In this sense, a larger middle class diminishes the sharpness of the differences between either group, making the sharpness of their differences less visible and provocative.[66]

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books treats the expanded middle class as stabilizing because it diminishes the conditions for conflict among those with the most *stasis*-inducing vices, not as a social environment that necessarily alters or dilutes those character states. For other views, see Kraut, 2002, 439; Yack, 1993, 238.

[63] [δεῖ δ᾽ ἀεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μέσους: ἄν τε γὰρ ὀλιγαρχικοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθῇ, στοχάζεσθαι χρὴ τῶν μέσων, ἐάν τε δημοκρατικούς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτους. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων ὑπερτείνει πλῆθος ἢ συναμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἢ καὶ θατέρου μόνον, ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἐνδέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον. οὐθὲν γὰρ φοβερὸν μή ποτε συμφωνήσωσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τούτους: οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄτεροι βουλήσονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑτέροις, κοινοτέραν δ᾽, ἂν ζητῶσιν, οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης. ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους: πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητὴς δ᾽ ὁ μέσος](*Pol* 4.10 1296^{b}35-4.10 1297^{a}8).

[64] On the topographical dimensions of *stasis*, see Berger, 1992, 95.

[65] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}5-7.

[66] The role that this expansion can play in avoiding provocation is suggested by Aristotle through a number of examples. He notes how the differences among those in the Piraeus intensified their democratic impulses, heightening the gap with the notables (*Pol* 5.3 1303^{b}12-15). Aristotle also cites cases at Sybaris and Syracuse (after 467 B.C.) when the

Moreover, a larger middle class allows more flexibility when there is a sudden growth or decline in the numbers of the poor or notables.[67] So, a larger reserve of those in the middle class can offset the magnitude of dissimilarity and allow more flexibility in how conflict may be avoided when there are sudden shifts into the sections of either the notables or people.[68]

III. Remedial Principles of Stabilization

Aristotle's remedial principles treat different spheres of factional struggle: gain distribution, honor distribution, office distribution, and broad power distribution. While some goods are straightforwardly gain or honor, others such as offices carry associations of either gain, honor, or both (under certain circumstances). Each of these principles is best applied in the most appropriate regime context. Aristotle offers an initial guideline for accommodating the opposing section of the regime without distorting the guiding structure of the regime.[69] He writes:

> And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have a smaller share in the government – in a democracy to the wealthy and in an oligarchy to the poor – either equality or precedence in all other things excepting the supreme offices of state.[70]

It is quite consistent with the characteristic motivations of the people that they are more interested in opportunities for gain than office, so long as offices are not sources of gain. Similarly, the notables are far more concerned with access to office than gain since their wealth already affords them more substantial opportunities for gain.

> For the poor will not want to hold office because of making nothing out of it, but rather to attend to their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to hold office because they have no need to add to their resources from the public funds; so that the result will be that the poor will become well-off through spending time upon their work, and the notables will not be governed by any casual persons.[71]

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infusion of settlers widened the divide between the sections (*Pol* 5.8 1308^{a}30-1308^{b}4). The victory at Salamis made the people more powerful, increasing the division between them and the notables (*Pol* 5.4 1304^{a}23).

[67] On the size of *poleis* and their vulnerability to *stasis* due to demographic shifts, see Figueira, 1991, 293.

[68] *Pol* 4.4 1304^{a}37-1304^{b}6.

[69] On Aristotle's use of selective gain and honor distribution see, Moshe Berent, "*Stasis*, or the Greek Invention of Politics," *History of Political Thought* 19, no. 3 (1998): 331-362; R. Mulgan, "Aristotle's Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy," in eds. Keyt and Miller,1991, 312; E. Garver, "The Uses and Abuses of Philosophy: Aristotle's Politics V As an Example," *History of Political Thought* 26, no. 2 (2005): 189-208.

[70] *Pol* 5.7 1309^{a}27-31.

[71] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}5-9.

The distribution of gain will be a more pressing concern for the people, whereas honor will be most problematic for the oligarchs. Let us consider Aristotle's guidelines for the distribution of gain.

Aristotle recommends a number of guidelines for the distribution of gain. First, the people must not perceive that they are missing out on lucrative offices or gain through such offices. This problem is of the highest concern whether the people perceive that such gains are being transferred to the wealthy, the bureaucrats and political operatives or any other group.[72] This is a working assumption that informs his recommendations for each and every regime. Second, he also recommends strategies for avoiding the appearance that gain is being transferred to the wealthy. He sees these strategies are especially helpful if the wealthy are not receiving great gains in this way. Third, he suggests that some lucrative offices be distributed to the poor, though not on a large scale and not in such a way that it changes the structure of the regime.

First, the people must not perceive that they are being denied the gains associated with political offices, no matter who the recipient(s) of those gains may be. Measures that aggressively restrict officeholders from profit of any kind (from their office) would significantly reduce this problem and the perception thereof.[73] Aristotle indicates that there are two strengths of such measures. Most importantly, the most dangerous sections of the regime have mutually reinforcing incentives to support these measures.[74] The notables are more concerned about being badly governed when the people come to occupy lucrative and powerful offices.[75] They are much less concerned about losing the profits that are associated with such offices. The people, especially the poor, would prefer to spend their time acquiring wealth than being engaged in public matters.[76] Of course, when others gain through those offices, the people are much more eager to fight for those offices or at least limit their rivals' access to them. So, both groups have incentives to support measures that restrict the monetary gains of office.[77] Another strength of such measures is that they accord well with the rule of law in both democratic and oligarchic regimes.[78] This offers a source of trust for the people, so long as the rule of law itself is preserved. But insofar as the people think that these laws are being

[72] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}11-22.

[73] *Pol* 5.7 1308^{b}17-21; 5.9 1309^{b}32-37; 5.8 1309^{a}4. (On its status as a *measure* that people and the oligarchs would want, see 5.9 1309^{b}40).

[74] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}1. Aristotle indicates that both groups have an interest and desire for this outcome.

[75] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}9.

[76] *Pol* 5.9 1309^{b}34-37.

[77] Aristotle also emphasizes how the goals of democracy and aristocracy find common ground: the prerogatives of all to hold office and the actual occupation of such offices by the notables.

[78] See *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}20, 32; 5.8 1309^{a}15, 22. Consider also Aristotle's discussion of the careful attention that must be paid to violations of the law and its rule *Pol* 5.8 1307^{b}31-35.

circumvented or are likely to be circumvented, then they have more incentive to reject such measures. The uncertainty about who may receive these gains leaves open the possibility that they too might receive them under the right circumstances.

Second, Aristotle offers specific guidelines for avoiding the more inflammatory appearance that gain is being transferred to the wealthy. This is perhaps the most important appearance to avoid, even if the people are disillusioned about the prospect of a wholesale eradication of office-based gain. So, even if the people expect that citizens will always have access to such gains, including some portion of the people themselves, the appearance of such transfers to the wealthy is still extremely inflammatory.[79] There are conditions under which the wealthy receive monetary gain from office. Some of these conditions are bad, but others are even worse. It is problematic for the people when wealthy citizens are appointed to offices that have attached to them publicly acknowledged levels of compensation.[80] But it is extremely problematic when such offices enable the wealthy or other notables to receive illicit gain, especially high levels of illicit gain, from already lucrative offices.[81] Aristotle claims that the appearance of graft intensifies the people's objections and fuels their perception that these gains belong to the people.[82] So, Aristotle maintains that these funds must be handled in ways that are quite public and visible. After all, the people easily turn their attention to the activity of the notables when the city suffers from sectional conflict, but especially when profit is at stake. Aristotle recommends that the notables use their visibility with respect to public funds to build credibility with the people. If the notables must be connected with such funds, then they should be so visibly. The more visible they are, the more visible is their propriety in the handling of those funds.

Moreover, the notables must specially cultivate their reputation with the people concerning gain. Aristotle recommends that their mode of living be as consistent with the regime as possible.[83] Moderately wealthy oligarchs may be elevated into higher offices. But they should not then appear to climb into a way of life that is more luxurious than their assessment suggests. They should live more in accordance with the regime not by spending more, but by saving more. They should be known not for earning money, but for having

[79] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}33, 37; 5.8 1309^{a}10, 13. This point is also very much in keeping with Aristotle's previous discussion of how the people engage in factional conflict when *others* aggrandize themselves. So, even if the people don't deserve these funds and they believe they don't, they can still be overwhelmingly driven to prevent others from having it *Pol* 5.1 1302^{a}40-5.2 1302^{b}3, 7-10. Aristotle also highlights this tendency with reference to public funds.

[80] *Pol* 5.11 1309^{a}11.

[81] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}37.

[82] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}14, 38-39. See also the earlier discussion of envy where wanting others not to have object x can increase the envious person's desire for object x. This aspect of envy is very much in the reaction Aristotle describes here.

[83] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}20-25.

money.[84] They should be respected for managing their wealth and property well; so well, that, they deserve to be trusted with wealth in more public settings. They may thereby inoculate their reputations against the suspicions of the people[85] for a time when some notable does engage in an impropriety. The more effectively the notables prepare their reputation with the people, the more likely it is that such improprieties will seem like isolated occurrences. Aristotle recommends just the kind of response that protects their larger reputations in such a situation. The wealthy must receive penalties for acts that the people would see as an affront to them.[86] When oligarchies seem capable of inflicting monetary penalties on the ruling class that seem severe and self-imposed, they appeal to something the people value. This kind of disproportionate penalty doesn't increase the commitment of the people to the regime. But it can reduce the chances of provoking the people through the gains of notables, whether ill-gotten or not.[87]

Third, Aristotle also recommends guidelines for a more positive, but selective, distribution of gain to the people. Aristotle does not suggest that it is possible or desirable for the oligarchs to extend long term and substantial opportunities for gain to the poor,[88] though gain that is occasional and visible is a useful strategy for an oligarchic regime. Such gestures diminish the harshness of the rhetoric that is quite frequent among the instigators in each section.[89] The best way for oligarchs to pacify the people is to maximize the visibility and scope of the distribution and to minimize the pain and cost of it. For example, they might offer the people small levels of compensation for jury attendance, but then loosen the requirements for jury attendance.[90] The people may very well prefer to forego this opportunity in order to make greater gains through other occupations. But the people don't want to be denied even small opportunities for gain *a priori*. By the same token, the oligarchic ruling class gains the advantage of extending some benefit to the people even if the people don't take advantage of it. But sometimes it is within the discretion of the oligarchs to allow the people access to lucrative offices, especially ones that don't also carry as much influence or honor.[91] According to Aristotle, it is necessary for oligarchic regimes always to take advantage of such opportunities in order to bolster the stability of the regime:

> In an oligarchy on the other hand it is necessary to take much care of the poor, and to allot to them the offices of profit, and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage against them must be greater

[84] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}15, 33-37; 5.8 1309^{a}6-8.
[85] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}10-15.
[86] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}22-23.
[87] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}37-39.
[88] *Pol* 6.3 1320^{a}30-35.
[89] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}11-12.
[90] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{a}25-26; 6.5 1320^{b}3-4.
[91] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{a}37-1320^{b}2.

> than it is done by one of themselves, and inheritance must not occur by bequest but by family, and the same man must not inherit more than one estate, for so estates would be more on a level and more of the poor would establish themselves as prosperous.[92]

Let us now consider Aristotle's principles for selective *honor* distribution. While the distribution of gain is a more significant source of conflict among the people, the distribution of honor is a constant source of friction to the notables.[93] And, as with the selective distribution of gain, honor can be used to stave off conflict between oligarchic and democratic factions[94] by more greatly honoring those sections outside of the ruling class and, especially, avoiding provocative circumstances where those same sections may be dishonored. Aristotle identifies guidelines for handling honor as follows. First, the level of honor can be elevated or diminished by adjusting the term of that honor. Second, the rule of law should limit the assignment of honors so that there is no appearance of impropriety in its distribution. Third, the dishonoring of certain individuals or groups is highly destabilizing. So, in some cases it is necessary to overcompensate dramatically in the level of honor (or dishonor) given to a certain section. Such measures effectively immunize the regime from the most incendiary appearances of impropriety that may latter arise from the sections in question. Fourth, there are some factors extrinsic to the distribution of honor in the regime that can distort the worth of that honor. Those distortions must also be avoided.

First, one way of extending honor to those outside the ruling class is by adjusting the level of honor they currently receive.[95] In both democratic and oligarchic regimes, those outside the ruling class can be more greatly honored without being given the most decisive offices of the regime.[96] Another way of adjusting that level of honor is by adjusting the term during which it is received.[97] In an oligarchic regime, the small honors that people receive can

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[92] *Pol* 5.8 $1309^{a}22$-26.

[93] *Pol* 5.1 $1302^{a}10$-13, 5.3 $1302^{b}11$-15. Aristotle notes numerous causes of this both within oligarchies and democracies: Hestinea (5.3 $1303^{b}33$), Epidamnus (5.3 $1304^{a}14$), Mitylene (5.3 $1304^{a}4$), Cnidus (5.6 $1305^{b}12$-20) and Elis (5.6 $1306^{a}14$-19). The level of tension that arises among the oligarchs concerning the distribution of honor is very much in keeping with the disposition of vanity which is quite honor-centered. What compounds their disagreements, both that between the people and among themselves, is that they can be pathologically over-attentive to the honor they think they deserve and that others don't deserve.

[94] This subsection will focus more on avoiding oligarchic revolutions in democracies, while the former subsection focused on avoiding democratic revolutions in oligarchies.

[95] There are many forms of honor and dishonor that can influence the stability among the sections of the regime. But Aristotle treats the honor of holding office as the most significant and relevant form. This will be the working assumption throughout the chapter.

[96] On the general importance of more greatly honoring a dissenting section, see *Pol* 5.8 $1308^{a}8$-27.

[97] *Pol* 5.8 $1308^{a}13$-17.

be heightened by lengthening its term.[98] This measure avoids granting the people higher and more substantive honors that might embolden them to take more. Similarly, the honor of the people in an oligarchy can seem greater when that of the oligarchs seems smaller. So, reducing the term of a highly honored oligarchic office seems to diminish its worth to the people. In a democracy it is important to pacify the oligarch's craving for honor, lest they organize a hasty takeover. So, an expansion of their terms of office (without expanding the powers thereof) enhances the honor of the oligarchs. If it turns out to be necessary in a democracy to increase the powers of the offices, then the overall increase in the honor of the office can be limited.[99] But the term length must appropriately be shortened.

One further test for adjusting the honor given to a group is by staggering the periods during which an honored office is held. Examples of this principle can be seen in democracies through the rotation of honored offices through lot or by some other appointment procedure. So, oligarchies might more widely incorporate this democratic principle into its selection of assemblymen.[100] This measure leaves the people with more fragmented gains of honor that would be difficult to consolidate into greater power.

Second, Aristotle also maintains that distributions of honor that are made on the basis of the rule of law best avoid claims of arbitrariness and/or partisanship. Aristotle consistently emphasizes that the rule of law lends credibility and stability to the process whereby sectional disputes are managed.[101] The credibility conferred through the rule of law is especially well suited for the distribution of honor. The worth of a particular honor is difficult to appreciate unless it appropriately reflects the worth of its possessor.[102] So, the level of credibility that is most important for appropriate honor distribution is captured well through the authority of law. And the distribution of honor can seem arbitrary, especially when adjustments are made, unless there is some common basis for its recognition, such as the rule of law enables.[103] In democracy, such appeals to the rule of law, rather than the sovereignty of the people are a vital stabilizing force.[104] For, the oligarchic dissent concerning honor is the lifeblood of oligarchic dissent. But the legitimacy of the rule of law is a quasi-oligarchic regime feature.[105] So, any appeal that a democratic regime can make to the rule of law is an appeal to an aspect of the regime that oligarchs should want to respect and maintain. Moreover, such an approach

[98] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}14.
[99] *Pol* 4.15 1299^{b}6-7.
[100] *Pol* 4.15 1299^{b}25-30.
[101] *Pol* 5.7 1307^{b}32-33.
[102] *Pol* 4.8 1293^{b}40-42.
[103] *Pol* 4.8 1294^{a}3-7.
[104] *Pol* 4.3 1290^{a}31.
[105] *Pol* 4.5 1292^{b}15-17; 4.5 1290^{a}33.

reinforces a blending of the regime that makes revolution less necessary and, at least, less urgent.

Such appeals may also be helpful when oligarchic regimes distribute honors to the people. The more the oligarchs do not seem arbitrary in the eyes of the people, the more they reduce the force of the people's demands.[106] After all, the rule of law is an authority that the people know the oligarch's rely upon.[107] But this is a measure that is less helpful in oligarchies than in democracies. In oligarchies the people are less concerned with honor than are the oligarchs. And appeals to oligarchic sources of authority – even ones that seem non-arbitrary – might also reinforce the drive of the people to replace the regime. But if the people are not in the latter phases of *stasis*, then some appeal to non-arbitrary sources of authority for distributing honor is helpful.[108] Moreover, most forms of democracy also elevate the rule of law.

Third, the dishonoring of certain individuals or groups is highly destabilizing. For example, wronging a highly ambitious person[109] can be as destabilizing as wronging a whole section, since such a person can mobilize a whole section. Another dangerous scenario for dishonor is when a wealthy man visibly wrongs one of the people. So, in some cases it is necessary to overcompensate by dispensing a greater level of honor (or dishonor) to a certain section.[110] Consider the latter case in an oligarchy. The offense might be classified as worse than one committed by one of the people against another within his class.[111] Moreover, the wealthy man might be punished with a much higher fine.[112] Such a measure immunizes the oligarchy from the appearance of being contemptuous towards the people.[113] The regime might have simply prosecuted the offenses of the wealthy against the poor as vigorously as possible.[114] The former measure not only treats what might be seen as oligarchic contempt for the people as inappropriate, but it also treats this contempt as especially dishonorable; perhaps even worthy of contempt by other notables. As a result, the people are less likely to see the contempt of individual oligarchs as symptoms of an oligarchic regime that must be replaced.

In a democratic regime, in contrast, the people should take care not to dishonor the wealthy through high, punitive fines.[115] This kind of scenario brings into contact the most incendiary of suspicions between democrats and notables. The notables see the democrats as a group that is eager to extract

[106] *Pol* 5.6 1306^{a}1-10
[107] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}28-31
[108] *Pol* 5.6 1306^{b}3-6, 5.6 1307^{b}7-12.
[109] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{a}9.
[110] *Pol* 5.7 1308^{a}23.
[111] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}21-22.
[112] *Pol* 5.5 1301^{a}21-24.
[113] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}11-12.
[114] On some discussion of how institutional checks might equalize factions, see Kraut, 2002, 448.
[115] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}16.

as much of their wealth as the law will allow. The people see the oligarchs as indifferent and contemptuous of them.[116] The people are eager to show the notables that they are not beyond the scope of the law, especially when it comes to their wealth. For, the people oftentimes view the status of the notables as exclusively a product of their wealth.[117] Good oligarchs might expect others to view their notable status as a reflection of their character. For example, a reputable wealth holder must have qualities that enable him to maintain and use his wealth well. So, when the people of democracies impose punishments upon the pocketbooks of the notables, they are also punishing what supports the contempt of the notables; not their worth, but rather their wealth itself. This kind of measure is particularly provocative to the notables precisely because they are more concerned about honor than money. The dishonor of high punitive fines highlights both the fact that the notables do not rule and that those who do are more concerned with the money of the notables than the superior leadership of the notables.

Fourth, it is important to avoid those circumstances that would distort the worth of the honor being distributed. For example, when the value of property holdings across a section changes, the property qualifications that the previous assessments were based become skewed.[118] In an oligarchic regime, the prerequisites for some office might be set to include a larger or smaller number of citizens. Perhaps the office serves a more stabilizing function for the city if a smaller number of property holders are admissible to it. So, if property values increase, then a greater number of citizens could hold that office. But in this case, the wider inclusion of property holders to that office also distributes honor more widely. It might turn out that a wider distribution of honor among the property holders is good for the regime, but such an outcome would have occurred through a somewhat arbitrary process. It is just as likely that the unintentionally wider distribution of honor could provoke the people who would expect an even wider basis for participation in the regime. It is also possible that a more established faction within the oligarchic section could oppose this change.

In any case, these remedial principles should be taken into account before making an explicit change in property qualifications. But in the above scenario, factors that are extrinsic to the considerations of the distribution of honor cause a new distribution of honor. A regime has much better prospects for stability if it avoids such distortions.[119]

[116] *Pol* 4.1 $1295^{b}14$-22.
[117] *Pol* 6.3 $1318^{b}4$-6.
[118] *Pol* 5.8 $1308^{a}35$-$1308^{b}7$.
[119] *Pol* 5.7 $1308^{a}35$-$1308^{b}10$.

Remedial Principles for Gain and Honor Distribution	
Gain	**Honor**
1. Not Deprive the People of Gain (Generally)	1. Adjust terms of office
2. Not Transfer Gain to the Wealthy.	2. Support the Rule of Law
3. Distribute Gain to the People	3. Avoid Dishonoring Select Groups
	4. Avoid Factors that Distort Honorn

Figure 6: Remedial Principles for Gain and Honor Distribution

IV. Applications of Remedies in Oligarchies and Democracies

The application of the above mentioned principles for stabilizing regimes is manifest differently based on the relevant regime structure. Let us consider some of the major features of oligarchic and democratic regimes that provide the backdrop for the implementation of the above principles. These features can be further modified and blended.[120]

[120] Aristotle maintains the each of the four grades of democracy and oligarchy can be altered materially and structurally. Material features of the regime include factors such as its size, population, level of urbanization (*Pol* 6.1 1317^{a}19-27). Along these lines, an example of a material change is something like a growth in population size or a growth in urbanization. The structural features of the regime are principles that are specific to the kind of regime it is, such as its basis for the distribution of gain and honor. (On the general relevance of such factors, see 7.4-5). So, a structural feature of oligarchy is that it distributes offices based on property qualifications of some sort. An example of a structural change is an adjustment in the distribution of offices, such as a widening of the qualifications for some office. Aristotle outlines the kinds of alterations of the structural and material features of the four grades of democracy and oligarchy (4.4 1291b31-4.5 1292^{a}37). This generates a subsequent description of four (altered) grades of democracy and oligarchy (4.5 1292^{b}22-1293^{a}34). This section considers how Aristotle's various principles for the distribution of gain and honor (especially 5.7 1307^{b}26-5.8 1310^{a}39) provide a basis for the alteration of the raw grades of democracy and oligarchy (4.4 1291^{b}31-4.5 1292^{a}37), taking into account the range of natural alteration possible for each of these grades (from the subsequent list, 4.5 1292^{b}22-1293^{a}34) and thereby cultivating a more stable blending of the these grades of regime, along the lines of the

Four Democracies

Democracies fall into four grades, ranging from the most oligarchic democracy to the most democratic democracy. Oligarchies similarly fall into four grades ranging from the most democratic oligarchy to its most oligarchic oligarchy.

Aristotle identifies several features of each grade of democracy.[121] Aristotle considers the (i) *absence of property qualifications* for lower offices ranging from the least popular[122] to the more popular (qualifications relating to civic distinction), to the most popular.[123] He also cites (ii) *property qualifications* for higher offices that range from those assessments that are the most stringent and therefore the least popular[124] to the least stringent (no property qualification) and therefore the most popular. Furthermore, (iii) he considers the rule of law as a crucial element in the first three grades of democracy,[125] though it is replaced by popular sovereignty in the fourth and most democratic grade of democratic *politeiai*.[126] Aristotle also discusses (iv) the *form of appointment* for lower or higher offices. In some democracies, in principle, each and every citizen is directly involved in decision making. In contrast, the goal for *most* democracies is that each and every citizen be involved with decision making; but not directly or, at very least, not at the same time.[127] So citizens must rotate these offices among them so that each citizen eventually has a chance to serve in office. Citizens might also select appropriate representatives to hold higher offices and/or serve on assembly committees. Such committees spare the assembly, as a whole, from having to consider the details of every matter in its jurisdiction. The presence of property qualifications and the rule of law are more characteristic of oligarchies, whereas the principle of all citizens participating in rule either directly or indirectly is more characteristic of democracy.[128] Each of these structural features can be accentuated, deemphasized or supplemented so as to make that particular grade of democracy more stable.[129]

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models suggested at 4.10 $1297^{a}14$-4.12 $1299^{a}2$, 6.3 $1319^{b}33$-6.3 $1320^{b}17$ and 6.4 $1321^{a}5$-6.4 $1321^{b}3$.

[121] These features are both structural and material.

[122] *Pol* 4.4 $1291^{b}26$-28.

[123] *Pol* 4.4 $1291^{b}41$-42.

[124] *Pol* 6.4 $1318^{b}9$-$1319^{a}19$, 4.4 $1291^{b}38$-41.

[125] *Pol* 4.4 $1291^{b}42$-$1292^{a}2$.

[126] *Pol* 4.4 $1292^{a}35$

[127] While Aristotle's remedies typically include greater albeit more selective forms of participation, he is also aware of the hazards of such measures. Greater participation among those with problematic views of justice can also inflame *stasis*. See Yack, 1993, 222. But a lack of decisionmaking would have been a more significant trigger of *stasis* than a lack of participation, see Berger, 1992, 57.

[128] *Pol* 4.5 $1294^{b}10$-12; 4.15 $1300^{a}15$-$1300^{b}5$. On the four grades of membership in the regime, see also M. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 13.

[129] On the importance of blending democracy and oligarchy, see *Pol* 5.4 $1319^{b}37$-5.4 $1320^{a}5$;

In the first grade of democracy,[130] offices are held on the basis of property qualifications, but extremely low ones.[131] In this regime the rule of law is sovereign,[132] but it is largely the farmers, and moderately propertied class that become the center of its power.[133] But the potential excesses of the ruling class are minimized by the fact that decision-making must be exceptionally streamlined. Because the way of life in this form of democracy is largely agricultural, there is less time for leisure and less time for assembly meetings.[134]The absence of leisure also places greater weight on the rule of law as the basis for decision making in the regime.[135] The considerable commitments that its citizens have for maintaining their land, households and livelihood lead them to streamline what work they must do as citizens of the regime.[136] Their way of life is such that there will be less opportunity for innovation and revision in the regime structure.

Aristotle considers this the most stable form of democracy because it is already a sturdy mixture of democracy with oligarchy.[137] Some of these oligarchic features can be further accentuated by adjusting its basis for the distribution of gain and honor, so that the regime becomes more stable.[138]

One oligarchic aspect of the regime is its process for office appointment.[139] Since appointment to higher offices requires a moderate property qualification, the higher offices will be shared, in oligarchic fashion, by those who hold property rather than by a popular representative. This oligarchic feature of democracy incorporates a more oligarchic standard for honor distribution into the regime.[140] Moreover, the terms of the higher offices can be lengthened in order to honor more highly those with suitable property levels. Similarly, the terms of the lower offices can be shortened so that those holding them will receive less honor and thereby compounding, by comparison, the honor for the higher offices. Those who hold the lower offices are closer to the people and are less concerned than the oligarchs are with honor than gain.

5.12 $1316^{b}40$-$1316^{a}4$.

[130] *Pol* 4.4 $1291^{b}31$-$1292^{a}1$; 4.5 $1292^{b}22$-37.

[131] *Pol* 4,4 $1291^{b}40$.

[132] *Pol* 4.4 $1291^{b}32$-37.

[133] *Pol* 4.4 $1292^{b}26$; $1318^{b}7$-10.

[134] *Pol* 4.4 $1292^{b}27$-28. Aristotle considers agrarian democracy a smaller and so more participatory variation of democracy. Some maintain that Athens had some elements of rural democracy, see Yack, 1993, 75; Osbourne, *Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985), 71-72.

[135] *Pol* 4.4 $1292^{b}29$-30.

[136] *Pol* 5.5 $1320^{a}22$-27.

[137] *Pol* 6.4 $1318^{b}8$-10.

[138] *Pol* 6.4 $1319^{b}37$-$1320^{a}5$.

[139] *Pol* 6.4 $1317^{b}20$-22; 6.7 $1321^{a}26$-27.

[140] The regime mixing that Aristotle proposes in his discussion of the remedies to faction don't aim to make a city half democratic and half oligarchic. It is always primarily one regime form or another, see Yack 1993, 235; Kraut, 2002, 370.

Remedial Principles for Stabilization and their Application Context

Remedial Principles		**Context for Application of Remedies**
Gain Distribution	**Honor Distribution**	**Unblended Regime**
1. Not depriving people of gain (General) 2. Not transferring gain to wealthy 3. Distributing gain to people	1. Adjusting of office terms 2. Role of Rule of Law 3. Avoiding dishonor to certain groups 4. Avoiding factors that distort honor	Grade 1: Democracy 1. Office held based on low property qualifications 2. Rule of Law
		Grade 2: Democracy 1. Most citizens hold office, except those of questionable status 2. Rule of Law
		Grade 3: Democracy 1. All citizens can hold office 2. Rule of Law
		Grade 4: Democracy 1. All citizens can hold office 2. Rule of People
		Grade 1: Oligarchy 1. Offices held by moderately high property assessment 2. Rule of Law
		Grade 2: Oligarchy 1. Offices held by very high property assessment 2. Rule of Law
		Grade 3: Oligarchy 1. Highest of offices transferred by hereditary system 2. Rule of Law.
		Grade 4: Oligarchy 1. All offices transferred by hereditary system. 2. Rule of landed dynasty

Figure 7: Remedial Principles for Stabilization and their Application Context

In the second grade of democracy,[141] there are no property qualifications for holding office. But the regime will exclude some citizens from holding office due to other objections.[142] There is some portion of the citizenry that come from what would be thought of as an especially low family lineage. Some portion of the citizenry might also have a citizenship status that is marred in some other respect. For example, there may be citizens whose status is diminished by factors such as a questionable citizenship status,[143] a lack of education, or a record that indicts his civic spiritedness.[144] The large majority of citizens, however, will be acceptable for selection to higher offices. And this same portion of the citizenry will be entitled to participate in assembly.[145] But this grade of democracy will be like the first grade in the sense that most citizens will not have the time available to be deeply involved in the assembly or other related offices.[146] Unlike the first grade of democracy, though, the way of life for its citizens is not largely agricultural and the scope and activities of the assembly are not streamlined. But most of its citizens simply do not have time to be involved with the range of subjects and deliberations it considers. Of course, the rule of law is sovereign in this regime and so checks the magnitude of change and innovation that might emerge through the initiatives of the people.

This grade of democracy is far more democratic than the first one largely due to its different material conditions.[147] The fact that it is larger,[148] less rural, and less propertied adds more matters for deliberation and a greater impetus to be distracted by it.[149] So any oligarchic centered adjustments in the distribution of honor, in particular, will make it less susceptible to oligarchic dissent.[150] Aristotle suggests that the growing range of subjects for assembly consideration should be handled through committee.[151] Committee members should have the same qualifications as above. They should represent the assembly as committee members and be selected by the assembly. This approach captures the democratic principle that the assembly as a whole should be concerned with all substantive matters that come before it.[152] But since it is not feasible that every assembly member be so engaged, a more select

[141] *Pol* 4.4 1292^{a}1-2; 4.5 1292^{b}35-40.

[142] *Pol* 4.5 1292^{b}36; 4.4 1292^{a}2.

[143] Some of these status indications might include the newness of citizenship, having only one citizen parent, etc.

[144] Some of these factors might include offenses such as slander, theft, assault or failures to perform civic duties such as military service, or jury duty. On this topic, see also *Pol* 6.4 1319^{b}9-14.

[145] *Pol* 4.5 1292^{b}39.

[146] *Pol* 4.5 1292^{b}40.

[147] *Pol* 6.4 1319^{b}20-30.

[148] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{a}14-16.

[149] *Pol* 6.4 1319^{a}26-31.

[150] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{a}5-10; 6.3 1318^{b}30-35; 6.5 1320^{a}22-27.

[151] *Pol* 4.15 1299^{b}3-5, 21-25, 27-31.

[152] *Pol* 6.3 1318^{b}21-25.

group must represent the assembly in this preliminary deliberation.[153] The exclusivity of this selection process also captures some aspects of the oligarchic principle. While the qualifications for selection could be more oligarchic, the terms might be adjusted to honor oligarchs more and/or democrats less. Aristotle also suggests that the terms of an office be staggered so that an opposing section doesn't perceive their rivals to be monopolizing an office.[154] Moreover, the staggering of terms of service on select committees increases the chances that their largely democratic members won't monopolize the honors of the office.[155] These are all ways of accentuating certain oligarchic features of the regime so that the honor denied the oligarch is less provocative.[156]

In the third grade of democracy all citizens are entitled to be selected for offices and to participate in the assembly.[157] This regime is a more democratic democracy, so the portion of citizens that might have been excluded from offices in the second grade of democracy must be included in this grade. Along these lines, all who qualify as citizens, in principle, can be considered for the highest of civic responsibilities. This grade of democracy is larger in size than the former two grades. Moreover, the extreme sections of this grade are much larger in size, proportionately, than in the former grades. These differences are made more noticeable by the fact that the way of life in this regime is largely urban in setting.[158] The structure of this grade of democracy is such that the rule of law is sovereign rather than the people. And, like the previous grades, most citizens don't have the leisure to be deeply involved with governance,[159] though the range of activities through which citizens can exercise self-government is greater than in the previous grades. So long as the growing number of urban poor is occupied adequately and not very attracted to the offices and deliberations of the assembly, it is less likely that the sovereignty of the rule of law will be replaced by the sovereignty of the people. But this change is precisely what has occurred in the fourth grade of democracy.

This grade of democracy can degenerate into the most pure and unstable form of democracy.[160] Unless such a regime achieves a more oligarchic blend of democracy, it is likely to decline.[161] This version of democracy is in great

[153] *Pol* 4.14 1298^{a}28-33; *Pol* 6.3 1318^{b}23-25.

[154] *Pol* 4.12 1299^{b}7-10.

[155] *Pol* 6.2 1317^{b}23-31.

[156] For more on Aristotle's on the general use of weighted voting as a remedy, see Kraut, 2002, 457-458. On the benefit of dual majorities as an institutional check on factional growth, see also Kraut, 2002, 459.

[157] *Pol* 4.4 1292^{a}3-4; 4.6 1293^{a}1-5.

[158] *Pol* 6.4 1319^{a}27-31.

[159] *Pol* 4.6 1293^{a}3.

[160] *Pol* 6.6 1320^{b}32-35.

[161] Aristotle is particularly concerned about faction arising among the urban poor because he works from the assumption that moral virtue requires consistent leisure. So the business of urban democratic settings compounds vices that might already drive the outbreak of *stasis*. See Kraut, 2002, 464.

peril even if it makes adjustments that would make it more oligarchic. For the modifications it would require are increasingly at odds with the current regime and the rule of law – a source of stability that is especially risky to undermine in this grade of democracy.[162] But dangerous conditions sometimes require dangerous measures, and Aristotle contends that avoiding instability is of urgent concern for all states, even tyrannies. The most pressing danger the democratic regime faces is that the oligarchs receive too little honor and, sometimes, outright dishonor. One remedy that Aristotle recommends is that oligarchs be allowed to veto decisions that they object to, but not allowed to ratify decisions that will be put into effect.[163] This extends considerable power and honor to the oligarchs, although it doesn't extend so much power that they can realign the democratic structure of the regime. Of course, the terms of higher – typically democratic – offices can be reduced so that the gap between honors given to democrats and honors given to oligarchs is not as great.[164] In this grade of democracy, it is especially important not to slight those who are ambitious and with great influence over volatile sections of the city. While it is important not to dishonor such individuals, it is dangerous to overcompensate in the distribution of honor or dishonor.[165] For example, punishing the people more than the wealthy can hasten the arrival of a more radical democracy, as much as it might pacify oligarchic sections.[166] Lastly, measures should be considered that make political participation seem not very substantial, interesting or lucrative.[167] Such measures might limit the growth of interest and participation in the assembly and remind people that other occupations will have more positive and significant impacts on their lives as individuals.[168]

In the fourth grade of democracy, all citizens are qualified for all offices and for full participation in the assembly.[169] On the one hand, this is the largest and wealthiest of the grades of democracy.[170] But, on the other hand, the number of people who are both poor and unoccupied is also the greatest. The level of participation of this group in assembly is also the highest of the grades of democracy.[171] While the people are sovereign, rather than the rule of law, the sovereignty of the people amounts to the sovereignty of the urban poor.[172]

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[162] *Pol* 6.4 1319^{b}37-6.5 1320^{a}5.
[163] *Pol* 4.14 1298^{b}38-40.
[164] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{b}27-31; 6.4 1318^{b}30-35.
[165] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{a}14-18.
[166] *Pol* 6.2 1318^{a}19-22.
[167] *Pol* 6.6 1321^{a}32-35. Aristotle was very careful about remedies involving the assembly, as it was an arena with such a visible potential for conflict or its avoidance. On the assembly as a decisive location for *stasis*, see Berger, 1992, 93; Fuks, *The Ancestral Constitution* (London: Routledge 167 Kegan Paul Limited, 1953), 120.
[168] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}34-36.
[169] *Pol* 4.4 1292^{a}4-7; 4.6 1293^{a}4.
[170] *Pol* 4.6 1293^{a}3.
[171] *Pol* 4.6 1293^{a}6-8.
[172] *Pol* 4.6 1293^{a}11.

The poor do not participate in assembly because they have the leisure to, but because they have few opportunities for occupation and their discontent is great. Aristotle treats this regime as the most democratic of regimes, yet the most unstable of democratic regimes. This kind of democracy easily attracts demagogues who quickly consolidate power through the people and can just as easily transform the sovereignty of the people into tyranny.[173]

Four Oligarchies

In Aristotle's treatment of the grades of oligarchy, he similarly discusses how features of the regime such as property qualification, form of sovereignty and form of appointment inform each grade. The range of oligarchies that he surveys begins with the most democratic of oligarchies and ends with the most oligarchic of oligarchies. This is the context for how the application of his remedial principles for the distribution of gain can make a more democratic blend of oligarchy.

In the first grade of oligarchy, most citizens can participate in the assembly, but only those with a moderate level of property qualification can be selected to hold a higher office. Like the first grade of democracy, a high percentage of the citizenry own property; but usually, small amounts of it. The number of citizens that are eligible to hold higher office is fairly high, and the number eligible to participate in assembly is even higher. But not all citizens who own property can hold higher office and not all citizens can participate in assembly. But most citizens do not have the time or need to be greatly involved in self-government. The rule of law is sovereign, not the rule of the oligarchs nor the rule of the people. Moreover, the rule of law is so well established in the ethos of this grade that its citizens are largely inclined to defer to it when possible.

Aristotle maintains that oligarchies require the rule by "some" rather than the rule of "all."[174] But like democracy, there are many ways to involve citizens in rule. Most oligarchies and democracies involve their citizens in rule at some level, but limit them in different ways. Oligarchies limit the participation of some citizens for some offices up front. They impose special qualifications – largely, property qualifications – in order to limit participation, instead of allowing all citizens to rule. Most democracies allow all citizens to rule, in principle, but then must find other ways to limit the scope, time and extent of their rule (e.g. term limits, committee representation, etc.).[175] The oligarchic

[173] Aristotle uses his description of the fourth grades of democracy and oligarchy to mark its most extreme forms, rather than as a grade that can be plausibly blended.

[174] *Pol* 4.15 $1300^{a}15$-$1300^{b}5$.

[175] In democracies, the main means by which it sets limits on participation is through its appointment procedures: shifting citizens in and out of higher offices or assembly committees by means of lot or representation. Oligarchies limit those who may rule through property qualification and then limit those who may rule by procedures along the lines of the former.

emphasis confers greater honor to those oligarchs who hold offices. Along these lines, the glaring problem in democracy – that oligarchs are denied the higher honor that they think they deserve – becomes the central aim of oligarchy. But this contrasting emphasis in oligarchy brings with it the following problem. The people perceive that either they receive too little in the way of gain, or the oligarchs receive too much, or both.[176] While the people can also be provoked by denials of honor and visible marks of dishonor,[177] they are far more gripped by the distribution of gain. The most pressing adjustment for stabilizing an oligarchy concerns the perceived distribution of gain.

The first grade of oligarchy, like the first grade of democracy, is the most stable of oligarchies because it is the most democratic of oligarchies.[178] But while the portion of those citizens who are able to participate in the decision making of this regime is comparable to those in the first grade of democracy, their basis for that participation is quite different. More citizens can participate because more citizens have property.[179] But fewer citizens do in fact participate because they have better things to do.[180] So, strengthening the stability of this regime doesn't necessarily make it a more democratic blend of oligarchy because it is difficult to revise oligarchic principles in that way.[181] After all, incorporating more citizens into the decision making of the regime is still done on oligarchic terms. They are admitted on the basis of some property assessment, although a much lower one.[182] The range of material for deliberation is wider than in any of the other grades of oligarchy, but more limited than the range found in the first grade of democracy. But the higher offices largely shape the agenda for deliberation. The most highly qualified citizens have rotating membership on special committees.

But this grade of oligarchy can still be strengthened by avoiding both the appearance and reality of monetary advantages associated with its higher offices. Even in this regime there are considerable gaps between those at the highest of property assessments that would be entitled to higher offices and those with enough property assessment to participate in lower offices. Most in this regime are more interested in their occupation than in political participation. But, still, those with less can still be enticed to transfer their labors into the assembly, if there is opportunity for gain. So, it is important for this grade to use the rule of law and any other source of authority to prevent the reality and appearance of gain through higher office.[183] The material gap

[176] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}5-11; 5.1 1302^{a}39-1302^{b}3.
[177] The people appreciate monetary punishments given to oligarchs as gratifying, but the oligarchs see them as a dishonor as much as a punishment.
[178] *Pol* 5.3 1320^{b}23-1320^{b}26.
[179] *Pol* 4.6 1320^{b}27-1320^{b}31.
[180] *Pol* 6.3 1318^{a}27-28; 6.3 1318^{b}12-15.
[181] *Pol* 6.4 1319^{b}37-6.5 1320^{a}5.
[182] *Pol* 6.6 1321^{a}26-27.
[183] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{a}22-27.

between those fully within the ruling class and those at its fringes is not so great that it would be useful to allow some opportunities for gain through the lower offices.[184] But Aristotle suggests that the people are more easily inflamed by the oligarchs gaining too much, especially with the appearance of impropriety than by the people receiving too little.[185]

In the second grade of oligarchy,[186] only those of with a certain property qualification are entitled to either participate in assembly or to hold higher office. The prerequisite for holding a higher office is a very high property assessment. While there are still a large number of property owners, there are fewer than in the first grade; and there are far fewer owners with high property qualifications. The range of issues for deliberation is limited and the agenda is entirely shaped by the higher offices. Any materials for committees arise infrequently. So, committee participation is quite limited. Its members are specially selected by those in the highest offices. The oligarchs who have influence in the regime are disproportionately wealthy and powerful. But their influence is moderated in this regime by the rule of law, which remains sovereign.

In this grade of oligarchy instability arises both from the people and rival oligarchs. Sometimes disaffected oligarchs ally with the people to bring about regime change.[187] But this grade of oligarchy leaves the lesser oligarchs and the people increasingly removed from the decision making of the regime. Moreover, the power of this newly disaffected group of oligarchs is consolidated as much through the people as it is through their own resources. Stability requires that the people see more interest in maintaining the regime than replacing it. Aristotle recommends, in some cases, that what involvement and status the people have be enhanced through honor and compensation. For example, the people might receive some standard subsidy for participation on juries.[188] He also suggests that wider access to some lower offices and opportunities for gain through those offices increases their overall commitment to the regime.[189]

In the third grade of oligarchy,[190] only those from the high property qualification are entitled to participate in assembly. The prerequisites for higher offices are so stringent that they no longer include a selection process. These offices are transferred from the highest of notables to their respective sons, when the latter are suitably prepared to exercise that office and the former are prepared to leave that office. The most substantial deliberations for the regime occur among those in the higher offices. The number of property owners of any

[184] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{a}37-1320^{b}7.
[185] *Pol* 6.3 1318^{b}35-6.4 1319^{a}1.
[186] *Pol* 4.6 1293^{a}23-27; 4.5 1292^{b}1-5.
[187] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}22-41.
[188] *Pol* 4.14 1298^{b}17-21.
[189] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{a}18.
[190] *Pol* 4.6 1293^{a}28-4.14 1298^{a}31.

property status is quite small. The number of those property owners who have a high property status is even smaller. These oligarchs control the most valuable property of the regime and can easily block the acquisition of these properties by lesser oligarchs. Similarly, these same oligarchs can thereby keep the higher offices in their own hands. But this grade of oligarchy preserves one of the last remnants of a healthy oligarchy – the rule of law. But, just as too much democracy can cause its own undoing, the oligarchy that is so oligarchic that it dispenses with the rule of law begins to look like more like a dynasty or monarchy than an oligarchy.

At this grade of oligarchy it is almost impossible to cultivate democratic aspects of the regime without triggering a sequence of changes that lead to a democratic revolution.[191] This condition mirrors the risks of the third grade of democracy where trying to moderate such an extreme regime is as dangerous as not trying to moderate it. Aristotle recommends that when the people are as removed from the decision making of the regime as with this grade of oligarchy then it is useful to make significant concessions.[192] The membership of the assembly can be given veto power over important decisions for the regime, but not the power to approve or authorize such decisions. Of course, this is only a significant concession if access to the assembly and other lower offices is widened. This is all the more pressing in the third grade of oligarchy where this kind of participation is even more exclusive than in the former grade. The danger in these measures is that they can reinforce the polarization between more established oligarchs and the people. Even if these measures build a greater basis for negotiation and the recognition of common interest, they also highlight the configuration of that conflict.[193] Moreover, the radical quality of such measures can undercut the credibility of what is also precious for this grade of regime – the rule of law.[194] But when a regime is as extreme as this, the fact that such measures are so necessary for its survival, is, itself, a manifestation of the regime's pathology.

In the fourth grade of oligarchy,[195] all office holders and assembly members are appointed through a hereditary system. A small dynasty of landowners transfer their property, wealth and offices to their children when the time is appropriate. This group is wholly sovereign rather than the rule of law. But because sovereignty is not established through the rule of law, this kind of regime is easily replaced by tyranny.

[191] *Pol* 6.6 1320^{b}32-35.
[192] *Pol* 4.14 1298^{a}28; 6.7 1321^{a}26-27.
[193] *Pol* 5.6 1306^{a}20-1306^{a}29.
[194] *Pol* 6.5 1320^{a}5-1320^{a}20.
[195] *Pol* 4.5 1292^{b}7-10; 4.6 1293^{a}31-34.

Remedial Principles, Applied, and Resulting Regime Context

Remedial Principles		**Context for Application of Remedies**			**Regime Result**
Gain Distribution	**Honor Distribution**	**Unblended Regime**	**Structural Alteration (Pre-Remedial)**	**Material Alteration (PreRemedial)**	**More Stable Regime Blend**
1. Not depriving people of gain (General)	1. Adjusting of office terms	Grade 1: Democracy 1.Office held based on low property qualification 2. Rule of Law	1.Rotation of offices (non-assembly) 2. Decision-making streamlined	1. Largely agrarian setting 2. Absence of leisure. 3. Resistance to innovation 4. Large numbers of property owners	Grade 1: Most Oligarchic Democ. 1. Terms of higher office lengthened 2. Terms of lower offices shortened 3. Higher offices held by higher property qualifications
2. Not-transferring gain to wealthy	2. Role of Rule of Law	Grade 2: Democracy 1.Most citizens hold office, except those of questionable status 2. Rule of Law	1. Rotation of offices (non-assembly) but more committee representation 2. Decision-making less streamlined	1. Setting less agrarian 2. Little leisure 3. Greater interest in innovation 4. Fewer prop. owners, larger estates	Grade 2: More Oligarchic Democ. 1. Terms of higher office lengthened 2. Terms of lower office shortened and staggered 3. High property qualifications for committee representation
3. Distributing gain to people	3. Avoiding dishonor to certain groups	Grade 3: Democracy 1. All citizens can hold office 2. Rule of Law	1. Less office rotation and much more committee representation. 2. Much more material for deliberation	1. Largely urban setting 2. Little leisure outside city, much leisure within city due to unemployment 3. Larger population size 4. Few property owners, very large estates	Grade 3: Less Oligarchic Democ. 1. Veto power for oligarchs, but not ratification power. 2. Terms of higher office shortened 3. Terms of lower offices lengthened 4. Not dishonor the ambitious (proto-demagogues) 5. No gain distribution for assembly or juries.
	4. Avoiding factors that distort honor	Grade 4: Democracy 1.All citizens can hold office 2. Rule of people			

1. Not depriving people of gain (General) 2. Not-transferring gain to wealthy 3. Distributing gain to people	1. Adjusting of office terms 2. Role of Rule of Law 3. Avoiding dishonor to certain groups 4. Avoiding factors that distort honor	Grade 1: Oligarchy 1. Offices held by moderately high property assessment 2. Rule of Law	1. Matters for deliberation limited 2. Most deliberation influenced by higher offices (along lines of προβούλευσις).	1. Many property owners, but small estates. 2. Property owners are moderately busy, not much time for participation	Grade 1: Most Democ. Oligarchy 1. Lower property qualification for office. 2. Stronger measures against gain through offices for notables.
		Grade 2: Oligarchy 1. Offices held by very high property asssessment 2. Rule of Law	1. Matters for deliberation limited 2. Deliberation controlled by high offices.	1. Fewer prop. owners, larger estates 2. Larger prop. owners busy, smaller assessments and those without prop. less occupied	Grade 2: More Democ. Oligarchy 1. Lower property qualifications 2. Subsidies for jury participation. 3. Limited incentives for office gain (based on need, 1320a39).
		Grade 3: Oligarchy 1. Highest of offices transferred by hereditary system 2. Rule of Law	1. Matters for deliberation Limited 2. Most deliberation occurs within higher offices.	1. Greater consolidation among property owners, very large estates 2. Smaller properties acquired by larger estates 3. Those with smaller properties and those without property are less occupied	Grade 3: Less Democ. Oligarchy 1. Lower property qualifications 2. Veto power for people, but not ratification power. 3. Subsidies for jury participation. 4. Wider opportunities for office gain (non-legislative, 1320[a]39).
		Grade 4: Oligarchy 1. All offices transferred by heredit. system. 2. Rule of landed dynasty			

Figure 8: Remedial Principles, their Application and the Resulting Regime Context

V. Conclusion

Aristotle's guidelines for the stabilization of deviant regimes provide an illuminating glimpse into his overall approach to *stasis*. He discusses a basis for selectively distributing gain and honor, not because justice requires it, but because stability does. But these remedial principles are only as helpful as an understanding of the regime type that must be stabilized. Aristotle offers an outline of the broad emphases of each grade of democracy and oligarchy, before considering the nature of the structural and material changes regimes always undergo. An understanding of these changes is important to keep in view when considering how his remedial principles would cultivate the most stabilizing regime blending. He suggests that, eventually, most oligarchies become more exclusively oligarchic and most democracies become more democratic. Even the most oligarchic democracies tend to become more radically democratic over time. So, Aristotle offers a model for how such remedial principles would blend each regime grade by accentuating dimensions of the regime that are in the process of fading away. For example, certain oligarchic dimensions within democratic regimes can be highlighted in order to counteract those tendencies in democracy that lead to its own undoing.

Aristotle's approach for stabilizing deviant regimes concedes both the fact that bad character causes *stasis* and bad character is widespread. He provides an investigation of what principles are appropriate for a properly proportioned expansion of the middle class by first explaining the parts of the city that form the backdrop of this expansion. He offers a similar kind of discussion about how the principles for the distribution of gain and honor can best reduce the conditions of factional conflict. He does this by explaining how they best fit with the particular blend of regime that each grade requires for its own stability.

While all of these remedies reduce the incidence of factional conflict without improving character, none of these remedies reduce the ultimate causes of factional conflict. But this is not to say that Aristotle's remedies don't also illuminate the character dimensions of the problem. Let us next consider what else these remedies reveal about this dimension of the problem and what guidance such insights might offer for limiting *stasis*.

5. A MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STASIS

The preceding chapter discussed Aristotle's remedies for *stasis*. Of course, the benefit of a remedy is always limited, if it only treats the symptoms rather than the causes of a problem. But *stasis* is such an intractable political pathology that removing – even trying to remove – its root causes either magnifies the problem or creates new ones.[1] But a better understanding of the causes of a disease always yields better remedies for it, even if it never yields a cure. For this reason, it is possible to understand more about the scope and complexity of *stasis* by reconsidering how and why these remedies may avert the outbreak of *stasis*. And this, in turn, can help us appreciate the remedies better,[2] especially by making their character dimensions more explicit.

Many of Aristotle's remedies discussed in the previous chapter avoid the circumstances in which *stasis* arises. But these remedies can and should be scrutinized in the backdrop of the *stasis* scenarios that they are designed to avoid. In doing so, it becomes clear that avoiding the circumstances under which *stasis* arises, also requires an understanding of the character states that drive it. And while envy and vanity are the vices that drive it, other vices make those circumstances more likely or even accelerate the *stasis* process without being its central causes. This chapter first presents three representative scenarios for *stasis* in oligarchy and democracy. It then identifies and discusses the vices that drive *stasis*, followed by a detailed ranking of them.

I. Stasis Scenarios in Oligarchy and Democracy

Aristotle treats the regime context as indispensable for illuminating the pattern of political degeneration that occurs in *stasis*. It is common for oligarchies to degenerate and be replaced by democracy, though democracies may also

[1] *Pol* 2.1 1260^{a}27- 2.5 1264^{b}25. On the importance of diminishing faction for the preservation of stability, see Kraut, 2002, 433.

[2] As an analogy, consider Plato's use of the city in books two and three of *Republic* as a macrocosm of the soul, in order to understand better the nature of the soul in books four and beyond. In turn, this richer understanding of the soul enables him to analyze the character dimension of political decline in books eight and nine.

be replaced by oligarchy when they decline.[3] This problem is fundamentally a struggle between the people and the oligarchs, and it can begin in either of two ways. In one case the conflict is largely between the oligarchs and the people. In the other case, the conflict appears to be between the people and the oligarchs, but is more centrally a conflict between two rival groups of oligarchs.

Stasis in Oligarchy

Scenario A: Oligarchy (*Pol* 5.6 $1305^{a}35$-$1305^{b}21$). Oligarchs treat the people "unjustly," thereby unleashing in the people a widespread response which can be championed by democratic leaders or oligarchic opportunists. "Oligarchies undergo revolution principally through two ways that are the most obvious. One is if they treat the multitude unjustly; for anybody makes an adequate people's champion, and especially so when their leader comes from the oligarchy itself."[4] At this point, the regime can breakdown in three ways. First, there might be a straightforward revolt of the people against the upper oligarchs, as occurred at Erythrae.[5] Second, a popular revolt[6] may be lead by a disaffected oligarch, such as occurred in the case Lygdamis at Naxos[7] and at Cnidus.[8] Third, a popular revolt may only later emerge when divisions among the oligarchic classes weaken the regime enough for the people[9] to

[3] See Loraux, 1991, 40, who argues that *stasis* tends to breed conflict between two central groups in a rgime. Even when there are various groups with varied interests and levels of support or enmity to the regime, eventually *stasis*, so long as it continues, polarizes those groups.

[4] *Pol* 5.5 $1305^{a}36$-38.

[5] Aristotle identifies this particular breakdown scenario as the most straightforward of them. That is, no outside leader whether of the oligarchic, foreign, or demagogic variety, mobilizes the revolt. The people are already ready and able to revolt; and they do so. Aristotle treats the example from Erythrae ($1305^{b}18$-22) as characteristic of this scenario. This Ionian city, located on the coast of Asia Minor near the island of Chios, was a long entrenched oligarchy that he refers to as being of the Basilidaie (Τῶν Βασιλιδῶν). See also Keyt, 1999, 106.

[6] Aristotle also suggests that the conditions for a breakdown scenario of this sort were present at Marseilles, Istrus and Heraclea ($1305^{b}5$) though each of these cases led to different results.

[7] Aristotle traces the first popular *stasis* at Naxos, a dispute between wealthy Naxians and a citizen named Telestagoras. At a later stage of the *stasis*, Lygdamis lead the revolt of the demos against the oligarch and (initially) established a democracy. He latter became tyrant of Naxos through the help of Peisistratus. See also, Moore, *Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 229 and Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902), 346.

[8] Although Aristotle uses Cnidus as an example in reference to the third kind of popular revolt, he does indicate that a notable championed the cause of the people ($1305^{b}17$-18). See also, Keyt, 1999, 108 and Neman, 1902, 349.

[9] While this kind of breakdown scenario is similar to some aspects of scenario B, it is not fundamentally a struggle between oligarchs, but rather a struggle between oligarchs and

seize control.[10] In these scenarios, the vanity of the oligarchs motivates acts of "injustice" towards the people. The people, whose background disposition of envy continually sets their sites on the honors and (especially) the gain they lack, are easily energized into common cause against them.

Scenario B: Oligarchy (*Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}21- *Pol* 5.5 1306^{b}20). In this scenario, the vanity of rival oligarchs motivates both their escalating demand for the higher honors of higher offices and their sensitivity to the dishonoring harassment so common among them. As the conflict ensues, the lesser oligarchs rally for greater power by winning popularity with those that can help them – either other oligarchs or the people. In one case, the lesser oligarchs flatter a wider base of oligarchs in order to gain preeminence over the more distinguished oligarchs.[11] While Aristotle initially treats their growing appeal as oligarchic in character, it eventually extends to the people at large and becomes more demagogic in character.

> On the other hand, oligarchies are overthrown from within themselves both when from motives of rivalry they play the demagogue (and this demagogy is of two sorts, one among the oligarchs themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them even if they are a very small body, – as for example in the time of the Thirty at Athens, the party of Charicles rose to power by seeking popularity with the Thirty, and in the time of the Four Hundred the party of Phrynichus rose in the same way.[12]

He cites the examples of Charicles and the Thirty,[13] as well as Phrynichus

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democrats that has as its starting point a convenient dispute between oligarchs. The latter might be rectified easily, whereas the former conflict is more intractable. On its starting point as an honor dispute among higher and lower oligarchs, see 1305^{b}3-6. Aristotle highlights such as case is Istrus, where it was replaced with a democracy. Along these lines, he also cites Cnidus to illustrate other features of the scenario. He sees the revolution at Cnidus, a city in the southwest corner of Asia Minor, as an example of how the people might seize a city in the midst of oligarchic tensions (1305^{b}17). See also Keyt, 1999, 108 and Newman, 1902, 349.

[10] Aristotle also cites cases where the people seize control through the use of military forces that join the cause of the people, as was the case with the Guards at Larisa (1306^{a}31) and at Abydos (1306^{a}32). Larissa was the main city of Thessaly. While the full scope of duties exercised by the Guards of Larissa (οἱ πολιτοφύλακες) is not documented, it is clear that they were a high level internal police force that also served a political function. Newman also suggests that they were elected by the people at large. See Neman, 1902, 351 and Keyt, 1999, 109-110.

[11] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}26, 29, 35.

[12] [κινοῦνται δ' αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων 'ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις–ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγοι ὦσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα ἴσχυσαν τοὺς Τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον] (*Pol* 1305^{b}22-27)].

[13] At the close of the Pelopennesian war (404B.C.) the Spartans imposed oligarchic government on Athens. The group of thirty oligarchs that took power ('The Thirty') fell into demagoguery soon after. Aristotle attributes this change to the influence of Charicles, though Xenophon attributes it to Critias (See Keyt, 1999, 109). On the tyrannical

and the Four Hundred[14] as representative examples of this change, because in both settings demagoguery arises from small factions within a small oligarchic ruling class. In another case, the lesser oligarchs flatter the people[15] in order to draw from their power and gain preeminence over the whole regime.

> ...and this demagogy is of two sorts, one among the oligarchs themselves...the other when the members of the oligarchy seek popularity with the mob as the Guards at Larisa courted popularity with the mob because it elected them...and in all the oligarchies in which the magistracies are not elected by the class from which the magistracies come...and in places where the jury-courts are not made up from the government...and when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy to a smaller number, for those who seek equality are forced to bring in the people as a helper....[16]

Aristotle treats this direct appeal to the people as the most frequent manifestation of this scenario. He cites numerous examples of it in addition to that of the Guards of Larisa,[17] including the cases of Heraclea on the Euxine,[18]

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trajectory of this change, see Neman, 1902, 350.

[14] The Four Hundred held power for close to half of the year 411 B.C. The fear of revolution split them into two factions. The demagogues, lead by Phrynichus, were desperate to maintain power against anti-oligarchic forces. So, he Phrnichus recognized an urgent need to bolster the oligarchic regime precisely by drawing from the power of the people. But eventually he was assassinated and the oligarchy fell. (See Keyt, 1999, 100 and Moore, 1975, 256). Newman also suggests that Aristotle overstated the role of Phyrnichus and understated the role of Theramenes because of his own ties with Theramenes. See, Neman, 1902, 351.

[15] Aristotle suggests that the people's envy for the oligarchs makes them more easily flattered by some oligarchs.

[16] [κινοῦνται δ΄ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων 'ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις–ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγοι ὦσιν – ἡ δ΄ ὅταν τὸν ὄχλον δημαγωγῶσιν οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὄντες, οἷον ἐν Λαρίσῃ οἱ πολιτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς τὸν ὄχλον ἐδημαγώγουν, καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ΄ αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσὶ;...καὶ ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματός ἐστι...ἔτι δ΄ ὅταν ἔνιοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἕλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν: οἱ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες ἀναγκάζονται βοηθὸν ἐπαγαγέσθαι τὸν δῆμον'...] (*Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}22-25, 29-32,36-37, 39-41).

[17] Aristotle chiefly refers to the Guards of Larisa to show how easily those of oligarchic status can be drawn into the aims of the people by currying favor with them. Neman (1902, 351) emphasizes how vulnerable the Guards were to the shifts in public opinion due to the fact that the people at large elected them. While only those of a high property assessment could be elected as Guards, they were still overwhelmingly subject to popular forces.

[18] Heraclea (Pontic Heraclea) was founded in 559 B.C. by Megara on the shores of the Euxine (Black) Sea, which is present-day northern Turkey. Aristotle refers (*Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}33) to an oligarchic regime in Heraclea that excluded those who were eligible for office from participation in the jury courts (τὰ δικαστήρια). If Aristotle is correct about this feature of its judicial system, then the jury courts would have been filled largely by the people; a very unoligarchic feature. However, this aspect of the regime adds further incentive for the oligarchs to court favor with the people, especially in a setting where the court system allows the people to impose the harshest of penalties. See also, Neman

Cleotimus of Amphipolis,[19] as well as at Abydos[20] and Apollonia.[21] In each of these cases, the oligarch's deepening reliance on the people committed them to the aims of the people and lead to a popular revolution.

Stasis in Democracy

Scenario C: Democracy (*Pol* 5.6 1304^{b}19-1305^{a}35). Democratic regimes often generate factions that lead to oligarchic revolutions. In such cases, the popular leaders, envying the material goods and honor of the oligarchs, aim to implement large-scale confiscations.[22] The demagogues reassure the people, who also envy the oligarchs, that their cause is the people's cause by attacking the oligarchs and, thereby, rallying their support.

> In democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the insolence of the demagogues; for they cause the property owners to join together, partly by malicious persecutions of those among them (for common fear brings together the greatest of enemies), and partly by setting the common people against them as a class.[23]

(1902, 353-354) who claims, contra Aristotle, that the jury courts included those eligible for office; but also included the larger portion of the population who were not eligible for office. In Newman's account the composition of the jury court was still drawn largely from the people, though, not entirely so. See Keyt, 1999, 109 and Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 295.

[19] Aristotle also refers to an especially destructive variation of this scenario that occurred at Amphipolis and Apollonia (*Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}39-1306^{a}10). In this case, the oligarchic appeal to the people is driven by some form of financial impropriety. The guilty parties might appeal to the people to trigger a shift in power. They hope to engineer a shift of oligarchic power that positions them more favorably for the backlash that will occur when their impropriety is exposed. Amphipolis was an ancient city of Macedonia located on the east bank of the river Strymon. It was originally colonized by Athens in 438 B.C. According to Neman (1902, 356), Cleotimus was a wealthy individual in the city who squandered his fortune and sought to shield himself from his subsequent financial improprieties by changing the power base of the regime. So he stirred up settlers from Chalcis (a city north of Athens, on the island of Euboea), drawing from their power to gain preeminence over rival oligarchs. See also Keyt, 1999, 110.

[20] Abydos was the ancient town of Phrygia, located on the eastern side of the Hellespont opposite in present-day Turkey. It was originally colonized by the Milesians in 678 B.C. Aristotle cites Abydos (1305^{b}33) as an oligarchy that was vulnerable to demagoguery. Some of its offices required both high property qualifications and election by the people. Aristotle suggests that this feature of the regime required these oligarchs to more broadly appeal to the people and gave the people a power that could easily co-opt its oligarchic base and cause its downfall as an oligarchy. See Neman, 1902, 352 and Keyt, 1999, 110.

[21] The ancient city of Apollonia (also located on the Euxine) suffered *stasis* under conditions similar to those in Amphipolis. The main difference with the case in Amphipolis is that one group of oligarchs – the rivals of the oligarchs that had plundered public funds – tried to turn the people against the guilty oligarchs before the latter managed to set the people against them (i.e. the rivals from the first group). See Neman, 1902, 357.

[22] *Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}37; 1305^{a}7.

[23] [καθ' ἕκαστον δ' εἶδος πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων μερίζοντας τὰ συμβαίνοντα δεῖ θεωρεῖν. αἱ μὲν

Aristotle highlights numerous cases that fit this pattern of breakdown, including those in Cos,[24] Rhodes,[25] Heraclea[26] and Megara.[27] He also maintains that this attack may be carried out in the form of unjust acts such as misdistribution,[28] slander,[29] expulsion,[30] or through a general posture of viciousness.[31]

οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίᾳ συκοφαντοῦντες τοὺς τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας συστρέφουσιν αὐτούς 'συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς φόβοσ', τὰ δὲ κοινῇ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπάγοντες] (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}19-25).

[24] Cos is an island that is southwest of Asia Minor opposite Halicarnassus. The date of the event that Aristotle refers to is unclear, though it is known that Cos withdrew from the Athenian alliance in 357 B.C. Aristotle claims that the worst of demagogues arose there causing the notables to band together and revolt (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}26-28). See Keyt, 1999, 103 and Neman, 1902, 336.

[25] Rhodes, an island off of present-day southeast Greece, in the Aegean Sea near southwest Turkey. It was colonized by Dorians from Argos before 1000 B.C. and had close cultural ties with Crete. The ancient city of Rhodes, on the northeast end of the island near the present-day city of Rhodes, was founded c. 408 B.C. from the union of three cities: Ialysus, Lindus and Camirus. In the case Aristotle is referring to (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}28-31), the demagogues needed to sustain their support of the people by subsidizing their participation in assembly and jury courts. But some of the resources for those payments could only be gained by denying payments for the production of naval vessels. This provoked an uprising of commanders and other oligarchs against the democracy. See Keyt, 1999, 81-82, 103 and Neman, 1902, 336.

[26] Aristotle's discussion of Heraclea is a reference to the same city from the previous note (Pontic Heraclea), though it is a different scenario. The political breakdown follows the above mentioned pattern except that the unjust treatment of the notables lead to their exile. Later, they returned and replaced the regime (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}31-34). See Keyt, 1999, 103 and Neman, 1902, 337.

[27] In the case of Megara, unlike that of Heraclea, the demagogues confiscated the property of the notables before they were exiled (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}35-39). But the revolution in Megara followed the pattern in Heraclea in every other respect. See Keyt, 1999, 83, 103 and Neman, 1902 , 338.

[28] *Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}28; 5.5 1305^{a}4; 5.5 1304^{b}22; 1305^{b}33.

[29] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{a}5. Aristotle cites the case of Dionysius, who slandered Daphneus and other notables in order to gain credibility with the people and, ultimately, to gain power through them (*Pol* 5.5 1305^{a}26-28). Dionysius I gained power in 406-405 B.C. in the midst of an invasion of Sicily. He continued to gain power in Syracuse in standard demagogic ways, though Aristotle highlights his slander of Daphneus. Daphneus was a Syracusan general who Dionysius falsely accused before the assembly. He was then dismissed and, later, executed, when Dionysius further consolidated his military power. See Keyt, 1999, 105 and Neman, 1902, 342.

[30] Aristotle claims that such occurrences were widespread (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{a}4), though he highlights the case of Thrasymachus in Cyme (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{a}1-3), as well as those at Megara and Heraclea. (In reference to the two latter cases, see earlier note).

[31] Aristotle consistently emphasizes this quality in reference to the demagogues. He refers to their malice (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}24) evils (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}27), insolence (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}22) and injustice (*Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}32; 5.5 1305^{a}4). He cites the example of Theaganes who frivolously slaughtered the cattle of the notables in Megara (*Pol* 5.5 1305^{a}24-26) and the hostile pledges of Pisistratus. Aristotle discusses how Pisistratus built the trust of the people through his strident vows to undermine the wealthy and their power (*Pol* 5.5 1305^{a}23-24). See Keyt, 1999, 105 and Neman, 1902, 342. These occurrences are quite typical in Tyrannies where new popular leaders might instigate violence against ordinary citizens in order to blame it on a the tyrant they want to remove. See also, Berger, 1992, 59.

> Sometimes they make the notables combine by wronging them in order to win favor, causing either their estates to be divided up or their revenues by imposing public services, and sometimes by slandering them that they may confiscate the property of the wealthy.[32]

The oligarchs, fearful for their own futures,[33] find common cause with one another and engage in civil conflict.[34]

II. The Vices that Drive Stasis

Aristotle maintains that bad character drives *stasis*.[35] While envy and vanity are the central causes, other vices also influence the *stasis* process at different phases and to varying degrees. Moreover, they also impact the formation of envy, vanity and other *stasis*-related dispositions.[36] This section characterizes each vice and its possessors and considers them with special reference to their impact by regime, breakdown scenario and social group. These vices include: overambition (φιλοτιμία), flattery (κόλαξ), cowardice (ἡ δειλία), rashness (ἡ θρασύτης), irascibility (ὀργιλότης), intemperance (ἀσοφροσύνη), wastefulness (ἀσωτία) and stinginess (ἀνελευθερία).

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[32] [ὁτὲ μὲν γάρ, ἵνα χαρίζωνται, ἀδικοῦντες τοὺς γνωρίμους συνιστᾶσιν, ἢ τὰς οὐσίας ἀναδάστους ποιοῦντες ἢ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὁτὲ δὲ διαβάλλοντες, ἵν' ἔχωσι δημεύειν τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλουσίων](*Pol* 5.5 1305^{a}5-8).

[33] *Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}22

[34] *Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}30;5.5 1304^{b}34-35; 5.5 1304^{b}38.

[35] The particular virtues and vices that Aristotle treats in his ethical theory play an important role in that theory. The unifying quality particular virtues on the agent possessing them and the disunifying impacts of particular vices suggests that character states outlined in his theory are critical ingredients for flourishing or failure in the political community. See Martha C. Nussbaum, "Non-relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach," in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 23, eds. Peter A. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 32-53.

[36] This chapter does not make a claim about the unity of virtue, as such (i.e. that having some of the moral virtues require having all the other moral virtues, though practical wisdom is necessary). But this chapter does assume a modest version of the disunity of vice. To have one vice doesn't mean that one must at one time or inevitably have all the other vices. The latter section considers various cases where agents have vices that promote *stasis* less, while avoiding vices more strongly associated with *stasis*. See also, Neera K. Badhwar, "The Limited Unity of Virtue," *Noûs* 30, no. 3 (1996): 306-329. Moreover , a distinction can be made between how virtue tends to promote internal unity and the possession of all the virtues. A virtue may tend to promote internal unity by unifying one's desires in a certain sphere (e.g. with respect to danger) and making one more receptive to the development of other virtues. One can gain greater unity of desire and affect across some spheres and be increasingly receptive to virtue in other spheres without already having all of the virtues. See also Kraut (2002, 470), who argues that the range and magnitude of vice in particular agents with some vices is open ended.

Overambition

Overambition (φιλοτιμία) and underambition (ἀφιλοτίμια) are the vicious extremes that the virtuous disposition of ambition falls between.[37] Overambition is the disposition of excess where the person is overaffected by an emotion associated with the gain of honor and desires to receive more honor than he should.[38] The form of honor that Aristotle emphasizes in this context includes projects and responsibilities that enable one to exercise leadership well, especially through political, military or civic office.[39] The overambitious person desires to assume more responsibilities than his abilities can accommodate because he habitually desires to have more honor than he deserves. As a result, he grasps after opportunities to climb to higher levels of distinction than his talents can sustain.[40]

Stasis Scenario A, Oligarchy

This scenario in oligarchy is vulnerable to the overambition of demagogues and disenfranchised oligarchs. Any promising leader among the people who has been done an "injustice" by the oligarchic class has been dishonored.[41] But the magnitude of this dishonor is limited by their still common status in the group.[42] Since their honor has not been specifically slighted, their ambition has not yet been challenged. But they may take this occasion to seek popular support, their ambition having become more acute. Their ambition poses a less dramatic risk for the regime, but still a formidable one.

Stasis Scenario B, Oligarchy

Overambition is a dangerous vice for these regimes, since it need not be held in wide supply to promote *stasis*. For, even a few ambitious persons can accelerate the *stasis* process in a regime.[43] The overambitious are dangerous when they are in a position to vie for the support of the people. Typically, it is the overambition of the demagogues or lesser oligarchs that pose the greatest risks. The oligarchy of the scenario B is most vulnerable to this, as the future of aspiring demagogues and lesser oligarchs rests on their popular appeal.[44] Their overambition manifests itself in their expected success with

[37] *EN* 4.4 1125^{b}10-12.
[38] *EN* 4.4 1125^{b}8-11,17.
[39] *Pol* 6.4 1318^{b}20-25; 5.8 1308^{b}4-13.
[40] *EN* 4.4 1125^{b}9-10.
[41] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}36-38.
[42] *Pol* 6.6 1306^{a}31-32.
[43] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{a}6.
[44] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}22-27.

the people. This expectation makes them dangerous in an oligarchic regime.[45] But measures that would most greatly hinder their rise would dishonor them enough to make them even more dangerous.[46] For, the most ambitious ones are the most slighted by such dishonors.[47] Their concern to appear honorable drives them to great lengths to vindicate it.[48] So, the overambitious are problematic for oligarchy when they are not hindered, and even more of a problem when they are hindered.

Stasis Scenario C, Democracy

Democracy is also vulnerable to the overambition of demagogues. It is the desire for greater honor and power over the people that drives them to be vicious to the oligarchs. This is the worst grade of overambition because it is so difficult to satiate. Aristotle presents the viciousness of the overambitious as at its peak when they are quite powerful but not as powerful as they could be. They are then at their most vicious because their desire for power is greatest and their resources for accomplishing it are at their height.

Flattery

Flattery (κόλαξ) is the vicious disposition concerning social affability, especially with respect to conversation and dealings in common life.[49] Flattery is a special case of the vicious extreme of complaisance (ἄρεσκος)[50] which opposes[51] the mean disposition of friendliness (φιλία)[52] and the other extreme of quarrelsomeness (δύρεσις).[53] The virtue of friendliness enables its possessor to regard others with the approval, indifference or opprobrium that is appropriate to the situation.[54] While the associations in which friendliness exhibits this regard do not rise to the level of friendship, they do share some features

[45] *Pol* 5.11 1315^{a}25-30.
[46] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{a}4-13.
[47] *Pol* 5.11 1315^{a}13-18; 5.8 1308^{a}4-13.
[48] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{a}21-39.
[49] *EN* 4.6 1126^{b}11; 1127^{b}8.
[50] *EN* 4.6 1127^{a} 8-9; *EN* 2.7 1108^{a}29.
[51] Of course, Aristotle also suggests that the extremes can, together, oppose the mean (*EN* 2.8 1108^{b}20-26). Still, Aristotle concludes that the each extreme opposes both the mean and the other extreme – albeit in different ways (*EN* 2.8 1108^{b}26-30).
[52] Friendliness is a standard, but misleading rendering of φιλία. Friendliness, in this context, is not being enthusiastic or outgoing. Aristotle has in mind some lower form of friendship where the full conditions for its better forms have not been met. This association is a stand-in for the better friendships when the time, permanency and scope of the good shared is attenuated (*EN* 4.6 1226^{b}20-26).
[53] *EN* 2.7 1108^{a}25-28; *EN* 4.6 1126^{b}17.
[54] *EN* 4.6 1126^{b}18-20; *EN* 4.6 1126^{b}28-37.

of friendship.[55] The best forms of friendship occur between two individuals that are each grounded in self-love and wish the good for the other.[56] Such friendships occur between those who know one another well, share a correct view of the good, and are cultivated through time, close proximity and experience.[57] They also mutually reciprocate affection.[58] The associations in which friendliness is exhibited are less substantial and less permanent,[59] though they capture some measure of the affection and well wishing that is found in friendship.[60] The complaisant individual is too deferent and accommodating towards these associates, whereas the quarrelsome one is too censorious and difficult with them.[61] Flattery is a vice that opposes friendliness, not so much through accommodation and deference to those who don't deserve it, but rather through a self serving gratification of anyone liable to help or harm one.[62] Aristotle treats flattery as a more active and self-serving case of complaisance. It is especially destructive because it undermines the bonds of civility and social affability precisely under the pretense of words and deeds that convey the former.

Stasis Scenario A and B, Oligarchy

While the vice of flattery doesn't enter into the struggle of this scenario A,[63] it is quite relevant to scenario B where a two front power struggle ensues. The lesser oligarchs use flattery to gain in power what they have lost in honor.[64] The democrats' susceptibility to flattery is necessary for the *stasis* scenario since they provide the greatest force to the lesser oligarchs.[65] They flatter whoever they need to win that power, whether oligarchs or people at large. The people turn out to be the most likely group to be flattered.[66] Since they provide the greatest force to the lesser oligarchs, their susceptibility to flattery

[55] *EN* 4.6 1126^{b}21; *EN* 4.6 1126^{b}23-25.
[56] *EN* 8.4 1156^{a}2-5; *EN* 8.4 1156^{a}21-23; *EN* 9.8 1168^{b}4-10; *EN* 8.3 1156^{a}10.
[57] *EN* 9.10 1170^{b}36- 1171^{a}3; *EN* 9.10 1171^{a}17-21; *EN* 8.3 1156^{b}26-31.
[58] *EN* 8.3 1156^{a}10.
[59] *EN* 8.4 1156^{b}33-35; *EN* 8.4 1156^{a}13.
[60] *EN* 8.9 1159^{b}25-29.
[61] *EN* 4.6 1126^{b}18-20; *EN* 4.6 1126^{b}28-37.
[62] *EN* 4.6 1127^{a} 8-9; *EN* 2.7 1108^{a}29.
[63] The starting points of the struggle in this scenario are dramatic and clear-cut. The people perceive considerable injustices on the part of the oligarchs. This prompts the people to retaliate, and inaugurate a cause that any leader – whether oligarch or democrat – could easily direct to victory. The nature of this struggle makes flattery less relevant to it.
[64] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}27-38.
[65] *Pol* 5.11 1313^{b}39-41.
[66] Aristotle indicates that during the time of the Four Hundred the faction associated with Phrynichus rose by courting popularity with the mob (*Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}29). He also suggests that Guards at Larisa pandered to the people to gain power there (*Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}29). See also, *Pol* 5.11 1313^{b}39-41 and 5.10 1312^{b}8-13.

is necessary for the *stasis* scenario. Were they not so disposed, they would be a less attractive ally to the lesser oligarchs and might even pose a threat to them. In actuality, their tendency to be flattered makes them a more prominent threat since their receptivity to the oligarchs offers them the ease and cover to realize the aims of the conflict.[67] Once their alliance is cemented and the options of the lesser oligarchs limited, the people's revolution is assured.

Stasis Scenario C, Democracy

The destabilization of democracy provides the most characteristic setting for the exhibition of flattery.[68] The demagogues and their people are crucially motivated by it, whereas the oligarchs are only incidentally moved by it. The whole power base of the demagogues rests on their ability to flatter the people. The *de facto* aims of the regime – license –[69] strongly disposes the people to a leadership that promises them whatever they seem to want, whether it promotes their long-term preservation or not. As it turns out, the dual dispositions of the democrats – the tendency of its leaders to flatter, and the tendency of the people to be flattered – is destructive of the democracy. For, the demagogues flatter the people by doing injustice to the oligarchs.[70] This assures the people that the demagogues will deliver them what they want[71] – a redistribution of wealth. So, the people give even greater support to the demagogues, sparking a chain reaction that leads to an oligarchic takeover.[72]

[67] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}2-11; 5.11 1313^{b}39-41; 5.1 1314^{a}1-3; 5.1 1315^{a}2-6.
[68] *Pol* 5.11 1313^{b}39-41.
[69] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{b}8-13; *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}25-35.
[70] *Pol* 5.4 1305^{a}3-5.
[71] *Pol* 5.11 1313^{b}33-39.
[72] Aristotle says that the oligarchs, fearful for their own futures, find common cause with one another and engage in civil conflict (*Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}30, 34-35, 38).

Cowardice

Courage (ἡ ἀνδρεία) is the virtuous mean[73] between the vicious extremes of cowardice (ἡ δειλία) and rashness (ἡ θρασύτης).[74] The virtue of courage enables its possessor to be affected appropriately by the emotion of fear (ὁ φόβος) and confidence (τὰ θαρραλέα) and driven by the correct desires in this sphere.[75] Cowardice then is a vice of deficiency that causes one to be controlled by the emotion of fear and to lack the emotion of confidence, especially under conditions of grave danger.[76] Moreover, his deficiency of character is such that he tends to lack the right desires under those same conditions.[77] The

[73] Typically, when Aristotle presents the definition of a virtue he refers to the mean as the state of character that falls between two extreme states. Of course, the mean can also refer to the choice of action that is a mean between two extreme actions (*EN* 2.3 1104^{a}15-17; 2.7 1104^{a}28-30; 2.7 1104^{a}17-20). But those extreme choices of action are the result of the extreme dispositions mentioned above. Keeping in view this qualification, it is helpful to describe the person with a deficient or excessive character state as tending to be deficiently or excessively affected by the emotion relevant to the character state (*EN* 2.6 1106^{b}17-24). For example, the irascible man has a disposition that is a vicious excess and usually leads him to be angered excessively. Of course, this feature of the mean, like the mean choice of action, can only be maintained in a qualified way. The way in which the emotion might be considered excessive – whether too quickly felt, too intensely felt, felt for too long of a duration – is always judged so in reference to other factors (e. g. how one with a mean state of character would be affected, what is called for in the situation, etc., *EN* 2.9 1109^{b}12-16).

[74] *EN* 2.7 1107^{b}1-3; 3.5 1115^{a}6-7.

[75] *EN* 3.6 1115^{b}17-19; 3.6 1116^{a}10-15; 2.7 1117^{a}29-34.

[76] *EN* 3.6 1115^{a}30-3.6 1116^{a}2; 2.7 1107^{b}3-5.

[77] This additional emphasis of the "conditions of danger" in reference to desire is quite appropriate and highlights a different role of the circumstance than in the case of emotion. In order to appreciate that difference it is important to distinguish what one tends to desire and what one tends to desire in circumstance x. First, consider the tendency to desire apart from circumstance x. For Aristotle, a particular character state controls *what* one tends to desire in the sphere relevant to that character state. For example, a courageous person tends to desire the end of being noble and honorable. But the actual desire is only activated under conditions of danger, at which point its coherence and unity is tested. This is somewhat different from one's tendency to be affected well. One can distinguish (1) the fact that Bob has the tendency to be affected appropriately by anger when he is sleeping, running, playing an instrument etc., and (2) the angry affect that occurs in a circumstance where he is slighted. This part of the contrast is similar to the standard contrast between a disposition for desire and an occurrent desire. The part of the contrast that is different is the following. One can be said to have a desire – an occurrent desire, and not just a disposition for it – well before some event or circumstance arises that is associated with it. For example, a great philanthropist may actually desire to give a great gift, before a situation arises where a great may be given. But when a situation arises where a great gift may be given or at least called for, then his desire to give becomes more specifically focused towards its object. (Desire will become even more specifically focused when practical wisdom yields an appropriate action for the agent to intend). A great philanthropist who desires to give – not just one who is disposed to so desire – desires to do so even more when a situation arises where he might give. In contrast, one is not affected by an emotion prior to the circumstance that gives rise to that emotion, though one is so disposed an emotion well before the relevant circumstance arises.

cowardly person tends to act in ways that are inadequate for the situation, whether by doing too little or acting too slowly or not acting at all. For example, a cowardly soldier is so gripped by fear that he wants to protect himself more than he wants to complete the mission or protect his fellow soldiers. In such situations, he selects actions[78] that are not substantial enough to accomplish the mission or he selects actions that are adequate, but executes them too slowly. In other cases, he executes theme quickly enough, but in too feeble of a way to make a difference.

Stasis Scenario A, Oligarchy

Both the fear of the people and of oligarchs play a discernable role in the *stasis* process. The people's fear of the oligarchs, as a whole, is extensive. The people fear their pre-eminence[79] and ruling status.[80] But their most immediate fear is of the injustice that the oligarchs may inflict upon them in the future,[81] as the fear driven by the injustice that has already been inflicted upon them.[82] And the people's fear is not diminished by the resentment they nurture for the oligarchs.[83] This fear is an important factor in their opposition to the oligarchs and, ultimately, to the regime. The oligarchic class, like the people, is motivated by fear and even fear what the people fear – the injustice of the oligarchs. That is, the oligarchs fear the injustice that they have done[84] to the people. And while this fear is less prominent and less tangible than the people's fear, it still plays a noticeable role in the onset of *stasis*. It weakens the oligarchic class by making them more prone to division[85] and thereby vulnerable to the powers of the people.

Stasis Scenario B, Oligarchy

In this scenario, fear plays a greater overall role, since it figures just as strongly in the motivations of the people as in scenario A. It also plays a more significant role in the internal power struggle of the oligarchic class than in scenario A. The starting point of *stasis* occurs when the lesser oligarchs avenge the unfair distributions of offices and dishonoring harassments of the pre-eminent oligarchs. The power struggle that ensues provides a lethal opportunity for the

[78] Of course, the deliberative faculty plays a part here as well (assuming the person will be acting cowardly, not simply due to impulsiveness). This point, however, emphasizes not so much a failure in deliberation, but rather the faulty character state that precedes the deliberation and drives him to select inadequate measures in battle.

[79] *Pol* 5.10 1311^{b}35-40.

[80] *Pol* 5.11 1315^{b}4-7.

[81] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}23-24.

[82] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}21-23.

[83] *Pol* 5.11 1314^{b}18-20.

[84] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}21.

[85] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}22.

people to enter the struggle, decisively affecting both the result of the conflict and the form of the regime. The lesser oligarchs fear the pre-eminence of the more established oligarchs,[86] and so, they quietly[87] counterbalance their power by seeking popularity with the people[88] or even stealing the popular power of the oligarchic class.[89] The more established oligarchs are made fearful by the injustices they have committed[90] and, as a result, are more prone to division. As fear infuses both oligarchic factions, their struggle becomes more polarizing. The fears of the people are the same as in scenario A. So, the people selectively insert themselves into the struggles that divide the oligarchs. The former supply the vital advantage needed by the winners and are able to co-opt the aims of the struggle.

Stasis Scenario C, Democracy

Fear also plays a noticeable role in the oligarchic takeover of democratic regimes. But in this *stasis* scenario, the fear of the demagogues and people plays a minimal role, whereas the fear of the oligarchs plays a considerable role. The people fear an economic pre-eminence of the oligarchs[91] that the demagogues easily overstate.[92] The demagogues exploit this fear when they attack the oligarchs to win greater support of the people. The fear of the oligarchs, however, is much more formidable and poses a lethal risk to the democratic regime.[93] The fear of the oligarchs unifies them rather than dividing them.[94] It provides the strength they need to take over the regime and avoid the mass confiscation and redistribution of property that would have inevitably occurred.[95]

[86] *Pol* 5.11 1314^{b}18-22; 1311^{b}35-40.
[87] *Pol* 5.11 1313^{b}10-16.
[88] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}28.
[89] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}31-4.
[90] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}21-24.
[91] *Pol* 5.10 1311^{b}35-40.
[92] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{b}25-30.
[93] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}22.
[94] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}23.
[95] The fear of the oligarchs and the people is the fear that cowardice enables, even though it brings the oligarchs together. Aristotle's reference to this function of fear in bad regimes anticipates Hobbes, who sees fear as a decisive motivating factor for forming a social contract (in what Aristotle would classify as a bad regime). In contrast, the young guardians of the *Republic* must first learn to master fear rather than be driven by it if they are to achieve internal and external unity with their fellow guardians. In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* it should be no surprise that courage is the first of the moral virtues discussed since it is such a vital virtue to have for the good man and for the good city. In bad cities, fear can provide a temporary measure of cohesion within and among groups, though it is as fleeting a bond as mob and vigilante bonds are.

Rashness

Rashness (ἡ θρασύτης) then is a vice of excess that causes the person under conditions of grave danger to be overaffected by confidence[96] and to be underaffected by fear.[97] Aristotle also notes that in some cases the rash act too boldly because they are extremely fearful and so are brave only in appearance.[98] Rashness also causes the activation of wrong desires, especially under the stress of danger. The rash person tends to act in ways that seem courageous but in actuality are too bold or premature or both.[99] This has the effect of sabotaging one's goal and endangering others unnecessarily.[100]

Stasis Scenario A and B, Oligarchy

The rashness of the demagogues always heightens the *stasis* process, but is not the motivation for it. Furthermore, the rashness of the demagogues is only a problem in regimes where they play a prominent role. In scenario A, they play a role as leaders of the people against the oligarchs. But, the nature of the people's reaction does not call for demagogues to lead them, let alone, make them vulnerable to their influence. Leaders from any class could guide the people's victory.[101] Still, were their leadership to emerge from the people, they would be rash leaders.[102] The rashness of the demagogues, in this case, would assure the victory of the people. Rashness also drives *stasis* in scenario B, although most notably when oligarchs explicitly draw from the people to outmaneuver rival oligarchs.[103] Moreover, a number of the demagogic *staseis*

[96] *EN* 3.7 1115^{b}27-28; 3.7 1115^{b}33; 2.7 1107^{b}2-3.

[97] *EN* 3.7 1115^{b}14-15.

[98] *EN* 3.7 1115^{b}29-30; 3.8 1116^{b}33-35; 3.8 1117^{a}22-27.

[99] *EN* 3.8 1117^{a}14-15.

[100] Aristotle suggests in *Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics* that courage is most exemplified under situations of grave danger, such as war. But this is not to say that the virtue and its vices are not also manifested in related situations. Any situation where fear and confidence can be triggered (except for the very irrational kinds of fear) is a situation where this character state – whether courage, cowardice or rashness – controls the desires and affective responses. Of course, most events in a *stasis* chain bring with them serious, if not grave risks. Conflict and revolution are always elements of *stasis* that factionaries always risk. At very least, they seek goods such as gain and honor that allow them to preserve themselves. Honor might seem like a luxury rather than a primary resource for self-preservation. But in actuality, one's livelihood can depend on one's reputation – even for the highest of oligarchs. So, the circumstances that surround *stasis*, at whatever phase, introduce risks and consequences that are quite relevant to the management of fear and confidence.

[101] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{a}40.

[102] *Pol* 5.11 1314^{b}18-22.

[103] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}21-5.6 1306^{b}20. Rashness is less of a problem in scenario B where the oligarchs don't appeal to the people so broadly. Aristotle suggests that these oligarchs are motivated by fear such that they calculate more rather than being emboldened by it. In contrast, the demagogues, nurtured by democratic impulses, are emboldened by any fear they may have of the oligarchs. Rashness plays a more significant role in *stasis*

that Aristotle cites involve military leaders.[104] This variation of the breakdown scenario is a characteristic manifestation of rashness for Aristotle.[105] The most representative instances of courage and rashness involve the noble (or ignoble) exercise of military force. So, the tendency to extend the sphere of military control beyond the purview of military competence to civil and political settings[106] is its most destructive and tempting pathology.[107] In short, rashness plays a greater role in political breakdown to the extent that demagogic forces take hold in civic life.[108]

Stasis Scenario C, Democracy

In this scenario, the rashness of the demagogues is driven by their fear of the disenfranchised oligarchs.[109] So, their attacks on the oligarchs are rash measures[110] meant to undermine the enemy they fear. Moreover, these attacks stir up the level of popular support, which they are afraid of lacking. The rashness of the demagogues is a decisive factor in the destabilization of the regime,[111] as it has the effect of strengthening the oligarchs and bringing them to power. The demagogues that arise from oligarchies and lead democratic revolutions are not very different in substance from the demagogues that Aristotle presents in this scenario. The scope and nature of their rashness is similar. However, the conflicts and circumstances in which they act from rashness are different. The expected consequences of their rashness are as

scenarios where the people must be won over through bold overtures of support.

[104] See earlier discussion of the Guards at Larisa (*Pol* 5.6 1306^{a}31) and the *stasis* at Abydos (*Pol* 5.6 1306^{a}32). These cases are representative examples both of how demagogues can emerge from the people under this breakdown scenario and of the military dimension of demagoguery. In some cases military leaders become leaders of the people. In other cases, the military is closely aligned with the demagogues thereby energizing their base and enhancing their power.

[105] Aristotle indicates that military figures close to the power of the regime are often driven by rashness (*Pol* 5.10 1312^{a}15-21). While they see themselves as courageous, they confuse both their proximity to power and likelihood of success with courage. (See also *EN* 3.8 1117^{a}9-12 for similar examples of false courage).

[106] Aristotle closely identifies the demagogic tendencies described above with tyranny. More importantly, both he and Plato agree that demagogic forces, whether in democracies or oligarchies, easily degenerate into tyrannies. The enormous power that demagogues gain from the people enables them to dominate the people.

[107] Plato recognizes a similar pathology in his account of political breakdown. The guardians' spirited part – their most significant motivational source – can easily co-opt their rational part, making them less receptive to practical reason and controlled by the exigencies of their passions. Guardians who become rash in this way are prone to form alliances that similarly co-opt the decisionmaking of the ruling class. The power and urgency of military interests become exaggerated and undue weight is given to them.

[108] While Aristotle often associates the concentration of power found in monarchy and tyranny with military-based demagoguery, he also highlights the rash tendencies of those engaging in *stasis* (*Pol* 5.10 1312^{a}21-39; 5.11 1314^{b}18-22; 5.11 1315^{a}6-13).

[109] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}21; 5.8 1308^{a}27.

[110] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{b}15-21.

[111] *Pol* 5.11 1314^{b}18-22.

irregular and unsteady as the disposition itself. The rashness of the demagogues that lead democratic revolutions has an intensity and boldness that can undo oligarchy. But such a posture doesn't similarly bring the stability and strength necessary to sustain that new democracy. The instability of demagogic rashness in the *Politics* is the political outgrowth of the unsteady disposition he describes in *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Irascibility

Irascibility (ὀργιλότης) and inirascibility (ἀοργήτος) are the vicious extremes that good temper (πραότης) falls between.[112] Irascibility is the disposition of excess[113] where the person is disposed to be overaffected by anger when slighted[114] and driven by inappropriate desires for vindicating the dishonor of the slight. The disposition leads one, consequently, to act[115] excessively, whether too severely, too hastily, too protractedly, too extensively or towards the wrong object.[116]

Stasis Scenario A, Oligarchy

In this scenario, the irascibility of the people is widespread. And their irascibility controls them initially,[117] as the oligarchs treat the people in a manner that seems unjust to the people.[118] These actions may dishonor the people[119] or deprive them of anticipated gain. In each case the people, overaffected by anger, respond impulsively. But cowardice is the overriding disposition at work.[120] For, they can expect more injustice and must allow a leader to emerge, if they are to succeed. While this leader emerges quickly, it is not their irascibility that lets them regroup and find effective leaders to latch onto. Nevertheless, the immediacy and gravity of their response easily attracts leaders that will vindicate them.[121] They wage a conflict against the oligarchs and destabilize the regime.

[112] *EN* 2.7 1108^{a}4-10; *EN* 4.5 1126^{a}5-1126^{b}10.
[113] *EN* 2.7 1108^{a}7; *EN* 4.5 1125^{b}30.
[114] *EN* 4.5 1126^{a}33-35.
[115] *EN* 4.5 1126^{a}17, 1126^{a}21, 1126^{a}23, 1126^{a}28, 1126^{a}29.
[116] *EN* 4.5 1126^{a}11-15.
[117] *Pol* 5.11 1314^{b}1-4; 1315^{a}20-24.
[118] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{a}35-1305^{b}21.
[119] *Pol* 5.10 1310^{b}31-1311^{a}7; 5.10 1311^{b}24-34.
[120] *Pol* 5.10 1310^{b}31-1311^{a}7; 5.10 1312^{b}26-31; 5.10 1311^{b}24-34.
[121] *Pol* 5.11 1315^{a}25-30.

Stasis Scenario B, Oligarchy

The irascibility of the people is considerable in this scenario.[122] But since the starting point of the *stasis* doesn't involve them, they are not immediately drawn into the conflict as in the former scenario. But, they eventually find common cause with the lesser oligarchs. The lesser oligarchs are less irascible than the people, but irascible enough to be overaffected by the perceived injustices of the greater oligarchs.[123] But their tendency to cowardice is more prominent and relevant here. For, their response is inhibited by cowardice. So, their calculated use of flattery suggests that their irascibility is not crucial here. They forge an alliance with the people. And the irascibility of the people sets into motion a response that other dispositions carry on. But, their respective irascibilities don't drive their alliance.

Stasis Scenario C, Democracy

Aristotle says much less about the incidence of irascibility in democratic regimes. While irascibility is certainly common in this regime, there is not a clear pattern of tension between the prominent groups of the regime that is driven by anger. While the demagogues do initiate attacks on the oligarchs, it is not due to anger against them. And the oligarchs do not respond with anger, but rather with fear.[124] But, it turns out that their fear is more dangerous to the regime than the anger might be. So, anger is more of a palatable political force in the degeneration of oligarchy than in democratic degeneration.

Temperance

Temperance (σοφροσύνη) is the virtuous state of character that is the mean between the vicious extremes of insensibility (ἀναίσθητος)[125] and intemperance (ἀσοφροσύνη).[126] The sphere of character that this virtue concerns is appetitive desire and its associated pleasures and pains. So, the person with temperance has a state of character that enables him to be driven appro-

[122] *Pol* 5.11 1314^{b}1-4; 5.11 1315^{a}20-24.
[123] *Pol* 5.10 1310^{b}31-1311^{a}7; 5.11 1311^{b}24-37.
[124] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21-23.
[125] *EN* 2.6 1107^{b}8-9. Aristotle indicates that insensibility is an extreme that occurs rarely, and is closer to the virtue than intemperance is. The virtue of temperance most characteristically opposes the vice of intemperance (*EN* 2.8 1109^{a}4-5), which is the extreme that most err in the direction of when they fail in temperance.
[126] *EN* 3.9 1117^{a}23-27.

priately by the desires[127] associated with food, sex and drink[128] and to be pleased and pained appropriately by their occurrence and absence.[129] Intemperance, then is a vice of excess where one is driven by those misshaped desires[130] that would lead to having the wrong things,[131] or to having too much of an otherwise appropriate thing, or to having the right amount at the wrong time or manner.[132] Similarly, one with intemperance tends to be pleased inappropriately by the satisfaction or frustration of these desires. He is pleased by activity associated with the wrong appetitive desires or for more of an appetitive good than is appropriate.[133] Along these lines he is pained by his failure to obtain the inappropriate appetitive desires or his failure to obtain an excessive portion of some otherwise appetitive good.[134] Moreover, he tends to act upon these bad desires and engage in appetitive activity that is altogether inappropriate or excessive.[135]

Stasis Scenario A, Oligarchy

The vice of intemperance is common for most individuals in deviant regimes. But the manner in which it contributes to the *stasis* process varies between group and regime. In oligarchic regimes, the intemperance of the oligarchs supplies more impetus for conflict than the intemperance of the people does. This is especially true in scenario A, as the intemperance of the oligarchs is manifested as a luxuriousness[136] and open self indulgence that breeds the resentment of the people.[137] Additionally, their intemperance makes them more vulnerable to general attacks from other groups as they become soft, and less prepared.[138] This weakened state also makes them subject to outside

[127] Aristotle maintains that these are always appetitive desires (*EN* 3.9 $1119^{b}15$; $1118^{a}2$), whereas most of the other virtues primarily concern non-appetitive desires (*EN* 3.9 $1117^{a}28$).

[128] *EN* 3.10 $1118^{a}29$-32; 3.11 $1118^{b}8$-13. Like any other virtue for Aristotle, there is an end for which one has desires. In this case, good appetitive desires aim for the end of health and well being (*EN* 3.12 $1119^{a}16$-19). On the nobility of the ends of temperance, see *EN* 3.9 $1119^{b}16$.

[129] *EN* 2.7 $1107^{b}6$-9; 3.10 $1118^{a}29$-32. The person with temperance is only pleased by satisfying appetitive desires for the right things in the right quantity, at the right time and way (1119 a13). Similarly, the person with temperance is not pained by the wrong things or excessive quantities of otherwise appropriate things ($1119^{a}14$-15). Of course, the person with temperance may be pained appropriately by the absence of some appetitive.

[130] *EN* 3.12 $1119^{b}15$; $1119^{a}6$-15.

[131] *EN* 3.10 $1118^{a}29$-32.

[132] *EN* 3.11 $1118^{a}26$-33.

[133] *EN* 3.12 $1119^{a}20$; 3.9 $1118^{a}16$-21

[134] *EN* 3.11 $1118^{a}26$-33; $1119^{a}14$-15.

[135] *EN* 3.10 $1118^{a}18$.

[136] *Pol* 5.9 $1310^{a}12$-25.

[137] *Pol* 5.10 $1312^{a}1$-5, 5.1 $1302^{b}8$-13; 5.11 $1314^{b}25$-36.

[138] *Pol* 5.10 $1312^{b}19$-25; 5.9 $1310^{a}12$-25.

influence.[139] These factors make *stasis* even more likely when the oligarchs do injustice against the people, as the people have more reason to respond and more hope of success.

Stasis Scenario B, Oligarchy

In this scenario, the intemperance of the oligarchs is still a disruptive force, but the landscape of the disruption is not so starkly set between the oligarchs and the people. Intemperance still plays a significant role in this *stasis*, but it is rather the intemperance of the greater oligarchs that destabilizes the regime most. The intemperance of the greater oligarchs makes them more easily resented by the lesser oligarchs.[140] This makes it easier for the lesser oligarchs to elicit the support of the people, who also share this grievance. Furthermore, the intemperance of the greater oligarchs weakens them,[141] making them easier targets and more subject to outside influence.[142] Certainly the intemperance of the lesser oligarchs and people is also considerable. But it is less destructive for the regime than the intemperance of the greater oligarchs. The lesser oligarchs are out of power and so the cost of their intemperance has fewer implications for the regime. Of course, their intemperance is still problematic for the regime insofar as it makes them more flatterable, wasteful, etc.

Stasis Scenario C, Democracy

Intemperance leads to unrest in democratic regimes due to its influence throughout the ruling class: the demagogues and the people. The intemperance of the people is well engrained[143] and a common byproduct of the aims of the regime. One of the central traits of the people is their distorted desire in this sphere. This trait is also significant because the oligarchs must gratify the desires of the people in order to maintain power. So, one reason that the measures of demagogues become increasingly over reaching, unsustainable, and dangerous is because they are a product of the people's desires. While the demagogues also bring their own destructive desires into the *stasis* process – and their own intemperance is no trivial factor in that process – the intemperance of the people is a much more driving factor.

[139] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{b}8-13.
[140] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{a}7-14, 5.11 1314^{b}25-26,28.
[141] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{b}19-25.
[142] *Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}8-13.
[143] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{b}7-14.

Stinginess and Wastefulness

Generosity (ἐλευθεριότης)[144] is the virtue concerning the giving and taking of wealth and property[145] that falls between the extremes of stinginess (ἀνελευθερία) and wastefulness (ἀσωτία).[146] Generosity enables one to be appropriately affected by the emotion of benevolence (χάρις)[147] and to desire rightly in giving to others. This person is also disposed to give the appropriate amount to the right person, at the right time, and in the right way.[148] Stinginess is the vicious extreme where the person tends to be underaffected by benevolence, perhaps even pained[149] at the prospect of giving an appropriate gift. He desires to give too little to others, and so, consistently gives too little to others.[150]

In contrast, the wasteful person possesses the opposite vicious extreme, where he foolishly gives more than he can afford. Sometimes he gives to those who won't benefit from the gift. Sometimes he simply gives at the wrong time or in a way that undermines the goal of the gift. His wastefulness makes him inappropriately affected by benevolence – perhaps, impulsively so – and is not praiseworthy for his gifts. His desire to give more than he should is not a generous desire nor is it a case of excessive generosity. But his expenditures may be rightly considered extreme for a number of reasons, whether because he cannot afford them or because they are undeserved, ineffective or too late to make a difference. Wastefulness is quite familiar in democratic factions of oligarchy or among the demagogic elements of democracy. It can take the form of being "generous" with other people's money.[151]

[144] *EN* 2.7 1107^{b}9-14; *EN* 4.1 1110^{b}23-1122^{b}17.

[145] *EN* 2.7 1107^{b}9; *EN* 4.1 1110^{b}25.

[146] *EN* 2.7 1107^{b}10; *EN* 4.1 1110^{b}28; 1121^{a}11-1121^{b}13; 1121^{b}14-1122^{a}15.

[147] *Rh* 2.7 1385^{a} -1385^{b}.

[148] *EN* 4.1 1120^{b}19-22.

[149] *EN* 4.1 1120^{a}26; 1121^{b}21.

[150] There are also two features of the stinginess that are usually unappreciated in Aristotle's account, but still relevant to this discussion. When stinginess is understood as a disposition to give too little, it is largely a product of the person's excessive love of money (*EN* 4.1 1121^{b}17; 1119^{b}31). Two elements of stinginess that are associated with this disposition are excessive occupation and indifference. The former leads them to busy themselves in the work of acquisition or gain, generally speaking. This behavior both reinforces stinginess and is a product of it. The immersion of the same individuals in their occupations, especially laborious ones, makes them somewhat indifferent to others, politically, economically, and socially. The pleasure they take in their own occupation harnesses the interest and affections they might have otherwise directed towards the work, status, and property of others (*Pol* 2.2 1263^{a}37-1264^{b}5). The disposition of stinginess and its related qualities is manifest more and less in the following regimes. Stinginess is an established disposition in Aristotle's deviant regimes (*EN* 4.1 1121^{b}13). But it is not as widespread as it could be (and, as the later discussion will show, would provide a modest stabilizing force). Whereas, the vice of wastefulness is well engrained among some oligarchic groups and most of the people.

[151] On Aristotle's brief discussion of how this fails to be generosity see *EN* 4.1 1120^{a}31-1120^{b}9. See also Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985),

Stasis Scenarios A and B in Oligarchy

In scenario A, the oligarchic class as a whole is characterized as somewhat wasteful.[152] Their continued wastefulness is a contributing factor in the "injustices" they inflict against the people.[153] It also drives the resentment of the people, as they see the wastefulness of the oligarchs, at large, as a source of their own suffering.[154] In scenario B, the wastefulness of the higher oligarchs influences the response of the lesser oligarchs and the people.[155] In both scenarios, some oligarchs and some people are stingy.[156] But, the widening scope of stinginess, especially among the people and greater oligarchs, diminishes the impetus for *stasis*. The stinginess of the people is a benign distraction for them. The stinginess of the greater oligarchs makes them less wasteful without eradicating their love of money. In both cases, stinginess somewhat curbs tendencies for *stasis*. For the people are less agitated. Some oligarchs are less prone to give them reason for being agitated. And other oligarchs are less motivated to ally with them.

Stasis Scenario C, Democracy

The wastefulness of individuals in democracy is widespread, especially among the demagogues and people. But, it is not a politically damaging disposition because the group that initiates *stasis* – the demagogues – has no grievance about wastefulness since they exemplify it most. Still, while their wastefulness doesn't make them a target of factional conflict, it does influence their struggle against the oligarchs. The oligarchs tend to possess stinginess far more than that of any other group in the regime. This tendency doesn't imperil the regime, since they are not its agitators. Moreover, it is not displays of thriftiness or restraint that fuel widespread confiscations and other attacks on the oligarchs.[157] But, were the people equipped to busy themselves productively, their personal investment in their occupations would provide satisfying diversions from the conditions of others, especially the oligarchs.[158] And then the demagogues would find less impetus from the people for conflict against the oligarchs. So, democratic regimes are undermined by wastefulness, though

III-VI, XV. He advances an inverted version of Aristotelian generosity, where instead of being generous with one's own money, one maximizes the benefits of generosity and minimizes its liabilities by being especially liberal with the money of others. This principle carries on in a way in modern liberalism where the expansive use of other people's money (i.e., the wealthy) brings power to leaders who appeal to the people in this way.

[152] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}38-1306^{a}9.

[153] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{a}35-1305^{b}21.

[154] *Pol* 5.11 1314^{b}1-4; *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}38-1306^{a}1.

[155] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}21-1306^{b}20.

[156] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}12-20.

[157] *Pol* 5.6 1304^{b}19-1305^{a}35.

[158] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}5-7; 5.11 1313^{b}1-6.

not as decisively as oligarchies are. But they do stand to gain some stability by transforming wasteful dispositions into stingy ones.

III. A Ranking of Vices

A ranking of vices is quite appropriate in Aristotle's practical thought, as he presents nearly every aspect of life in a hierarchical framework, whether it be better and worse regimes,[159] friendships,[160] virtues[161] or ways of life.[162] The contemplative life is better than the practical life.[163] Intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.[164] But his hierarchy of regimes and character is most helpful for our purposes in setting out the structure by which vices are ranked.[165]

Aristocracy is far better than tyranny because it is the rule of the excellent and so fosters the common good[166] overwhelmingly better than a tyranny. Tyranny is only the rule of the most powerful, and so, conduces least to the common good,[167]save anarchy. Democracy is much worse than aristocracy because the rule of the many doesn't foster the quality of good that aristocracy does. And democracy is still better than tyranny because even what good is possible in democracy is considerably better than the level of goodness expected in tyranny.

One other factor in the goodness of regimes is their stability. It is better to have a less good regime for Aristotle than to have revolution and anarchy. That is not to say that the best of regimes are not potentially the most stable and permanent of regimes. In principle they are the most stable. But this is just to say that the permanence of the good[168] fostered is a factor that

[159] *Pol* 3.4 1278^{b}6-3.5 1281^{a}10; 4.9 1296^{b}2-1296^{b}13.

[160] *EN* 8.3 1156^{a}5-8.4 1157^{b}6.

[161] *EN* 1.13 1102^{a}27-1103^{a}6; 2.7 1107^{a}27-1108^{b}10; 3.6 1115^{a}4-4.9 1128^{b}36.

[162] *EN* 1.4 1095^{a}14- 1.5 1096^{a}11.

[163] *EN* 10.7 1177^{a}11-10.8 119^{a}33.

[164] The latter can somewhat constrain the former. Moral virtue can constrain the achievement of intellectual virtue, just as moral virtue enhances it. Vice can undermine the development of and exercise of intellectual virtue, just as moral virtue enhances both. This is not to say that moral virtue is sufficient for intellectual virtue, as one can have most of the moral virtues and little intellectual virtue(except practical wisdom). Of course, the above relation is slightly different in the case of moral virtue and practical wisdom, as they are mutually dependent. One cannot have any moral virtue without practical wisdom and vice-versa

[165] On some contemporary treatments of vice, their ranking and the role they may play in moral theory see, T. Hurka, *Virtue, Vice and Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 58-91; J. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 7-39; P. Simpson, *Virtues, Vices and Consequences: Essays in Moral and Political Philosophy* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 2001), 45-73.

[166] *Pol* 3.7 1279^{a}35-40; 4.7 1293^{b}1-11.

[167] *Pol* 3.7 1279^{b}7-10; 4.8 1293^{b}22-30.

[168] *Pol* 4.12 1297^{a}1-10.

Aristotle considers alongside the quality of the good fostered. He considers democracy better than oligarchy because it is more stable than oligarchy,[169] though oligarchy might be more conducive to goodness than democracy. But, whatever superiority it might have in that respect is overshadowed by its vulnerability to revolution.[170] So his ranking of regimes is based on both quality and stability; that is, the quality of the good that a regime is conducive to and its permanence. Of course, this hierarchy is also built into the structure of virtue and vice. The virtues that are most conducive to the highest excellence are the best of the moral virtues. Greatness of soul (μεγαλοψύχια) is that virtue.[171] But there are also more modest discriminations of higher and lower virtues, such as how generosity is not as high of a virtue as munificence[172] since handling greater sums of money and property requires a higher order of character than with ordinary sums.[173] Moreover, if it is exercised well, it contributes to a better good than does generosity. Other distinctions can be drawn between those virtues that manage appetitive goods versus non-appetitive goods. Non-appetitive goods are associated with some of the following: high honor, greatness in leadership, the highest friendships, contemplation and beauty. These are examples of goods that are higher than mere life. So, virtues that enable the above are higher virtues than those that manage the goods of the body.

Similarly, vices can be ranked according to the extent to which they undermine the achievement of goodness; in this case, that amounts to the extent to which they contribute to *stasis*.[174] For *stasis* is a pathological condition

[169] *Pol* 4.9 $1296^{a}5$-22.

[170] Aristotle seems to note an exception to that when it comes to more democratic democracies , which are particularly vulnerable to demagogues and eventually tyranny. The more democratic oligarchies are probably more stable than the most democratic democracies. This is discussed further in chapter four.

[171] *EN* 4.3 $1123^{a}34$-$1125^{a}35$.

[172] *EN* 4.2 $1122^{a}7$-$1123^{a}33$.

[173] *EN* 4.1 $1119^{b}20$-$1122^{a}17$.

[174] The vices discussed in this section do not directly contribute to *stasis* as envy and vanity do. They are not the causes of *stasis*. But they can impact *stasis* indirectly. In order to distinguish the direct versus indirect contributions to *stasis* it is necessary to elaborate on the major components of *stasis*. There are a number of circumstances, dispositions and events that contribute to a *stasis* process that culminates in revolution. The initial *stasis* scenarios emphasize the circumstances and events that figure in each *stasis*, whereas the above discussion has filled out the dispositional backdrop for those circumstances and events. An example of an event that contributes to *stasis* is the malicious persecution of the oligarchs by the demagogues in scenario C. Of course, they occur in a chain of events that terminate in revolution. An event found in a latter place in the *stasis* chain is the return of exiled oligarchs and the mobilization of remaining ones. Aristotle recognizes that some circumstances give rise to *stasis* events by provocation. Other circumstances simply increase the propensity for these events, such as the rich-poor gap can do. Some of the vices here can bring about the two kinds of circumstances discussed above. For example, flattery can cause a shift in power that that makes *stasis* more likely to occur, even though vanity and envy drive *stasis* and bring about many of the above circumstances. These vices can also cause events that impact the central *stasis* events. In scenario B, the vanity of the oligarchs drives a wedge between the

that frustrates the achievement of excellence and its preconditions in the political community. Of course, it should be no surprise that vanity is a vice that opposes the highest moral virtue – greatness of soul (μεγαλοψυχία).[175] Similarly, envy opposes righteous indignation (νέμεσις),[176] which is an indispensable quality for any just regime or for any regime that aspires to it. These are very destructive vices.

But on what basis can the vices discussed here be ranked? Aristotle suggests the bases for such a ranking in his treatment of *stasis*. He indicates that the ends which factionaries desire determine the scope and severity of the faction they form. As Aristotle says, the starting point of a *stasis* is all-important for its outcome.[177] But the character state of the factionary determines what ends he desires. So, some vices reinforce envy or vanity directly. Other vices influence them indirectly by promoting the vices that reinforce envy and vanity. The more a vice fosters envy or vanity, whether directly or indirectly, the higher it ranks in its grade of destructiveness.

Some events that occur in a *stasis* prone regime are more and less significant contributors to *stasis*. Some are more significant because they contribute the critical force necessary to put the *stasis* in motion. This generates the crucial momentum that the *stasis* needs in its early phase. Some events contribute most by maintaining or even boosting the momentum of the *stasis* in its middle phase. Other times, it rapidly accelerates the *stasis*, even bringing about a sudden regime change. So, vices that impact *stasis* more significantly or less significantly can also be ranked accordingly. Their badness is framed according to the extent to which they undermine: (a) the quality of good that a regime and its members can achieve and (b) its permanence. The more it undermines this, whether by the forcefulness or immediacy of its impact on *stasis*, the more it[178] affects its caliber of destructiveness.[179]

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lesser and greater oligarchs that leads to most of the subsequent *stasis* events. But there are also smaller events such as the lesser oligarchs' campaign of flattery, whereby they hope to win the support of the people. This contributes to the eventual popular revolt. The events that lead into the revolution most immediately are standard *stasis* events and are driven by vanity and envy. But there are numerous events like this that contribute to regime degeneration. These vices can also accelerate or slow the process of *stasis* without counting as the essential causes of *stasis*. For example, cowardice and irascibility are vices that can inhibit or propel individuals in harmful ways. These and other vices, therefore, can be construed as contributing to *stasis* without being their most significant causes. And, lastly, many of these vices influence the formation of envy and vanity and/or reinforce them. This is not to say that they simply cause *stasis* because they further the vices that do. But they still contribute something to the *stasis* process thereby and can be ranked accordingly for their harmful consequences.

[175] *EN* 4.3 1125^{a}17-35.

[176] *EN* 2.7 1108^{b}1-6.

[177] *Pol* 5.7 1307^{b}35-40; 5.3 1303^{a}21-26; 5.3 1303^{b}17-24.

[178] Factors (a) and (b) both figure significantly in the caliber of the vice's destructiveness.

[179] In reference to the latter point, Aristotle suggests that sudden and forceful shifts in the *stasis* process are quite problematic. Consider his comments regarding the overambitious. He warns against wronging the overambitious, especially at the wrong time.

This final section makes an overall assessment of how harmful each of the above dispositions are for the regime by considering the following questions:

(1) To what extent does it intensify envy and vanity? Does the disposition have an effect on a person's own desire for gain or honor? If so, is it more for gain or honor? Does the disposition lead people to be more affected by the gain or honor of others?

(2) To what extent does it hasten the *stasis* process itself? Is the disposition decisive in the triggering of some event in the *stasis* chain?[180] If so, how important of an event is it in the chain?[181]

(3) What is its relation to other vices? Does this vice reinforce or diminish other *stasis*-vices? Are the vices it influences relevant to the *stasis* process or envy/vanity? If so, then how significant is its promoting or undercutting of *stasis*?

Overambition

(1) Overambition has a considerable effect on the formation of envy and vanity.[182] The person who is overambitious doesn't simply desire a higher level of honor than he currently has.[183] He habitually wants more than he currently has. To make matters worse, he grasps after positions and responsibilities that are always beyond his abilities in order to bring him that excessive honor.[184] The growth of overambition has a ripple effect on the growth of envy and vanity. Those who want more honor are more likely to want some one else's honor.[185] Moreover, the most ambitious don't wait for opportunities to receive higher honors, but rather search after them vigorously.[186] So, his disposition to envy the honors of others is the first step in his quest for greater honor. The most convenient outlet for this overambition is in the footsteps of those peers and rivals who have gained more than he. It is an easy step from simply

Moreover, the overambitious, in scenarios A and C, are the one's that most dramatically impact the outcome of the scenario. So, this is why he treats them as the most dangerous of factionaries. In contrast, *stasis* occurrences that have less rapid effects, are more manageable. Additionally, events that fuel *stasis* quite forcefully, such as the effective coalescence of dissimilar elements in an alliance, are also difficult to manage; although, a slower coalescence of the former is better than a more rapid one. There is a wide range of time frames for the life of a full *stasis*. Some may lead almost immediately to revolution, whereas others may be quite protracted. See Berger, 1992, 99.

[180] On the contrast between those situations and events that trigger *stasis* and those situations and events that reinforce a propensity for *stasis*, see Berger, 1992, 60.

[181] On the chain of effects associated with some *stasis* situations, see Loraux, 1991, 38-39.

[182] *Pol* 5.11 1312^{a}21-39; 5.10 1312^{a}15-16.

[183] *Pol* 4.2 1307^{a}1-5.

[184] *EN* 5.7 1123^{b}10-14; 4.3 1125^{a}30-31.

[185] *EN* 2.7 1108^{b}6; *Pol* 5.1 1302^{a}39-1302^{a}3.

[186] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{a}25-26.

wanting more honor to wanting someone else's honor.[187] Vanity is the underside of the envy that ambition brings. Vanity isn't necessarily found alongside material envy, but it easily arises alongside honor envy-especially that of the upwardly mobile sort.[188] Those who are pathologically committed to their social rise are easily slighted when the impressions of others fail to match their own inflated assessment of their value.[189] This is also why Aristotle thinks that the young and those new to money are so easily prone to vanity.

(2) Aristotle treats overambition as one of the most dangerous dispositions in a regime, especially when possessed by a certain persons at certain times.[190] An overambitious person who is well placed can ignite conflict and disorder within the regime. So, while overambition sows the seeds of disunity in the long run, its most dangerous and immediate impact is to embolden opportunists to tap into the discontent outside the ruling class and to seize its leadership.[191]

(3) The overambition that Aristotle highlights in the *Politics* is a special case of it, since it is a political ambition that fuels factional struggle rather than the garden-variety private ambition. Its impact on the formation of other vices is both widespread and substantial, especially with respect to flattery, wastefulness, intemperance and irascibility.

The overambitious are much more prone to engage in flattery than those possessing any other vice.[192] Those who have the power to elevate someone to greater responsibility and honor usually do not want to elevate undeserving overambitious individuals, even if his lack of merit is not so clear cut. They would prefer to elevate those who are overwhelmingly qualified. This is especially the case for someone who might be elevated from a position or office of lesser responsibility and status to a dramatically higher one.[193] But obviously those who don't deserve such opportunities oftentimes receive them. While there are a number of factors that might account for it, flattery is a common contributor. The overambitious learn to flatter those with power over them in order to achieve their ambitions more effectively.[194] Most of Aristotle's cases of political flattery, however, occur when a group or section is flattered, in order to bring more power to the flatterer.[195] These kinds of examples show an even greater link between overambition and flattery. Those with great political aspirations have a much easier time flattering the people or other elements of their constituency than do well-placed individuals with the power

[187] See also the chapter three discussion on this point in the analysis of *Pol* 5.1-3.
[188] *EN* 4.3 1124^{a}20-25.
[189] *EN* 4.3 1124^{a}29-1124^{b}5.
[190] *Pol* 5.8 1308^{a}4-13.
[191] *Pol* 5.11 1315^{a}13-15.
[192] While most who engage in flattery, especially political flattery, are overambitious, not all who are overambitious are already established flatterers.
[193] In this sense, the more severe the vice of overambition, the more dire the need for flattery.
[194] *EN* 4.6 1127^{a}10-12.
[195] *Pol* 5.4 1305^{a}3-5, 27-38; 5.11 1315^{b}1-2.

to help them. The latter are more prepared and adept at identifying and deflecting such persons. Moreover, larger groups can be more receptive to flattery and more docile about how its support is directed.[196] The politically overambitious are quick to flatter fellow citizens because it conveniently serves their ambitions.

Overambition intensifies dispositions of intemperance and wastefulness. The overambitious, especially in democracy, cater to the people's intemperance and acquisitiveness.[197] They make bold actions and gestures that help their would-be-constituents to secure the objects of their misguided desires and acquisitive impulses. In democracies, those whose overambition drives them to gain power quickly and decisively must do what it takes to win that support most easily. They help give the people what they want in order to get what they want-more power. Such an outcome requires spending more and taking more than is appropriate.[198] The more the people are gratified in this way, the more they are habituated to engaging in wastefulness themselves.

Overambition also reinforces irascibility on the part of the overambitious and on the part of those within their power base.[199] The overambitious that Aristotle highlights in the *Politics* become more angered due to the political demands of their ambition.[200] Their political ambition requires the support of some base whether democratic or oligarchic. But to energize their support they must be increasingly attached to their needs and desires. Oftentimes this makes them more attentive and ardent in their appeal to those needs and desires. They are particularly eager to perfect the honor of their base from those who may encroach upon it or those who have always done so. Those who want to rally the support of oligarchs are quick to magnify the alleged injustices inflicted upon them by the people. Similarly, those currying the favor of the people become easily inflamed by any perceived wrong inflicted upon them by oligarchs.[201] The hastiness and other excesses associated with their reaction are typical of what catalyses factional associations; especially, as the interest of the faction becomes increasingly identified with the good of the political community at large. Moreover, the excessiveness of their response should be expected. For, it is the most expedient way to convince their base of the rising leadership's commitment to them.[202] They can become more attentive and vigilant to the interests of a faction already characterized by excess. Insofar as they do so, they continually exceed the ardor of their most dedicated factionaries. The members of such factions would not respond to rising leaders of this sort, if the anger of the later seemed misplaced. The

[196] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}2-11; 5.10 1313^{b}33-39.
[197] *Pol* 5.4 1305^{b}38-1306^{a}9.
[198] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}25-35.
[199] *Pol* 5.11 1315^{a}13-18.
[200] *Pol* 5.6 1306^{b}27-36.
[201] *Pol* 5.4 1305^{a}35-1305^{b}21.
[202] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21-23.

intensified irascibility of their ambitious new leaders begets a more severe irascibility among those it leads.

Overambition is the worst of the other vices because it has the most significant impact on the formation of envy and vanity. Its impact on *stasis* is so potent because it motivates power seekers to forge difficult alliances. And, under certain circumstances, such a person can decisively change the outcome of a *stasis*. Lastly, while it reinforces many vices, most of them are not among the worst of *stasis* vices, save flattery. But flattery does reinforce the worst of vices. So, all things considered, overambition is the most harmful of vices for the regime, besides envy and vanity.

Flattery

(1) Flattery is a vice with considerable influence in these *stasis* scenarios, both for good and bad. Flattery is a disposition that thrives in an environment of vanity and envy, and reinforces it widely. The dispositions of vanity and envy are quite vulnerable to flattery. The envious person desires to have more gain and honor, and so is quite receptive to words and gestures of those that promise them what they already desire.[203] The vain person has an inflated view of his worth which makes him prone to be flattered by those clever enough to flatter him by at least that measure.[204] For example, the more the people desire to receive the higher honors that their rivals receive, the more they are willing to be flattered to that extent. Furthermore, since the vain person desires to be honored more greatly than others are willing to honor them, he is easily gratified by those who do honor him in this way.[205] This is especially gratifying if the flattery exceeds the level of honor that the vain person imagines himself to deserve. So, the envious and vain easily attract flatters.

This can be seen in the former *stasis* scenarios. The demagogues in scenario C flatter the people, who envy the gain and honor of the oligarchs. Their envy for the oligarchs makes them easily flattered into greater support when the demagogues attack the oligarchs.[206] And this does not diminish the people's envy for the oligarchs. Along these lines, the lesser oligarchs in scenario B play a similar role towards the people, generating a related effect. But they also flatter the oligarchs at large, who are prone to vanity.[207] The latter is difficult to do, as the vanity of the oligarchs does not provide a common basis for flattery, other than their superiority over the people as a whole. And the

[203] *Pol* 5.11 1313^{b}39-41; *EE* 3.7 1234^{a}30-33; *Rh* 2.9 1387^{b}25, 30-31.
[204] *EN* 4.3 1123^{b}6-7; *EE* 3.5 1233^{a}10-12; 1232^{a}33-35.
[205] *EN* 1124^{b}9-13; *EE* 1232^{b}33-35; *Rh* 1.11 1370^{a}23.
[206] *EN* 1305^{a}5-8.
[207] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}26, 29, 35.

lesser oligarchs must choose which ally they will flatter.[208] While they will eventually side with the people, they may initially woo the oligarchs. When this option is played out, the blindness of the oligarchs to their vanity makes them receptive to flattery – even to a flattery vague enough to accommodate the diverse vanities across the oligarchic class. And the oligarchs are no less vain due to being flattered.

Similarly, flattery reinforces the dispositions of vanity and envy. It is not that those who are flatterers will necessarily become more vain and/or envious themselves. But, flattery can increase vanity and envy in its possessors and certainly promote it among their associates. Those who engage in flattery appeal to the distorted desires for gain and honor of those being flattered.[209] But the goals of flattery are not achieved with those who don't have the kind of desires for gain and honor that allow them to be flattered. One who doesn't want to be honored more than he really deserves won't be susceptible to flatterers.[210] So, it is only those who desire the inflated portion of gain and honor that are flatterable. So, flattery doesn't generate new envy and vanity ex nihilo, it only reinforces or increases the distorted desires for gain and honor among those who already have them. Moreover, it is fair to say that flattery increases the level of envy or vanity among those who are already susceptible to it, since flattery precisely conveys more honor to the person than he previously possessed or deserved to possess.[211] Aristotle indicates that gaining more goods than is appropriate leads the agent to want more than is appropriate. The impact that flattery has on vanity and envy can be seen in oligarchic *stasis* scenario B and the democratic *stasis* scenario.[212] In the latter scenario, the demagogue's flattery of the people is a central feature of the regime.[213] Flattery is vital for its genesis and maintenance, though it

[208] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}36-38.

[209] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{b}8-13; *EE* 1.11 1370^{a}23; *Rh* 2.15 1390^{b}12-15.

[210] Of course it is possible that one who does desire more honor than he deserves, whether due to ignorance about what he actually deserves or simply due to overreaching desires, may resist being flattered even though he is quite susceptible to it.

[211] Flattery increases the desire that the envious have for those with more honor or gain. Not only does the act of flattery indulge the misguided desires of the envious and vain, it increases it. Material or honor based flattery is by its nature short term. It can be repeated, but its appeal is the sudden elevation in status that it conveys to the one who is flattered. Consistent flattery loses its power as flattery, unless the status of the flattery conveyed also increases. But even then, it brings diminishing returns. Along the same lines, the more someone is flattered the more honor they desire and the more difficult it is to sustain that honor since it really is more than they deserve. Envy and vanity are the characteristic vices of those who always want more than they themselves can sustain. In contrast, the great-souled man is highly honored, deserves to be highly honored, and can therefore sustain that level of honor. Moreover, he would never desire to receive more honor than that from others, nor would he want the greater portion of honor that someone else has.

[212] *Pol* 5.5 1304^{b}19-1305^{a}35.

[213] Aristotle describes the demagogue as a flatterer of the people (*Pol* 5.9 1313^{b}39-1314^{a}5), not someone who is incidentally prone to flattery on his rise to power; rather, his flattery

eventually contributes to the downfall of the regime. But one of the crucial means by which demagogues cement their appeal with the people is their assault on the oligarchs. Most importantly, their appeal to the people is an appeal to the envy of the people, as they attach the wealth and honor of the oligarchs through confiscations, slander and the imposition of unfair monetary penalties and burdens.[214]

In scenario B, the vain rivalry of the oligarchs drives the lesser oligarchs to expand their base of power through flattery. Their frequent acts of flattery are simply the means by which they carry out their power struggles with rival oligarchs.[215] So flattery, in this scenario, has the effect of intensifying vanity, not just among those closest to the flattery, but across the whole class of oligarchs – the lesser and greater of them. When the lesser oligarchs are successful in their flattery, it brings them more power to wield against their rival oligarchs and, thereby, forces the latter to honor them more. Such an outcome further reinforces the lesser oligarchs' inflated views of how honorable they are. Moreover, their rivals only offer them higher honors begrudgingly. The vanity of the greater oligarchs demands that they deny the lesser oligarchs' greater honor. The vanity of the lesser oligarchs demands that they reach for it.[216] But high honor is in short supply, especially for the vain. The greater oligarchs see any honor concession they make to the lesser oligarchs as a loss of honor for themselves. To honor more highly the lesser oligarchs is to diminish the preeminence of their own status. So, in this scenario, flattery has the effect of magnifying vanity throughout the oligarchic class.

(2) The main role that flattery plays in promoting *stasis* is to provide a crucial impetus for dissimilar factions to organize. This is an indispensable aspect of *stasis* that flattery uniquely engenders. The demagogues in scenario C are an elite with interests that go well beyond the scope of their rank and file supporters. The people have good reason to be suspicious of demagogues, as they manifest many of the characteristics of oligarchs and have a well-established record for tyranny. But their mutual willingness to serve their respective interests is cemented by flattery, as it overstates the extent to which their interests are common. Flattery must do this to an even greater extent in scenario B, where the groups being flattered are much less similar and their interests much less common. So, flattery plays a vital role in building uneasy alliances necessary to destabilize the regime.

(3) The disposition of flattery also has a widespread impact on other vices. The most direct impact it has on the others vices are those of intemperance and wastefulness. The power of the flatterer over the flattered person draws

is a dominant character trait and one that is essential to his power. So, in demagogic democracies, flattery is a central feature of the regime.

[214] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{a}5-8, 25-35.

[215] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}22-27.

[216] *Pol* 5.2 1303^{b}4-7; 5.3 1302^{b}25-33.

from some unfulfilled desire on the part of the flattered person, besides the desire to be flattered.[217] For example, the demagogues in scenario C flatter the people through bold measures that convince the people of the formers' great esteem for them. But their confiscations of wealth and property are not just symbolic; the people want more, and not just because they are cold and hungry.[218] Moreover, since the people in these *stasis* scenarios always possess intemperance on a widespread basis, they will be gratified by flattery insofar as it sustains their intemperance. Their intemperance largely drives them to seek more in the way of gain and their wastefulness is a habitual consequence of it.[219] So, the vice of flattery also gratifies the further desire of the people to squander their limited resources to continually satisfy appetitive drives.[220] Flattery, in this sense, reinforces intemperance and wastefulness.

Flattery also promotes the vices of cowardice, irascibility and overambition. Flattery often times distracts individuals who would otherwise by angry. Aristotle suggests that under some conditions of anger, those who are not overambitious can be flattered, and so, their anger is avoided.[221] This is not to say that flattery employed in this way has a significant impact upon irascibility. The tendency of the irascible agent to be overaffected by anger is not diminished by flattery. But there are situations when the irascible would typically be overaffected by anger, but instead their anger is disarmed or distracted and they fail to act in an irascible way.[222] Another example of this is when they are frightened, just when they are about to become enraged. Such an outcome does impact their character. At very least, the disposition of irascibility is not reinforced, but somewhat restrained. So, flattery can have a curbing influence on irascibility.

Flattery has a significant impact on the vice of cowardice. One reason that flattery thrives in these *stasis* scenarios is because fear does.[223] Some groups use flattery to gain power, and thereby to protect themselves from other groups they fear. The lesser oligarchs fear the greater oligarchs and protect themselves by gaining power vis-à-vis other oligarchs or the people.[224] The

[217] *Rh* 1.11 1370^{a}23.

[218] According to Aristotle one doesn't become a tyrant because he is cold and hungry (*Pol* 2.4 1267^{a}15).

[219] *EN* 4.1 1121^{b}7-10

[220] *EN* 4.1 1121^{b}6. Aristotle also discusses flattery in the context of wastefulness as an excess of giving to the wrong person (*EN* 4.1 1121^{a}30-1121^{b}3). One who takes pleasure in offering praise to the wrong person is more likely to take pleasure in misplaced spending, especially when the desires for more gain and honor fuel both. On the link between flattery and intemperance, see *Pol* 1312^{b}8-13. Dante also suggests that flattery promotes intemperance. See the cases of Venedico Caccianemico (*Inferno*, Canto XVIII, 51-57), the other Bolognesians (58-66) and Alessio Interminei (117-132).

[221] *Pol* 1310^{a}2-11; 1308^{a}4-13. On the diminishing of anger see *Rh* 2.3 1380^{a}22-23, 24-25, 27-29.

[222] *Rh* 2.3 1380^{a}29-31.

[223] *Pol* 1304^{b}21-24; 1311^{b}35-40.

[224] *Pol* 1305^{b}22-27.

demagogues fear the oligarchs because of their influence, status, and the alleged integrity of their claims to rule. They go to great lengths to flatter the people and win their support.[225] Their use of flattery, under conditions of fear, reinforces the disposition of cowardice. Of course acts of flattery, whether under fearful circumstances or not, also reinforce the disposition of flattery. So, flattery and cowardice can be mutually reinforcing.

Flattery also compounds the disposition of overambition. The overambitious oftentimes use flattery to expand their influence and honor. While the demagogues in scenario C are the clearest example of this, the lesser oligarchs in scenario B are also an effective illustration of this. The lesser and greater oligarchs are vain.[226] Their rivalry centers on the relative distribution of honor. The dishonor which the lesser oligarchs perceive and the greater honor to which they aspire is a motivation for their flattery.[227] But, their hope to use flattery to gain power vis-à-vis the other oligarchs and, eventually, to garner greater honor serves their overambition in a different way than it serves their vanity. While their vanity is the most driving force behind their power struggle within the oligarchic class, it is a more specific reaction to honor comparisons within that class. In contrast, overambition is a tendency to desire greater honor, more generally speaking.[228] The overambitious are not necessarily concerned with gaining more recognition vis-à-vis a rival section or group, but rather, to receive wider recognition simply. It is also a disposition that is less reactive in nature: vanity causes one to be easily provoked when given too little honor, whereas overambition causes one to strive after honors that are inappropriate and undeserved.[229] The latter requires more time, planning and determination. So, there are different ways to desire excessive honor and different dispositions that drive them. So, flattery often manifests itself in such a way that it reinforces vanity and overambition.[230] It may be that the kind of flattery found in most *stasis* scenarios does not always coincide with the disposition of overambition. But when it does, its resulting actions are likely to reinforce the disposition of overambition.

Flattery is nearly the worst of the other vices. It significantly reinforces envy and vanity, thereby promoting disordinate desires for the ends that the envious and vain seek. But flattery isn't quite as bad as overambition, as it can also be used to avoid or disarm factional conflict. (See the discussion from chapter four for more on this). Like overambition, flattery is also destructive in its power to coalesce dissimilar sections into a common alliance. But, in these *stasis* scenarios, its impact is not as sudden and tumultuous as that of the overambitious. However, flattery is the most destructive in terms of its

[225] *Pol* 1305^{a}5-8.
[226] *EN* 4.3 1124^{a}17-20.
[227] On the tie between vanity and overambition, see *Rh* 2.11 1389^{a}10-13.
[228] *EN* 4.3 1125^{a}32-34.
[229] *EN* 4.3 1124^{b}9-13.
[230] *Rh* 2.15 1390^{b}6-12.

influence on other vices. It aggravates almost all of the worst vices and does so substantially.

Cowardice

(1)The disposition of cowardice doesn't directly influence the dispositions of envy and vanity. The goals of gain and honor are roughly shared by the envious, vain and cowardly alike. But their goals are only partially overlapping and their relation to them is dissimilar. The cowardly person is typically overaffected by the fear of losing gain and honor, among other things.[231] But his motivations are more basic, for he fears the loss of all of these things, chiefly through the loss of life.[232] In contrast, the aims of the envious are more long term and slowly cultivated. They require the cover of peace, security, and the mundane to attract the attention of the would be envious. The misshaped desires for gain and honor that envy induces may lead one with cowardice to be more fearful of losing the goods that danger threatens. But it isn't clear that the reverse is true. While one dimension of cowardice includes an overattachment to the same goods that envy concerns, its more characteristic aspect is the reaction at the immediate and unexpected prospect of their loss.[233] The confusion, panic and instability that arise under such conditions are more characteristic than one's excessive attachment to the goods at risk, even when the goods at risk are undeserved. So, being cowardly doesn't make one more likely to be envious because the field of motivation associated with cowardice is too dissimilar from envy.

Vanity is somewhat closer to cowardice in the following ways. The cowardly and the vain are both overaffected by emotions prompted by the actions and intentions of others. In the former case, a person poses a threat to life and limb. In the later case, others fail to honor one appropriately either through dishonoring gestures or an inadequate level of honor.[234] The cowardly and vain are susceptible to actions and gestures of this sort. But the kind of susceptibility engendered by cowardice is too immediate and short term in purview to influence the same susceptibility in the sphere of vanity; although, extreme vanity may generate fears that intensify cowardice. In any case, the cowardice of the people in scenario A and B does not contribute to their envy.[235] The cowardice of the lesser oligarchs does not influence their vanity. However, the prospect of their honor being injured further does add to their cowardice. In scenario C, the cowardice of the expelled oligarchs does not add to their vanity, as their situation is too urgent for vanity to enter and be

[231] *EN* 3.6 1115^{a}4-25.
[232] *EN* 3.6 1115^{a}25-29.
[233] *Rh* 2.5 1382^{ab}.
[234] *Rh* 2.2 1378^{b}28-32.
[235] Aristotle treats their fear as quite immediate and more concerned with safety than honor or gain (*Pol* 5.2 1302^{b}21-24; 5.6 1306^{a}20-26; 5.8 1308^{a}25-30).

reinforced. Moreover, they must align themselves with old rivals who would have otherwise induced just the kind of vain comparisons and power struggles that they don't have the luxury to engage in anymore.[236]

(2) Cowardice promotes *stasis* in all three scenarios. The most representative case is of the oligarchs in scenario C. The scale of their common fears impels them to engage in factional strife, eventually overthrowing the oligarchy.[237] The scale of their fear contributes crucially to the magnitude of *stasis* there. In the other scenarios, fear plays a destructive role in the regime, but its manner is more inhibiting. The fear of the people in scenario A leaves them waiting for a leader to remedy their situation. For, without effective leadership they risk further injustices. Had their fear made them rash, the regime would have stood a better chance of survival. They might have made foolish mistakes in their haste that would cause the revolution to fail. Instead, fear inhibits the people enough to allow effective leadership to succeed. In scenario B, the fear of the people and demagogues similarly inhibits them.[238] The revolution that eventually ensues, however, is less dramatic and is preceded by a period of intrigue and alliance. So, in both scenarios A and B, cowardice does influence *stasis*, but it is less direct than in C.[239] Furthermore, in scenarios A and B cowardice is the disposition that initially fuels the *stasis* chain, but other dispositions, such as flattery, ambition, and rashness, figure more importantly in the subsequent *stasis* events.

(3) Cowardice also has a wide-ranging influence on the other vices. It increases the propensity for rashness and flattery, but decreases the propensity for irascibility. In scenarios A and B, the cowardice of the people and lesser oligarchs engenders flattery. Aristotle treats the objective of flattery as increasing one's power vis-à-vis the person being flattered. In some cases that greater power is necessary for the preservation of oneself or the group. In other cases, the power is unnecessary, but still desired. Cowardice makes flattery of both kinds more likely, but especially the flattery of necessity. In scenario B, the cowardice of the lesser oligarchs leads them to flatter those whose support buffers them from the power of other oligarchs.[240] The people are useful allies to the lesser oligarchs. This situation makes the lesser oligarchs more prone to flattery, as well as the people. The people's greater susceptibility to flattery is similarly engendered in scenario A. For, their fear of the oligarchic class in scenario A and of the greater oligarchs in B, makes them receptive to the spell of those who can deliver them from this threat.[241]

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[236] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21-24.

[237] *Pol* 5.6 1304^{b}19-1305^{a}35.

[238] *Pol* 5.6 1306^{a}20-26.

[239] Aristotle is clearer here than anywhere else that fear drives the backlash of the expelled oligarchs (*Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21-23), whereas in the other scenarios fear contributes to *stasis*, but not as decisively.

[240] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}22-27; 1305^{b}22-25, 29, 32, 36-37, 39-41.

[241] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}3-5; 1305^{b}27-38.

Rashness is a consistent byproduct of cowardice. As the disposition that opposes cowardice, it interacts with the same emotions and desires. But in some cases of rashness, the rash person is not simply overaffected by confidence and underaffected by fear. Rather, he is overaffected by fear, such that he becomes foolishly emboldened to action.[242] Aristotle also includes this form of rashness as a pretender to bravery.[243] It appears to be bravery, but it is not properly motivated. The disposition of cowardice supports the formation of the disposition of rashness. Aristotle says that in one sense the extremes oppose one another, but in another sense they ally with one another to oppose the mean.[244] Cowardice, under the right circumstances can easily yield rash actions and cultivate rashness. This link is relevant to the *stasis* scenarios.

In scenario C, the fear of the demagogues vigorously emboldens them to attack the oligarchs.[245] It is not their cowardice that drives the attack, for other groups possess it more prominently. They don't fear imminent attack or some other short-term threat. But, they still fear the oligarchs, nevertheless. What cowardice they do have makes them subject to the same fear that emboldens the rash person. So, when opportunity to attack the oligarchs presents itself, their rashness drives them to seize upon it.

The disposition of cowardice also influences the disposition of irascibility. The tendency to be overaffected by fear in adverse circumstances makes one less likely to be angered in those circumstances.[246] There are circumstances that could give rise to either fear or anger, such as when an injustice is done to one by a group too formidable to be counteracted effectively, or when the injustice is the beginning of further injustices, or when the source of the injustice is concealed or still vague. So, the disposition of cowardice can restrain somewhat an irascible reaction in the above mentioned conditions. This is not to say that it directly influences irascibility in other spheres, but it still reduces it somewhat. The oligarchs in scenario C and lesser oligarchs in scenario B are less prone to anger in some circumstances because they are excessively affected by fear. The people in scenario A are similarly gripped by fear, in lieu of anger, when they have been slighted on a large scale.[247]

Cowardice can be grouped with the other vices of rashness and irascibility which are all more short-term in their purview. They either inhibit or propel the agent under changing circumstances. Their immediacy and shortsightedness enables them to be destructive, but also prevents them from being the most destructive of *stasis* vices. It is the cooler vices of ambition and flattery that most significantly promote a desire for the ends associated

[242] *EN* 3.7 1115^{b}30-35.
[243] *EN* 3.8 1116^{b}25-35.
[244] *EN* 5.8 1308^{b}10-20.
[245] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21-23.
[246] *Rh* 2.2 1380^{a}29-31.
[247] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}18-22.

with vanity and envy. But cowardice also promotes them to a considerable extent. It is most harmful because it restrains citizens from taking action that would avert *stasis*, although occasionally it emboldens citizens dangerously.[248] Lastly, the vices that cowardice promotes (i.e. flattery and rashness) are dangerous enough to rank among the worst of vices. But its direct influence does not rank quite as highly in its harmfulness.

Rashness

(1)The causal relation between rashness and the vices of envy and vanity is somewhat limited due to the same constraints present with cowardice. For they operate in the same sphere of motivation: fear, confidence, and their related desires.

(2) While the causal relation between boldness, envy and vanity is limited, the impact of boldness on *stasis* is not slight. In scenario A, boldness is necessary to mobilize the people and to carry out the *stasis*.[249] In scenario B, boldness becomes most destructive when the lesser oligarchs' popular base turns them into demagogues and is required for immediate regime change.[250] In scenario C the rash acts of the demagogues occur much earlier in the *stasis* chain. But regime change can only occur much latter when the oligarchs have the power to accomplish it.[251] So, rashness is not a moving cause of *stasis*, but it does make its consequences more devastating.

(3) Rashness is a disposition that influences the vice of overambition indirectly, but noticeably. One of the goals of the rash person is to preserve one's life, limb and honor from a threat. While the overambitious want to enhance their honor in the future, they must still act excessively in order to achieve it. For example, they strive for offices and other honors that are far enough beyond their abilities and influence that they must devise ways of compensating for this gap. Bribery, kickbacks and extortion are quite extreme but not unusual options for such a person. Other problematic options might include self-promotion, political maneuvering, slander, deception, etc. These are the kinds of extreme actions that factional struggles are made of. Yet, these are all the kinds of foolishly dangerous extremes that are unleashed by a lack of restraint; just the kind of restraint that rashness is blind to when it counts. Of course, the purview of rashness is usually more immediate than remote. But it is still long term enough and honor-oriented enough to reinforce the overreaching tendencies of the overambitious.[252] This is not to say that a

[248] This is the case in scenario A. See also discussion on this below in reference to rashness.
[249] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{a}36-38; 5.6 1305^{b}19-21.
[250] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}22-27.
[251] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21-23.
[252] Aristotle's describes confidence as an emotion that the rash man is overaffected by. In this description he suggests that the emotion takes into account some longer term factors

growing disposition of rashness simply breeds overambition in the person who would otherwise be appropriately ambitious. But insofar as rashness short circuits one's restraint in matters of honor, one may be excessive in the other spheres of honor that character manages. So, rashness can reinforce overambition in one who is already tending to be overambitious. For, the person who tends to act excessively with respect to the preservation of their honor is more likely to act excessively to further consolidate their honor. So both dispositions drive the agent towards similar objects, though through different drives and contexts. The objects and drives of rash are similar enough to those of overambition that it reinforces the relevant features of overambition.

Rashness ranks just below cowardice because it influences envy and vanity only slightly. However, it is at least as destructive as cowardice in its propensity to accelerate the *stasis*. The impacts of rashness can arise very suddenly and at any stage of the *stasis*. Of course, some rashness stems from cowardice, as indicated above. So, some of the magnitude of its harm should be attributed to cowardice. Rashness can also promote overambition. So its indirect contribution to the *stasis* prone ends of its factionaries is significant, though not as much so as cowardice.

Irascibility

(1) The irascibility of the people in scenario A does not make them more envious, as the purview of excessive anger is usually short term .[253] The ends for which the irascible are motivated are broadly similar to those of envy – gain and honor. But, the short-term preservation of one's current gain and honor is a very different stance towards those ends than that of the envious. The envious must have enough immediate safety and ease to long for the gain and honor that others have. Any role that irascibility plays only has a slight influence on envy, for reasons similar to those mentioned above.[254]

without being long term in focus such as hate or spite may be. For example, the overconfident person may expect to be victorious in a battle that he also expects to be protracted. He tends to expect that his past military success will always ensure success in similar situations in the future. In contrast, the man with courage is also confident but has a more sober expectation. He recognizes what advantages he derives from his past experience without being blinded from seeing what may be the challenges and difficulties of the unfolding situation. Of course, he approaches even the latter with strength, effective execution, and appropriate confidence.

[253] *Rh* 2.4 1382*a*-2.5 1382^{b}1.

[254] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}22-27. Another reason to think that irascibility has a minimal influence on envy is suggested in Aristotle's initial treatment of envy (*EN* 2.7 1108^{b}). There he describes envy as a vice that opposes righteous indignation. So, when a person exhibits indignation he is precisely not envious, or anything like it. This is akin to the difference between wastefulness and stinginess (*EN* 4.1 1119^{b}23-27). The one disposition that stinginess doesn't make one more likely to be is wastefulness.

The irascible and vain dispositions are also concerned with the object of honor, though in different ways. The irascible person is overaffected due to slighting gestures or deeds that dishonor him.[255] The vain person is overaffected by the inadequacy of the honor he does receive from others.[256] Still, the onset of anger should heighten the tendencies that make vanity thrive. For example, the oversensitivity of the person to the honors or dishonors conveyed by others.[257] The chief vanity candidates – the oligarchs – are the ones least prone to irascibility in any of the scenarios.[258] So, the irascibility-vanity link is plausible, but not manifest in these particular regimes.

(2) The irascibility of the people in scenario B doesn't contribute to *stasis*.[259] Irascibility influences the *stasis* process in scenario A much more, since it supplies the initial impetus for the alliance of lesser oligarchs and people.[260] This alliance is crucial to the downfall of the regime. In scenario C, the irascibility of the demagogues is considerable although it doesn't extend to the rest of the regime.[261] For the people are highly favored, as it is a democratic regime. Moreover, the oligarchs, who are easily persecuted, become far more fearful than angry (at least until they are exiled). So, irascibility can have a substantial impact on the *stasis* process, but the magnitude of its impact varies among regimes.

(3) There are a few dispositions that irascibility gives rise to or reinforces: overambition, flattery, and cowardice. While irascibility makes one overlyaffected by anger, it also makes one less prone to fear, since anger undercuts fear and vice-versa.[262] Some dishonoring situations are also dangerous ones. So, one whose irascibility is more dominant than his cowardice will feel fear less frequently in these situations because anger undercuts fear.[263] Of course, the only way not to have cowardice is not to be overaffected by fear and underaffected by confidence in dangerous situations. The only way to have the latter is to have courage, which never has to borrow from anger to control fear, since it is not subject to fearful excesses to begin with. So, irascibility can diminish some cowardly behavior in some circumstances.

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[255] *Rh* 2.2 1378^{b}.

[256] *Rh* 2.15 1390^{b}12-13.

[257] *EE* 1232^{b}33-35; *Rh* 2.15 1390^{b}14-15; 1391^{a}.

[258] In scenario A the people are the most irascible as they are more frequently wronged (*Pol* 5.4 1305^{a}36-38). In scenario B the conflict among the oligarchs is more like an underlying power struggle than a hostile struggle to redress past wrongs (*Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}22-27). Aristotle doesn't present the oligarchs in this scenario as irascible. The oligarchs in scenario C are more fearful than angry, at least until they depart (*Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21-23, 23-25, 36-38).

[259] *Pol* 5.4 1305^{a}36-38.

[260] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}22-27.

[261] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}19-1305^{a}35.

[262] *Rh* 2.3 1380^{a}29-31.

[263] Similarly, the cowardly disposition makes one, who would typically be too easily and excessively angered in situations of being slighted, less angry when danger is near (*Pol* 2.3 1380^{a}29-31).

Irascibility tends to limit the disposition of flattery, rather than increasing it.[264] The irascible person is not as easily flattered, although some are just as able to engage in flattery, such as the demagogues in scenario C, who use flattery[265] as a means for vindicating some perceived wrong.[266] The irascible are not as easily prone to flattery as others because their excessive anger is highly focused – pathologically focused – on the source of their slight. Flattery, especially flattery delivered by a party independent of the slighting context,[267] does not appease appropriate anger, let alone distorted anger. Only some change associated with the offending party (e.g. punishment, self deprecation, admissions of guilt, tragic occurrences, etc.) can adequately diminish this anger.[268] Moreover, this link is manifest in each scenario. The role of irascibility declines from scenario A to B to C.[269] But their susceptibility to flattery increases from scenarios A to C. The people in scenario A are the most slighted. And so, while they are happily flattered by their emerging leaders, they are less docile than the people flattered by demagogues in scenario C where their irascibility is the least. This is not to say that the irascible are not flatterable at all in any respect. It is just that the irascible are less flatterable than others.

The irascible and overambitious are both concerned with the same object – honor. But these dispositions highlight different aspects of that object and their stances towards it. The overambitious are concerned with the long-term achievement of honor, whereas the irascible are more absorbed by an immediate dishonor directed against them.[270] Still, irascibility reinforces overambition insofar as it reinforces a desire for honor, especially among those whose irascibility centers on real and imagined dishonor in the professional sphere.[271] This is most strikingly the case among demagogues, as their irascibility towards the oligarchs wins them the power of the people and their own

[264] The disposition of flattery can refer to a tendency to engage in flattery and/or a tendency to be flattered. In this section the emphasis is more on the latter than the former.

[265] This use of flattery doesn't usually extend to the strategic flattery of those who have wronged them, except among those with a bitter temper (*EN* 4.5 1126^{a}20-23) or an all out hatred (2.5.1382^{a}) .

[266] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{b}26-33.

[267] One who is irascible can be highly flatterable in a context that is not associated with his anger. But the latter is beyond the scope of this discussion.

[268] All the situations that diminish anger involve an alteration of its origin (*Rh* 2.2 1380^{a}). None of the many conditions that Aristotle outlines for reducing anger bypass the source of the anger such as third party flattery does.

[269] In scenario C, irascibility plays a much smaller role in the political community at large, though it remains a significant force among the demagogues.

[270] *Rh* 2.2 1378^{b}10-30.

[271] The language of the "professional sphere" can be misleading and anachronistic in reference to Aristotle. It can suggest a sharper division between "private" and "public" dimensions of life than Aristotle would concede. For our purposes the expression only has to identify responsibilities and opportunities through which people exercise ambition (e.g. offices, positions, business ventures, military status, and any form of leadership in these fields).

advancement. But, the reverse is much more common. Overambition much more reinforces the more basic forms of irascibility. The excessive concern for greater future honor amplifies the impact of sudden dishonors inflicted by others. So, the irascibility-overambition link is important in the case of the demagogues, but their irascibility does not enter all of the *stasis* scenarios.[272]

Irascibility is much like rashness in the scope and magnitude of its impact. It is the third among those vices that either dangerously inhibit or propel factionaries into volatile *stasis* contexts. It is not quite as harmful as rashness because most of its *stasis* consequences tend to occur in the early phase of *stasis* (scenarios A and C). But the suddenness and tumultuousness of its impacts mirror that of rashness. Moreover, irascibility, it also breeds overambition. So, it is almost as destructive as rashness, but it is still quite dangerous for the regime, in any case.

Intemperance

(1) Intemperance has a distinctive influence on envy, as it is the vice of the people more than any other group. The aims of intemperance overlap with the aims of envy. The gain that the envious desire in another is the same gain that sustains intemperance. One important motivation for envy is to secure the apparent means for a more permanent satisfaction of intemperate desires. Intemperance is not sufficient to reinforce envy, but the intemperance of some in some situations does reinforce envy. This can be seen in all the *stasis* scenarios where the people are most often intemperate.[273] They are also more prone to envy than others. This is not to say that other groups aren't prone to envy or intemperance. But the intemperance of the people is more pronounced, as is their envy.

(2) Intemperance is a disposition that contributes to *stasis* in a consistent but less substantial way than the other vices, though, it can spark an event that dramatically unleashes *stasis*.[274] The widespread incidence of intemperance among the citizenry makes *stasis* more likely. The basic goods that motivate intemperance are the same goods for which factional struggle is waged. The intemperance of conflicting groups makes their struggle more volatile. For the intemperance of the people makes them pursue what they desire impulsively. In scenario C, they empower the demagogues to carry out their quarrel with

[272] The greater irascibility of some groups would diminish their potential for fear, and its impact on *stasis*. A somewhat greater level of irascibility on the part of the lesser oligarchs in scenario B, and the oligarchs as a whole in scenario C would be less harmful. It would diminish the role that fear plays in the flattery of the people in scenario B. And it would disunify the deposed oligarchs in scenario C whose fear focuses their common aims.

[273] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}25-35.

[274] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{a}13; 5.9 1310^{a}12-25.

the oligarchs.[275] In scenarios A and B the appetites of the peoples similarly undermine stability, but less forcefully so.[276] Even the intemperance of the oligarchs can spark controversies that imperil the regime. These may be scandalous acts of sexual impropriety or luxurious self-indulgence that animate the contempt or insults of disenfranchised groups.[277] Such situations will speed the struggles typical in scenarios A and B.

(3) The vice of intemperance influences the formation of other vices such as wastefulness. The link between intemperance and wastefulness is direct and well established. The intemperance of individuals makes them more prone to waste their money and property in pursuit of appetitive excesses.[278] These excesses do not necessarily lead to wastefulness, and wastefulness can occur without intemperance. But, a greater incidence of intemperance easily breeds more wastefulness, as the appetitive goods necessarily carry costs that eventually strain one's resources. This is especially true among the people whose intemperance provides the greatest strain on their resources. Moreover, their intemperance is greater than with other groups and their resources more limited. The intemperance of the people promotes wastefulness in the lives of the people in scenarios C[279] and the wastefulness of the oligarchs in scenario A.[280] Intemperance also promotes a disposition where one is prone to flattery and a disposition to flatter in the case of others.[281]

Intemperance falls into a group of vices with wastefulness and stinginess that are less other-directed and so somewhat more benign in their impact. But, minimally, they do cultivate some of the underlying conditions for *stasis*. Specifically, intemperance does reinforce envy, especially gain envy. While intemperance does not promote envy (or vanity) as much as overambition and flattery do, it still does so more consistently than most of the other vices do.[282] But compared with the vices discussed above,[283]it is less incendiary and less prone to unleash tumultuous *stasis* events. Intemperance is not as destructive as the other vices already discussed. But it is not entirely benign in its impacts, as it consistently promotes the conditions for *stasis*.

[275] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}22-27.
[276] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{a}36-38.
[277] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{a}1-5, 5.3 1302^{b}8-13; 5.1 1314^{b}25-36.; 5.9 1310^{a}12-25.
[278] *Pol* 5.5 1305^{b}38-1306^{a}9; 5.9 1310^{a}15-22.
[279] *Pol* 5.6 1304^{b}19-1305^{a}35.
[280] *Pol* 5.9 1305^{b}38-1306^{a}9.
[281] This is discussed further in the flattery section.
[282] The above includes: irascibility, rashness, cowardice, wastefulness and stinginess.
[283] Those include: envy, vanity, overambition, flattery, irascibility, rashness and cowardice.

Wastefulness and Stinginess

(1) Wastefulness is a vice that fuels envy more than vanity, along the lines of those discussed with respect to intemperance. The most widespread cause of wastefulness is intemperance, especially among the poor who can't afford their intemperance. Wastefulness fuels envy insofar as intemperance does. Moreover, wastefulness compounds the envy that intemperance causes, as the consistently wasteful are in a worse long-term position to secure the goods that their neighbors have and that they hope to have. The non-wasteful intemperate are less desperate for the goods of their neighbor. In contrast, the disposition of stinginess can curb the onset of envy (as discussed in the previously section on stinginess).

(2) Wastefulness is a disposition that contributes to *stasis* most decisively when it is possessed by the ruling class. The wastefulness of both oligarchs and demagogues makes them more likely to take unjustly[284] and to limit the distribution of gain and honor, as in scenario B.[285] This wastefulness generally agitates the people (scenario A) and other oligarchs (scenario B).[286] And when the people are the ruling class then their wastefulness makes them prone to confiscate the goods of the oligarchs.[287] For, were they less wasteful, they would have less motivation to confiscate the goods of others.[288] The wastefulness of the people in scenarios A and B also makes the regime less stable. For, the wastefulness of the people is a destabilizing force for the same reasons that intemperance is. Their wastefulness, which occurs more easily both due to their intemperance and their poverty, makes them more desperate for regime changes that would give them more. And the greater the magnitude of their wastefulness, the less they have to lose by engaging in *stasis*.[289]

Stinginess is not held widely in these scenarios, but when it does occur it does little to facilitate *stasis*.[290] The oligarchs in scenario C and the greater ones in B may be stingy. But their stinginess isn't a motivation for their struggles with other factions. The oligarchs in scenario C are attacked more often because they possess much and due to the vicious disposition of others, rather than due to the stinginess by which they maintain their wealth.[291] Whatever stinginess contributes to the *stasis* process is somewhat remote and less significant than the other dispositions already mentioned.

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[284] *Pol* 5.4 1305^{a}36-38. In reference to scenarios A and C see *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}21-23
[285] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}22-27.
[286] *Pol* 5.10 1312^{a}; 5.2 1302^{b}8-13; 5.11 1314^{b}25-36.
[287] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}37; 5.4 1305^{a}7.
[288] *Pol* 6.3 1318^{b}11-16.
[289] *Pol* 5.6 1305^{b}38-1306^{a}9.
[290] *Pol* 5.9 1310^{a}12-20.
[291] *Pol* 5.4 1304^{b}22.

(3) Wastefulness and stinginess both have influence on important dispositions for these scenarios: intemperance, overambition, and rashness. The disposition of wastefulness reinforces the disposition of intemperance. The oligarch's in scenario A and demagogues of scenario C spend excessively for the sake of excessive appetitive goods. The vice of stinginess, when understood as giving too little, can limit intemperance. The disposition of the person who is excessively restrained in his giving of money and property must hold his appetites in check.[292] For the intemperate are driven by their appetites to foolishly spend on appetitive goods. So, appetite must be curbed somewhat for one to be successfully stingy. This does not make the person temperate, only continent in this respect. But, still, the vice of stinginess is less problematic than wastefulness under many circumstances.

Both the dispositions of wastefulness and stinginess undercut the formation of overambition.[293] For, the wasteful person is more concerned with gain than honor. The wasteful face vulnerabilities that make their excessive aspirations less plausible. The more one possesses wastefulness the harder it is for them to nurture one's overambitious illusions; and further, it is harder for one to rise and maintain one's level of honor under this condition. It is true that the demagogues from scenario C become both overambitious and wasteful. But this is difficult to sustain for very long, as their eventual quarrels with the oligarchs destroy the regime. Stinginess limits the onset of overambition more reliably, at least under the regime conditions which Aristotle discusses. The stingy person becomes willing to be vigorously occupied in the management of his own wealth and property. This person is sufficiently absorbed in these private efforts to be less prone to grasp after greater honors. For this person is quite pleased by his feverish activity and what he sees as honorable in it. So, he doesn't aspire to more honor than he is equipped to earn or inclined to pursue.

The disposition of stinginess also decreases the incidence of rash acts. The stingy person is less prone to act rashly because he is less attached to the outside threats for which oligarchs and demagogues can be emboldened.[294] While the stingy person is not entirely insular, he is more attentive to his contribution to a self sufficient and productive city than to honor and dishonor, unless it diminishes his current goods.[295] The adversity and fear that prompts one to boldly and foolishly pursue some goal does not affect the stingy so intensely. For, the more focused purview of the stingy person diverts him from many of the exaggerated threats to his honor; although, it can also divert him from some of the noble associations of honor. So, the disposition of stinginess directs the person away from those preoccupations that would make

[292] For example see *Rep* 559$^{a\text{-}d}$ where Plato highlights the case of the oligarchic father who helps to restrain his son's appetitive desires through hard work and thrift.
[293] *Pol* 5.8 1309^{a}5-7; 5.5 1305^{a}15-21.
[294] *Pol* 5.11 1315^{a}13-20.
[295] *Pol* 6.4 1319^{a}24-37.

him more rash. Of course, the only way to lessen the disposition effectively would be to act less rashly under conditions of adversity. Still, stinginess does stifle some aspects of its development.

Much of the badness of wastefulness has its roots in intemperance and so, impacts the regime in similar ways. While it does not contribute to envy and vanity as much as intemperance does (see above discussion), it can lead to scandal ridden events such as fraud, extortion and embezzlement, which often have destructive consequences for the regime. While these events do occur, Aristotle treats them oftentimes as derivative of intemperance. At the very least they occur with less frequency or turbulence than the events connected with the earlier vices. Its impact on other vices is not minor, as it can influence the growth of rashness and reinforce intemperance. But its impact is not as far reaching as the cooler vices of overambition and flattery. Moreover, it is not as tumultuous in impact as cowardice, rashness and irascibility are. But it does contribute to *stasis* and cannot be ignored as a damaging vice for any regime.

IV. Conclusion

Aristotle's treatment of *stasis* in his *Politics* teaches us much about his overall approach to moral-political life. He is rightly skeptical about measures that try to eradicate *stasis*, because he is adamant that bad character is its central cause. But for this reason he is not a moral skeptic. He is unwavering in his regard for good character as the most vital factor in the flourishing of a regime and bad character as its most problematic hindrance. So, he is appropriately cautious about the prospects for eliminating *stasis* since bad character is too intractable a problem to eliminate, even in the better of cities.

Moreover, he is not a thoroughgoing skeptic about the prospects for reducing the occurrences of *stasis*. Many of his remedies discussed in the previous chapter avoid the circumstances in which *stasis* arises. But when these remedies are considered in the context of the *stasis* scenarios they are designed to avoid, the character dimension of his remedies becomes more explicit. A regime can more prudently avoid the circumstances under which *stasis* arises, by understanding the character states that drive it. So this chapter has considered in more detail the most characteristic *stasis* scenarios that his remedies bypass, followed by Aristotelian grounds for ranking the vices that contribute to *stasis*.

The latter, in the spirit of Aristotelian political science, offers a character-oriented framework for minimizing the outbreak of *stasis* that is also in keeping with his realism about the pathological conditions of most regimes. Moreover, in Aristotle's theory of *stasis*, he is able to live with the tension between the magnitude of that pathology and the potential for nobility and

goodness that is essential to human flourishing. For, the latter is the standard against which he measures the magnitude of moral-political decline. It is the irreducibly human potential for nobility and goodness that his theory never compromises in the face of his penetrating analysis of the human, all-too-human conditions that plague most regimes.

6. CONCLUSION

This book argues that Aristotle's theory of *stasis* must be understood in light of the more basic character causes beneath his stated proximate causes of *stasis*. Given this understanding of the proximate and ultimate causes of *stasis*, Aristotle is appropriately skeptical about remedying *stasis* in the worst cities. While the occurrences of factional conflict may be reduced by limiting their proximate causes, factional conflict cannot be eliminated because its ultimate cause - bad character - cannot be eliminated in such cities. The book then elaborates institutional remedies for limiting the outbreak of *stasis*. An analysis of these remedies reveals an implicit ranking of the vices that cause faction more and less. This later implication of his remedies offers helpful criteria for making adjustments in the regime that would discourage the most destabilizing of vices.

Chapter one presents the nature of *stasis*, its *politeia* contexts and proximate causes. It highlights the conflicting views of justice that allegedly drive oligarchic and democratic factions into conflict over the distribution of wealth and honor. Upon closer consideration, the conflicting views of justice that are the apparent cause of faction are divided into three proximate causes that could only arise from the beliefs and desires of the agents engaged in factional conflict.

Chapter two then draws from Aristotle's moral psychology in order to illuminate the function of character in the formation of the beliefs and desires from which agents act. The chapter first provides a discussion of the faculties of the soul in both their cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. Aristotle's account of the faculties offers a substantive basis for understanding character and its connection with emotion, desire and action. With this account in place, it is possible to understand action as the consequence of the union of desire and belief as the consequence of character. The last half of the chapter shows that moral education shapes moral character, which in turn shapes desire and belief and consequently, choice and action. This treatment of Aristotle's moral psychology leaves us in a good position to grasp the ultimate cause of *stasis* as the bad character beneath the desires and beliefs of the agents engaged in *stasis*.

Chapter three shows that bad character is the source of the beliefs and desires that fuel factional conflict in Aristotle's *Politics*. Aristotle maintains that bad character is widespread in most regimes. This view is evident throughout his *Politics*, especially in his criticism of Plato's *Republic* and the projects of

Phaleas of Chalcedon. This chapter shows that since one's desires and beliefs are a function of character, the bad character of a citizenry must have shaped their beliefs and desires, especially those central in factional conflict. More specifically, the ends that democratic and oligarchic factionaries desire and the beliefs they possess drive factional conflict. These desires and beliefs must be caused by the envy and vanity of their possessors. So, the chapter establishes that the vices of envy and vanity must be the causes of the beliefs and desires of those engaged in *stasis* and so the ultimate cause of *stasis*.

But even though identifying the character sources of *stasis* demonstrates how intractable the problem is, it doesn't follow that cities cannot manage *stasis*. Chapter four elaborates Aristotle's remedies for reducing the occurrence of those circumstances that provoke factional conflict. This chapter first details Aristotle's guidelines for selectively distributing gain and honor, taking into account the nature of the structural and material changes that regimes undergo in *stasis*. The chapter shows how these remedies reveal principles for more stable blendings of oligarchy and democracy. The chapter also elucidates those principles for a properly proportioned expansion of the middle class while highlighting the parts of the city that form the background of this expansion. The expansion of the middle class and selective distribution of gain and honor may reduce the conditions for, and the occurrences of, factional conflict.

Chapter five makes the case that these remedies reveal additional grounds for the character dimensions of *stasis*, especially through an analysis of the vices that contribute to *stasis* more and less. This chapter first scrutinizes the remedies outlined in chapter four in the backdrop of the *stasis* scenarios they are designed to avoid. It presents three representative scenarios for *stasis* in oligarchy and democracy. When these scenarios are analyzed in detail, it can be seen that minimizing the conditions under which *stasis* arises requires an understanding of the character states that fuel it. While it had already been shown that envy and vanity are the vices that promote it, other vices may accelerate its circumstances without being the cause of *stasis*, as such. But, while his skepticism reflects his expectation concerning the inevitability of vice, it still recognizes some flexibility concerning what groups will possess which vices and to what extent they will possess them. So a ranking of vices offers some guidelines for understanding which vices possessed by which groups aggravate *stasis* more and less. This latter aspect of his theory provides important criteria for adjusting the ethos of the *politeia* that would at least discourage the most significant sources of *stasis*.[1]

[1] The implication and basis for this approach is elaborated in the subsequent appendix.

Appendix: Vice, Political Skepticism and Aristotelian Political Science

Aristotle's treatment of *stasis* in his *Politics* provides a rich cross section of his ethical-political thought. However, the reading of Aristotle and line of argument that this book pursues raises questions about the methodology he employs with respect to *stasis*. This appendix considers this approach further by testing how the previous discussion illuminates the methodological demands of Aristotelian political science (ἡ πολίτικη ἐπιστήμη) and the spirit of his political skepticism.

In the early sections of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle presents an overview that serves as a methodological introduction to his ethical-political theory.[1] This presentation illuminates how his ethical-political works should be understood, especially the *Politics, Rhetoric, Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics*. The *Nicomachean Ethics*, in particular, is a compilation of lectures intended for relatively mature students who were already established in their civic commitments and prepared to take on leadership roles in their community. His lectures were not intended to persuade moral skeptics, but rather to articulate the structure of an ethic that corresponded to a way of life they were already committed to - the good life.[2]

An important feature of his overview is to highlight the limitations and constraints of his approach. He maintains from the outset that the good is the object of the theoretical and practical sciences.[3] Moreover, political theory must treat the good as the end of its inquiry since it is the master science for the city.[4] But, despite the loftiness of its object, this science can only achieve the level of precision that is proper to its subject matter.[5] For this reason, Aristotle maintains that political theory should proceed according to a broad outline (τύπος) of the truth.[6]

[1] *EN* 1.3 $1094^{b}12$-$1095^{a}13$.
[2] See Bodéüs, 1993, 59-62.
[3] *EN* 1.2 $1094^{a}22$. See Salkever, 1990, 103; Lawrence, 2006, 41; Kraut, 1989, 396.
[4] *EN* 1.2 $1094^{b}27$-28.
[5] *EN* 1.2 $1094^{b}12$-13.
[6] Aristotle indicates that the exactness of the work must be in keeping with the level of

The outline quality[7] of his ethical-political theory is manifested throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. For example, in the former he maintains that the moral quality or excellence of human beings is their character. But their character largely concerns the ends they tend to desire and how they are disposed to emotion. Similarly, Aristotle categorizes the quality of a regime by the ends its honors. The structure of the regime is organized according to its highest standards of worth. Aristocracy honors excellence as the greatest good for which its citizens should strive and so honors them accordingly in the distribution of offices and powers. In contrast, democracy does not value excellence, as such, as the highest end. Instead, it treats freedom as the highest end and so distributes offices and powers on that basis - the freedom that each has as citizen. But, according to this method, one need not know of every feature of cities nor have surveyed every city in existence in order to identify what features best characterize them. The same is true of our understanding of human beings.

The most significant example of this approach is Aristotle's treatment of practical wisdom and political prudence. Practical wisdom is an intellectual virtue that enables the virtuous man to recognize the most appropriate means to achieve a good end that he desires. While features of practical wisdom can be elaborated, the practically wise action is not determined by a rule or formula. In a similar way, the statesman may exercise political prudence in determining the best course of public action to achieving some end to which the city is already committed.

Moreover, Aristotle's view of political prudence is a representative example of his approach to ethical-political matters because it articulates correctly a function of political prudence that can be both substantive and situation-specific. Of course, political prudence is exercised most characteristically in its grasp of what is fitting in a situation in light of some noble end. But to provide a predetermined set of rules for action across a whole range of possible circumstances might generate a calculus for action that is exacting but inappropriate and, thus, quite imprecise. Political prudence avoids the extremes of offering guidance that is either too situation-dependent to be substantive or too abstract and general to be applicable. Political prudence is neither a precept nor a convenient acquiescence to circumstances.

Aristotle's understanding of political prudence and its place in his wider political theory illuminates his method. Political theory does not provide the guidance that political prudence offers the statesman, rather it provides an account of how political prudence functions. Moreover, it articulates the

precision that the subject matter admits. In this sense, he designates this presentation as an outline of the truth or (truth in outline, τύπῳ τἀληθὲς, *EN* 1.3 $1094^{a}20$). See also Kraut, 2003, 51-54; Salkever, 1990, 84; Sparshott, 1994, 23-24.

[7] On the outline quality of his ethics, see Kraut, 2003, 70; Bobonich, 2006, 26; Stewart, 1892, 27; Reeve, 1992, 7-66; Broadie, 1991, 19; Sparshott, 1994, 27-29; Salkever, 1990, 83.

principles, qualities, associations and choices at work in ethical-political life. Similarly, Aristotelian political theory enlists philosophy in the crafting of directives or rules for action, even though philosophy reflects on political life and philosophers have an unavoidable tie to the city, whatever their role in it should be.[8] Political theory does not have as its object things that change, as practical wisdom and political prudence do, but rather unchanging objects. It provides an articulation of the nature and structure of ethical life and the organization of the political community that is essential for it and its members to flourish.

This overarching approach to ethical-political matters is especially appropriate for understanding the problem of *stasis*. It must grasp the intractable interplay of ethos and ēthos, as the structure of a regime tends to shape its citizens in accordance with those priorities. Yet, the character that the regime inevitably influences also determines the beliefs and desires of the citizens who reinforce or alter the regime. While Aristotelian political theory does not provide the guidance that only political prudence can provide, it may offer reflection about how political prudence is best preserved in good and bad regimes. And while it does not offer policy prescriptions, it can articulate the principles and conditions under which justice and virtue flourish and against which injustice and vice thrive.[9]

A more skeptical approach to *stasis* might ignore its character dimension, not recognizing the range of vices that drive, spark and intensify it, opting instead to only avert the events of *stasis*. But in order to grasp the causes of *stasis* one must grasp its character dimension.[10] This is a case where political expedience might replace political prudence in the life of a city. Political theory cannot generate political prudence nor can it replace it. But political theory can bring an articulation of how it functions and what its appropriate limits are. Political theory may offer guidance that reinforces models of political decisionmaking, character or justice that are in keeping with how things are. Its guidance may also discourage models that diverge from or obscure how things are - as is the case when a rule-based or expedience-based

[8] On the scope of Aristotelian political science, see also Lord, 1991, 7; Bodéüs, 1993, 60-65; Saxonhouse, 1992; N. Smith and R. Mayhew, "Aristotle on What the Political Scientist Needs to Know" in *Aristotelian Political Philosophy Vol. I*, ed. K. Boudouris (Athens: Ionia Publications, 1995); Simpson, 1998; Bobonich, 2006, 21-24.

[9] One aspect of Aristotle's political realism is the specificity of his remedies to the kinds of regimes in question. For example, Aristotle maintains that it is increasingly counterproductive for a city to eradicate disunity in regimes. This is very much in keeping with the spirit of his political science. See, chapter nine of Arlene W. Saxonhouse, *Fear of Diversity*: *The Birth of Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Kraut, 2002, 470; R. Barlett, "The 'Realism' of Classical Political Science," *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 2 (1994): 381-402. On faction reduction as an example of Aristotelian political science, see Kraut 2002, 437; Salkever, 1990, 81.

[10] See Kraut, 2002, 437; Yack, 1993, 232.

form of decisionmaking is presented as political prudence.[11] To return to the earlier case, one approach to *stasis* may ignore all but its proximate causes, as it aims to curb its effects. But if one excludes from consideration the ends of the agent's engaging in factional conflict, when the desires for those ends necessarily drive such conflicts, then one fails to grasp their essential basis for action. Not only does political prudence recognize the relevance of ends for the best political decision, it is a grand manifestation of decisionmaking wholly shaped by the goodness of the end for which it aims.

Of course, political leaders of all kinds separate the ends of agents from an understanding of their actions, as well as their prospects for cooperation.[12] Moreover, some even make a virtue of such a bifurcation. But it is an even worse problem when political expedience is considered political prudence and when political prudence is considered political foolishness. Political theory must be able to account for the difference between the two, even if its role is not to exercise either. While such an approach may be politically expedient, it shouldn't be considered politically expedient in Aristotle's sense. But as Thucydides tells us, it is under conditions of great disunity that good things are referred to as bad and bad things are referred to as good.

> Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the places which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been done before carried to a still greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence, became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of self-defence. The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In fine, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended...The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy, engaged in the direct excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the animosities of the

[11] See Yack, 1993, 167; Broadie, 1991, 60; Salkever, 1990, 84.

[12] As an example of the theoretical basis for such a problematic position, see Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 54, 80-81, 354-355. For some responses, see also, M. W. Jackson, "Aristotle on Rawls: A Critique of Quantitative Justice," *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 19 (1985): 99-117; D. Lewis, *Justice or Tyranny? A Critique of John Rawls' Theory of Justice* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1979); P.H. Nowell-Smith, "A Theory of Justice?" *Philosophy of the Social-Sciences*, 3 (1973): 315-329; S. Collins, *Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6-40; M. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 184-195.

> hour...Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape...To put an end to this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor oath that could command respect; but all parties dwelling rather in their calculation upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of things, were more intent upon self-defence than capable of confidence. In this contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations of their more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had recourse to action: while their adversaries, arrogantly thinking that they should know in time, and that it was unnecessary to secure by action what policy afforded, often fell victims to their want of precaution.[13]

Aristotle's approach also brings a political realism that recognizes the limitations that are faced by a regime when vice is widespread and its public priorities are skewed. But Aristotle's political skepticism is also a measured one. It is skeptical because it rightly recognizes both the necessity of human excellence for a good *polis* and the limited prospects for human excellence in most *poleis*. It is a measured skepticism because his theory doesn't thereby dismiss what institutional measures might reduce *stasis* without organizing these measures around illusions of social progress. Aristotle's political skepticism is also moderated by its unflinching reference to goodness and virtue as the goal against which it measures the scale of decline and according to which it also aims to minimize what viciousness it can minimize.

But, while his skepticism reflects his expectation concerning the inevitability of vice, it still recognizes some flexibility concerning what groups will possess which vices and to what extent they will possess them. So a ranking of vices offers some guidelines for understanding which vices possessed by which groups aggravate *stasis* more and less. Such an approach recommends itself to the challenge of moral education in bad regimes. It provides a framework for understanding which dispositions should be blamed more and less in these. So, though the vicious circle cannot be bypassed, there are character-oriented guidelines for minimizing the formation of the most politically dangerous dispositions.

Aristotelian political theory provides an approach to the theory and practice of political life that hopes to preserve as much political prudence as possible without either conflating theory with prudence or failing to theorize about it. This approach correctly recognizes the level of flexibility that must be available to prudent rulers, especially those in bad regimes, if they are to

[13] *Thuc.*, 82.3-5, 8; 83.1-4. On the similarity between oligarchs and democrats rhetoric in such cases, consider the following analysis of N. Loraux: "Thus in Thucydides' analysis of the effects of civil war on language, there is no real difference between the language the oligarchs use and the language the democrats use. Both sides use the same expressions, snatched from their opponents and endlessly contested in a continual exchange...The rich possibilities afforded by the suffix -teros, which in classical Greek can describe either of two sides as 'the others' (*heteroi*), are widely exploited in this way since the reversibility it expresses is perfect. Either side can be 'the others' because the separation operates along the symmetrical line of duality" (1991, 45). See also, Loraux, 1986, 95-112.

realistically handle the exigencies of political life, yet still preserve as much goodness as is possible.

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Ronald Weed offers a fresh investigation of political conflict in Aristotle's *Politics*. While there have been a number of studies of *stasis* or factional conflict, few provide a thorough analysis of its intractable character dimensions. Weed presents a highly original and provocative analysis of the moral psychology of factional conflict in the middle books of the Politics. Drawing from key texts from *Rhetoric*, *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, Weed elaborates features of Aristotle's moral psychology that are not typically used to illuminate political pathologies in the Politics. Weed argues that that the character deficiencies of a citizenry are the central causes of *stasis* and indispensable for understanding both the nature of these conflicts and their remedies.

After reconsidering Aristotle's rich but neglected accounts of envy and vanity, Weed explains their propensity to inspire factional associations and fuel pathological effects. While Aristotle considers factional conflict to be as common in most cities as bad character is in most humans, his view does not require a thoroughgoing skepticism about the inevitability of wide-scale *stasis*. Instead, Weed contends that Aristotle draws a more moderate conclusion that *stasis* can be greatly limited without greatly reducing bad character, so long as the vices that breed it most are limited. Weed presents a novel and detailed explanation of how Aristotle's institutional remedies, such as the selective distribution of honor and wealth, may bypass circumstances that provoke *stasis*, if they account for what vices are triggered under those circumstances. These remedies reveal an implicit ranking of faction-causing vices and offer helpful criteria for making adjustments in the regime that would discourage the most destabilizing of vices.

Weed advances an understanding of Aristotle's practical thought that captures Aristotle's penetrating realism about political breakdown and pathology, while also preserving the robust and irreducible essence of his theory of character and rational choice.

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